BRIE GERTLER Corcoran Department of Philosophy University of Virginia 120 Cocke Hall, P.O. Box 400780 Charlottesville, VA 22904 gertler@virginia.edu http://pages.shanti.virginia.edu/bg8y RESEARCH INTERESTS Philosophy of Mind especially self-knowledge, mental content, and consciousness. EMPLOYMENT University of Virginia. Commonwealth Professor of Philosophy (2014-present) Professor (2013-2014) Associate Professor (2004-2013) University of Wisconsin Madison. Associate Professor (2004-5, leave of absence); Assistant Professor (2001-2004) College of William & Mary. Assistant Professor (1997-2001) EDUCATION Brown University, Ph.D., Philosophy, 1997 Dissertation: An Introspectivist View of the Mental. Committee: Ernest Sosa (chair), Jaegwon Kim, James Van Cleve. University of Pennsylvania, M.A., Philosophy, 1992 Swarthmore College, B.A. with High Honors, Philosophy, 1989 AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS Visiting Fellowship, Centre for Consciousness, The Australian National University (January- February 2010). University of Virginia Sesquicentennial Award (Spring 2010) University of Virginia Summer Research Funds (2005, 2007, 2009, 2012) University of Wisconsin Summer Research Funds (2002, 2003) College of William and Mary Summer Grant (2000) NEH Stipend to attend summer seminar on Folk Psychology (1999) NEH Summer Grant (1998) Brown University President s Award for Teaching Excellence (1996)
Gertler, 3/2015, p. 2 RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: Self-Knowledge and the Demands of Rational Agency. In draft. Mental Individualism (working title). MS in progress. PUBLICATIONS: Books Self-Knowledge (2011). Routledge. Arguing About the Mind (2007), co-edited with Lawrence Shapiro. Routledge. Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge (2003), edited. Ashgate, Epistemology and Mind series. Articles Self-Knowledge. Forthcoming (2015) in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Major revision. Previous versions appeared in 2008 and 2003.) Internalism, Externalism, and Accessibilism. Forthcoming (2015) in Externalism and Skepticism, S. Goldberg, ed. (Cambridge). Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What is the Boundary of the Thinker? (2012) Philosophical Perspectives 2012: Philosophy of Mind, pp. 51-75. Renewed Acquaintance. (2012) In Smithies and Stoljar, eds., Introspection and Consciousness (Oxford), pp. 89-123. Conscious States as Objects of Awareness. (2012) Philosophical Studies symposium on Uriah Kriegel s Subjective Consciousness: a self-representational theory. Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief. (2011) In Hatzimoysis, ed., Self-Knowledge (Oxford), pp. 125-45. The Role of Ignorance in the Problem of Consciousness. (2009) Critical notice of Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: the epistemic origin of the problem of consciousness. Noûs 43: 378-93. Introspection. (2009) In Bayne, Cleeremans and Wilken, eds., The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. (Oxford) Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self. (2007) Philosophical Issues 17: 37-56. Overextending the Mind? (2007) In Gertler and Shapiro, eds., Arguing about the Mind. (Routledge) In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism. (2007) In Feinberg and Shafer-Landau, eds., Reason and Responsibility, 13 th edition. (Wadsworth) Reprinted (2014) in Timmons and Shoemaker, eds., Knowledge, Nature, and Norms, 2 nd edition. (Wadsworth). Reprinted (2011) in Alter and Howell, eds., Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reader (Oxford).
Gertler, 3/2015, p. 3 Tienson s Challenge to Content Externalism. (2007) The Southern Journal of Philosophy (Spindel Conference 2006) 45: 60-65. Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced. (2006) In R. Stainton, ed., Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Blackwell), pp. 202-216. The Knowledge Argument. (2005) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2 nd edition. (Macmillan) We can t know a priori that H 2 O exists. But can we know that water does? (2004) Analysis 64: 44-7. Simulation Theory on Conceptual Grounds. (2004) Protosociology 20: 261-84. How to Draw Ontological Conclusions from Introspective Data. (2003) In B. Gertler, ed., Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge (Ashgate), pp. 233-51. Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments about the Mind. (2002) Noûs 36: 22-49. Can Feminists be Cartesians? (2002) Dialogue 41: 91-112. The Mechanics of Self-Knowledge. (2002) Philosophical Topics 28: 125-46. Metaphysics. (2002) Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Macmillan). Introspecting Phenomenal States. (2001) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63: 305-28. The Relationship between Phenomenality and Intentionality. (2001) Commentary on Charles Siewert, The Significance of Consciousness (Princeton). Psyche 7 (17). The Explanatory Gap is Not an Illusion (reply to Michael Tye). (2001) Mind 110: 689-94. Functionalism s Methodological Predicament. (2000) The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38: 77-94. A Defense of the Knowledge Argument. (1999) Philosophical Studies 93: 317-36. Book Reviews Review of Katalin Farkas, The Subject s Point of View. (2009) Philosophical Quarterly 59: 743-47. Review of Roessler and Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. (2004) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Review of John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. (2002) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, inaugural issue. Review of Andre Gallois, The World Without, The Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority. (2000) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61: 235-8. Review of Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. (1999) Ethics 110: 202-5. Review of W.G. Lycan, Consciousness and Experience. (1998) Mind 107: 676-9.
Gertler, 3/2015, p. 4 PRESENTATIONS: Upcoming Self-Knowledge and the Demands of Rational Agency. Rutgers Epistemology Conference, May 2015. Do we have Privileged Access to our Dispositional Attitudes? Philosophy of Mind conference, Virginia Tech, April 2015. Does the Mind Extend Beyond the Body? Public talk for Philosophy Today series; and Self- Knowledge and the Demands of Rational Agency (department talk), University of Alabama (Tuscaloosa), April 2015. Past Transparency Accounts of Self-Knowledge: a consumer s guide. Talk in session on Self- Knowledge and Transparency (Invited), APA Central Division meeting. St. Louis, February 2015. Conscious Attitudes and Intentional Action. Moral Phenomenology conference, in connection with Illuminating Reasons project (Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons; Invited). University of Arizona, October 2014. Subjectivity and Agency: What Makes My Attitudes Mine?. Subjectivity and Experience conference, in connection with Philosophy of Perspectival Thoughts and Facts project (Invited). University of Barcelona (Spain), September 2014. Subjectivity and Agency: What Makes My Attitudes Mine?. Subjective Structure of Consciousness conference (Invited). University of Manchester (England), June 2014. Standing Attitudes and Agency. Stanford University, May 2014. Observational Self-Knowledge and the Demands of Rational Agency. University of Miami, December 2013. Vehicle Externalism and Intentional Action. Varieties of Externalism Workshop (Invited). Eidyn Research Center, University of Edinburgh (Scotland). October 2013. Standing Attitudes and Intentional Action. University of Wisconsin Madison, September 2013. Does the Mind Extend into the World? Davidson College, April 2013. Observational Self-Knowledge and the Demands of Rational Agency. Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology Conference (Invited). Austin, Texas, February 2013. Standing Attitudes and Intentional Action. Rice University, January 2013. Standing Attitudes and Intentional Action. University of Massachusetts Amherst, November 2012. Observational Self-Knowledge and the Demands of Rational Agency. (Keynote address) 10 th Annual Philosophy of Mind, Language, and Cognitive Science graduate conference, University of Western Ontario, May 2012. The Narrow Self. (Invited) At Consciousness and the Self workshop, Southern Methodist University, April 2012.
Gertler, 3/2015, p. 5 Critic in Author Meets Critics session on Peter Carruthers, The Opacity of Mind (Oxford 2011). APA Pacific Division meeting, April 2012. Standing Attitudes and Intentional Action. University of Vermont, March 2012. Critic in Author Meets Critics session on Derk Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (Oxford 2011). APA Central Division meeting, February 2012. Observational Self-Knowledge and the Demands of Rational Agency. (Invited) At 3 rd Annual Mind Knowledge! workshop, Universität Graz (Austria), December 2011. Observational Self-Knowledge and the Demands of Rational Agency. (Invited) At Consciousness, Intentionality, and Phenomenality conference. Rice University, October 2011. Observational Self-Knowledge and the Demands of Rational Agency. (Invited) At Virginia Philosophical Association annual meeting. College of William & Mary, October 2011. Observational Self-Knowledge and the Demands of Rational Agency. (Keynote address) At Subjectivity and Self-Knowledge conference. Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, September 2011. Defending Introspectionism. (Invited) At Introspective Self-Knowledge workshop. University of Luxembourg, June 2011. Introspective Knowledge by Acquaintance. (Invited) At Acquaintance: A Conference on the Centenary of Bertrand Russell s Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. University of Texas Austin, March 2011. The Extended Mind and the Status of Standing Attitudes. University of Rochester, February 2011. The Extended Mind and the Status of Standing Attitudes. University of Iowa, January 2011. Philosophy TV Dialogue with Alex Byrne (MIT), discussing knowledge of one s own beliefs. November 22, 2010. http://www.philostv.com/alex-byrne-and-brie-gertler/ Philosophy TV Dialogue with Eric Schwitzgebel (UC-Riverside), discussing introspection. September 30, 2010. http://www.philostv.com/eric-schwitzgebel-and-brie-gertler/ Mind-Body Dualism and the Demands of Scientific Naturalism. UVa Psychology Department, Cognitive Lunch series. September 2010. Internalism, Externalism, and the Delineation of the Subject. (Invited) At Externalism Challenged? Internalism versus Externalism Today. University of Stockholm, May 2010. Conscious States as Objects of Awareness. Author Meets Critics session on Uriah Kriegel s Subjective Consciousness: a self-representational theory (Oxford 2009), APA Pacific Division meeting, April 1, 2010. What We Talk About When We Talk About Externalism. The Australian National University, January 2010. The Extended Mind and the Status of Standing Beliefs. University of Sydney (Australia), February 2010.
The Extended Mind and the Status of Standing Beliefs. University of Wollongong (Australia), February 2010. Gertler, 3/2015, p. 6 Does Your Mind Extend Beyond the Limits of Your Body? John Tyler Community College (Chester, VA), December 2008. How Should Externalists Delineate the Mind? Society for Philosophy and Psychology annual meeting (Toronto), June 2008. Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief. (Invited) Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology annual meeting (New Orleans), March 2008. Does the Mind Extend into the World? University of Richmond, May 2007. Content Externalism and the Limits of the Self. Wake Forest University, April 2007. Am I Embodied and Embedded? Externalism and the Self. Tucson 2006: Towards a Science of Consciousness, Tucson, AZ, April 2006. Phenomenal Character, Representational Content, and Intrinsicness. (Invited) Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop and Network, July 2005. The Narrow Mind. California State University Northridge, March 2005. The Narrow Mind. Virginia Commonwealth University, October 2004. A Fregean Argument Against Externalism. University of Virginia, March 2004. A Fregean Argument Against Externalism. Harvard University, November 2003. A Fregean Argument Against Externalism. Northern Illinois University, September 2003. The Narrow Mind. NEH Institute on Consciousness and Intentionality (Santa Cruz, CA), July 2002. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: what introspection can tell us about the mind. Lafayette College, October 2001. Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments about the Mind. University of Colorado Boulder, February 2001. Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments about the Mind. UC Santa Cruz, February 2001. Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments about the Mind. University of Wisconsin Madison, September 2000. Can Feminists Accept Cartesian Introspectivism? APA Pacific Division meeting (Albuquerque), April 2000. The One and Only Water: How a Conceptual Account of Explanatory Reduction Can Ensure Uniqueness, APA Central Division meeting (Chicago), April 2000. Linguistic Labor and the Explanatory Gap. Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology annual meeting (New Orleans), April 1998. Introspecting Phenomenal States. Brandeis University, October 1998.
Gertler, 3/2015, p. 7 Introspecting Phenomenal States. Society for Philosophy and Psychology annual meeting (New York City), June 1997. With comments by Robert Van Gulick. Introspecting Phenomenal States. College of William and Mary, February 1997. Introspecting Phenomenal States. University of Delaware, Februrary 1997. Introspecting Phenomenal States. University of Coventry (England), January 1997. Comments On Terry Horgan and John Tienson, Phenomenal Intentionality and Holism. Conscious Thought and Thought about Consciousness workshop, University of Mississippi, April 27-May 1, 2014. On Matthew Lockard, Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop and Network, August 2013. On Benj Hellie, Out of this World. APA Pacific Division meeting (San Francisco), March 2013. On Larry Herzberg, On Knowing How I Feel: A Causal-Reliabilist Analysis. APA Central Division meeting (New Orleans), February 2013. On Michael Pelczar, Relativity and Experience. III UVa Department of Philosophy International Colloquium, April 28-30, 2011. On Robert W. Schroer, Mental Paint and the Forgivable Introspective Mistake. APA Central Division meeting (Chicago), April 2009. On John Tienson, What Does a Deceived Cartesian Meditator Know? The First-Person Perspective in Philosophical Inquiry (Spindel Conference), University of Memphis, September 2006. On Torin Alter, What do Split-Brain Cases Show about the Unity of Consciousness? APA Central Division meeting (Chicago), April 2006. On Jonathan Ellis, Content Externalism and Phenomenal Character: a new worry about privileged access. APA Central Division meeting (Chicago), April 2005. On Liane Stillwell, Lockean Persons and Psychological Continuity. APA Central Division meeting (Chicago), April 2004. On Fred Dretske, Knowing What You Think vs. Knowing That You Think It, 36 th Chapel Hill Colloquium in Philosophy, October 2002. On Galen Strawson, What is the Relation between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience? SOFIA XIV Conference (Veracruz, Mexico), December 2001. On Sean Allen-Hermanson, The HOT Core of Naturalizing the Mind, APA Central Division meeting (Minneapolis), May 2001. On Gordon Barnes, In Defense of Conceptual Analysis, APA Pacific Division meeting (San Francisco), April 2001. On David Sosa, A Table of Contents, Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference (Bellingham, WA), August 2000.
On Michael Rea, Naturalism and Material Objects, 4 th Annual Mighty Midwestern Metaphysics Mayhem, University of Notre Dame (South Bend, IN), August 1999. Gertler, 3/2015, p. 8 On Eric Schwitzgebel, In-Between Believing, APA Pacific Division meeting (Berkeley), April 1999. SERVICE PROFESSIONAL SERVICE Book Symposia Editor, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2009-2014. Mentor, 2013 Mentoring Workshop. I am serving as a mentor to 5 junior female philosophers. The mentorship project is organized by Louise Antony (UMass-Amherst) and Ann Cudd (Univ of Kansas). The 9 mentors and 45 mentees participated in a threeday workshop at UMass in June 2013. Member, International Research Network, Extended Knowledge project, at the Eidyn Research Center, University of Edinburgh, 2013-16. Information here: http://eidyn.ppls.ed.ac.uk Referee for American Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Mind and Language, Noûs, Philosophers Imprint, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Oxford University Press, Routledge. Editor for Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, Philosophy Compass. (www.philosophycompass.com) 2005-2008. Member, APA Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research. (2004-7) DEPARTMENTAL AND UNIVERSITY SERVICE (AT UVA) Promotion and Tenure Committee, Arts & Sciences, 2014-2015. Interim Chair, Department of Philosophy, Fall 2014. Director of Graduate Studies, Philosophy Department. January 2005-June 2013. External member, Departmental Chair search, Religious Studies Department. Fall 2011. Secretary, UVa Faculty Senate; Member, Faculty Senate Executive Committee. 2010-11. Philosophy Department representative, Faculty Senate. Fall 2005-Spring 2011. Member, ad hoc Peer Review Committee (July 2010). Convened to evaluate an appeal by a faculty member facing termination. With George Cohen (Law) and Tim Wilson (Psychology). Member, Faculty Senate Grievance Committee (2005-9). ADVISING GRADUATE Advisor: Sam Nicholson, Philosophy, Transparency and Intrinsic Intentionality. Ph.D. December 2011. Informal advising: Regular meetings with Jared Peterson (PhD student in Philosophy at Northwestern), visiting UVa April-May 2014.
Dissertation committee member (at UVa): Gertler, 3/2015, p. 9 Philosophy: S. Matthew Duncan, Ph.D. 2014; Charles Rathkopf, Ph.D 2013; Paul Nedelisky, Ph.D 2013; Joungbin Lim, Ph.D. 2011; Brannon McDaniel, Ph.D. 2009; Charles Tanksley, Ph.D. 2009; Jason Megill, Ph.D. 2008; Catherine Sutton, Ph.D. 2008; Andrew Moser, Ph.D. 2006; Patrick Toner, Ph.D. 2005. External: Megan Scalia Bryce, Psychology, Ph.D. 2013; James Maxwell, Physics, Ph.D. 2011; Elizabeth Tenney, Psychology, Ph.D. 2011; Joshua Magee, Psychology, Ph.D. 2010. Dissertation committee member (at Wisconsin): Stephen Schmid, Philosophy, Ph.D. 2004. UNDERGRADUATE Honors tutorial in Epistemology, Jonathan Weinstein, 2012. Honors tutorial in metaphysics, Michael Murphy, 2008. Thesis (Distinguished Majors Program), Nicholas Lawson, 2008. COURSES TAUGHT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA Consciousness and Physicalism (graduate seminar) Mental Content (graduate seminar) Self-Knowledge (graduate seminar) Philosophy of Mind (graduate seminar) Themes from Descartes (graduate first-year seminar, co-taught with Antonia LoLordo) Epistemology (advanced undergraduate) Philosophy of Mind (advanced undergraduate) Seminar for Majors: Action Theory (advanced undergraduate) Seminar for Majors: Self-Knowledge (advanced undergraduate) Knowledge and Reality (undergraduate) Introduction to Philosophy (undergraduate) AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN A Priori Knowledge (graduate seminar) Self-Knowledge (graduate seminar) Metaphysics (advanced undergraduate) Philosophy of Mind (advanced undergraduate) Introduction to Philosophy (undergraduate) AT THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY Metaphysics Seminar (advanced undergraduate) Philosophy of Language Seminar (advanced undergraduate)
Gertler, 3/2015, p. 10 Philosophy and Feminism (undergraduate) Introduction to Critical Thinking (undergraduate) Introduction to Philosophy (undergraduate) AT BROWN UNIVERSITY Knowledge and Reality (undergraduate) Philosophy and Feminism (undergraduate)