Anna-Sara Malmgren CURRICULUM VITAE July 2018 E-mail: malmgren@stanford.edu Department of Philosophy Phone: (+1) 212 960 3680 Bld. 90, 450 Serra Mall Office: 92L Stanford University Web: https://philosophy.stanford.edu/people/anna-sara-malmgren Stanford, CA 94305-2155 Academic Employment Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, 2011 present. Professor II at CSMN, University of Oslo, 2013 2015. (15% research appointment.) Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, 2008 2011. Education PhD in Philosophy, New York University, 2009. Committee: Paul Boghossian (supervisor), Stephen Schiffer, Crispin Wright. Dissertation Title: Essays in the Theory of Justification. BPhil in Philosophy, Magdalen College, University of Oxford, 2001. (1 st with Distinction.) BA in Philosophy, King s College, University of London, 1999. (1 st with Distinction.) Research Areas Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind (AOS). Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics (AOC). Academic Publications (Articles) Varieties of Inference?, Philosophical Issues: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, edited by C. Juhl and J. Schechter, 2018 (forthcoming). A Priori Testimony Revisited, The A Priori In Philosophy, edited by A. Casullo and J. Thurow, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements, Mind, vol. 120: 478, 263 327, 2011. Is There A Priori Knowledge by Testimony?, Philosophical Review, vol. 115:2, 199 241, 2006. (Reviews) Review of Philosophy Without Intuitions by H. Cappellen, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2013. (http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/39362/) Review of Relying on Others by S. Goldberg, Mind, vol. 120: 480, 1251 1258, 2011. 1
Work in Progress (Books) Understanding Inference (working title), under contract with Oxford University Press. (Articles) Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, under review. TBA, for Philosophical Issues: Epistemology, edited by L. Miracchi and E. Sosa (2019). Awards and Fellowships William H. and Frances Green Faculty Fellowship, Stanford University, 2014 2015. APA Article Prize (for Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements ), 2012. Visiting Fellowship at Arché, University of St Andrews, 2010. Blossom Flowers Ford Burns Excellence Endowment, University of Texas at Austin, 2008 2010. Dean s Fellowship, University of Texas at Austin, 2008. Dean s Dissertation Award, New York University, 2006 2007. Frankel Fellowship, New York University, 2005 2006. McCracken Fellowship, New York University, 2001 2006. Scatcherd Scholarship, University of Oxford, 1999 2001. Adrian Grey Turner Prize, King s College London, 1998. Sambrooke Exhibition, King s College London, 1997. Invited Talks and Commentaries Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, CPA Annual Congress, June 2018. Reply to Rationality Requires Rationally Representing Representations as Rational by R. Neta, Conference on Inference and Reasoning, UNC, April 2018. Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure, University of Lund, June 2016. Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure, University of Miami, April 2016. Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, Arizona State University, April 2015. The Normativity of the Sub-Personal, Högre Seminariet, University of Göteborg, April 2015. Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, Oberlin College, March 2015. Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, 48th Chapel Hill Colloquium, October 2014. Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, Simon Fraser University, October 2014. Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, Reasoning Conference, University of Konstanz, July 2014. 2
Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, Workshop: Perspectives on Inference, CSMN, University of Oslo, June 2014. (Co-organized with Olav Gjelsvik) Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, UC Irvine, May 2014. Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure, UCLA, May 2014. Inference and the Problem of Relevantly Complete Representation, University of Notre Dame, April 2014. On Getting Started, Symposium on Philosophical Method, Tufts University, February 2014. A Puzzle about Inference, University of Copenhagen, June 2013. A Puzzle about Inference, 5th Formal Epistemology Festival, University of Toronto, June 2013. Inference: Explanation and Justification, CSLI Workshop, Stanford University, June 2013. Inference: Explanation and Justification, University of Arkansas, April 2013. Reply to Intuitive Knowledge and the Benacerraf Problem by J. Bengson, Pacific APA, March 2013. Philosophy Without What?, Symposium on Philosophy Without Intuitions by H. Cappellen, The Institute of Philosophy (University of London) and CSMN (Oslo University), February 2013. Inference: Explanation and Justification, LEMMing Graduate Conference (keynote), University of Cologne, November 2012. Inference: Explanation and Justification, University of Victoria, November 2012. Particularistically Unreasonable, Workshop on Intentions, University of Leeds, June 2012. A Priori Testimony Revisited, Harvard University, November 2011. Varieties of Inference, Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference (keynote), University of St Andrews, October 2011. A Priori Testimony Revisited, North Carolina Metaphysics Workshop, June 2011. Reply to Iconic Representation and the Interface Problem by C. Montemayor, UT-UNAM Conference on Perception and Consciousness, University of Texas at Austin, October 2011. Reply to Easy Knowledge, Reliabilism, and the Transparency of Justification by R. Neta, Pacific APA, April 2011. Varieties of Inference, Workshop on the Philosophy of Richard Feldman, University of Texas at San Antonio, February 2011. Quine s Two Dogmas, University of Oslo, December 2010. Varieties of Inference, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November 2010. Varieties of Inference, King's College London, July 2010. Varieties of Inference, Stanford University, January 2010. 3
Sub-Personal Reasons, Workshop on Theoretical and Practical Reason, University of Leeds, June 2010. The Content Problem and Varieties of Inference, Arché Methodology Seminar, University of St Andrews, June 2010. Reply to McKinsey One More Time by C. Wright, Conference on Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency, CSMN, University of Oslo, June 2010. Warrant-Preservation and Testimony, Forry and Micken Lecture Series on the Philosophy of Testimony, Amherst College, March 2010. Testimony, Self-Knowledge and The A Priori, Basic Knowledge Workshop VI, Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, March 2010. Reply to Delusion, Assertion and Mad Belief by D. Murray, Central APA, February 2010. The Justification of Intuitive Judgments, Workshop on Thought Experiments and The A Priori, University of Fortaleza, August 2009. Inferential Integration and Epistemic Relevance, Filosofidagarna, Lund University, June 2009. Intuitions by Inference, University College London, March 2008. Intuitions by Inference, Cornell University, February 2008. Intuitions by Inference, University of Rochester, February 2008. Intuitions by Inference, University of Massachusetts Amherst, February 2008. Intuitions by Inference, University of Western Ontario, February 2008. Intuitions by Inference, University of California Berkeley, February 2008. Intuitions by Inference, University of Pittsburgh, February 2008. Intuitions by Inference, University of Texas at Austin, January 2008. Intuitions by Inference, University of California Davis, January 2008. Reply to Is God an Unnecessary Hypothesis? and We re Right, They re Wrong by P. van Inwaagen, Workshop on Science and Religion, New York Institute of Philosophy, March 2007. What Do We Know When We Know That Smith Doesn t Know And How Do We Know It?, University of Texas at Austin, December 2006. Intuitions and The A Priori, Arché Epistemology Seminar, University of St Andrews, July 2006. Reply to Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals by T. Williamson, Anders Wedberg Lectures, Stockholm University, April 2006. A Priori Knowledge by Testimony, Logic and Language Seminar, Stockholm University, June 2003. Is There a Coherent Form of Environmentalism?, Cumberland Lodge Weekend, University of London, October 1997. 4
Professional Service (Departmental) Member, Stanford Philosophy Diversity Committee (2018 present). Member, Stanford Philosophy Graduate Admissions Committee (2013, 2015, 2017, 2018). Member, Peter Hawke s Dissertation Committee (2013 2017). Member, Samuel Asarnow s Dissertation Committee (2013 2015). Member, Stanford Philosophy Search Committee (2013 2015). Chair, Stanford Philosophy Colloquium Committee (2011 2014). Member, UT Austin Philosophy Colloquium Committee (2010 2011). Member, UT Austin Philosophy Outreach Committee (2010 2011). Member, Jenn Nielson s Dissertation Committee (2010). (Other) Reader for: Analysis, American Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Bellingham Summer Conference, Dialectica, Disputatio, Episteme, Erkenntnis, Inquiry, Journal of Philosophical Research, Mind, NWO (Dutch Research Council), Noûs, Oxford University Press, Philosophers Imprint, Philosophical Studies, Philosophia, Philosophical Review, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Routledge, Synthese, Thought, Teorema. Invited Discussant/Commentator-at-Large at: Penn Reasons and Foundations of Epistemology Conference, University of Pennsylvania, November 2017, November 2016; Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference, University of British Columbia, July 2017; Workshop on the Normativity of Logic, University of Bergen, June 2017; Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop, University of South Alabama, May 2016; Epistemology and Cognition, College of William and Mary, September 2016. International cooperation partner, Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases: Theoretical Foundations, Responses, and Alternatives (EXTRA), Emmy Noether, German Research Foundation (2018 2022). International network member, Knowledge Beyond Natural Science, John Templeton Foundation, University of Stirling, the Thought trust (2017 2019). Member, sakkyndig komité, IFIKK, University of Oslo (2015). Sub-Editor in Philosophy of Language, Thought (2013). Member, American Philosophical Association (2008 present). Affiliate, Stanford University Symbolic Systems Program (2011 present). Courses Taught (Stanford University) Advanced Dissertation Seminar, Fall, Winter, Spring 2013 14, 2014 15, 2017 18. (G) Self Knowledge and Consciousness, Spring 2018. (UG) 5
Philosophy of Mind, Spring 2013, 2014, 2016, Winter 2015, 2017. (UG/G) Metaphysics, Spring 2012, Winter 2017. (UG/G) Rule-Following, Fall 2014. (G) Explanation and Justification, Winter 2013, 2014. (UG) Bounded Rationality, Fall 2013. (UG) Dissertation Development Pro-Seminar, Fall, Winter, Spring 2012 2013. (G.) Theory of Knowledge, Spring 2012. (G/UG) What s an Inference? Winter 2012, Fall 2012. (G) (University of Texas at Austin) Thought Experiments, Spring 2010. (G) Theory of Knowledge, Fall 2009, Spring 2010, Fall 2010. (UG) Knowledge and Reality, Fall 2009, 2010. (UG) (New York University) Minds and Machines, Spring 2008. (UG) Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Fall 2007, Summer 2005. (UG) 6