The Intelligence Function Issues in Crime and Justice CJ 4610 PA 5315 Professor James J. Drylie Week 2
The 9/11 Commission Report Chapter 1 Timeline of 9/11 Chapter 2 Where much of it began Chapter 7 Planning the attack Chapter 8 The System was Blinking Red
Chapter 1 We have some planes Tuesday, September 11, 2001 Four separate flights originate from three US cities Boston Washington, DC Newark 19 operatives AA 11 5 men UA 175 5 men AA 77 5 men UA 93 4 men
AA 11 Boston - LA Portland, Maine 0600hrs Mohamed Atta Abdul Azizz al Omari Depart for Boston s s Logan International 0645 arrival 0652 Atta speaks with Marwan al Shehhi (UA 175) Atta and Omari board AA 11 with three other highjackers 0745 departure time
UA 175 Boston - LA Shehhi and four highjackers board the flight 0800 departure time
AA 77 Washington,DC LA Dulles Airport 5 highjackers begin boarding at 0715hrs. 0820 takeoff
UA 93 Newark LA 0739-0748hrs four highjackers have boarded
Airport security Atta underwent CAPPS scrutiny in Portland. Later determined that Atta was agitated by the delay Other highjackers bags were scrutinized, but not the individuals Some of the highjackers were unfamiliar with airport security
Timelines AA 11 0759 takeoff 0819 hijacked 0838 NEADS notified 0846 AF scramble 0846:40 1 WTC 0853 AF airborne UA 175 0814 takeoff 0842 takeover 0852 word from flight crew 0903 2 WTC
AA 77 0820 takeoff 0851 takeover 0905 AA aware of highjacking 0932 Dulles radar 0937 Pentagon UA 93 0842 takeoff 0928 takeover 0936 UA contacted by flight crew 0957 passenger revolt 1003 Shanksville, PA
The Crisis Most federal agencies learned of AA 11 hitting 1 WTC from CNN Military officials notified internally Karl Rove, with the President in FLA, is informed that a small, twin-engine plane struck 1 WTC VP Cheney in the White House Sees UA 175 strike 2 WTC on TV
No accident After the second plane hit 2 WTC it was clear to White House personnel it was no accident Not aware yet of additional highjacked aircraft
A series of teleconferences FAA White House Defense Department All participated in teleconferences linked to the Situation Room in the White House Rules of engagement discussed 1025 confirmation of authority to shoot down aircraft
CAP Combat Air Patrol VP notified by 1000hrs that the AF is attempting to establish CAP over Washington, DC VP speaks with President Bush who gave authorization to shoot down hihgjacked aircraft 1002 Secret Service advises of an inbound aircraft Approximately 1010 the aircraft, UA93, is 80 miles out
Decisive action VP Cheney is asked for authority to engage the aircraft Affirmative 1012 UA93 is 60 miles out Again VP is asked for authority to engage Affirmative Aides suggest VP confirm order with President
Confirmation 1018 VP contacts President Bush aboard AF-1 Confirmation of authority Word received of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania 1030 reports of an additional highjacked aircraft 5-105 miles out Again, VHP authorizes engagement
Shoot down Order 1014 a LtC relays to NMCC conformation to engage 1031 NORAD broadcasts order to engage aircraft that do not respond 1039 VP updates SecDef
Foundation of the New Terrorism February 1998 Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al Zawahiri issue a fatwa in the name of the World Islamic Front Calls for the murder of any American A fatwa is an interpretation of Islamic law by a respected Islamic scholar Neither Bin Ladin or al Zawahiri are Islamic scholars May 1998 Bin Ladin claims that the killing of Americans is more important that killing others
The Rise of Bin Ladin The Soviet-Afghan conflict in the 1980s drew young Muslims from around the world to fight the jihad, or holy war against the Soviet invaders 1980 Bin Ladin (23 YOA) arrives in Afghanistan Engaged in battle, but is known more for his generous support of the jihad
The Golden Chain Bin Ladin recognized the need for global support of the jihad in Afghanistan Developed a financial support network consisting of financiers from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf state NGOs (nongovernmental organizations channeled money to the holy warriors Mosques, schools, and boarding houses from around the world, including the US, acted as recruiting stations
al Qaeda The Foundation April 1988 Moscow announced the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan The jihad was successful Bin Ladin was successful in maintaining support and established the base or foundation (al( Qaeda) ) for future jihad
A structure emerges August 1988 Bin Ladin emerges as the leader (emir)( of al Qaeda The organizational structure includes Intelligence Military Finance Political Media & propaganda
Bin Ladin s exile August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait Bin Ladin proposed to the Saudi monarchy to use the mujahideen to retake Kuwait, they rebuffed Bin Ladin and joined the US-led coalition Bin Ladin was deeply disturbed by the stationing of US troops in the holy land Bin Ladin was exiled from his country
The Sudan After his exile from Saudi Arabia Bin Ladin moved to the Sudan 1991 Bin Ladin established a large and complex set of intertwined business and terrorist enterprises A global network of bank accounts and NGOs emerged
Declaration of War 1992 al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa against the Western occupation of Islamic lands Bin Ladin s reputation as an extremist was well-known in the Islamic world Bin Ladin s extremist network reached into NJ with ties to the Blind Sheikh
Somalia US troops were deployed to Somalia in 1992 IEDs exploded in hotels housing US personnel Somalia became a magnet for other extremists and those willing to train terrorists October 1993 Black Hawk Down Extremist trainers boasted of their assistance
June 1996 a VBIED destroys the Khobar Towers 19 Americans killed 372 wounded Bin Ladin is also linked to the 1993 WTC bombing Bin Ladin is seeking ability to use WMDs intended to kill on a mass scale A price of $1.5 million for weapons- grade uranium did not deter him
Afghanistan & Pakistan By 1998 Bin Ladin s base in the Sudan was gone after external pressure against the Sudanese government forced his ouster He shifted focus back into Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan The ability of al Qaeda to move in and out of Afghanistan has long been linked to official/unofficial facilitation from Pakistan
Mid-1998 al Qaeda reportedly meets with Iraqi intelligence 1999 additional meetings reported offering Bin Ladin safe haven The Golden Chain allows Bin Ladin to cultivate strong ties with the Taliban Al Qaeda operatives enjoy unfettered access in and out of Afghanistan Official Afghanistan equipment is available to al Qaeda The Taliban allowed al Qaeda to open and maintain training sites
The Attack Looms The planning of the planes operation was discussed between KSM and Bin Ladin in the spring of 1999 Several targets were considered: White House Pentagon US Capital WTC
From the beginning the plan considered four suicide operatives These individuals were selected by Bin Ladin 2 of the original 4 would be on AA77 Fall 1999 elite training in terrorist camps for the four PT Firearms CQB Night OPS Shooting from moving vehicles
Initial plans targeted East Asia and the US Spring 2000 Bin Ladin cancels the East Asia plan and concentrates on the US The Hamburg connection By late 1999 Mohamed Atta and 3 other operatives from Germany entered the picture Bin Ladin s part as a key player & leader, over KSM, was clearly evident with the selection of the Hamburg Four Bin Ladin is personally involved in selecting Atta to be the tactical commander for the OP
Follow the Money KSM was a key facilitator in providing the money to the operatives $400,000 - $500,000 was spent Money was moved and handled in ordinary ways that could easily defeat detections used at that time Saudi Arabia was a key source of $$
Hawala Ancient system of moving money Based on trust Very informal al Qaeda had a $30 million operating budget 10-20 million was given to the Taliban in exchange for safe haven Drug trafficking and conflict diamonds were alleged to be a source of funds
Arrival in the US By summer 2000 Atta and others began flight training in the US Newark was a point of entry for key operatives Atta al Shehhi Jarrah
The highjackers 12 of 13 came from Saudi Arabia 1 from the UAE Late 2000 the highjackers were completing training in Afghanistan Travel between Newark, Europe and key US cities for flight training Surveillance flights on Boeing 757s originating in Newark Tickets for 9/11 purchased by Atta between 11/25 9/5
Final days Late August Bin Ladin notifies senior al Qaeda leaders of the pending attack Highjackers return unused operational funds Approximately $26,000 AA77 operatives travel to Maryland UA 93 operatives traveled from FLA to NJ Atta was moving between MD and NJ with a final destination in ME
The Plan KSM began to conceptualize the plan to use aircraft as weapons in 1996 Five years later, on 9/11, that plan was executed with startling precision
The Attack Looms By January 2000 the operations plan of what would become the 9/11 Attacks has begun May 2000 two highjackers abandoned flight training Early summer 2000, Atta and the other Hamburg pilots arrive One pilot, Hani Hanjour (AA77) first came to the US in 1991 and began flight training in 1997 By the end of 2000 training involved flight simulators on large aircraft
The Teams By fall 2000 the teams were selected by Bin Laden and senior al Qaeda leaders Physically, these men averaged 5 6 5 The majority were from Saudi Arabia (12) KSM indicates that Saudi s s comprised a large number of al Qaeda operatives located in the training camps.
Training Focused on highjackings Disarming techniques Explosives Edged weapons The cockpit would be the priority The cabin area a secondary concern
Final measures By August 2001 Atta was coordinating the purchase of the airline tickets and team assignments Targets were still being discussed at this time WTC White House Pentagon Capitol The White House was a primary consideration The Capitol, a secondary target