Chapter 1 A primer of major ethical theories Our topic in this course is privacy. Hence we want to understand (i) what privacy is and also (ii) why we value it and how this value is reflected in our norms and practices. This second question makes our course a course in applied ethics, like a course on environmental ethics or medical ethics. It is common to begin applied ethics courses with a brief overview of traditional ethical theories. Our brief overview of these theories today will be necessarily cursory and incomplete. But often when we re debating an ethical issue, our arguments appeal to principles or concepts which are adopted by some but not all ethical theories, and it is hence good to have some familiarity with these theories. For other, shorter presentations of very similar material, see [Vallentyne2014aa], [McNaughton2014aa], [Hursthouse2014aa]. The following presentation is indebted heavily to [Baron1997aa], which I use in quarter-long courses on normative ethics. Utilitarianism, or the tradition following Mill 1. The basic idea. The basic idea of utilitarianism is that what is right is what promotes everyone s happiness. The initial attractiveness of utilitarianism is that [... ] the only fundamental moral facts are facts about individual well-being ([Scanlon1982] p. 108). Mill himself thought that there was a natural enough inference from the individual member of society to society as a whole: [... ] that each person s happiness is a good to that 1
2 1. A primer of major ethical theories person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons ([Mill1991] Chapter 4 3). 2. Happiness. But what is meant by happiness? If it just means pleasure and the absence of pain, then the utilitarian can t easily explain why it s ever right for sometime to spend time doing anything other than eating good food, sitting in the sun, etc. One move is to say something like: these are mere short-term pleasures but one also ought invest in well-being over the long-term. Another move is to say that there s some difference between lower-order pleasures and higher-order pleasures. 3. Traditional objections. Many of the traditional objections to utilitarianism focus on cases where it departs from consensus views on what constitutes sound moral judgement. For instance, suppose that I could cheat on my exam without anyone finding out about it, and that I would be much happier as a result and everyone else would be equally happy. Or, suppose that some I am in some tragic situation where I could save ten innocent lives only by letting nine innocent people die. Utilitarianism seems to clearly suggest that I should cheat and let people die, whereas consensus views suggest that these actions are outright wrong or at least deeply troublesome. 4. Act vs. rule utilitarianism. One standard utilitarian response to these kinds of objections is to distinguish between act and rule utilitarianism. The act utilitarian says: the right action is the one which promotes everyone s happiness. The rule utilitarian says: the right system of rules is the one which promotes everyone s happiness. For instance, the rule utilitarian might say something like: it s wrong to cheat because a system of rules in which cheating is prohibited would lead to more happiness than a system of rules in which cheating is allowed. One great difficulty for rule utilitarianism is to say something useful about what exactly constitutes a system of rules. E.g. if rules like Sean is allowed to cheat when it does not harm others is allowed, then it seems like there might be little difference between rule- and act-utilitarianism. Kantian ethics, or deontological approaches 5. Ends in themselves. Kant thinks that it s really important to treat people as ends in themselves, and not means to some other end (cf. [Kant1996] 4:429). People are free, rational agents: they have freedom to choose which goals to adopt, and they deliberate rationally about which goals they want to adopt. One way to think about what it means to treat people as ends in themselves
Kantian ethics, or deontological approaches 3 is: people s status as free rational agents is an intrinsic good, which is important regardless of whatever good benefits this might produce, and it s a more important good than any other good (cf. Hill [Hill-Jr.1980] pp. 91-92). 6. Example: lying. Suppose that I know of a job opportunity and when a friend asks me whether I know of any job opportunities, I lie and say that I don t know of any. For the utilitarian (or maybe: for the act utilitarian), whether this was right or wrong probably depends on a complicated calculation as to whether the job opportunity would have been good for my friend. For the Kantian, this is always wrong because I have robbed my friend of a choice. But lying becomes problematic for the Kantian because it almost looks like they would have to say that lying is nearly always wrong. For instance, suppose my friend is an alcoholic and asks me whether there is any liquor in the house. Seems like in this case one might have the intuition that one should lie, whereas the Kantian would seem to suggest that telling the truth is better. 7. Example: happiness of others. Suppose that my college-aged child wants to become an artist when I believe that being a doctor would be better, and I am thus faced with the dilemma of whether to financially support my child in her dreams. For the utilitarian, this is ultimately a question of which would result in more happiness, perhaps in the long term. For the Kantian, another important consideration is respecting the agency of my child. But this can again become problematic for the Kantian since it kind of looks like her view is that this value dominates all others. For instance, if I am in the fortunate position of being able to financially help a friend who habitually makes bad decisions, maybe I should place conditions on my aid. 8. Acting from a sense of duty. The utilitarian has a pretty quick answer to why people should want to do the right thing: they want to do it because it makes them or others happy. It s less clear what Kantian should say. Kant s own view is that the good person acts the way she does simply out of a respect for the moral laws, or out of a sense of duty. Given that moral laws often conflict with what would make one happy, the life of the good person is characterized by a great deal of inner conflict for Kant. 9. Actions, maxims, and the categorical imperative. An action is what you do, while a maxim is your reason for doing it. For instance, one person might rob a bank, thinking to himself: Rob a bank whenever you need money! While another person might rob a bank, thinking to himself Rob a bank whenever your son needs an expensive operation! These two robbers do the same action, but have different maxims. With this, we can formulate Kant s categorical imperative: Act only on that maxim through which you can at
4 1. A primer of major ethical theories the same time will that it should become a universal law ([Kant1996] 4:421). 10. Examples: lying. Suppose that I lie, thinking to myself: Lie whenever it is to my advantage!. Can I really want the world to be such that everyone is permitted to lie when it is to their advantage? That would be a chaotic world in which society as we know it could not exist. The categorical imperative thus suggests that it s wrong to lie when it is to your advantage. What s the relation between this and 1.6? Well, presumably the connection is: if it s okay for me to lie when it s to my advantage, then there being no relevant moral difference between me and other agents, it should also be okay for others to lie when it s to their advantage. 11. Examples: helping others. Likewise, suppose that I fail to help someone, thinking to myself: Don t help people when it is not to your advantage!. The categorical imperative asks to us consider whether I could really want the world to be organized such that everyone is allowed to act like that. Perhaps I would be in need of aid at some point, and I would hence be wanting a world in which people don t want to help me. But Sidgwick later pointed out that this depends a lot on who exactly you are: [... ] a strong man, after balancing the chances of life, may easily think that he and such as he have more to gain, on the whole, by the general adoption of the egoistic maxim; benevolence being more trouble than profit ([Sidgwick1981aa] p. 389 fn, cf. [Herman1984] p. 581 ff). Virtue ethics, or neo-aristotelian approaches 12. Basic idea: taking virtues seriously. The two theories we described so far can seem a little far-removed from some of our usual evaluative modes of speech. If I ask you what makes a good person, it might be natural to start talking about things like being kind, being diligent, being trustworthy, etc. Perhaps the utilitarian and Kantian each have complicated reasons why these traits make for a person who does largely good. But the idea of virtue ethics is to take these modes of evaluation as what comes first: a good person is a virtuous person, a good life is a virtuous life, etc. This kind of theory was first set out by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics ([Aristotle1999aa]), and so virtue approaches are sometimes labelled as neo-aristotelian. 13. Virtue and function. Besides listing virtues, is there anything that one can say about what a virtue is? A traditional Aristotelian answer was that: virtues are that which enables an object to perform its function well. For instance, rhythm is a virtue of a harpist (since the function of a harpist is to play), having 20/20 vision is a virtue of an eye (since the function of an eye is
Virtue ethics, or neo-aristotelian approaches 5 to see), having an ample root system is a virtue of a plant (since the function of a plant is to grow). But what exactly is the function of a human? Aristotle thought it was: an activity of the soul ([Aristotle1999aa] 1102a5). Some modern virtue theorists, like Hursthouse, hold onto some variant of this idea, in that they think virtue is what helps you to flourish or have a good life ([Hursthouse2014aa] p. 46). Other modern virtue theorists, like Slote, take the specific virtues themselves to be what is primarily good, and dispense with talk of functions as outdated ([Baron1997aa] p. 209). 14. Doctrine of the mean. Perhaps the most famous Aristotelian claim about virtue was the so-called doctrine of the mean: But having these feelings at the right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to virtue. ([Aristotle1999aa] 1106b21-5) E.g. bravery is having feelings of fear and confidence at the right times, about the right things, etc; temperance is having feelings of pleasures and pains at the right times, about the right things, etc. Modern virtue theorists tend to keep some part of the Aristotelian view, emphasizing the relation to emotional states and the consideration of contextual factors. 15. The reality of virtues. Paradigmatic virtues such as honesty and kindness are not only ideals to which we should aim, but they are also stable character traits. I think that this comports fairly well with every day usage, and it s implicit in the Aristotelian doctrine that what causes virtue is actions which the virtuous human would do in the way that the virtuous human would do them ([Aristotle1999aa] 1105b10-15). However, it has been recently noted (e.g. [Doris1998aa]) that the stable attribution of virtues seems inconsistent with long-standing research in social psychology which suggests that the presence of such traits can be easily manipulated by environmental factors. E.g. people are significantly more disposed to help others when they have recently found some change on the ground. 16. How to apply virtue ethics. Since our course has a dimension of an applied ethics course, it is natural to ask how to apply virtue ethics. Annas suggests that one think about the virtues as not merely being ideals or goals to aspire to, but also as making moral demands on us ([Annas2015aa] p. 11). For instance, honesty not only recommends telling hard truths but also demands it. Likewise, the prevalence of virtue talk in everyday evaluation almost makes it easier to apply: tell business people that they have violated some ethical principle and they may say something dismissive about ethical principles. But tell them that they have shown themselves to be cowards or liars or bullies or unprofessional and they will react negatively indeed ([Hartman2013aa] p. 251).
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