ISLAM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: SUNNI SHIA DIVIDE AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

NSITMUN 2018 SUBSTANTIVE MATERIAL BACKGROUND GUIDE ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION ISLAM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: SUNNI SHIA DIVIDE AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT AND EXECUTIVE BOARD

PAGE 1 LETTER FROM THE SECRETARIAT On behalf of this year's Secretariat, it is our honour and pleasure to extend a warm invitation to your institute for the seventh iteration of NSIT Model United Nations conference. NSIT MUN is widely recognised as a highly acclaimed conference, where the agilest of minds and most persevering of teams unite to create a conference which is not only memorable but inspiring. It is time to finally raise curtains for NSIT MUN'18, which will be held on 31st March - 1st April 2018 at Netaji Subhas Institute of Technology, Delhi. NSIT MUN is the flagship event of Colloquium - Literary and Debating Festival of NSIT, organised by the Debating Society of NSIT. The conference will highlight the issues of national and global concern such as non-self governing territories, international extradition policies and religious laws in India and prompt the delegates to find solutions to pressing affairs while maintaining ingenious diplomacy. NSIT MUN'18 is a perfect platform for all the prolific thinkers and eloquent debaters. We are committed to surpassing all expectations and breaking barriers to redefine the standards of Model UN simulations. Whether you are an experienced delegate or a novice into an intellectually thrilling simulation of this sort, NSIT MUN'18 will surely provide you with the right mix of challenge and guidance, and be a pivotal point for your MUN experience in the future. We invite your institution to these two days of quality debate, witness the best of the best, and discover an all-new facet of the world of debate, dissent and diplomacy. With newfound zeal and gusto, the NSIT MUN'18 Secretariat vows to deliver a stimulating learning experience and a conference to remember! With warm wishes and regards, Anirudh Batra, Secretary General, NSITMUN'18 Komal Gupta, Director General, NSITMUN'18 Rahul Paul, Director General, NSITMUN'18

PAGE 2 LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD I hope this guide reaches you in excellent health. Before I introduce the contents of the guide to you, I would like to draw your attention towards a couple of points to help you prepare your stance accordingly. Please understand that I speak on behalf of both Hisham and myself, when I say that we do understand that MUN Conferences nowadays have a glamour quotient, but we hope to have a substantive debate that empowers our shared purpose of moderating an issue that has been prevalent in the Islamic world, and has also been a cause of both dissent and violence in the religion. While formulating your stance, please note that do and speak whatever that protects your country s national interest, and defend it with adequate justification, even if it may be bizarre or controversial, because at the end, your code of conduct as an actual delegate doesn t get fulfilled if you let your own foreign policy be violated. What would aid you more, is the understanding of OIC which you can easily go through at https://www.oic-oci.org/home/?lan=en. Coming to the guide, this guide is divided into sections, and each section is supported by certain research papers, which may be opinionated, biased or even outdated. The links are there to guide you further and may as well give you an idea of how to frame your arguments. At times, I may as well leave a sub-topic not concluded properly, because it may be subjective to your country. But that should be treated as a semicolon and not as a full stop, and encourage you to go further into stance formation. Please do not limit yourselves to the guide, and read through the statements on the UN website with respect to the divide. Country reports, native research papers, and regional bloc statements, if any that your country is a part of, shall help you more. We shall be simulating the Islamic Summit of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Towards the end of the guide, there is a section called Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMA). This section is aided towards a unanimous, coming together of this committee, which I suppose shall be divided on the basis of ideological blocs, suiting their foreign policy, thus bringing us with a solution. The questions shall be more or less incomplete, or may at times even sound irrational. I leave it at the discretion of the Member State Representative to use the questions to suit their needs. Within the QARMA section, I have added the links for the actual OIC Resolutions, just so that the format of resolution is clear.

PAGE 3 IN COMMITTEE, THE UNA-USA RULES OF PROCEDURE WILL BE FOLLOWED, AND IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT DELEGATES BE FAMILIAR WITH THE SAME. HTTP://WWW.UNAUSA.ORG/GLOBAL-CLASSROOMS-MODEL-UN/HOW-TO- PARTICIPATE/MODEL-UN-PREPARATION FOR CONSENSUS BUILDING AND UNIFORMITY WITHIN THE COMMITTEE, I WOULD REQUEST YOU TO CONTACT THE SECRETARIAT, SO THAT IT CAN PUT YOU IN TOUCH WITH YOUR CO DELEGATES, WHICH WOULD AID YOUR POINTS MORE. IT MIGHT LOOK SCRIPTED, BUT AT TIMES, WITH SUCH HEAT INTENSIVE AGENDAS, THE COMMITTEE DOES NOT COME TOGETHER AS ONE, WHICH DEFEATS THE IDEA OF CONSENSUS, AND THE CONFERENCE IN GENERAL. HISHAM AHMED RIZVI - SECRETARY GENERAL BHAVYA MEHTA - DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL 9560964240/ BHAVS02@GMAIL.COM

PAGE 4 AGENDA OVERVIEW ISLAM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: SUNNI SHIA DIVIDE AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS The Sunni-Shiite divide occurred in 632 AD with the death of Prophet Muhammad. Sunnis believed that the new leader should be elected, and chose Muhammad's advisor, Abu Bakr. "Sunni" in Arabic means "one who follows the traditions of the Prophet." Shiites believed that the new leader should have been Muhammad's cousin/son-in-law, Ali ibn Abu Talib. As a result, Shiites have their own Imams, who they consider holy. They consider their Imans to be the true leaders, not the state. "Shia" comes from "Shiat-Ali," or "the Party of Ali." The Sunnis prevailed and chose a successor to be the first caliph. Eventually, Ali was chosen as the fourth caliph, but the peace did not last long as violent conflict broke out soon. Two of the earliest caliphs were murdered. War erupted when Ali became caliph, and he too was killed in fighting in the year 661 near the town of Kufa, now in presentday Iraq. The violence and war split the small community of Muslims into two branches that would never reunite. The war continued with Ali's son, Hussein, leading the Shiites. "Hussein rejected the rule of the caliph at the time," says Vali Nasr, author of The Shia Revival. He stood up to the caliph's very large army on the battlefield. He and 72 members of his family and companions fought against a very large Arab army of the caliph. They were all massacred. Hussein was decapitated and his head carried in tribute to the Sunni caliph in Damascus. His body was left on the battlefield at Karbala. Later on, it was buried there.

PAGE 5 THE 12TH IMAM The Shiites called their leaders imam, Ali being the first, Hussein the third. They commemorate Hussein's death every year in a public ritual of self-flagellation and mourning known as Ashoura. The significance of the imams is one of the fundamental differences that separate the two branches of Islam. The imams have taken on a spiritual significance that no clerics in Sunni Islam enjoy. "Some of the Sunnis believe that some of the Shia are actually attributing almost divine qualities to the imams, and this is a great sin," Gause says, "because it is associating human beings with the divinity. And if there is one thing that's central to Islamic teaching, it is the oneness of God." This difference is especially powerful when it comes to the story of the 12th Imam, known as the Hidden Imam. "In the 10th century," says Nasr, "the 12th Shiite Imam went into occultation. Shiites believe God took him into hiding, and he will come back at the end of time. He is known as the Mahdi or the Messiah. So in many ways the Shiites, much like Jews or Christians, are looking for the coming of the Messiah." Those who believe in the Hidden Imam are known as Twelver Shiites. They are the majority of the Shiites in the world today. "Twelver Shiism is itself a kind of messianic faith," Georgetown's Brumberg says. It is based "on a creed that the full word and meaning of the Koran and the Prophet Muhammad's message will only be manifested or made real and just, upon the return of the 12th Imam, this messianic figure." http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a494842.pdf

PAGE 6 POLITICAL POWER FUELS RELIGIOUS SPLIT Over the next centuries, Islam clashed with the advent of European Crusaders, with the Mongol conquerors from Central Asia, and was spread farther by the Ottoman Turks. By the year 1500, Persia was a seat of Sunni Islamic learning, but all that was about to change with the arrival of Azeri conquerors. They established the Safavid dynasty in Persia modern-day Iran and made it Shiite. "That dynasty actually came out of what's now eastern Turkey," says Gause, the University of Vermont professor. "They were a Turkic dynasty, one of the leftovers of the Mongol invasions that had disrupted the Middle East for a couple of centuries. The Safavid dynasty made it its political project to convert Iran into a Shia country." Shiites gradually became the glue that held Persia together and distinguished it from the Ottoman Empire to its west, which was Sunni, and the Mughal Muslims to the east in India, also Sunni. There were periods of conflict and periods of peace. But the split remained and would, in the second half of the 20th century, turn out to be one of the most important factors in the upheavals that have ravaged the Middle East. "Why has there been such a long and protracted disagreement and tension between these two sects?" asks Ray Takeyh, author of Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. "It has to do with political power." In the 20th century, that meant a complex political dynamic involving Sunni and Shiites, Arabs and Persians, colonizers and colonized, oil, and the involvement of the superpowers. https://www.ft.com/content/413ea2ea-b3df-11e5-8358-9a82b43f6b2f

PAGE 7 KEY PLAYERS IN SUNNI SHIA SPLIT https://www.thebalance.com/sunni-shiite-split-3305550

PAGE 8 SPLIT IN CONTEMPORARY TIMES Iran s Islamic Revolution in 1979 gave Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini the opportunity to implement his vision for an Islamic government ruled by the guardianship of the jurist (velayat-e faqih), a controversial concept among Shia scholars that is opposed by Sunnis, who have historically differentiated between political leadership and religious scholarship. Shia ayatollahs have always been the guardians of the faith. Khomeini argued that clerics had to rule to properly perform their function: implementing Islam as God intended, through the mandate of the Shia Imams. Under Khomeini, Iran began an experiment in Islamic rule. Khomeini tried to inspire further Islamic revival, preaching Muslim unity, but supported groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Pakistan that had specific Shia agendas. Sunni Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, admired Khomeini s success, but did not accept his leadership, underscoring the depth of sectarian suspicions. Saudi Arabia has a sizable Shia minority of roughly 10 percent, and millions of adherents of a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism (an offshoot of the Sunni Hanbali school) that is antagonistic to Shia Islam. The transformation of Iran into an overtly Shia power after the Islamic revolution induced Saudi Arabia to accelerate the propagation of Wahhabism, as both countries revived a centuries-old sectarian rivalry over the true interpretation of Islam. Many of the groups responsible for sectarian violence that has occurred in the region and across the Muslim world since 1979 can be traced to Saudi and Iranian sources. Saudi Arabia backed Iraq in the 1980 1988 war with Iran and sponsored militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan who were primarily fighting against the Soviet Union, which had not only invaded Afghanistan in 1979, but were also suppressing Shia movements inspired or backed by Iran.

PAGE 9 The transformation of Iran into an agitator for Shia movements in Muslim countries seemed to confirm centuries of Sunni suspicions that Shia Arabs answer to Persia. Many experts, however, point out that Shias aren t monolithic for many of them, identities and interests are based on more than their confession. Iraqi Shias, for example, made up the bulk of the Iraqi army that fought Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and Shia militant groups Amal and Hezbollah clashed at times during the Lebanese civil war. The Houthis, a Zaydi Shia militant group in Yemen, battled the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, a Zaydi, several times between 2004 and 2010. Then, in 2014, the Houthis captured the capital Sana'a with ousted president Saleh's support. For their part, both mainstream and hard-line Sunnis aren t singularly focused on oppressing Shias. They have fought against coreligionists throughout history, most recently in the successive crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Iraq s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia s battles against al-qaeda and related Sunni militant groups. Sharing a common Sunni identity didn t eliminate power struggles among Sunni Muslims under secular or religious governments. But confessional identity has resurfaced wherever sectarian violence has taken root, as in Iraq after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion removed Saddam Hussein, a dictator from the Sunni minority who ruled over a Shia-majority country. The bombing of a Shia shrine in Samara in 2006 kicked off a cycle of sectarian violence that forced Iraqis to pick sides, stirring tensions that continue today. In the Arab world, Shia groups supported by Iran have recently won important political victories. The regime of Syrian President Bashar al-assad, who has ruled since 1970, relies on Alawis, a heterodox Shia sect that makes up about 13 percent of Syria s population, as a pillar of its power. Alawis dominate the upper reaches of the country's military and security services and are the backbone of the forces fighting to support the Assad regime in Syria s civil war. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq unseated Saddam Hussein and instituted competitive elections, the Shia majority has dominated the parliament and produced its prime ministers. Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia militia and political movement, is the strongest party in Lebanon. The Houthis, Shia militants in Yemen tenuously linked to Iran, have toppled the country's internationally recognized government. Iran, a majority Shia country, has seen its regional influence swell as its allies in these countries have accumulated power. Sunni governments, especially Saudi Arabia, have increasingly worried about their own grips on power, a concern that was exacerbated during the protest movement that began in Tunisia in late 2010. The Arab Awakening, as the uprisings are known, spread to Bahrain and Syria, countries at the fault lines of Islam s sectarian divide. In each, political power is held by a sectarian minority Alawis in Syria and a Sunni ruling family in Bahrain where Shias are the majority. In Yemen, Houthi rebels have expanded their territorial control, which Saudi Arabia perceives as a potential beachhead for Iran on the Arabian peninsula, along vital shipping routes in the Red Sea and in territory abutting Saudi Arabia's own marginalized Shia minority.

PAGE 10 GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SPLIT The intensification of sectarian warfare in Iraq during the last year has generated a flow of commentary in the Western press, claiming that this conflict is the consequence of age-old animosities between the Shias and the Sunnis because of their deep religious differences. In other words, most of these commentaries convey a sense of inevitability and permanency about Sunni-Shia conflict, not only in Iraq but also elsewhere in the Muslim world where there are substantial Shia minorities. Clearly, differences between the Sunnis and Shias, which began immediately following the Prophet Muhammad s death, concerning his legitimate successor, are real and cannot be denied. However, historically, ordinary Sunnis and Shias have lived peacefully, even if not closely, together. This has been partly due to the fact that the Shias lost early in the competition both for political power and for the allegiance of the majority of Muslims; the Shias retreated essentially to a politically quietist position, as advised by the sixth Shia Imam, Ja afar Sadegh. Therefore, in the history of Sunni-Shia relations, there are no parallels to the Thirty Years War between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. The only events that come somewhat close were the Ottoman Saffavid wars. However, those wars were more about competition between an established empire, that of the Ottomans, and a newly formed empire, that of the Saffavids, and not about religion, as such, even though the Saffavids were Shia. By the end of the 17th century, Ottoman Saffavids rivalry had subsided and, since the early 18th century, with a few brief periods when internal turmoil in Iran invited Ottoman intervention, relations between the two empires and, later, between the Republic of Turkey and Iran have been peaceful and even friendly.

PAGE 11 In South Asia, where there are also substantial Shia minorities, until the last decade or so there was no history of any large-scale Sunni-Shia conflict. Furthermore, in the last forty years, there have been efforts on the part of Sunni and Shia Ulema for reconciliation between the two groups. Good examples of this were the contacts during the 1960s between Ayatullah Ghomi in Iran and Sheikh Shaltut of Al Azhar, which had positive results. Following these efforts, Ja afari was recognized as another school of Fiqh in Islam. In addition to inter-state rivalry, the socially and economically disadvantaged position of the Shias in Sunni majority countries, or countries where Shias are a majority but the rulers are Sunni --as was the case in Iraq and now is in Bahrain -- has in recent decades contributed to the Shias sense of alienation and their quest for emancipation and legitimacy. The Shia revival movement in Lebanon, which began in the 1960s, under the leadership of Ayatullah Musa Sadr, is the best example of this Shia quest for equality and recognition. If the Shia movement became radicalized, this was to no small part due to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 1982 and the ensuing Lebanese civil war. In post-war Iraq, too, sectarian conflict is the result of two interrelated factors: years of discrimination against the Shias by repressive Iraqis governments and the failure to develop a sense of national identity transcending tribal and sectarian affiliations; and fears generated among the Sunnis about their future economic and political position under a Shia-dominated government. On a broader scale, the latest intensification of sectarian tension throughout the Muslim world reflects the Western strategy of instrumentalizing sectarian differences to forge a regional alliance against Iran. http://nationalpost.com/news/world/the-sunni-shia-split-at-the-heart-of-regional-conflict-inthe-middle-east-explained

PAGE 12 CASE STUDY GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPLIT IN SYRIA The conflict in Syria has, more than any other factor, helped proliferate sectarianism in the region. However, the Syrian civil war will not continue forever. No one knows for sure when, or how it will end. It could last for years, or only a few more months. Nevertheless, one day it will end. The question observers of the Middle East need to ask is what will happen next. Are the scars of the conflict too deep to heal? In that case, sectarianism could shape regional geopolitics for the foreseeable future. However, that is not the only possibility. The sectarian strife, which currently defines Middle Eastern geopolitics, was not inevitable. As we have seen, Sunni-Shi i divisions have not always shaped regional politics. This is an important fact to keep in mind as we look towards the future. Regional actors could move beyond the Syrian conflict. As was the case prior to the Arab Spring, other interests could again shape their actions. Either way, the length and outcome of the Syrian civil war will certainly have an impact on future political alignments in the region. To take just one example, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, having been forced from power in a military coup, may find it convenient to rekindle its alliance with Iran, which also opposes Egypt s current military government. Such an outcome would be greatly aided by a quick end to the conflict in Syria, especially if Assad s regime is toppled and Iran is seeking new allies. In contrast, if the conflict drags out, a renewed alliance between Iran and the Egyptian Brotherhood would be strained at its best. This is only one of the many scenarios that will be affected by the length and outcome of the Syrian violence. https://www.fpri.org/article/2013/12/the-geopolitics-of-the-sunni-shiidivide-in-the-middle-east/ https://www.voanews.com/a/sunni-shiite-divide-threatens-stability-ofmiddle-east/2424584.html https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/48033/08_sectarian_identities_or_geopolit ics.pdf

PAGE 13 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE SPLIT Solving the Sunni Shia Conflict begins with Tehran Iran historically supported rising political movements in Lebanon and Iraq, and these movements have now risen to become dominant players in their respective countries. In Lebanon, Shiites have rallied around Hezbollah, an Iran-funded militant political group that performs well in elections and has the most formidable military force in the country. In Iraq, the U.S. invasion of 2003 brought about Shiite domination at the hands of both moderate and radical groups, most of which was supported by Iran for decades.of course Iran doesn t only support fellow Shiites. its anti-american and anti-israeli policies have led it to support the radical, violent Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both of which are Sunni organizations. In Syria, Iran has been a stalwart supporter of Bashar al-assad s regime, which is dominated by members of the Shia-like Alawite sect.iranian policies are therefore not predicated on an endemic bigotry against Sunnis, but rather guided by Iran s need to survive the very isolation its leaders created after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 a revolution that featured the slogan death to America, and calls for exporting unrest to neighboring Arab countries. Oman s approach: Oman s Ibadi-based method of mediation has long been applied to internal disputes between tribes, to domestic grievances, and even to external diplomacy. Each wilayat(province) of the country has trained mediators and reconcilers whose job is to help resolve family and regional conflicts. Indeed, court cases must first be heard by a mediator before they can go to litigation. The same methods that guide the process of mediation on the family or tribal level are also applied to Oman s international diplomacy, a method that has succeeded in resolving other conflicts in the region. In the case of diplomacy, a mediator in any conflict must be non-threatening, impartial and trusted by both parties in a dispute. Oman s approach to mediation has enjoyed the trust of both Sunni-majority and Shia-majority nations, as illustrated by Oman s efforts during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, which certainly had religious dimensions to it. Fixing the problem in Iraq and Syria Fixing the problems in Iraq and Syria can best be achieved by motivating people to do what they see is in their best interest and providing a method of achieving their goals. Sunnis, Shiites, or Kurds etc. seem very willing to fight and die, if necessary, to protect their families and their people but quite unwilling to do so for groups they despise. In either Iraq or Syria, a cohesive national army seems impossible at this time. It is hard to envision, for example, Sunnis fighting to protect Shiite or Alawite areas or Shiites or Alawites fighting to protect Sunni areas. Perhaps the example of partition, as what happened in the separation of Pakistan from India can serve as a significant improvement. The migration of Hindus from violent Muslim areas and the reverse migration of Muslims from Hindu areas reduced the level of violence.

PAGE 14 The establishment of Iraq as a confederation with each province getting much greater autonomy and providing for its defense and policing would be the first step. The second step would be to vote for the religious or sectarian character of that province. For example, each province would decide to go Sunni, Shiite, Kurds, Christian, or pluralistic, meaning tolerance. The third step is to have a time period during which populations would have an opportunity to sell their property, leave their homes and relocate to an area of their people that is satisfactory to them. In some cases, because of the demographics of the area, it might be desirable to divide a province into two or more separate provinces. Https://www.transcend.org/tms/2014/10/the-sunni-shia-conflict-any-solution/ https://acmcu.georgetown.edu/sunni-shia-tensions https://drive.google.com/openid=1hrtf6uskz7ihwkiivm6ogx2piz91telb_wyidm5u _yy

PAGE 15 Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMA) PLEASE TAKE IN NOTE THAT THE FOLLOWING POINTERS MUST BE MENTIONED, OR ANSWERED IN AN IDEAL RESOLUTION FOR THIS COMMITTEE: What would be the hypothetical implications of a unified Muslim world? How does the split affect terrorism? Will any of the solutions help in the decease of ISIS? Will the end of split also mean the end of Shiaism? How will the blocs aid to their existing foreign policies with respect to the split and its cease? Can the problem be resolved within OIC? What role do the non member states play in the same? Is there a need and/ or way of tackling specific inter country rivalries and power play? If so, what steps can be taken for the same? OIC Resolutions: https://www.oic-oci.org/subweb/cfm/44/en/docs/final/44cfm_res_pol_en.pdf https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docid=15&refid=5 https://drive.google.com/open?id=1ftj-sdtn1yc0g8fjegfzly3qv_7vdjiw https://drive.google.com/open?id=1tpo2hsndbksixjrnl1qvamw0wpygs1zz

PAGE 16 TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS-1 570: The Prophet Muhammad is born. 598: Ali, who will become the fourth caliph and the first Shiite Imam, is born. 610: The year Muslims cite as the beginning of Muhammad's mission and revelation of the Quran. 613: The public preaching of Islam begins. 630: The Muslims, led by Muhammad, conquer Mecca. 632: Muhammad dies. Abu Bakr is chosen as caliph, his successor. A minority favors Ali. They become known as Shiat Ali, or the partisans of Ali. 656: Ali becomes the fourth caliph after his predecessor is assassinated. Some among the Muslims rebel against him. 661: Violence and turmoil spread among the Muslims; Ali is assassinated. 680: Hussein, son of Ali, marches against the superior army of the caliph at Karbala in Iraq. He is defeated, his army massacred, and he is beheaded. The split between Shiites and Sunnis deepens. Shiites consider Ali their first imam, Hussein the third. 873: The 11th Shiite Imam dies. No one succeeds him. 873-940: In the period, known as the Lesser Occultation, the son of the 11th Imam disappears, leaving his representatives to head the Shiite faith. 940: The Greater Occultation of the 12th or Hidden Imam begins. No imam or representative presides over the Shiite faithful. 1258: The Mongols, led by Hulagu, destroy Baghdad, ending the Sunni Arab caliphate. 1501: Ismail I establishes the Safavid dynasty in Persia and declares Shiism the state religion. 1900: Ruhollah Khomeini is born in Persia. 1920-1922: Arabs, both Shiite and Sunni, revolt against British control of Iraq. 1922-1924: Kemal Ataturk abolishes the Ottoman sultanate and the Turkish Sunni caliphate. 1925: Reza Khan seizes power in Persia, declares himself shah, establishing the Pahlavi dynasty. 1932: Iraq becomes an independent nation, under King Faisal, a Sunni Arab. 1935: Persia is renamed Iran. 1941: Reza Shah abdicates throne in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Shah. British and Soviet military forces occupy Iran. 1953: A joint CIA/British intelligence operation in Iran keeps the shah on the throne and ousts nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh.

PAGE 17 TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS-2 1963: Amid widespread protests in Iran against the shah, Ayatollah Khomeini is arrested, then exiled to Najaf in Iraq. 1967: Israel defeats Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the Six-Day War. 1968: The Baath Party seizes power in Iraq. 1973: Israel defeats Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War. 1978-79: Widespread protests force the shah to abdicate and flee Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran to lead the revolution. 1979: Saddam Hussein seizes power, becomes president of Iraq. Iranian revolutionary students seize the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and take diplomats hostage. They are released in January 1981. 1980: Saddam orders the Iraqi army to attack Iran. 1980-1988: Iran-Iraq War. Hundreds of thousands die on each side and the war ends in a stalemate. 1982: Israel invades Lebanon, seizes Beirut. Hezbollah is formed in Lebanon. 1983: Suicide truck bombers, believed to be Hezbollah, kill 241 American servicemen in Beirut. 1989: Ayatollah Khomeini dies in Iran. 1990: Saddam orders his army to seize Kuwait. 1991: The U.S. military ousts the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Shiites of southern Iraq rebel against Saddam, who puts down the rebellion brutally. Thousands of Shiites are killed. 1991-2003: Iraq is placed under economic sanctions. U.N. weapons inspectors destroy most of Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs. 2001: Al-Qaida, led by Sunni Muslim fundamentalists, mounts attacks in the United States, killing 3,000 people. The United States invades Afghanistan and ousts the Sunni Taliban government. 2003: The U.S. military invades Iraq, topples Saddam. An Iraqi insurgency erupts, led by Sunni Baathists and al-qaida. 2005-2006: Iraqi elections bring Shiite political parties to power in Baghdad, backed by Iran. Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence intensifies. 2005: Hard-line fundamentalist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is elected president in Iran. Iran pursues acquisition of nuclear technology. 2006: War breaks out between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The U.N. Security Council imposes economic sanctions on Iran in response to nuclear activities. 2007: The United States sends additional troops to Iraq.

BEST OF LUCK, DELEGATE. AN EVENT OF NSIT'S LITERARY AND DEBATING FESTIVAL