Syria in Crisis Outlook and Implications for Middle East Regional Security

Syria in Crisis Outlook and Implications for Middle East Regional Security Syria s Chemical and Biological Weapons Threats, Challenges and Responses Rod Godfrey 21 August 2012 Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 4

Current challenges Syria not member of OPCW No legal mandate to intervene; Requires separate UN resolution to act. Still has P5 support in the UN Russia and China taking strategic view; Short-term instability not an issue; Unwilling to accept principle of internal interference. Varied characterization of the conflict Several actors seek to characterize the conflict on ethnic or religious basis, expressing support for a Sunni state, support for a new emirate, or support for the rights of Kurds, Druze, or Christians; Each of these differ from Western view. Strategically difficult to intervene Limited access and absence of springboard nations. Syria is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, but it is a party to the Geneva (Protocol) of 1925 which prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. So they have a clear obligation not to use chemical weapons in any circumstances. OPCW Director-General Ahmet Uzumcu Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 6

Syrian chemical weapons arsenal Until July 2012, Syria repeatedly denied pursuing a non-conventional weapons program. However, Western intelligence agencies believe Syria has amassed a sizeable stockpile of CW agents and delivery systems. CW Agents Mustard Nerve, possibly including VX Bulk Agent Stocks Delivery Systems Air delivered bombs Artillery shells Scud missiles SS-21 missiles Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 7

Possible use / loss of control scenarios State Use of Chemical Weapons Possible use if regime is threatened Precedent? Unconfirmed use in Hama in 1982 Loss of Control Regime elements Rebel forces Proxy forces No chemical or biological weapons will ever be used, and I repeat, will never be used, during the crisis in Syria no matter what the developments inside Syria," All of these types of weapons are in storage and under security and the direct supervision of the Syrian armed forces and will never be used unless Syria is exposed to external aggression." Foreign Ministry Spokesman Jihad Makdissi Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 8

Limitations on possible use of CW Existing CW seen as a strategic counterbalance. CW of limited use in current situation. US President Barack Obama said on 20 August that the use of chemical weapons by Syria would be a "red line" that would change his thinking on military intervention in the crisis. CW use likely to provoke adverse international reaction. Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 9

Critical action items Locate all known stocks Plan to secure Constrained by resources Satellite image taken 23 July 2010 of the Al Safir Complex a possible chemical weapons research and development facility located 20 km southeast of Aleppo. Communicate intent Existing authority Future authority Opportunist elements Neighbouring states Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 10

Syria in Crisis Outlook and Implications for Middle East Regional Security Prospects for Sectarian Tensions and Civil War Critical Variables Bilal Saab 21 August 2012 Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 11

Agenda Background Reducing and containing sectarian violence Leadership of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) International containment efforts Regional intervention Societal awareness Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 12

Background The Syrian uprising has gradually turned from a peaceful popular rebellion against an authoritarian government into a sectarian civil war. The dynamics of sectarian violence in Syria s cities are not unlike those seen in Lebanon in 1975-1990, in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 onwards, in Kosovo in 1999, and in Sierra Leone in 2000. The fate of Assad (death, escape, or arrest) is less relevant today and unlikely to change much about present and future sectarian tensions and violence across the country. Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 13

Reducing and containing sectarian violence The scope, intensity, and duration of the Syrian civil war are a function of five critical variables: 1. Leadership on the part of the Free Syrian Army and effective command and control. 2. International containment efforts to prevent all-out civil war 3. Role of Al-Qaeda and increasing Islamist radicalization. 4. Regional intervention that could makes things worse. 5. General societal awareness. Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 14

FSA leadership / command and control The FSA is not a tight-knit military entity with a hierarchical chain of command and a coherent organizational structure, but instead is a collection of militias comprising defectors from the Syrian military, civilians who decided to take up arms, and foreign fighters. Many of the operations and battles waged by armed elements theoretically operating under the FSA umbrella take place without supervision or even knowledge of FSA leader Riyad al-asad. Tribal and ideological differences will make it very difficult for all armed opposition groups to agree on how to manage and control the scope and intensity of sectarian violence. FSA leader Riyad al-asad Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 15

International efforts Physically separating Alawites from Sunnis and the rest of the country and creating a federal state. Sponsoring national reconciliation efforts. Building state capacity and sending an international (UN) stabilization force to prevent Iraq-style lawlessness in the event that Assad falls. Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 16

Regional intervention The stage is set for a regional, sectarian proxy conflict on Syrian soil pitting Shia and Alawites against regional Sunni groupings The Iranians are more likely to step up military, financial, and logistical assistance to the Alawites and even create Alawite and Shiite militias in a post-assad Syria as they have done in Lebanon and Iraq. Instead of Iranian-supplied weapons and money being distributed from Syria to neighboring Iraq and Lebanon, the networks will flow in the opposite direction, from Iraq and Lebanon into Syria. Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 17

Societal awareness Revenge killings will inevitably occur in Syria against the Alawite community. Syria s main political opposition force the Syrian National Council (SNC) is composed of senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who still harbor ambitions for revenge over the 1982 Hama massacre. It is unclear if cool heads will prevail with regard to sectarian retribution. Widespread sectarian violence is not a certainty in post-assad Syria due to the presence of several local committees across Syria that have been organizing the revolt against Assad. The Iraqi and Lebanese experiences could influence the mindset of Syria s societal groups. Large popular protests are likely to continue in a post-assad Syria, although widespread sectarian conflict is not a certainty. Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 18

Agenda How Syria fits into Ayman al-zawahiri s Agenda Jabhat al-nusra: Al-Qaeda in Waiting? The blowback from Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Regional Support Infrastructure Interplay with other jihadist groups Foreign fighters Money flows Outlook for Al-Qaeda Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 20

Syria and Zawahiri s Agenda Zawahiri sees Syria as a significant opportunity for Al-Qaeda. Syrian crisis offers Al-Qaeda an opportunity to expand in the country and set-up a zone of operations that extends from Syria to Iraq to Lebanon to Jordan, taking the group closer to Israel s borders and bolstering its capability for global jihad. Defense of Sunnis from brutal Alawi regime provides opportunity to recruit in Syria and restore the group s appeal in the Arab world. Future confrontation with Israel also calculated to boost support. Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 21

Jabhat al-nusra (JN): Al-Qaeda in waiting? JN emerged in early 2012 and has claimed responsibility for a number of suicide bombings and other attacks, including against security forces in Damascus and Aleppo. Information on the group is still fragmentary, but it appears to have several hundred fighters and is active across Syria Several indications that it is closely aligned with Al- Qaeda, including: Privileged access to restricted web forum used by other Al-Qaeda affiliates. (Around 50 statements thus far) Very positive reception on pro-al-qaeda forums. Use of suicide bombings A damaged military intelligence building where two bombs exploded in Damascus on 10 May 2012. JN has not formally pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda Central nor received recognition from its leaders. Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 22

Blowback from Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) US intelligence believes AQI is active in Syria and may be linked to some of the largest bombing attacks. A relatively small number of AQI operatives ballpark figure of 100 have crossed the border into Syria and these experienced fighters are now cooperating with JN. Returnees of particular concern in border region of Der ez Zour & in Idlib province where there is a significant salafist presence. We have solid information and intelligence that members of al Qaeda terrorist networks have gone in the other direction, to Syria, to help, to liaise, to carry out terrorist attacks Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 23

Al-Qaeda s regional support infrastructure Al Qaeda already has regional infrastructure in place to support its efforts in Syria which stretches from Lebanon to Iraq to Jordan. Recruitment of foreign fighters, logistics, weapons, and fundraising. Support from groups like AQI, Fatah al-islam, and a network of extremist preachers. Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 24

Interplay with other jihadist groups According to sources with contacts on the ground and other reports, most jihadist brigades fighting in Syria do not subscribe to Al-Qaeda s narrative of global jihad. Many of those who have joined jihadist brigades are turned off by Al-Qaeda ideology because of violent excesses in Iraq & elsewhere. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that there is respect for JN s urban combat among jihadist brigades and even the rank and file of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Image from a video released by Jabhat al-nusra on 27 February relating to a suicide attack in the Syrian capital Damascus on 6 January 2012 Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 25

Foreign fighters Foreign fighters are outnumbered by Syrians inside jihadist groups, and number in the hundreds rather than thousands. These fighters come from across Arab world, and some are likely to be using the same facilitation networks that previously took foreign fighters into Iraq via Syria. Also some reports of Chechens and Pakistanis participating in the violence in Syria. Evidence that a small number of Western foreign fighters from the UK, France and Belgium have joined jihadist groups. Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 26

Money flows Concern that money from Gulf donors ending up with salafist jihadist groups is strengthening them in relation to more secular fighting groups. Saudi Arabia has taken tight control of fundraising for Syria and appears to have been largely successful in this effort. Persistent concern that money is flowing to jihadists from some other Gulf countries. Crown Prince Nayef (center), who died in June 2012, played an important role in Saudi efforts to crackdown on the financing of terrorism Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 27

Outlook for Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda will not find it easy to significantly build-up its presence in Syria given widespread negative perceptions of the group. Increased sectarian violence will likely play into Al-Qaeda s hands, as it did in Iraq. Unlike Iraq, no US forces are present to popularize the ideology of global jihad. If Al-Qaeda comes to be seen as the group making a big impact, this could boost its recruitment. An important unknown: to what degree is JN committed to global jihad? Could commitment weaken as it takes on new Syrian recruits or will vetting of recruits ensure ideological purity? Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 28

Syria in Crisis Outlook and Implications for Middle East Regional Security Tim Pippard Director Defense, Risk and Security Consulting Email: tim.pippard@ihs.com; Tel: +1-703-236-3135 21 August 2012 Copyright 2012 IHS Inc. All Rights Reserved. 30