Could There Have Been Nothing?
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Could There Have Been Nothing? Against Metaphysical Nihilism Geraldine Coggins Keele University, UK
Geraldine Coggins 2010 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2010 978-0-230-57363-5 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave and Macmillan are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-36476-3 ISBN 978-0-230-29524-7 (ebook) DOI 10.1057/9780230295247 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Coggins, Geraldine, 1975 Could there have been nothing? : against metaphysical nihilism / Geraldine Coggins. p. cm. Summary: Could there have been nothing? is the first book-length study of metaphysical nihilism the claim that there could have been no concrete objects. It critically analyses the debate around nihilism and related questions about the metaphysics of possible worlds, concrete objects and ontological dependence Provided by publisher. 1. Nihilism. 2. Metaphysics. I. Title. B828.3.C59 2011 110 dc22 2010034127 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10
To Maureen and Gabriel Coggins and Killian, Conor and Sinéad O Brien
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Contents List of Diagrams Preface ix x 1 Could There Have Been Nothing? 1 1.1 Could there have been nothing? One question, three answers 3 1.2 Possible worlds 4 1.3 Could things have been different? 5 1.4 Nihilism, anti-nihilism and philosophical explanations 6 1.5 The structure of the discussion 7 1.6 The nature of metaphysics and the role of intuition 9 1.7 A note on some technical terms 10 2 Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument 11 2.1 Premise (A1) 12 2.1.1 Unit sets 14 2.1.2 Parts of concrete objects 16 2.2 Rodriguez-Pereyra s subtraction argument 17 2.3 Premise (A2) 22 2.4 Premise (A3) and the other subtraction premises 24 3 Possible Worlds 26 3.1 Metaphysical nihilism, the subtraction argument and worlds 26 3.2 Three views of worlds and objects 27 3.3 What about sets? 38 3.4 Another way out? 44 3.5 The problem with memberlessness 47 3.6 Modal fictionalism 51 3.7 Conclusion 54 4 Concreteness 57 4.1 What is nihilism? 57 4.2 Criteria of concreteness 59 4.3 The sense-perception account 61 vii
viii Contents 4.4 The causal account 63 4.5 The spatio-temporal account 65 4.6 The Identity of indiscernibles 71 4.7 Natural boundaries 75 4.8 Other accounts of concreteness 81 4.9 The temporal criterion of concreteness and possible world theories 82 4.10 The motivation for nihilism 83 5 Concreta, Dependence and Anti-Nihilism 86 5.1 More subtraction arguments 87 5.2 Premise (A1) 87 5.3 Premise (A2) and Anti-nihilism 1 88 5.3.1 The modal ontological arguments 92 5.4 Premise (A3) and Anti-nihilism 2 94 5.4.1 Do abstract objects exist in every possible world? 96 5.4.2 Ersatzism and anti-ersatzism 98 5.4.3 The challenge from absolute nihilism 99 5.4.4 Do abstract objects depend on concrete objects? 100 5.4.5 Universals and the empty set 106 5.4.6 Dependence 111 5.5 One more challenge to nihilism 113 5.6 Conclusion 115 6 The Metaphysics of Subtraction 117 6.1 Subtractability 117 6.2 The subtraction premise 119 6.3 General strategies for defending metaphysical nihilism 123 6.4 The downward induction argument for metaphysical nihilism 125 6.5 Downward induction in the subtraction argument 129 6.6 Objections and replies 132 6.7 Conclusion 135 7 The Trouble with Metaphysical Nihilism 137 Notes 143 Bibliography 161 Index 169
List of Diagrams 1 The category theory I am attributing to Rodriguez-Pereyra 49 2 The category theory I am endorsing 50 ix
Preface My project involves looking at the metaphysics of possibility. There are two questions that are central to the metaphysics of possibility: firstly, what are possible worlds and secondly, is there an empty possible world? Possibilist and actualist accounts of worlds attempt to answer the first question while discussions of metaphysical nihilism, the empty world and the modal ontological arguments deal with the second. However, no one has systematically considered how the answers given to one of these questions affect the answers available to the other this is my project. I develop a new way of categorising theories of possible worlds. I argue that metaphysical nihilism (the claim that there could have been nothing) is compatible only with the ersatz view of worlds. I defend the importance of using the correct criterion of concreteness in discussions of metaphysical nihilism and work out which criterion that is. I argue that if we modify the account of concrete objects used by the metaphysical nihilists, then nihilism can be shown to be compatible with the ersatz account of possible worlds. Finally, I argue that, given these considerations, the anti-nihilist arguments are ultimately more convincing than those used to support nihilism. In Chapter 2 (Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument), I look at whether or not one particular modal claim is true. This is the claim that there could have been nothing. On the standard analysis of modal statements we can translate this claim into: there is an empty possible world. I analyse the subtraction argument (the main argument for metaphysical nihilism) as it stands and make some criticisms that will be used later. In Chapter 3 (Possible Worlds), I ask what is it that makes statements of possibility, necessity and contingency true? According to the standard possible-world analysis of modal claims, a proposition P is possible if and only if there is a world at which P is the case. However, it is far from clear what these worlds are. I suggest a new way of categorising theories of possible worlds and argue that the metaphysical nihilist must embrace ersatzism about possible worlds. In Chapter 4 (Concreteness), I argue that the proponents of metaphysical nihilism have been using an inappropriate criterion of concreteness in their arguments and develop an appropriate criterion. x
Preface xi In Chapter 5 (Concreta, Dependence and Anti-Nihilism), I reconstruct the argument for metaphysical nihilism using the appropriate criterion of concreteness. This gives us the strongest version of nihilism welldefined and compatible with a broader ontology including appropriate accounts of concreteness and possible worlds. I also advance the antinihilist case against this version of nihilism. I argue that the anti-nihilist arguments are convincing even against this strong version of nihilism. In Chapter 6 (The Metaphysics of Subtraction), I argue that the subtraction technique itself is flawed and that metaphysical nihilism will never be successfully supported by any argument of this kind. I conclude that metaphysical nihilism is nothing more than an unsupported intuition. Anti-nihilism, on the other hand, can be defended unproblematically. I m very grateful to the following for discussions on the topic and in some cases comments on earlier drafts: Tom Baldwin, Peter Bauman, David Efird, Robin Hendry, Killian O Brien, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Tom Stoneham and an anonymous referee for Palgrave Macmillan. Particular thanks are due to Jonathan Lowe for his insight, patience and support. Thanks also to my colleagues and erstwhile colleagues at Keele who have encouraged the project and discussed various elements of the argument with me, in particular: Alan Bailey, Josie D Oro, John Horton, James Tartaglia and John Rodgers. I also want to thank audiences at seminars and conferences in the Universities of Aberdeen, Birmingham, Durham, Glasgow, Keele, Leeds, Nottingham, Reading, the Arché Research Centre at St Andrews, and York. I want to thank Keele University for giving me research leave in the spring semester 2007 to work on the manuscript. Thanks also to the department of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, where I worked on the book as a visiting scholar from February to April 2007. I am particularly grateful to Priyanka Gibbons and Melanie Blair, and prior to them Daniel Bunyard, at Palgrave Macmillan for their support and patience during the whole process. I am grateful to Gabriel Coggins for editing and proof-reading the manuscript and also to Steven Leach for help with editing. Some sections of the argument have been previously published elsewhere in my (2003). World and object: Metaphysical nihilism and three accounts of worlds. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CIII: 353 360; and my (2008) Recent work on metaphysical nihilism. Philosophical Books, 49 (3): 229 237. An overview of some of the relevant issues can be found in my (2007) Metaphysical Nihilism in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online), edited by Craig, E. London, Routledge.
xii Preface Finally I am grateful to Killian, Conor and Sinéad O Brien for giving me the time to complete the book and for their patience and understanding during the process. Geraldine Coggins Keele 2010