World-Wide Ethics Chapter Five Deontology Utilitarian thinking, as seen in the previous chapter, focuses on the good and bad consequences of actions, or of action types. The reason why some actions are right and others are wrong, or why some moral rules are correct and others are incorrect, is what those actions and rules are expected to bring about. But might it not be, instead, that actions are right or wrong in themselves, apart from what they bring about? This idea is known as deontology, and in the study of ethics it is the main alternative to theories like utilitarianism. The word deontology comes from the idea of duty, which in ancient Greek was deon. A duty is an action that ought to be done, or that is morally required. Deontology, like utilitarianism, refers to a family of theories with a common element. In this case the common element is the recognition that some actions ought to be done simply for their own sakes. Actions are right not because of the good consequences they can bring about, as in utilitarianism, but because of the type of actions they are. For this reason the moral principles of deontological theories are often expressed in commands, or imperatives. Historically, this goes back as far as the Ten Commandments. A number of those commandments express religious duties, to God: such as not taking his name in vain, or keeping the sabbath day (seventh day) holy. But most of them are general moral imperatives, like Thou shalt not kill! Thou shalt not lie! and Thou shalt not commit adultery! The command-structure of morality, in deontological theories, suggests that morality itself commands our obedience, regardless of what our actions may bring about. If God or society may somehow determine what our duties are, it is morality itself that imbues them with authority. Suppose, for example, that you are a soldier who must report to your post at 1:00 for guard duty. The fact that it is your duty to be at your post at that time would be determined by your commanding officer. But commanding officers are not authorized to determine the duties of their subordinates merely through their own power, or just because they say so. They are authorized by the command-structure of the army, which can also place limits on what they are entitled to command. Similarly, if the duties in deontology may be derived from God, or society, this would only be so if these sources of duties are authorized to command, like military officers. The Bhagavad Gita The military model of duty is celebrated in The Bhagavad Gita, a scripture from ancient India, from around 300 BC. Often called the Geeta, for short, it relates the story of a reluctant warrior-prince named Arjuna. On the eve of a great battle, in a civil war, Arjuna is struck by the recognition that the opposing army he must fight includes a number of his relatives: cousins and uncles, and even grandfathers. He therefore wonders whether it can be worth it to do his duty and fight the battle, considering what the result is likely to be. Wouldn t it be better, he wonders, to allow his relatives to kill him, than for him to kill them, and then grieve for their loss? Seeking guidance, he prays to the god Krishna: My compassionate nature is overcome by the dread of sin [if I do not do my duty]. Tell me truly what may be best for me to do. I am thy 1
disciple, wherefore instruct me in my duty, who am under thy tuition; for my understanding is confounded by the dictates of my duty. The god then appears to Arujna, and in a long discourse, encourages him to do his duty, no matter what. If thou art slain thou wilt obtain heaven; if thou art victorious thou wilt enjoy a world for thy reward; wherefore, son of Kunti, arise and be determined for the battle. Make pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat, the same, and then prepare for battle; thus thou shalt not incur sin. The doctrine here declared to you is according to the Sánkhya; hear now the Yoga (teaching). Let the motive be in the deed and not in the fruit. Be not one whose motive for action is the hope of reward. Let not thy life be spent in inaction. Steadfast in devotion, perform thy duty, abandon all thought of the consequence, and make the event equal, whether it terminate in good or evil. The doctrine of Sánkhya Yoga that Krishna teaches includes the idea that by following the dictates of our duty, without question, everything will work out right in the end. So we need not think of consequences, and shrink from doing our duty because of anticipated pleasure or pain, good or evil. This is part of a larger view of human life that is explained in the Gita. According to this view we are all, in reality, invisible and immortal souls, who are connected to virtually worthless bodies. For this reason, Arjuna s killing his relatives in battle, or their killing him, will have no effect on what is real. The warriors on both sides are expected to do their duties, and if they do, then in the end all will be equal, come what may. That is the meaning of those two lines of advice from Krishna: Make pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat, the same and make the event equal. All that is under our control in life is whether we do our duty or not. The consequences of what we do are not under our control. The ethics of deontology makes us subject to praise and blame only for what we can control, only for doing our duty. If things go awry once we do our duty, that cannot be our fault. Often, as in the example of the Gita, deontological theories suggest that some higher power can be relied on to make everything equal for those who do their duty. What may appear to us as a bad consequence of doing our duty will be, in the end, offset by some good we are presently unable to recognize. Not all deontological theories are like this, however. Kantian Ethics Late in the 18 th century, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) provided what seems still to be the most complete and non-religious development of deontology. For this reason, the moral theory he explained is today often equated with deontology itself. That is, when people think of deontology they inevitably think of Kantian ethics, even though Kant never used the term deontology. It was not invented until about twenty years after his death. When we use a phrase like Kantian Ethics to refer to a theory in ethics, this is comparable to the way scientists use Newtonian Physics to refer to a theory in physics. Sometimes, the theories that philosophers and scientists introduce are so unique and revolutionary that their names become permanently associated with them. We do not expect a deontological theory to tell us merely the tautology that we ought to do our duty. We expect such a theory to provide one or more principles that express what our duties are; and we expect it to explain why those principles are correct. Kant understood these expectations very well. At the beginning, he emphasized the classic doctrine of deontology that our moral duties are expected to be done for their own 2
sake, and not for any good consequences. From only this assumption, he reasoned, it is possible to learn what our duties are. It is possible to derive one basic principle, in the form of a command, that expresses all of our duties. Here are five steps that more or less represent Kant s thinking. First, duty for duty s sake. If we are expected to do our duty for its own sake, then this tells us that our duties cannot be based at all on any of the good consequences of our actions as the utilitarians thought. Second, desires and feelings cannot determine duties. The consequences of doing our duty could interest us only because of our feelings of pleasures or pains, or only because of our desires. So this tells us that since our duties cannot be based on good consequences, they cannot be based on our feelings or desires. Third, duties determined by reason. The only thing left, once feelings and desires are ruled out, is intellect, or reason. Everyone understands that some actions are reasonable, while others are unreasonable; and everyone understands that an action s being reasonable recommends it, and that an action s being unreasonable is a recommendation against it. Fourth, reason s universality. Whenever we are led to a conclusion by reasoning, we can always expect everyone else to follow our line of reasoning, and agree. We are led to conclusions by reasoning in geometry and algebra, for example. So the same should be true about reasoning in ethics. Reasoning is universal meaning that everyone can be expected to follow a line of reasoning; and, if it is sound, they will be forced to accept the truth of its conclusion. Fifth, duties based on universality. Since moral duties must be based in reason, reason s universality is the clue to discovering what our duties are. If a way of acting cannot be adopted universally, by everyone, then it is not right. The Categorical Imperative The basic moral principle of Kant s deontological ethics, which is based on the preceding five steps of his thinking, is a command called the categorical imperative. There is a technical reason why that name is appropriate in his theory; but here is not the place to go into that. This is what Kant s categorical imperative says: Statement of the Categorical Imperative Act only on the maxim that you can will to become a universal law. The principle of the categorical imperative is offered as a summary of all our moral duties. Kant s thinking was that if people always follow this command in their actions, then they will always do their duty, their actions will always be right; and any action can be identified as wrong if its maxim cannot become a universal law. What is a maxim? For reasons related to the history of philosophy, Kant believed that everyone would understand what he meant by the term, maxim. But people today do not readily understand this. The way the word is used today bears only a faint resemblance to what Kant meant. Today a maxim is something like a rule of thumb, or motto to live by. If one person adheres to a certain maxim, this does not mean that others do. So for this reason maxims are thought of along the lines of personal policies. Never let an insult go unavenged, might be someone s maxim; someone else might have as one of her maxims: Always look before you leap. As Kant understood the idea of a maxim, as employed in his categorical imperative, it would be possible to form a maxim for every one of a person s actions. The difference between the actions of animals and of human beings is that human beings can always explain why they are doing what 3
they are doing. When humans act deliberately, they can always think, or say, I m doing [this action] in order to bring about [this result]. To be slightly more informative they can add another bit of information, I m doing [this action] [in these circumstances] in order to bring about [this result]. This is what Kant had in mind in referring to a maxim. It is technically a three-part statement of action-explanation. A maxim rationalizes an action, meaning that it gives the reason why the action makes sense to the person doing it; and can make sense to others. What is a universal law? This is any law that everyone is expected to follow. Laws of nature are universal laws in this sense. Everyone can be expected to follow the law of gravity in fact, no one can fail to follow it. When in the categorical imperative Kant refers to a maxim s becoming a universal law, he has in mind something like its becoming a law of human nature. He is thinking of a maxim as if it is no longer a rule of action-explanation for a person, but a rule followed by all persons, everywhere, like the law of gravity. So if our duty is to act only on maxims that can become universal laws, this means that we can tell whether any action is right or wrong by thinking of its maxim as if it were everyone s maxim. The personal reference to I in the maxim is replaced by Everyone : Everyone does [this action] [in these circumstances] in order to bring about [this result]. A maxim s becoming a law of nature would mean not only that we all observe that law, but also that we all know we all observe it. So it turns out that, for some maxims, everyone s acting that way, while also knowing that everyone acts that way, makes no sense. That is the precise indication of an action s wrongness. Kant s most well understood example of an action shown to be wrong by the categorical imperative is a lying promise. Suppose a man is desperately in need of money, and comes up with the plan to borrow the money he needs, and to assure the lender that he will pay it back, even though he knows he will not be able to. Here is Kant s explanation of the case. Lying Promise Example [T]he maxim of his action would be as follows: When I believe myself to be in need of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know I shall never do so... [He] then puts the question: How would it be if my maxim became a universal law? He immediately sees that it could never hold a universal law of [human] nature. For the universality of a law which says that anyone who believes himself to be in need could promise what he pleased with the intention of not fulfilling it would make the promise itself, and the end to be accomplished by it, impossible; no one would believe what was promised to him but would only laugh at any such assertion. Kant s categorical imperative says, in short, that we can tell whether actions are right by asking, What if everyone acted that way? If everyone s acting that way is impossible, or cannot bring about the result the action would be intended to achieve, then acting that way is not right. Kant believed that every action type that we already know to be wrong, lying, cheating, killing, etc., will fail the universalization test of the categorical imperative, and that is precisely why it is wrong. For actions about which we are not so confident, he believed, all we need to do is apply the categorical imperative test to their maxims, and we ll have the answer. The Golden Rule Kant knew the moral principle that many today call the golden rule roughly: Always treat others in ways you would want them to 4
treat you. This statement, in the form of an imperative, seems to capture much of what Kant had in mind with the categorical imperative, and it is much simpler. For example, since you would not want anyone to borrow money from you when they know they cannot pay it back, this shows why it would be wrong for you to act that way. Kant did not favor the golden rule, however. Although its simplicity is a point in its favor, it turns out to be too simple. One of the problems with the golden rule, he pointed out, is that there are many circumstances in which people should not adopt the attitude of equal treatment recommended by that rule. Sometimes, because of their relationships, people ought to treat others in ways they would not want to be treated. Kant gave the example of a judge sentencing a convicted criminal. The judge should do what is right, and not be lenient in sentencing, even though, if she were the criminal, she would want a light sentence. Another example involves helping people in need. Some people feel they are independent and self-reliant, or at least they aspire to live that way. They would not welcome anyone s helping them, even if they were in a desperate situation they would want to rely on their own wits and skills. So by the golden rule, it would be wrong for people with this attitude to help anyone else. But that does not seem like a correct result. If they know of others who needed their help, and would like to receive it, then it seems they should be permitted to help them. An additional problem Kant recognized with the golden rule is that it is about treating other people, only. It does not provide any guidance for how we ought to treat ourselves; and he thought that some of our moral duties do address the treatment of ourselves. For example, Kant had some ideas about circumstances in which suicide would be wrong. He also supposed that people ought, morally, to develop their natural talents. He thought it would wrong for someone, like a mathematical prodigy, to choose to squander his time and energies on trivial things like playing solitaire, or memorizing names in a phonebook. He thought also that servility is wrong, which is allowing yourself to be used by others, however they please. Servility shows a lack of self-respect. Treating others as you prefer to be treated is important for morality, Kant thought. But most important is equal respect for yourself and for others. One of Kant s great ideas was that because they are rational, all human beings deserve a basic level of respect for their dignity. There are wrong ways to treat other human beings, even wrong ways to treat yourself, because of human dignity. Respecting human dignity means refusing to act against human beings in these ways, no matter what the consequences may be for overall happiness. This is the fundamental insight behind the modern idea of human rights. Are Consequences Always Irrelevant? If a deontological theory like Kant s tells us that the rightness of actions never has anything to do with their consequences, then, to most people, that seems like a problem. Perhaps, if we believe in a grand doctrine like Sánkhya Yoga, as taught by Krishna, we can feel comfortable about ignoring the consequence of our actions completely. But a lot of people do not. So it looks like Kant s theory of the categorical imperative will have a problem when the consequences of doing the right thing turn out to be seriously bad. A famous objection arose for Kant s theory along these lines, not long after he explained it. The Case of the Inquiring Murderer. Is it always wrong to lie, even if by doing so you 5
can prevent someone from murdering a friend of yours? Suppose someone has threatened to kill your friend, Megan; and suppose she comes to your house to hide. You invite her in, and let her hide upstairs. But not long afterwards, you hear the doorbell ring. It is the man who wants to murder Megan, and he is asking whether she is hiding in your house. Now if you want to protect her, you would answer that she is not in your house, and add, perhaps, that you think she is out of town. But saying these things would be lying. The categorical imperative tells us that if it were a universal law that everyone lies in order to protect their friends lives, then, as in the lying-promise example, no one would believe what you would say in this situation. So the categorical imperative seems to say that lying to protect Megan is wrong. You could instead try to avoid lying by changing the subject, or by evading the question in some other way. But then the man would know that, because you are not giving the simple yes or no answer he is looking for, you are hiding something or in this case, someone. So it seems that your options are to lie, to tell the truth, or to do neither, and by your odd behavior convey the truthful answer to the murderer. Things don t look good for Megan, if you are not willing to lie. This case, and many variations on the same idea, has posed one of the most serious stumbling blocks to acceptance of Kant s theory. This case makes it seem that actions consequences must matter after all. It makes it seem that we cannot seriously believe that lying must always be wrong, as the categorical imperative seems to say. Not surprisingly, act utilitarians think that the case of the inquiring murder shows the superiority of their theory to Kant s. They would say that of course the lie is right, considering the fatal consequences of not lying. So does the case of the inquiring murderer refute deontology? Some philosophers have thought that it only defeat s Kant s version of deontology. They have thought that other types of deontology can be developed, which do not say we must always tell the truth, no matter the circumstances. Prima Facie Duties In the 1930s, an English philosopher named W. D. Ross developed a deontological theory that deals somewhat differently with hard cases like the case of the inquiring murderer. His key idea was that duties like truth-telling are only prima facie. In Latin, this means first face. The idea is that lying is wrong in the abstract, but in concrete circumstances, like the case of the inquiring murderer, lying might be right. So, in a sense, Ross s theory of prima facie duties say that truth-telling is one of our basic duties, but there can be exceptions to it. Ross would not want to be classified as any kind of utilitarian, however. He did not think that exceptions to prima facie duties are based on utility. He did not think, in other words, that it would be right to tell a lie if the result is the greatest happiness for the greatest number. As a deontologist, Ross theorized that we have a whole set of prima facie duties, and truth-telling is one among them. If we are in a situation where truth-telling is called for, and no other prima facie duty applies in the situation, then in that situation we ought to tell the truth. It would be wrong not to do so. But if there may ever be another duty present also, like a duty keep a promise, or a duty to protect someone from harm each of which would be a prima facie duty then whether we should tell the truth or not depends on what Ross would call the stringency of the other duties. In the case of the inquiring murder he would say that 6
the duty to protect your friend is more stringent, or more compelling, than the duty to tell the truth; so in that circumstance, that is the duty that we should fulfill. Most people think that this is the correct response to that case. Ross would put it technically like this: the prima facie duty that is most stringent for the situation in this case the duty to protect your friend, Megan is the actual duty for the situation. We ought always to do our actual duty; and we determine what our actual duty is by comparing the set of prima facie duties that apply in any situation. We do not calculate the utilities of our alternative actions. Rather, we settle on what seems actually right by first considering all that seems prima facie right. Evidence for Prima Facie Duties In thinking about the practice of promising, Ross noticed a part of that practice that utilitarians have difficulty explaining. All of us recognize that sometimes we cannot keep promises we have made, and we have good reasons why we cannot. Ross s example is this: suppose you have agreed to meet someone at 3:00, for some trivial purpose. And on your way to the meeting you come across someone in distress, and in need of your help. Here you have a duty to keep your promise, but also a duty to help someone the duty to be a good Samaritan. A utilitarian might say that depending on the happiness at stake the happiness of everyone affected it could be right to help the person, even if it means breaking your promise to meet at 3:00. Ross would agree that this could be right. But what he noticed is this. The duty of promise-keeping does not simply vanish because helping the person in need is right. The duty is thought to remain; because when you next see the person you agreed to meet, you ought to apologize. This is something the utilitarian seems unable explain. Suppose that if you had kept the promise, you would have done something wrong. The utilitarian would think that keeping the promise would have been wrong if helping the person in distress would have produced greater utility. But then when you next see that person, why, according to the utilitarian, should you have to apologize? Are you expected to say, I m sorry for not meeting you at 3:00, which would have been the wrong thing for me to do? As the utilitarian must see it, your duty to keep the promise vanished from the scene with the appearance of another action that would lead to greater utility so no apology should be expected you actually did not have a duty to keep the promise. This does not seem like the correct explanation, however. It seems rather that even though it can sometimes be right to break a promise, the fact of the promise leaves something like a moral residue. The broken promise continues demanding to be addressed, so to speak. Ross thought that the idea of promising s being a prima facie duty explains this very well. For promisekeeping, and for many other duties besides, when they are not the most stringent duties in our circumstances and so not our actual duties they will not be cancelled so much as dimmed, or blurred. They can still require that we act in certain ways, even if we can no longer act in the ways they would have required, if they were our actual duties. So a prima facie duty of promise-keeping can require that we apologize if we are unable to keep a promise like meeting someone at 3:00, because some other duty came up that was more stringent. 7
Knowing by Intuition In listing our prima facie duties, Ross s theory provides a set of moral principles. He did not claim that this list is complete, but he thought that it at least seemed to capture what most people think morality requires of us. List of prima facie duties 1. Duties depending on one s prior actions: a. Duty of fidelity (promise-keeping) b. Duty of reparation (restitution) 2. Duty of gratitude 3. Duty of justice 4. Duty of beneficence (doing good for others) 5. Duty of self-improvement 6. Duty of non-maleficence (not harming) But how do we know these principles are correct? How do we know these action types really are our duties, even if they are only prima facie duties? Ross answered that we know this by what he calls intuition. This is a way of knowing something without perceiving it with our senses. He thought it is self-evident that justice and beneficence and non-maleficence are among our duties. He could of course count on everyone s agreeing with him that they are; but most philosophers have not found his answer to be very satisfactory. One reason it has seemed unsatisfactory is that Ross s theory presents a number of moral principles indicating the specific duties we have. It emphasizes, also, that these duties can conflict. In some circumstances, one duty tells us to act one way, and another duty tells us to act differently. Saying that we all know our prima facie duties by intuition does not help us decide which are our actual duties. It may be selfevident to everyone that we have a prima facie duty to keep promises, and a prima facie duty to help people in distress, but it is not self-evident, in any situation, which one would be our actual duty. This is not selfevident, because people sometimes disagree over which duty is actual; and they could not disagree if this were self-evident any more than they could disagree over the sum of 2+2. Ross said that we do not know our actual duties by intuition; we only know our prima facie duties that way. The fact is, he admitted, that when prima facie duties conflict, we really cannot know what our actual duties are. We can all agree that we ought to tell the truth, and that we ought to prevent murders if we can. But according to Ross and this part is a little strange we can never be certain, in any circumstance, that preventing a murder is a more stringent duty than telling the truth. Perhaps that seems like a better result than provided by Kant s theory, which seems to tell us that we can be certain that telling the truth is always more stringent. But most philosophers have hoped to do better. Most expect a moral theory to provide a way to tell what our actual duties would be, in any situation. It should be expected to help us see not only what moral principles are correct, but also, if more than one can apply to a given situation, which one takes priority. Chapter Summary The central focus of deontological moral theories is on the idea of duty, or on what ought to be done. Theories like this invoke a kind of military model, where moral principles are like commands from a higher authority that must be obeyed no matter what. That is, it does not matter what consequences may be expected from doing our duty. We act rightly by doing our duties, and wrongly by not doing them. Two of the most highly regarded deontological theories have been provided by Immanuel Kant, in the 18 th century, and by Sir David Ross, in the 20 th century. Kant 8
assumed that all of our moral duties can be captured by one simple moral principle expressed in what he called the categorical imperative. His idea was basically that our duty is to act only in ways that could become laws of (human) nature that is, ways in which everyone else could be expected to act, in the same circumstances. So, to oversimplify just a bit, lying would be wrong because if everyone was a liar, then no one would believe what anyone says, and thus there would be no point to lying. Kant s categorical imperative resembles the principle of the golden rule ; but there are cases where the two principles differ. A difficult problem that Kant s theory has had to face is that the categorical imperative seems to say that lying would be wrong, even in order to save someone s life. This is something that act utilitarians point to as a great advantage of their theory, over deontological theories like Kant s. For it seems obvious that telling a lie in order to save a life would bring about greater happiness, at least some of the time. According to Ross s version of deontology, moral duties like the duty not to lie are only prima facie duties. This means that circumstances can present more than one duty, in conflict, and then the most stringent among them would be the actual duty for the circumstances. For example, it is a prima facie duty not to lie, and it is a prima facie duty to help people in need, especially if you can save their lives. If it should happen that you can save someone s life by telling a lie, then saving the life is probably what Ross would call the actual duty in the circumstance. This would not be because it would produce greater happiness, but simply because, in this case, the duty to save the life is more stringent. A problem looming for Ross s theory, is that it can be hard to tell which prima facie duty is more stringent than another. In fact, Ross himself thought that we probably cannot ever be certain about this. Where We Go from Here Suppose it were possible somehow to combine utilitarian interests in bringing about good results, with the deontological emphasis on duty. Such a combination might yield the best of both worlds. The next chapter presents a family of theories that combines an interest in overall happiness, like utilitarianism, with a command structure like deontology. It resembles rule utilitarianism in some ways, but not in other ways. It can also resemble cultural relativism, because it presents morality as arising from some of the basic requirements for living in society. It is called the social contract theory, and it suggests that morality is based on a fundamental agreement that people would make for living together peacefully in society. The basic assumption of this type of theory is that human beings are overall happier living together in social settings, provided they submit themselves to some basic social rules, as duties. So moral principles can be expressed as social duties, and the benefits of social life can be expected to result from people s adhering to their duties in society especially duties like justice, or fairness. Of the three families of philosophical theories, utilitarianism, deontology and social contract, the contract theory seems like the most advantageous theoretical model for ethics especially for the part of ethics dealing with human rights. Works Cited The Bhagavad Gita: with an English Translation, Explanatory Notes and an Examination of Its Doctrines (London: The Christian Literature Society for India, 1899). 9
Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1990). 39. Terms Introduced Duty: in ethics, an action that ought, morally, to be done; it can also be our moral duty not to act in certain ways, like lying. Deontology is the moral theory, or family of moral theories, that emphasizes duties. Categorical Imperative: in the ethical theory of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the basic principle that can tell us what our moral duties are, expressed as a command. Though Kant provided different versions of this principle, it basically says: Act only on maxims that can become universal laws. Maxims: in Kant s ethics, these are personal rules or principles that people follow in acting. Although people may not be conscious of their maxims when they act, their maxims express the reason or rationale behind their actions. For example, someone s maxim might be: When I stayed up late the night before, and there is not an exam in my early class the next day, I ll skip the class in order to catch up on my sleep. Some people act on that maxim very frequently. Universality, or Universal law: in Kant s ethics, a maxim is treated as a universal law when it is supposed that everyone would act on the maxim. If everyone cannot act on a maxim having become a universal law, then, by the categorical imperative, anyone s acting on that maxim is morally wrong it is everyone s duty not to act that way. Maxims that involve lying are a good example of this, since if everyone expects everyone else always to lie, then no one ever believes what anyone says. The Golden Rule: In one formulation: Always treat others in ways you would want them to treat you (see also Terms Introduced in Chapter 1). The golden rule is a deontological moral principle it is not assumed to be correct because of any overall good consequences of acting that way. Kant s categorical imperative resembles the golden rule in some respects, but not in others. For example, in Kant s theory, moral principles can apply to actions that affect only ourselves; but the golden rule is about actions that affect others, only. Prima Facie Duties: in Latin, prima facie means something like first face, or upon first appearance. In W. D. Ross s deontological theory, some action types are prima facie duties, such a promise-keeping. This means that we ought to keep our promises, but there can be circumstances where we also ought to do something else. Prima facie duties are sometimes called conditional duties. Actual Duty: in Ross s theory, the prima facie duty that is most stringent in the circumstances. Actual duties are sometimes called absolute duties. Intuition: in Ross s theory, this is how we know the set of our prima facie duties. Things we know by intuition are said to be self-evident. 10