Adam C. Pelser Curriculum Vitae

Adam C. Pelser Curriculum Vitae Adam_Pelser@baylor.edu Education PhD, Philosophy,, Waco, Texas, expected graduation May, 2011. Dissertation: Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Goods, Robert C. Roberts, director. MA, Philosophy,, Waco, Texas, 2009. MA, Religion, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 2007, with Highest Honors. Thesis: Made in the Image of Man: The Value of Christian Theology for Public Moral Discourse on Human Cloning, Simeon Illesanmi, director. BA, Philosophy, with minor in Biblical Studies, Biola University, La Mirada, California, 2003, summa cum laude. Areas of Specialization Ethics, Epistemology Areas of Competence Applied Ethics, Moral Psychology, History of Ancient Philosophy, History of Modern Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Logic and Critical Thinking Professional Memberships American Philosophical Association Society of Christian Philosophers Teaching Experience Courses and Colloquia Taught: Introductory Topics in Ethics: Seven Deadly Sins (in progress) World of Rhetoric II: Rhetoric in Context, Baylor Interdisciplinary Core (in progress) Introductory Topics in Ethics: Philosophy of Love and Sex, Fall 2010 C.S. Lewis The Four Loves, Baylor Honors College Colloquium, September 2010 C.S. Lewis The Abolition of Man, Baylor Honors College Colloquium, April 2010 University 1000, Baylor New Student Programs, Fall 2008 Logic II and III, Live Oak Classical School (August 2008 May 2010) Assistantships and Other Experience: Philosophy and Religion; Teaching Assistant to Dr. Jonathan Kvanvig Introductory Topics in Ethics: Philosophy of Love and Sex; Teaching Assistant to Dr. Alexander Pruss

C.V. Page 2 of 6 Introductory Topics in Ethics: Seven Deadly Sins; Teaching Assistant to Dr. Robert Kruschwitz Critical Thinking; Teaching Assistant to Dr. Francis Beckwith Lecture on Epistemic Contextualism for Dr. Jonathan Kvanvig s Epistemology course, April 17, 2008 Workshop on Teaching Philosophy, seminar (taught by Dr. Robert Kruschwitz) Professional Experience and Service Referee for Mind and Philosophical Psychology Research Assistant to Dr. Jonathan Kvanvig, (2008-09); duties included refereeing for, indexing, and copyediting of Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Vol. II, as well as planning and organizing the 4 th Annual Philosophy of Religion Conference held at, Feb. 5-7, 2009 Mentor for visiting Chinese graduate student (August 2010-present); duties include providing academic and professional guidance and facilitating cultural experiences and involvement in the social life of an American university; sponsored by a Templeton Foundation grant Publications Against Frankfurt s Care Ground of Importance, Southwest Philosophy Review (forthcoming). Belief in Reid s Theory of Perception, History of Philosophy Quarterly 27, 4 (2010): 359-78. Conference Presentations and Participation (forthcoming) Against Frankfurt s Care Ground of Importance, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, San Diego, CA, April 20-23, 2011 APA Pacific Graduate Student Paper Award Foundational Beliefs and Persuading with Humor: Reflections Inspired by Reid and Kierkegaard, with coauthor Daniel M. Johnson, Evangelical Philosophical Society Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA, November 17-19, 2010 Against Frankfurt s Care Ground of Importance, 72 nd Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Society, Memphis, TN, November 12-14, 2010 To Understand and To Understand Are Two Things: Kierkegaardian Reflections on the Value of Understanding, Baptist Association of Philosophy Teachers Biennial Meeting, Samford University, Birmingham, AL, October 8-10, 2010 Emotion and the Value of Understanding, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, San Francisco, CA, April 2, 2010 APA Pacific Graduate Student Paper Award Foundational Beliefs and Persuading with Humor: Reflections Inspired by Reid and Kierkegaard, with coauthor Daniel M. Johnson, Annual Conference of the British Society for the History of Philosophy, Universities of Aberdeen and Glasgow, Scotland, March 21-26, 2010; also presented at Philosophy Graduate Colloquium: Prospective Student Weekend, January 23, 2010.

C.V. Page 3 of 6 Too Much Information: The High Metaphysical Price of a Neo-Aristotelian Account of Perception, Society of Christian Philosophers Eastern Regional Meeting, Winston-Salem, NC, March 12, 2010 Seeing is Not Believing: A Case for Modifying Reid s Analysis of Perception, American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, Chicago, IL, February 19, 2010 APA Central Graduate Student Paper Award Foley, Frankfurt, and Failures of Rationality, 5 th Annual Philosophy of Religion Conference, San Antonio, TX, February 4-6, 2010 Getting to Know the Unknowable: The Value of Philosophical Theology on Alston s Divine Mystery Thesis, Society of Christian Philosophers Central Regional Meeting, Oklahoma Baptist University, April 23-25, 2009 Emotional Wisdom as Intellectual Virtue in Aristotle s Ethics, Society of Christian Philosophers Eastern Regional Meeting, Assumption College, Worcester, MA, March 28, 2009 Emotional Knowledge: Emotion as a Basic Source of Justification, American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, Chicago, IL, February 20, 2009; also presented at Philosophy Graduate Colloquium: Prospective Student Weekend, February 15, 2009. APA Central Graduate Student Paper Award The Temptations, Desires, and Sympathy of Christ, Society of Christian Philosophers Central Regional Meeting, Union, TN, May 10, 2008; also presented at Philosophy Graduate Colloquium, September 21, 2007 Does Punishment Preclude Forgiveness? Society of Christian Philosophers Eastern Regional Meeting, April 19, 2008; also presented at the Christian Scholars Forum, UT Austin, April 5, 2008 Augustine Against Skepticism, 41 st Annual Meeting of the North Texas Philosophical Association, Denton, TX, April 12, 2008 Session Chair, 3 rd Annual Philosophy of Religion Conference, San Antonio, TX, Feb. 7, 2008 Course Work Ethics: Emotions seminar Robert Roberts Aristotle s Ethics seminar Robert Roberts (also listed under History of Philosophy) Epistemology of Emotions/Moral Epistemology directed reading Robert Roberts (also listed under Epistemology) Virtue Ethics seminar Robert Roberts Contemporary Ethics seminar Robert Roberts (audit) Normativity Jon Kvanvig (audit, also listed under Epistemology) Epistemology: Contemporary Debates in Epistemology directed reading Jon Kvanvig Virtue Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge seminar Jon Kvanvig Epistemology of Emotions/Moral Epistemology directed reading Robert Roberts (also listed under Ethics) Normativity Jon Kvanvig (audit, also listed under Ethics)

C.V. Page 4 of 6 History of Philosophy: Aristotle s Ethics seminar Robert Roberts Augustine seminar, focused on the Cassiciacum Dialogues Michael Foley Thomas Reid seminar, focused on Reid s theory of perception Todd Buras Søren Kierkegaard seminar, focused on his pseudonymous works C. Stephen Evans Readings in Ancient/Medieval Philosophy independent study for comprehensive exam Readings in Modern/Contemporary Philosophy independent study for comprehensive exam Philosophy of Religion/Religious Studies: Cosmological and Ontological Arguments seminar Alexander Pruss Augustine seminar, focused on the Cassiciacum Dialogues Michael Foley (also listed under History of Philosophy) Søren Kierkegaard seminar, focused on his pseudonymous works C. Stephen Evans (also listed under History of Philosophy) Comparative Religious Ethics (Wake Forest) Simeon Ilesanmi Religion, Ethics, and Pubic Life directed reading (Wake Forest) Simeon Ilesanmi Church, Law, and Ethics (Wake Forest) Historical Christology (Wake Forest) Craig Atwood Modern Biblical Interpretation (Wake Forest) Mary Foskett Research Methods in Religion (Wake Forest) Fred Horton Religions of Japan (Wake Forest) James Ford Metaphysics: Philosophy of Time seminar Alexander Pruss Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics seminar Alexander Pruss and Robert Koons (Baylor/Univ. of Texas joint course) Other Course Work: Logic Alexander Pruss Philosophical Writing Jon Kvanvig Teaching Philosophy Workshop Robert Kruschwitz Awards and Honors APA Pacific Graduate Student Paper Award, 2011 APA Pacific Graduate Student Paper Award, 2010 APA Central Graduate Student Paper Award, 2010 APA Central Graduate Student Paper Award, 2009 Dean s Scholarship, 2007-present Graduate Assistantship and Stipend, 2007-present Wake Forest University Graduate Scholarship, 2005-2007 Epsilon Kappa Epsilon Honors Society of Biola University, inducted 2003

C.V. Page 5 of 6 References Dr. Robert C. Roberts, Distinguished Professor of Ethics Robert_Roberts@baylor.edu (254) 710-6363 Dr. Jonathan Kvanvig, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Jonathan_Kvanvig@baylor.edu (254) 710-6364 Dr. C. Stephen Evans, University Professor of Philosophy and Humanities C_Stephen_Evans@baylor.edu (254) 710-7333 Dr. Robert B. Kruschwitz, Professor and Director of the Center for Christian Ethics Robert_Kruschwitz@baylor.edu (254) 710-3775 Dr. Michael Beaty, Professor of Philosophy and Department Chair Michael_Beaty@baylor.edu (254) 710-4806 Dr. Simeon Ilesanmi, Washington M. Wingate Professor of Religion Wake Forest University ilesanmi@wfu.edu (336) 758-5459 Dr. Gregg Ten Elshof, Professor and Philosophy Department Chair Biola University gregg.tenelshof@biola.edu (562) 944-0351/5577

C.V. Page 6 of 6 Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Goods Dissertation Abstract Recent work in the philosophy of emotions has been marked by the development of two significant trends. First, the past few decades have seen a significant rise in interest in perceptual accounts of emotions. Contemporary emotion theory has been marked, secondly, by a quickly growing literature on the epistemology of emotions. The simultaneous development of these two trends is not coincidental. Given the central importance of sense perception as a paradigmatic source of belief and contributor to justification, knowledge, and understanding in epistemology, understanding emotions as perceptual states has obvious and important implications for the epistemology of emotions. In this dissertation I engage these two closely related trends in emotion theory. In sharp contrast to the popular view, which Catherine Elgin has called the standard view, that emotions and rationality are antithetical, I contend that emotions, understood as evaluative perceptual states, can contribute positively to our achievement of valuable epistemic goods including justification, understanding, and wisdom. I argue, moreover, that some important cognitive achievements are not possible apart from apt emotional perception. In chapter one I begin my development and defense of the claim that emotions are evaluative perceptual states by considering some of the oft-cited parallels between emotions and paradigmatic sense perceptions, as well as some similarities between emotions and sense perceptions that have received little or no attention in recent literature. Here, I employ some helpful resources gleaned from Thomas Reid s seminal work on perception. I argue that emotions, like sense perceptions, can be both original and acquired and that they are distinct from the sensory inputs that give rise to them. Emotions also parallel sense perceptions in being passive, intentional mental states with propositional (and, hence, conceptual) content and by being sources of belief, while yet not themselves beliefs. I conclude the chapter by arguing that even if there are non-emotional evaluative perceptions (e.g., desires or concerns) this does not threaten the perceptual thesis of emotion. In chapter two I provide further support for the perceptual thesis of emotion by arguing that emotions, like their sense perceptual analogues, can and do function as justifying reasons or evidence for beliefs. I call this the justificatory thesis of emotion (or justificatory thesis for short). I defend the justificatory thesis, first by considering a couple of cases that plausibly involve justified evaluative beliefs that are both formed and justified on the basis of emotional experience. The justificatory thesis can also be seen to be initially plausible on the basis of an argument from the existence of justified evaluative beliefs; whence the justification for these beliefs if not in evaluative experience of the sort characteristic of emotions? Having provided a positive case for the plausibility of the justificatory thesis I then defend the thesis against the strongest objections posed against it in recent literature. In chapter three I continue my defense of the perceptual thesis of emotion by arguing that emotional experience is necessary for the best and deepest human understanding of value just as sense perceptual experience is necessary for the best and deepest human understanding of the physical world. Here I draw a parallel between a modified version of Frank Jackson s Knowledge Argument against physicalism and an account of Temple Grandin, an autistic animal scientist whose emotional deficiencies seem, according to her own account, to result in diminished understanding of certain evaluative (aesthetic) properties. I conclude the chapter by arguing that just as emotion is a source of evaluative understanding it is also plausibly the source of our awareness and appreciation of the value of at least some kinds of understanding. In chapter four I argue that the evaluative understanding under discussion in chapter three is an essential constituent of practical wisdom. Hence, insofar as emotional experience is necessary for evaluative understanding, emotional experience is also necessary for practical wisdom. This analysis fits very nicely with and perhaps even follows from Aristotle s discussion of practical wisdom. Aristotle identifies a deliberative and a perceptual element of practical wisdom and he identifies emotions as evaluative perceptual states. I argue that if, as it seems, emotional experience is (partly) constitutive of both the deliberative and perceptual elements of Aristotelian practical wisdom, then we can derive additional support from Aristotle s discussion of practical wisdom for the justificatory thesis of emotion defended in chapter two, as well as for the perceptual thesis of emotion defended throughout the dissertation.