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Transcription:

Appendix 1(i)

Hassan Nasrallah on Al-Manar TV, boasting about the results of the rocket fire against Israeli civilians (July 29, 2006) " For more than 18 days, two million Israelis have been forced to leave [their homes] or to live in bomb shelters, and the number will grow with the increase [of our rocket fire] when we start [firing rockets] beyond Haifa 2

SEIZED DOCUMENT: HEZBOLLAH S STOREHOUSES IN THE VILLAGES OF SOUTH LEBANON A Hezbollah document seized in Kafr Kila refers to explosives, anti-tank mines and charges to be used in attacks the IDF forces along the roads of the eastern sector. It shows that the explosives were stored in the south Lebanon villages of Kafr Kila and Dibbin, and that Hezbollah operatives in those villages were in charge of transferring them from the storehouses to the organization s sapper squads. Overview 1. In south Lebanon, Hezbollah operatives dug a series of explosive pits 1 for charges weighing hundreds of kilograms. They were dug along the roads leading to the border and at main intersections. An explosive pit in the eastern sector exposed before the war 2. On August 7, a computer was seized in the intelligence collection center in Kafr Kila. It contained files of the plan to defend vital locations in the Fifth 1 Shallow pits holding explosive charges covered with earth. 3

Territorial Subdivision (the eastern sector of south Lebanon) in case of an IDF attack. The plan included appendices describing the roles of the various professional branches in the region. 3. One of the files (classified top secret ) described the role of the engineering branch in the defense plan. The document is undated, but was apparently updated to April 2003. It elaborated the way sapper squads would prepare and detonate explosive pits, load anti-tank mines and use other explosive charges in the Fifth Territorial Subdivision. The plan ended with a table of the necessary equipment and the amounts of explosives, anti-tank mines, etc. 4. The plan details how charges, mines and explosives would be transported to Hezbollah s various sapper squads ( explosive teams in the original) for placing charges in pits or other locations along roads and at junctions. The squads were ordered to report to the anti-tank center in Kafr Kila (east of the Israeli town of Metula) or in the infantry center in the village of Dibbin (north of Marjayoun). From there they would be sent to the explosives storehouses in those villages. 5. According to the plan, detonating the charges and mines along the roads, paths and vital locations was intended to cause [the enemy] extensive casualties and loss of equipment, and to delay his progress (the sections entitled Mission and Method ). The plan details the specific missions allotted to each team and how equipment would be supplied from Hezbollah storehouses in Kfar Kila and Dibbin. 4

The chief missions of the sapper squads 6. Following are the chief missions as defined in the plan: a. The Tel al-nehas region 1) The mission: To equip the explosive [pit] on the Tel al- Nehas-Burj Mlouk road (the little bridge) with detonation devices. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the anti-tank center in Kafr Kila, and from there to go to the storehouse to bring the detonation devices and the necessary equipment The explosion squad [is to] report to Kafr Kila, where it will receive the radio detonation devices and the necessary equipment 2) The mission: To equip the explosive [pit] on the road leading to the Tel al-nehas-al-khardali junction with the detonation devices. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the anti-tank center in Kafr Kila, and from there go to the storehouse to bring the detonation devices and the necessary equipment The explosion squad [is to] report to Kafr Kila, where it will receive the radio detonation devices and the necessary equipment 3) The mission: To equip the explosive [pit] on the Burj Mlouk-al-Khiyam road with detonation devices. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the infantry center in Dibbin, and from there go to the storehouse to bring the detonation devices and the necessary equipment The explosion squad [is to] report to the infantry center in Dibbin, where it will receive the radio detonation devices and the necessary equipment b. The Al-Shreifeh-Dibbin region: 5

1) The mission: To equip the explosive [pit] on the Dibbin-al-Khiyam road next to the house under construction with detonation devices. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the infantry center in Dibbin, and from there go to the storehouse to bring the detonation devices and the necessary equipment The explosion squad [is to] report to Kafr Kila, where it will receive the radio detonation devices and the necessary equipment 2) The mission: To equip the explosive [pit] on the Dibbin-al-Khiyam road near the olive grove with detonation devices. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the infantry center in Dibbin, and from there go to the storehouse to bring the detonation devices and the necessary equipment The explosion squad [is to] report to the infantry center in Dibbin, where it will receive the radio detonation devices and the necessary equipment c. The Al-Izzie region: 1) The mission: Mining the road at the Al-Izzie-Al- Tawari 2 -Kafr Kila junction. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the anti-tank center in Kafr Kila, and from there go to the storehouse to bring the mines and the necessary equipment 2) The mission: Laying anti-tank mines along the dirt road leading from Al-Izzie to Al-Aoueda-al-Taibe. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the anti-tank center in Kafr Kila, and from there go to the storehouse to bring the detonation devices and the necessary equipment 3) The mission: Laying anti-tank mines at the Al-Izzie to Al-Aoueda-Al-Tawari 3 [junction]. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the anti-tank center in Kafr Kila, and from 2 Al-Tawari here refers to UNIFIL. The reference may be to the location of a UNIFIL position. 3 See previous footnote. 6

there go to the storehouse to bring the mines and the necessary equipment d. The region of the Sarada-Al-Khiyam-Burj al-mlouk junction: The mission: To equip the explosive [pit] on the Al-Khiyam-Sarada road before the al-khiyam junction near the concrete blocks with detonation devices. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the infantry center in Dibbin...The explosion squad [is to] report to the infantry center in Dibbin, where it will receive the radio detonation devices and the necessary equipment. [After that, it is to] go to the Al-Qlaia a area e. The Al-Hamamiss region: 1) The mission: Planting anti-tank mines along the road leading to the Al-Yaaqousa post. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the infantry center in Dibbin, and from there go to the storehouse to bring the mines and the necessary equipment first the along mines anti-tank Planting mission: eht (2 tank embankment near the Al-Yaaqousa post. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the infantry center in Dibbin, and from there go to the storehouse to bring the mines and the necessary equipment 3) The mission: Planting anti-tank mines along the second tank embankment near the Al-Yaaqousa post. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the infantry center in Dibbin, and from there go to the storehouse to bring the mines and the necessary equipment 4) The mission: Planting anti-tank mines along the third tank embankment near the Al-Yaaqousa post. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the infantry center in Dibbin, and from there go to the storehouse to bring the mines and the necessary equipment 7

f. The Marjayoun observation post area: The mission: Planting a wire [-detonated] explosive charge in the Al- Qal ah district on the road leading to the Marjayoun post. [Operatives are to] report to the meeting place in the infantry center in Dibbin, and from there go to the storehouse to bring the mines and the necessary equipment 7. Other sections of the plan (which were not translated) follow in the original document: coordination instructions, administration and logistics, headquarters, communications and additional material (a transparency of explosive pit and explosive charges and tables of the necessary equipment). 8. The original document follows: 8

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Appendix 1 (ii)

HEZBOLLAH BATTLE PLAN FOR THE TOWN OF DEIR MIMESS IN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF SOUTH LEBANON. Overview 1. Among the documents seized in the intelligence-collection center in Kafr Kila during the war was a detailed defensive plan for the fire sector [of the town of Deir Mimess]. It was part of the comprehensive defensive plan for the Fifth Territorial Subsection (the eastern sector) of the Nasr Unit, the unit responsible for the area south of the Litani River), operating under the command of the Jihad Council. 1 2. The town of Deir Mimess lies 3 km (slightly less than 2 miles) northwest of Kafr Kila on a hill overlooking a meander of the Litani River. The population of the town stands at about 500, most of them Christian (Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Protestants and a few Maronite families). According to documents seized, Hezbollah regards the town as strategically important for defending the sector against a possible IDF incursion, since its location commands the roads leading north from Israel to the eastern sector, or past the Litani River and from there to Nabatiyeh. 3. According to the defense plan, the tactical missions of the Deir Mimess sector are to defend the sector within its borders and to provide the necessary support for the neighboring sectors (Kafr Kila, Burj al-molouk, the Deir Mimess grove and Al-Qlayaa). The sector s mission would be to fire on advancing IDF forces and the possibility of [also] firing at the 1 The Jihad Council is a body within Hezbollah s headquarters, responsible for building up its military power and preparing for emergencies. It is headed by Hajj Imad Fayez Mughniyah, Hassan Nasrallah s military deputy. The document was found on a computer and had typographical errors. 2

settlements 2 [in Israel] nearby, should the nearby sectors be unable to do so. The definition of one of the missions of the Deir Mimess sector is the possibility of firing at Israeli population centers. 3 4. The Deir Mimess defense plan, called Al-Muntazar 2, contains an analysis of the possible avenues of action open to the IDF and details the operations of the Hezbollah battle teams in the sector, should Israel attack. The artillery and engineering squad operational plans for the town of Deir Mimess are also given in detail. 5. The defense plan is based on combat between the IDF and armed operatives who would use weapons prepared in advance within the town of Deir Mimess and on the roads in the sector. It details the various districts where explosive devices would be hidden, including one across from a church. It also details 2 Musta marat ( settlements or colonies ). Hezbollah does not recognize Israel s right to exist and uses Arabic terminology which reinforces their stand. Hezbollah regards Israeli population centers as illegal settlements. 3 The original document contains several typographical errors. 3

how anti-aircraft SAM-7 and SAM-14 4 missiles would be deployed and fired from the town, and what the targets of the mortar shells and 107 mm rockets stationed in the town would be. The plan set out missions for Hezbollah battle teams equipped with anti-tank missiles and explosives, located within the town of Deir Mimess. 6. According to the plan, Hezbollah s local sector headquarters was to be located in Deir Mimess, subordinate to the main headquarters in Marjayoun. The various weapons for the battle teams in the town were supposed to be transferred to Deir Mimess from storehouses in Kafr Kila (including antitank and anti-aircraft missiles and explosives). 7. The defense plan clearly illustrated Hezbollah s combat concept, which views the towns and villages in south Lebanon as arenas in which and from which to fight against Israel. Hezbollah based its defensive plans on that concept, intending to fight from within population centers using the local residents as living shields, acts considered war crimes and gross violations of the international laws governing warfare. 8. The following are examples of how Hezbollah fought according to plan Al- Muntazar 2 in Deir Mimess. The original document follows. Assigning missions to the Hezbollah battle teams operating in Deir Mimess 9. Missions were assigned to Hezbollah battle teams operating in Deir Mimess according to plan Al-Muntazar 2. The teams were to detonate the explosive 4 The SAM-7 is a heat-seeking shoulder-fired missile with a range of 4 km (2.5 miles). The SAM-14 is a heat-seeking shoulder-fired missile with a range of 5-6 km (3 to almost 4 miles)., 4

charges and explosive pits and engage with the IDF forces. The missions for the teams were: 5 i. Battle team 511 would wait in ambush for IDF forces advancing toward the Tel al- Nehas junction. The team would include an anti-tank squad of 13 operatives equipped with a 106 mm recoilless gun, three Sagger launchers and two B-10 recoilless guns, a B-9 recoilless gun and a TOW launcher. The weapons would be transferred from the storehouse in Kafr Kila to the eastern part of the Deir Mimess, where the Palestinians had fortified positions. ii. Battle team 513 would be positioned in the eastern part of the town to ambush the IDF forces advancing along the Tel Al-Nehas-Al-Khardali road. The team would have five operatives with a Sagger anti-tank launcher, a B-10 recoilless gun and a TOW launcher. The weapons would be transferred from the storehouse in Kafr Kila to Deir Mimess. iii. Battle team 525 would have five operatives equipped with an RPG-7 launcher who would prepare an ambush, explode wire-detonated charges and engage with IDF forces in the Deir Mimess town square. The explosives for the team would be transferred by the engineering branch in Kafr Kila. iv. Battle team 526 would have five operatives equipped with an RPG-7 launcher who would prepare to ambush IDF forces in the town square. The explosives for the team would be transferred by the engineering branch in Kafr Kila. v. Battle team 527 would have five operatives equipped with an RPG-7 launcher who would prepare to ambush IDF forces near the village school. The explosives for the team would be transferred by the engineering branch in Kafr Kila. vi. Battle team 528 would have five operatives equipped with an RPG-7 launcher who would prepare to ambush IDF forces in the church (al- 5 The description is a summary of the missions and not a literal translation of the document (which follows below in the original Arabic). 5

kaniseh) district. The explosives for the team would be transferred by the engineering branch in Kafr Kila. vii. Battle team 529 would have five operatives equipped with an RPG- 7 launcher who would prepare to ambush IDF forces in the neighborhood of the al-azzia grove. The explosives for the team would be transferred by the engineering branch in Kafr Kila. 10. Battle team 526, which would ambush IDF forces in the town square, was defined as the main force. Battle teams 525 and 528 would form its reserves. Battle team 526 s mission was to wage stubborn warfare against the IDF forces by launching RPGs and attacking after the rocket fire. The team members were ordered to be ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Allah, and only if their ammunition were exhausted and they had no choice, would they be permitted to retreat to an alternative position and prepare themselves for the next mission (additional missions for battle teams 525, 527 and 528 are detailed later in the document). Firing mortars and rockets from within the town 11. Under the heading Artillery and rocket team there is a plan according to which mortars and a rocket would be positioned in the town of Deir Mimess and which describes their missions. Among them are: i. A squad with a 120 mm mortar and its ammunition would be positioned in the town. The mortar and ammunition would be brought from the storehouse in Kafr Kila. ii. A squad with a 107 mm rocket and its ammunition would be positioned in main and alternative positions in the town. The rocket and ammunition would be brought from the storehouse in Kafr Kila. 6

iii. A squad with an 81 mm mortar and its ammunition would be positioned in the town. The mortar and ammunition would be brought from the storehouse in Kafr Kila. iv. Two 60 mm mortars [in the village of Deir Mimess] would fire on the advancing IDF forces and into the village at all stages of the fighting. Detonating explosive devices along roads and inside the village 12. According to the Hezbollah plan, engineering squads would place explosive charges in shallow covered pits and along the roads for which the fire sector of Deir Mimess was responsible. They would detonate them as IDF forces advanced. The locations of the pits along the various roads were noted. Explosives would be brought from the storehouse in Kafr Kila (See Appendix 1(i)). 13. The plan gives the exact location of the various explosive pits. In addition to the pits, wire-detonated explosive charges (which would also be brought from Kafr Kila) were to be blown up at the entrance to Deir Mimess and within the town itself. The following places were noted: i. The al-azzia entrance to Deir Mimess. ii. [Another] entrance to Deir Mimess. iii. The town square. iv. The Deir Mimess-Al-Azzia road, on the left next to the main electricity pole. v. Left of the electricity pole next to the knocked-down concrete wall [?]. vi. The road from the crossroads on the way down on the left hand side going toward the church. vii. Across from the church inside the town. 7

- 7 7 The Deir Mimess charge across from the church (inside the town). The mission: to hide the charge from Kafr Kila across from the church (inside the town). viii. The internal intersection of the square. ix. Near the Al-Ahibba small supermarket, near the electricity pole. x. Near the villa near the school xi. The former volleyball field. Air defense 14. Under the heading Air defense, the plan states that the air space in the Al- Azzia-Deir Mimess region is to be secured with shoulder-fired SAM-7 and SAM-14 missiles. 15. To that end SAM-7 and SAM-14 launchers should be brought to Deir Mimess from the storehouse in Kafr Kila. 8

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Appendix 1(iii)

SEIZED DOCUMENT: TWO APARTMENTS AND TWO BUSINESS SITES IN THE VILLAGE OF MAJDAL SILM RENTED BY A HEZBOLLAH LOGISTICS UNIT OPERATIVE 1. Most Hezbollah operatives in south Lebanon live in the villages in which they are active. However, sometimes operatives from other locations are stationed in the villages. Hezbollah customarily rents apartments and occasionally business sites for them. 2. Muhammad Abd al-hamid Srour, from the village of Aita al-shaab, was detained during the second Lebanon war and during interrogation described how Hezbollah rents buildings and apartments: a. An apartment is rented after Hezbollah approaches the person in charge of the village. He coordinates contacts between the organization and the apartment s owner. b. As far as Hezbollah is concerned, there is nothing to prevent civilians from living in the other apartments in the building. c. The owner of the apartment does not necessarily have to belong to Hezbollah. He receives his security clearance from person in charge of the village, who knows him personally. d. Hezbollah pays the rent directly to the owner, without involving the person in charge of the village. 2

e. The apartments thus rented serve as meeting places for Hezbollah operatives before the organization sends them out on their various missions. 3. Hezbollah documents were seized in its construction unit center in Majdal Silm. One of them was a three-year lease for four properties rented by the organization, two apartments and two stores in section 221 of the village. They were owned by Ahmad Muhammad Shams al-din, a resident of Majdal Silm, and rented by Ali Hussein Shuqeir, an operative of Hezbollah s logistics unit, who may have been transferred to the building unit. The total monthly rent for all four properties was $250. 4. The original lease follows: 3

Original Document 4

Appendix 1 (iv) 1

SEIZED DOCUMENTS: PURCHASE OF SERVICES FROM BUSINESSES IN SOUTH LEBANON BY THE HEZBOLLAH LOGISTICS UNIT Overview 1. Hezbollah s logistics unit customarily purchases from civilian Lebanese businesses for its military infrastructure, e.g., buying food, notions (small articles such as buttons and thread), building materials, fuel, etc. Some of the businesses are owned by Hezbollah operatives and some by civilians who have commercial connections with the organization. 2. Among the documents seized in Hezbollah s construction center in the village of Majdal Silm were two small sheets of paper stapled together (see Appendix). The first was a table of 13 businessmen in south Lebanon who had been subjected to a Hezbollah security check which would enable them to sell merchandise to operatives from the 2401 st Department (the general construction department in Hezbollah s construction unit). The second was a table of six businessmen who had been subjected to a security check which would enable them to sell merchandise to Fourth Territorial Subsection (Ramim ridge) operatives. 3. The tables included the businessmen s full names, the names of the town or village in which their businesses were located, where they lived, the names of their businesses, comments and the results of the security checks. Three businessmen did not pass the security check and their names are highlighted. 4. Translations of the documents and photographs of the originals follow: 2

DOCUMENT NO. 1, TRANSLATION Request for security clearance for the following businesses to sell [merchandise] to the operatives of [logistics] Department 2401 No. Full Name Location Residence Business/ Address 1 Atef Sa ad Khirbet Silm Khirbet Silm Sa ad Electrics/Bir al-selassel Comment s Clearance Approved 2 Adel Shari Khirbet Silm Khirbet Silm Electrics/Mai n road Rejected 3 Ghassan al-tawil Bir al- Selassel Khirbet Silm Food Approved 4 Nur al-din Al- Sultaniyeh Al-Sultaniyeh Nur al-din Wood Approved 5 Yussuf Ibrahim Nidham Kafr Dounin Kafr Dounin Yussuf Nidham Stores Cement and iron Approved 6 Ali Abdallah Salman Al- Shahabiyeh Al-Shahabiyeh Salman Stores Iron Approved 7 Ahmad Hussein Rakin Kafr Dounin Al-Shahabiyeh Rakin Stores Iron/alumi num Approved 8 Ali Munir Hamzeh Al- Shahabiyeh Al-Shahabiyeh Al- Shahabiyeh Auto mechanic Approved 9 Husni Hassan Yussuf Al- Shahabiyeh Al-Shahabiyeh Husni Paints Paint Rejected 10 Ali Hussein Qassem Rumeiti Al-Majadel Al-Majadel Rumeiti Stores Bathroom fixtures Approved 3

11 Ali Muhamma d Qaduh Bir al- Selassel Al-Sawanah Qaduh [gas] Station Gas Approved 12 Ahmad Muhamma d Hariri Kafr Dibbin Project Station Hezbollah Approved 13 Ali Muhamma d Abd Ali Aitit Aitit Fruj Approved 4

DOCUMENT NO. 1, ORIGINAL 5

DOCUMENT NO. 2, TRANSLATION [merchandise] to the operatives of [logistics] Department 2401 No. Full Name Location Residence Business/ Address Comment s Clearance 1 Abd al-hadi Ibrahim Mazner Al-Sawanah Al-Sawanah The Abd al-hadi Sells notions Approved Mazner Company 2 Dib Fadel Al-Sawanah Toulin Fadel Fuel Company Gas station Approved 3 Abd al-nabi Muhammad Fatouni Al-Sawanah Al-Sawanah Pita bakery Approved 4 Hassan Ahmad Dabouq 5 Ali Mustafa Nur al-din Khirbet Silm Khirbet Silm Dabouq Commerce Building materials Khirbet Silm Khirbet Silm Stone and concrete factory Rejected Approved 6 Ali Muhammad Fattouh Khirbet Silm Al-Sawanah Fattouh Gas Station Gas station Approved 6

Document No. 2, Original 7