Harry Frankfurt Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person Up to this point we have been discussing the compatibility of determinism and what we might call free action. Our question has been: if determinism is true, is it ever true that people act freely, where this means that the person could have done otherwise. But what about the concept of free will? What is the relation between freedom of the will and freedom of action? And what is freedom of the will, anyway? Frankfurt is going to give us an account of these two notions, i.e. freedom of action and freedom of will. Frankfurt thinks that his account supports compatibilism. Along the way we are also going to get a theory about what it is to be a person. 1
First-order desires: desires to do something - expressed in statements of the form A wants to X, where to X refers to an action Effective 1st-order desires vs. Non-effective 1st-order desires -Effective 1st-order desires: desires that have motivated, are motivating, or will motivate an agent to act On Sunday I had the desire to go to a movie. This motivated me to go the movies ( Thor, thumbs up for geek entertainment value). Right now I desire to be speaking to you about free will. I also desire to get a cup of coffee after lecture is over. This will motivate me to go get a cup of coffee (trust me). -Non-effective 1st-order desires: desires that are not effective On Sunday I had the desire to stay inside and listen to the rain while I binged on Netflix. Right now I have the desire to take a nap. I also want to take a nap after lecture is over. (I didn't, and won't actually do these things) 2
Frankfurt: your effective first-order desires = your will To identify an agent s will is either to identify the desire (or desires) by which he is motivated in some action he performs or to identify the desire (or desires) by which he will or would be motivated when or if he acts. (8) Second-order desires, 2 varieties: 1. desire for a first-order desire - expressed by statements of the form A wants to X, where to X refers to a first-order desire I want to want to do crossfit consistently I want the desire to eat less cake 2. desire for a first-order desire to be effective = second-order volition I want my desire to get a cup of coffee after class to be effective 3
Psychotherapist example A psychotherapist treats heroin addicts. He believes that he can better help his patients if he knows what it is like to want to take heroin. But, he has a strong aversion to heroin - he strongly desires not to take heroin. The psychotherapist s desires: - 2nd-order desire for the desire to take heroin - 1st-order desire not to take heroin - no 1st-order desire to take heroin - no 2nd-order volition regarding the desire to take heroin My desires: - 2nd-order desire for the desire to do crossfit consistently. - 1st-order desire to not do crossfit at all. -1st-order desire to do crossfit. -2nd-order volition- I want my desire to do crossfit to be effective 4
Having a 2nd-order desire for some 1st-order desire does not entail Having that 1st-order desire Having the 2nd-order volition that some 1st-order desire be effective does entail Having that 1st-order desire 5
Frankfurt: Now it is having second-order volitions, and not having second-order desires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person. (10) wantons = beings with first-order desires but no second-order volitions (wantons may have second-order desires that are not volitions) - wantons are not persons, according to Frankfurt - a wanton does not care about her will, she is indifferent about which of her first-order desires is effective - a wanton may possess and employ rational faculties of a high order. Nothing in the concept of a wanton implies that he cannot reason or that he cannot deliberate concerning how to do what he wants to do. (328) Dictionary definition of wanton: without regard for what is right. 6
3 kinds of addicts, same physiological addiction in each addict Unwilling addict - 1st-order desire to take the drug - 1st-order desire to refrain from taking the drug - 2nd-order volition: he wants his 1st-order desire to refrain from taking the drug to be effective Wanton addict - 1st-order desire to take the drug - 1st-order desire to refrain from taking the drug - no 2nd-order volitions Willing addict - 1st-order desire to take drug - 2nd-order volition: he wants his 1st-order desire to take the drug to be effective 7
2nd-order volition for this 1st-order desire to be effective desire to take the drug unwilling addict desire not to take the drug Question: does the unwilling addict have free will? Is the unwilling addict free to have the will (i.e. effective 1st-order desire) that he wants to have? NO Because of the unwilling addict s physiological addiction, his 1st-order desire to take the drug will be effective. So he is not free to have the will he wants to have. Frankfurt: It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volitions, then, that a person exercises freedom of the will. (15) 8
Freedom of the will = being able to have the will one wants to have. desire to take the drug desire not to take the drug wanton addict Does the wanton addict have free will? NO Because of his addiction, the wanton addict s desire to take the drug will be effective. Is this the will the wanton addict wants to have? The wanton addict has no 2nd-order volitions - he is indifferent about what his will is. The wanton addict lacks free will, but for a different reason than the unwilling addict. 9
Another definition of person-hood: the type of entity for whom freedom of the will may be a problem. (330) This is just another way of saying that persons have second-order volitions. Freedom of the will is a problem only if you have some desires about which of your1st-order desires should constitute your will. Freedom of action vs. freedom of will Freedom of action = being able to act on one s 1st-order desires - both the unwilling addict and the wanton addict have freedom of action - compatibilists would call this a lack of "external" impediments Freedom of will = being able to have the will one wants to have - neither the unwilling addict nor the wanton addict have free will Freedom of action Freedom of will does not imply implies Freedom of will Freedom of action 10
2nd-order volition for this desire to be effective desire to take the drug willing addict Does the willing addict have free will? NO The willing addict is not free to have the will he wants to have, even though he does have the will he wants to have. Frankfurt: The willing addict s will is not free, for his desire to take the drug will be effective regardless of whether or not he wants this desire to constitute his will. But when he takes the drug, he takes it freely and of his own free will. (19) [This is puzzling: his will is not free, yet he takes the drug of his own free will?? Is this a mistake on Frankfurt's part?] 11
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Is the willing addict morally responsible for her actions when she takes the drug? Frankfurt: YES But because of her physiological addiction, the willing addict did not have any alternatives open to her. She could not have done otherwise. Nevertheless, Frankfurt thinks that the willing addict is morally responsible. For Frankfurt, moral responsibility implies that you have a 2nd-order volition for the 1st-order desire upon which you act. Being morally responsible for your action. Having a 2nd-order volition for the 1st-order desire that motivates you to act. Having alternatives open to you. 13
Frankfurt: My conception of the freedom of the will appears to be neutral with regard to the problem of determinism. It seems conceivable that it should be causally determined that a person is free to want what he wants to want. If this is conceivable, then it might be causally determined that a person enjoys a free will. (20) 2nd-order volition for this desire desire not to do crossfit at all desire to go to crossfit consistently me According to Frankfurt, it may be causally determined that I am able to satisfy my 2nd-order volition. 14
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