Introduction In this volume I have collected together many of my essays on philosophy, published in a wide range of venues from 1979 to 2011. Part I, the first group of essays, consists of my writings on logic, argumentation theory and some applications in computer science. These essays fall broadly into two areas. One recurring area of my interest is informal fallacies. In Is there a Case for Ad Hominem Arguments, I argued that the number of cases in which it is logically legitimate to attack a person s character or background is more limited than some commentators had been suggesting, and I more recently expanded on this theme in Does Virtue Epistemology Provide a Better Account of the Ad Hominem Argument? In another pair of articles, I take up the issue of just how useful the standard and traditional analysis of informal fallacies really is. I argue in Are Fallacies Common? A Look at Two Debates that it is very useful, because informal fallacies as standardly defined are indeed prevalent in ordinary discourse, and continue the defense of that view in a rejoinder to one of my critics in Fallacies are Common. Additionally, I have tried to amplify the standard treatment of informal fallacies in several of my writings. In The Nature of the Argumentum ad Baculum, I suggest that appeals to fear more often involve scare tactics than actual threats,
x Philosophic Thoughts: Essays on Logic and Philosophy a view that was included in my treatment of informal logic in my introductory logic text, Introduction to Logic. 1 In Hedging as a Fallacy of Language I urge that the category of fallacies of language be expanded beyond the usual focus on fallacies of ambiguity to include the use of understatement. I eventually expanded the category of fallacies of language even further in Chapter 6 of my later critical thinking text, Critical Thinking: Developing an Effective Worldview. 2 The second broad area of my interest has been non-standard or deviant logics, especially non-assertion logics specifically, the logic of questions (erotetic logic) and dialog logic (formal dialectic). This interest grew out of both my teaching of informal fallacies and my research into philosophy of science, research that culminated in my book The Logic of Scientific Discovery. 3 In Notes towards a Formal Conversation Theory I sketch out some ideas on formal dialectic, and I review some ideas on the subject by some other writers in my review of Logical Dialogue-Games and Fallacies. And the use of non-standard logics in computer science I explore in my articles Erotetic Logic as a Specification Language for Database Queries and Dialog as an Abstract Data Type, as well as in my review of Logics for Artificial Intelligence. I also include in this section my reviews of Logic: a Computer Approach and Expert Systems. The essays in Part II consist of my essays on epistemology and philosophy of science, including psychology and cognitive science. One area of my interest has been in the logic of scientific discovery and what Peirce termed abductive inference. In The Concept of Discovery, I explore some of the meanings of the term discovery, and in Science and Common Sense, I consider whether the processes we use for scientific research differ from common sense. In Two Problems of Induction, I argue that inductive logic is dialectical in nature, and in Epistemologies and Apologies, I argue that while the sort of pragmatism that Peirce espoused may not face the traditional problem of induction, it faces its own functional analog (the problem of convergence). In The Role of Error in Computer Science, I explore the constructive role that searching for (and eliminating) error plays in computer software design. Another broad area of interest to me is cognitive science and what it has to say about traditional views of the unconscious. In my reviews of The Foundations of Psychoanalysis and The Myth of Neurosis, I summarized some of the traditional critiques of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. In my more recent reviews of Unauthorized Freud and Remembering Trauma, I review more recent critiques. I also include a review of a useful book on pseudoscience, The Skeptic s Dictionary. Part III of this anthology consists of my essays on ethics and (some of my essays on) social and political philosophy.
Introduction xi One area of work is on a sketch of my ethical theory, something of a variant on that of W.D. Ross. In Deontologism and Dialectic, I infuse multiple rule deontologism with dialog logic and pragmaticism, suggesting that the deliberation process in ethical reasoning is dialogical in structure, and truth in such deliberative matters lies in convergence over the long term. In Dialectic and Desiderata, I extend the sketch to outline a mental-state theory of happiness in which happiness is conceived of as a balance among various desirable feelings (including, but certainly not limited to, pleasure), a balance that is achieved by dialogical reasoning. Another broad area of my interest has been trying to craft a satisfactory classically liberal social and political philosophy. In my review essay on the book Libertarianism: For and Against, I sift through in detail the major arguments for the philosophy of minimalist government, trying to separate the stronger from the weaker. Overlapping this is my work in applied ethics. In The Market for Body Parts, I argue on convergent ethical theoretical grounds that society ought to allow competent adults the right to sell their own body parts (within reasonable regulation). In The Ethics of Tort Reform, I again use different ethical theoretical arguments to suggest that the United States ought to move to the British rule (or the loser pay ) system of tort law. Several of my more recent articles have been on topics in business ethics. In The Ethics of Closed Shops, I argue that contracts requiring workers to support a union are not ethical and ought not to be allowed. In The Ethical Case for Boycotting GM and Chrysler, I argue that the recent nationalization of most of the American auto industry raised serious ethical issues. And in my review essay The Case for Free Trade, I argue that while the ethical case for free trade is clearly compelling, the opposition to it is based in evolutionary psychology so not easy for most people to recognize. I also include in this section my article On the Nonexistence of Computer Ethics (in which I question whether we need a separate category in applied ethics for issues that arise in computing), my review of Happiness, Economics, and Public Policy (a book on recent empirical economics research on what causes happiness), and of A Rat is a Pig is a Dog (a book on the animal rights movement). Finally, in Part IV I include in a group of pieces on miscellaneous topics. In my article Is the Soul-Making Defense Sound? my earliest philosophy article I argued that the problem of evil is not solved by the soul-making theodicy. In Roadblocks to Research, I review the difficulties faced by adjunct faculty in conducting research, and in Using Philosophical Dilemmas to Teach Composition I discuss a technique I have used for many years to teach introductory philosophy students how to craft argumentative essays.
xii Philosophic Thoughts: Essays on Logic and Philosophy I also include some book reviews, including of Can Modern Wars be Just? (on whether classical just-war doctrine applies to modern conflicts), of Abused Science: The Case against Creationism, of Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes, and a review essay on Explaining Postmodernism. I have generally kept the language of the original publications without change, except in the articles on formal logic. In these, given the difficulty of printing subscripted subscripts, I use a slash convention: a i/j means a with a subscript i itself subscripted with a j. I have also brought the spelling of certain words into line with American usage: dialogue is now dialog and analogue now analog. Notes 1. Boston, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers,1994. 2. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2001. 3. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1989.