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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library MEMORANDUM \ THE WHITE HOUSE SECRET /XGDS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION DECL,t\SSIFIED AUTHORITY~~.3/Bif!!t, Me 0.yJ 1:~./(,.Jo-t BY W ~~f;u;\, DA"rE 2 1Jalt z..... PARTICIPANTS: DATE AND TIME: PLACE: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Wednesday, December 5, 1973 8:05 a.m. - Breakfast The Pentagon Let's talk about the Cambodian Air Force improvement plan. It will require help from CIA and State. What about the hotline to Peking? Early warning too? It can be added to this plan easily. Let's add the warning element. But hold it close. It would start a war if it got out. in Egypt? Can I tell Carrington about the British Ambassador It wouldn't do any good. The French are getting into giving arms to the Saudis and we have to move out. SECRE'i'/XGDS

&ECRB!!' /XGDS 2 Moorer going over. No problem. I just don't want Clements and We must not overwhelm them with an ardent embrace. Why don't I raise this when I am in Jidda? Clements just can't be low profile. I suspect he has something else in mind when he gets there. He is enthusiastic. We shouldn't have anyone running around there in light of these messages. [He had given Schlesinger the messages earlier.] It is important what we say to Yamani. I think they are afraid of being left alone with the radicals. The abject behavior of the Europeans has had just the opposite effect. The Japanese told the Arabs not to give us oil. They're giving the Arabs all kinds of aid. first. It's too bad we can't get the oil turned on for us I probably will go to Algeria also. I'll have to drop two hours off Cairo. Show Jim the President's letter to Faisal. Yamani is bright but not influential. He must not know what Fahd is doing. Clements is inclined to apologize to the Saudis. The Europeans have nothing to offer the Arabs. They have no threats. Try to keep Clements under control, but you see Yamani so if Clements goes off the reservation, you can straighten it out. Tell Yamani that they are blowing their best opportunity. The U.S. is now willing to do something in the Middle East. Let me tell you about Sadat. I was gloomy when I went there. I told him that Nasser was a fool because he confronted the United States. I said, "You can get the October 22 line if you want a brawl, but then the Israelis e1!5cr~t /XGDS

SBGR:ST/XGDS 3 will be able to mobilize opposition." He finally bought it, then fell off last week. I wrote him, and he fell off again. We'll have a tough time with the Israelis at the conference. Less than you would think. Israel realizes they had a hard time strategically. Ocean. I think we should increase a presence in the Indian I want to withdraw the amphibious group to refit. I think we should think about putting 5-6000 Marines in Bahrein. They will never agree. Now about Europe. I will be very tough at NATO. I will say we are for European unity and NATO but things are tough. The energy crisis proves our point -- we can operate alone, they can't. We will make no other proposal. Heath gave two statements. In the second speech he said if the Europeans hadn't been united they couldn't have withstood the United States. Heath knew every detail of our plans except the timing. He says we object to negotiating with the Dane. That is crud. We object to an instructed delegate. nuclear war agreement. The biggest problem is with the U.S. -Soviet You tell Carrington we are fed up because Brimelow drafted the nuclear agreement and then didn't back it. The French want a statement about the nuclear agreement in the declaration. I refused because it indicates a question about it. There should be no difference between the Nine and NATO. should they be different as a group than their initial positions'? Why They have to under We should stand back to back on this though. stand we are tough. SEGRE'!' /XGDS

SEC:R~'r /XGDS 4 My theme has been that we take NATO security seriously and they must take it seriously. The French theme that we have to defend Europe no matter what is crap. Will you send me a message of what you pick up? They are contradictory -- they say we are bound to protect them but that we are deserting them. I sent Walters to Galley. I told the Ambassador that after leaning over backwards, we would reluctantly have to take them on. They said we screwed them on nuclear cooperation. We don't want to let loose yet, but if we give them negative guidance, is that increaseable? Yes, but we can give it out bit by bit. That is crap that they turned on us because of a refusal on negative guidance. It was the other way around. I regret about the French because theirs is the only serious defense effort. Once the Europeans face the defense problem it will drive them against the Soviet Union. Once the Europeans realize they can't get our cooperation if they attack us. Only the French have the guts to stand up against us -- but they don't have de Gaulle, a special relation to the Soviet Union, etc. But I would like to back them down without breaking them. I am planning to extemporize mostly. I have refused to give a lead-off speech at NATO. Remember that most of the countries are for us. That is right. to say look what you have done to us. who have been good. I want our friends to go to the French I will have bilaterals only with the ones I would not see the Germans. SECRE':P/XGDS,,.,...

~ECBik~/XGDS 5 If Scheel asks, I will have to, but only then. Jackson-Nunn: German offset already covers the deficit. and Commerce in line. If OMB can do its job, the But we have to keep Treasury Work it out with Jim. Let's draw a NSSM on offset. Have an SRG on it. on where the forces are. The balance of payments impact is not so dependent I do not want acquisition policy in the interagency process. No, we will do it directly with you. NSSM-171. It is based on Dulles' view of China. Let's review it, but we can't expose one real reason for our forces in Asia, that is, China policy. We need to have a long word with Canada. They are doing nothing in NATO, nothing in NORAD, free import of cars. What do we want? We want them to put a brigade back in NATO. They'll never do it. But I believe in putting our policy on reciprocity. But there we have to have objectives which are attainable. You can take a run at the brigade but he has domestic problems. That was Trudeau's decision. Politicians always go after the incremental 10 percent and lose their whole constituency. The whole European political scene is this. This is Brandt's problem. Only the British have been firm and they are the same now. Did you give Mahon the cuts? 56GR:ST/XGDS

SEGR~T /XGDS 6 agrees. We are fat. I got that money back. I just don't want SALT-related items jeopardized. Only Trident, and we don't need it. Zumwalt McClellan said he would cut us $3 billion but would agree to a supplemental for that much. I want to fly an SR -71 over Cuba rather than a U -2 because we don't need the protection. Okay. Brezhnev said, "Can't we stop deploying new systems?" willing to pay Trident, we need a price which is commensurate. think they will give up MIRV testing. If we are I don't community. not my view. We shouldn't air the price we pay throughout the Let Lodal circulate his papers. It is useful, but Trident is an albatross. \,; I,,, '\"/' '"-=_/'if"

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