AUGUSTINE 354 430...et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.
PLATO S SOUL
KINDS OF CONFLICT Reason Desire Emotion
VIRTUE AS RATIONAL CONTROL Resolution: Control by the rational part of the soul. Virtue: Subjecting the horses, especially the ignoble, rebellious horse, to the firm control of the driver. Each must play its proper role. The rational element must dominate the others for a person to be virtuous and happy.
VIRTUE AS BALANCE Each part of the soul has a role to play, a function Virtue = each part playing its proper role Weakness of will = knowing proper roles, but not being strong enough to force the elements into them
FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES For Plato, therefore, there are four cardinal virtues: Wisdom: the excellence of Reason Self-control: the excellence of Desire Courage: the excellence of Emotion Justice: the balance of the other parts
PLATO S DEFINITION Too narrow? Virtue Too broad? Parts of soul playing their proper roles
AUGUSTINE S CRITICISMS Plato: conflict > different parts But Reasons can conflict Desires can conflict Emotions can conflict Are there thousands of parts?
CAN DESIRES CONFLICT?
CAN DESIRES CONFLICT? Good: I want to study, but I also want to help the poor Bad: I want to steal this BMW, but I also want to steal that Porsche
CAN FEELINGS CONFLICT?
CAN FEELINGS CONFLICT? Approach-Avoidance conflicts Approach-Approach conflicts Avoidance-Avoidance conflicts
CAN FEELINGS CONFLICT? Catullus: Odi et amo. Quare id faciam, fortasse requiris? Nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior. I hate and I love. Why, you may ask? I do not know, but I feel it, and I am in torment.
CAN RATIONAL CONCLUSIONS CONFLICT?
CAN RATIONAL CONCLUSIONS CONFLICT? This sentence is false If it were true, it would be false, since that s what it says If it were false, then what it says would be true Generally: antinomies (Abelard s Yes and No; Peter of Lombard s Sentences)
AUGUSTINE S ANALYSIS Weakness of will is conflict between higher and lower-order willings: Willing to do what you don t will to will to do (willing unwillingly) I choose to eat the cake I will that I eat the cake But I wish I didn t want to eat the cake I will that I will that I not eat the cake
AUGUSTINE S ANALYSIS First-order desires: I want to do A E.g.: I want to study I want to do not-a E.g.: I want to goof off So far, this looks symmetrical
AUGUSTINE S ANALYSIS First-order desires: I want to do A E.g.: I want to study I want to do not-a E.g.: I want to goof off Second-order desires: I want to want to do A E.g., I want to want to study I don t want to want to do not-a E.g., I don t want to want to goof off
AUGUSTINE S ANALYSIS First-order desires: I want to do A I want to do not-a E.g.: I want to goof off E.g.: I want to study Second-order desires: I want to want to do A I don t want to want to do not-a E.g., I don t want to want to goof off E.g., I want to want to study Temptation = having a desire you want not to have Weakness of will = acting in accord with that desire (that you want not to have)
Theory of Knowledge
PERCEPTION IS NORMALLY RELIABLE In fact, I believe that the senses are not untrustworthy either because deranged persons suffer illusions, or because we see things wrongly when we are asleep. If the senses correctly intimate things to the vigilant and the sane, it is no affair of theirs what the mind of a sleeping or insane person may fancy for itself.
LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS Logical and mathematical truths can be known, even if skeptical arguments succeed I am certain that either there is only one world or there are more worlds than one. I am likewise certain that if there are more worlds than one, their number is either finite or infinite.
APPEARANCES Restrict your assent to the mere fact of your being convinced that it appears thus to you. Then there is no deception, for I do not see how even an Academic [Skeptic] can refute a man who says: I know that this appears white to me. I know that I am delighted by what I am hearing. I know that this smells pleasant to me. I know that this tastes sweet to me. I know that this feels cold to me.
IF I AM DECEIVED, I AM I am most certain that I am, and that I know and delight in this. In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians, who say, What if you are deceived? For if I am deceived, I am.... [C]ertainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And, consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know.
Metaphysics
THE PLATONIC TRADITION Judgment of perception: This is a triangle Mind is turned toward object perceived But also to the form of a triangle We perceive the thing as a triangle because we apprehend the form
PLATO S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND Form This is a triangle Object
OBJECTS AND ABSTRACT FORMS You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?
OBJECTS AND ABSTRACT FORMS And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on -- the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?
PLATO S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND Participation This is a triangle Form? Perception Object
PLATONISM S PROBLEM We don t perceive the forms How do we know anything about them? Aristotle s answer: abstraction Plato s answers: Recollection The Form of the Good
PLATO S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND The Good Participation This is a triangle Form Recollection Perception Object
PLATO S BEARD How can we, Limited to the realm of the senses, Have access to a realm beyond the senses? Dilemma: Reject possibility of knowing abstract truths, or Postulate some special faculty of knowledge
NOMINALISM The Nominalist s Solution: There are no universals Get rid of the Forms
CONCEPTUALISM The Conceptualist s Solution: There are universals, but they are mind-dependent Put the Forms inside the head
REALISM The Realist s Solution: The Forms are independent of mind We have some way of knowing about them
CLASSICAL RATIONALISM We are able to have knowledge of the world independently of experience because the structure of the mind matches the structure of the world
PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA Forms are ideas in the mind of God Our minds and the world are both stamped with the Word of God Word Word
PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA Philo s solution has elements of both conceptualism and realism The Forms are independent of human minds They are dependent on the mind of God How do we know about them? God reveals some of them to us
PLATO S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND The Good Participation This is a triangle Form Recollection Perception Object
AUGUSTINE S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND God Participation This is a triangle Form Illumination Perception Object
AUGUSTINE S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND God Participation This is a triangle Form Illumination Perception Object