An Epistemological Assessment of Moral Worth in Kant s Moral Theory Immanuel Kant s moral theory outlined in The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (hereafter Grounding) presents us with the metaphysical grounding to know which actions we, as moral agents, ought to do actions which have moral worth and which actions we ought not to do those that lack moral worth. This theory, normative in nature, explains what we ought to do but falls short of explaining if we can ever know that our actions are truly what we ought to be doing; I can know what I ought to do, but I cannot know if what I am doing is what I know I ought to. In explaining his normative theory, however, Kant does unknowingly imply the possibility of a descriptive interpretation, which can shine a light on what we can know, according to conditions he outlines, about the moral worth of our actions, above and beyond what we ought to do. In explaining what constitutes an action having moral worth Kant describes four cases of morality that range from an act contrary to duty and lacking moral worth, to an act done from duty and having complete moral worth. 1 These four cases and their subsequent explanations outline the requirements for an action to have moral worth. In this paper I show that a close assessment of the conditions of moral worth outlined in the four cases reveals that Kant actually suggested we can know about the moral worth of our actions, and from this I argue for the existence of a fifth case of morality. Kant s moral theory explains which actions have moral worth and which ones lack it; it tells us what we ought to do and ought not to do as moral agents, however it tells us also that we cannot know if our actions have moral worth. Kant defines an action as having 1 Kant, Immanuel; translated by James W. Ellington [1785] (1993). Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 3rd ed. Hackett. AK 398.Grounding, 397-400.
genuine moral worth as an action that is performed without any inclination at all, but solely from duty 2 Of duty, Kant states, An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined. 3 Kant also states, Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law. 4 The law Kant speaks about here is the categorical imperative: I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. 5 What this means is that an action lacks moral worth if its maxim could not be universalized. An example of such an action which lacks moral worth would be lying; when someone lies, the lie itself depends on the idea that, universally, we all tell the truth. It is only upon the assumption that we all believe the truth is told universally that we can tell a lie. To universalize lying would mean that we all tell lies, and as a result the assumption of truth would not exist because everyone knows we all lie and so no one believes anyone. If no one believes anyone, then one cannot lie, given the fact that lying is based on the assumption of universal truth. To universalize lying would remove the foundation upon which the lie is based, and thus make lying impossible. As such, lying cannot be universalized and lacks moral worth because the maxim of lying would necessarily destroy itself just as soon as it was made a universal law. 6 Kant presents four cases of morality to explain how one can distinguish different scenarios according to moral worth 7 : 1. Actions which are contrary to duty (lying, cheating, etc). 2 Ibid. AK 398. 3 Ibid, AK 399. 4 Ibid AK 400. 5 Ibid AK 402. 6 Ibid AK 403. 7 Ibid AK 397-400.
2. Actions which accord with duty which a person has no immediate inclination but does have mediate inclinations thereto (paying taxes to avoid the penalties). 3. Actions which accord with duty and for which the person has an immediate inclination (refraining from suicide when one is experiencing an enjoyable life). 4. Actions which accord with duty but are contrary to some immediate inclination (not committing suicide even when one is experiencing a remarkably unpleasant and distressful life). Examples 1-3 cannot be said to have moral worth because the motivation behind the action is not from duty. As states earlier, Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law. 8 This means that in cases 2 and 3, even if the action is in accordance with duty, because it does not come from a respect for the law, but rather from other inclinations, the action lacks moral worth. Example 1 also lacks moral worth, but this is because it is an action that is contrary to duty. Case 4 is the only case that Kant admits to having moral worth. Kant provides an example stating, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the taste for life, if an unfortunate man wishes for death and yet preserves his life without loving it not from inclination or fear, but from duty then his maxim indeed has a moral content. 9 Kant goes on to say, [if a man] performs an action without any inclination at all, but solely from duty then for the first time his action has genuine moral worth. 10 While case 4 is an example of what we ought to do, Kant excludes the possibility that we can ever know if such an action has ever been performed or is possible. Kant states, an action done from duty must altogether exclude the influence of inclination and 8 Ibid AK 400. 9 Ibid AK 398. 10 Ibid AK 398.
therewith every object of the will. 11 He however also states, we can never, even by the strictest examination, completely plumb the depths of the secret incentives of our actions. 12 As such, we can never know with absolute certainty if our action has moral worth, because we cannot discount the possibility that we are motivated by some secret unknown inclination. Such knowledge however is not necessary in Kant s moral theory. Just because one cannot know that their action has moral worth does not mean that they should not strive towards what they know they ought to do. Kant states, reason unrelentingly commands actions of which the world has perhaps hitherto never provided an example even though there might never yet have been a sincere friend, still pure sincerity in friendship is nonetheless required of every man 13 The same conditions that make it impossible to know if I am acting from duty make it possible to know if I am not acting from duty. Because I know that an act from duty requires a complete absence of inclinations, and I cannot know for sure that the act is free of all inclinations, I cannot ever know that an act is done from duty. This model however tells me that if an act does have an inclination, I know it is not done from duty. In order to better explain this I will structure Kant s conditions for an action done from duty as a logical conditional proposition. If (1) an action is done from duty [D], Then (2) it must altogether exclude the influence of inclination 14 [~I] (~I = not I, meaning no inclinations) 11 Ibid AK 400. 12 Ibid AK 407. 13 Ibid AK 408. 14 Ibid, AK 400
[D] > [~I] This logical conditional proposition could be used to determine and thus know if an action is done from duty, not just in accordance with it. A problem arises, however, with this condition as [~I] can never be known. 15 As such, while this proposition would allow me to know if an action is done from duty, the fact that Kant rules out the possibility of [~I] means it cannot be known. This proposition, however, can be used to show some knowledge of our action can be determined from Kant s theory. If I were to take the contrapositive of this conditional proposition, I would find a valid proposition that translates directly into some form of knowledge of the moral worth of our actions. The contrapositive of [D] > [~I] is [I] > [~D]. This conditional proposition translates to the following: If (1) the influence of inclination is included [I] Then (2) an action is not done from duty [~D] Unlike [~I], [I] and [~D] are not excluded as possibilities by Kant. As such, it follows that influence of inclination on my actions means that I can know that my actions are not done from duty. Thus, while I can never know if I am acting from duty, I can know if and when I am not, as the influence of inclination is a sufficient condition for not acting from duty. While the absence of inclination can never be known, such a condition does not apply to the presence of inclination. If we grant that my contrapositive formulation of knowledge of moral worth stands, then from this, Kant s moral theory does suggest that we can know something about the 15 Ibid, AK 407
moral worth of our actions and it also says how we can know this. A close assessment of Kant s theory, then, reveals that Kant implicitly allows for some knowledge of the moral worth of our actions to be derived from it. As it stands, this knowledge of the moral worth of our actions is divided into two sections. The first section is what I just finished explaining; an action, either done in accordance with duty or not, that we know lacks moral worth because of the presence of inclination. The second section is an action done in accordance with duty, but lacks the presence of inclination. Knowledge of the moral worth of this action is impossible because any action that falls into the section exists in a sort of moral knowledge limbo: we cannot say we know the action lacks moral worth because it does not contain the presence of inclination, however given the fact we cannot rule out the possibility of inclination, we cannot say we know it to be an action of moral worth either. What this means is that while we can know when our actions lack moral worth, the absence of the condition which necessitates such a lack (the presence of an inclination) cannot tell us anything about the moral worth of said action. This second section is what I call The Realm of Moral Potential. An act done within the realm of moral potential is done in accordance with duty, however we cannot say we know it to be an action which lacks moral worth, given its lack of the presence of inclination, nor can we say that it has moral worth, given the fact we cannot rule out the possibility of inclinations being the motivating factor. As a result, all we can say we know is that such a scenario is one in which the moral worth of an action isn t discounted, but it also isn t certain: the action has potential for moral worth. The scenario I just outlined is one that was arrived at by solely reformulating Kant s own words into logical propositions, manipulating them through logical processes, and
turning them back into their original statements. Because of this, the realm of moral potential is not so much a creation by me, but rather a discovery of something that was already contained, yet hidden, in Kant s moral theory. The structure of the scenario for a realm of moral potential falls in with the same structure as the four cases Kant outlined in the Grounding that I outlined earlier in this paper. All cases wish to determine a scenario where we can know the moral worth of an action, given its relevant surrounding circumstances. Since the realm of moral potential was derived from Kant s moral theory and holds the same structure as the other 4 cases, I argue that it should be incorporated into the Grounding in order for Kant to account for all possible scenarios. This would mean that Kant s cases would be 5 in number and would include not just the instances where we can know if something has or lacks moral worth with certainty, but also include the hypothetical, yet still possible situation of uncertainty in which the moral worth of an action falls within the realm of moral potential. One may object to my argument in two ways: first, one may object to the idea of the realm of moral potential itself and claim that it was not derived from Kant s theory; second, one may not reject the realm of moral potential, but may reject the notion that it should be incorporated into the 4 other cases Kant outlines in the Grounding. I now briefly address both of these potential objections. While the realm of moral potential does appear to be derived directly from Kant s Grounding, there are a number of assumptions which one must agree to in order to accept it. The first of these is the contrapositive formulation of duty, which allows one to know when one s actions do not have moral worth. This formulation, while never explicitly stated in the Grounding is derived through logical formulation. To reject this formulation would be
to reject the potential for knowledge of moral worth of our actions to come from the Grounding and subsequently also reject the realm of moral potential which is supported by it. While the contrapositive formulation is an original idea, it was derived using sound logical reasoning. Kant did not so much suggest this, but actually said it, just formulated in a hidden manner. If we accept the rules of logic then we can accept the contrapositive formulation that allows us some knowledge of moral worth directly from the Grounding. A second assumption is the idea that, given what the contrapositive formulation can tell us about what we can know about the moral worth of our actions, there is only one second alternative when it comes to this knowledge, namely the realm of moral potential. What is important to understand here is that this assumption is false: knowledge of the lack of moral worth as evidenced by the presence of inclination, and the realm of moral potential are not exhaustive possibilities. In fact, in order to accept the realm of moral potential, one does not actually have to accept it as being the only alternative to an act that we know lacks moral worth. Kant points out an alternative to this in case 4. Case 4 is one where our actions accord with duty, but are contrary to some immediate inclination. This is a case in which we know the action has moral worth; even if we can never know that such an action could ever happen. Such a case is an alternative to both knowing an action lacks moral worth and knowing one cannot know if an action has moral worth or lacks it. The second objection states that even if we grant that the realm of moral potential is derived purely from the Grounding in a sound manner, it should not be incorporated with the other 4 cases of moral worth in the Grounding. The reasoning behind this objection is the fact that the four cases can tell us with certainty the moral worth of an action: cases 1-3 lack moral worth, whereas case 4 has moral worth. The realm of moral potential is distinct
because it is a scenario that cannot tell us with certainty if our action has moral worth or doesn t. I do not deny that the realm of moral potential is distinct from the other 4 cases, however this distinction is not enough to exclude it from consideration when it comes to possible cases that illustrate the extent of what we can and cannot know about the moral worth of our actions. While the realm of moral potential cannot tell us whether or not our act has moral worth with certainty, it can tell us with certainty when we cannot know the moral worth of our act. The fifth case of moral worth, what I call the Realm of Moral Potential, is a scenario derived entirely from Kant s Grounding. By performing a close inspection of the text I was able to determine that Kant not only suggests we can know something about the moral worth of our actions above and beyond what we ought to do, but I also derived from this knowledge a fifth case of moral worth which should be incorporated into Kant s moral theory in the Grounding if it wishes to be a more complete moral theory, given the fact that its origin is the Grounding itself.