On Holy Ground: A comparison of the Red Mosque and Golden Temple raids Brent Kesler

On Holy Ground: A comparison of the Red Mosque and Golden Temple raids Brent Kesler Introduction In July of 2007, Pakistani forces launched Operation Silence, storming Islamabad's Red Mosque to remove Islamist militants who had begun enforcing sharia law in their neighborhood of the capital. This raid has many parallels to Operation Blue Star, the Indian army's 1984 assault against Sikh militants occupying the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the largest city in India's Punjab state. In both cases, well-armed, religiously motivated militants sought refuge in a place of worship, forcing the government to risk popular backlash by violating its sanctity. This paper will examine the events leading up to Operation Blue Star and Operation Silence and how each forced the Indian and Pakistani governments to respond to a challenge to their authority by launching an unpopular assault on a place of worship. It will then look at these events from four different angles. First it will examine the internal political decisions that defined how the two governments responded before deciding that a military operation would be necessary; in both cases, local officials were ready to act against the threat, but were restrained by national officials who feared a public backlash and even supported the militants for political reasons. Second, it will compare the motives and goals of the two groups that sought refuge on holy ground; while the Sikh militants had a more nuanced set of political objectives than the Islamists, both groups sought to protect a religious identity against outsiders secularism in the case of the Islamists, Hinduism in the case of the Sikhs. Third, it will attempt to measure popular perception of the two military operations, given the available data. Finally, it will outline the different tactical situations presented by the two holy sites and how they affected the two governments' calculations; Islamists used the Red Mosque as base of operations in a particular neighborhood, while the Sikh militants operated all over the Punjab region, using the Golden Temple only as a last refuge. * * *

The Red Mosque The Red Mosque was built in 1965 by the Capital Development Authority (CDA), the government body in charge of development in the Pakistani capital, making it one of the oldest mosques in Islamabad. Its first prayer leader was Maulana Muhammad Abdullah, who advocated a strict Deobandi interpretation of Islam. In 1977 Muhammad Abdullah mobilized supporters against Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, winning the favor of General Zia ul-haq, who overthrew the prime minister that same year. In the 1980's, Abdullah funneled Red Mosque students to fight in the US/Saudi-funded and Pakistani-managed jihad against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. This made him popular with government officials and earned him land for the construction of the Jamia Fareediya madrassa, serving male students. In 1988, more land was granted for the construction of the Jamia Hafsa school for female students. In 1998, Maulana Abdullah was assassinated inside the Red Mosque, allegedly for his support of anti-shia militants. His two sons, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Abdul Rashid took over administration of the mosque with the elder Abdul Aziz as chief cleric and the younger Abdul Rashid as his deputy. 1 Build up to Operation Silence The events that would lead to a military operation against Muslim extremists in the Red Mosque began with a land dispute. On January 20, 2007, the CDA and the Islamabad district administration demolished two mosques near the Islamabad Highway and Murree Road. Officials claimed that terrorists could use the mosques as a base of attack against foreign dignitaries and government officials traveling from the Islamabad International Airport. 2 The demolition of mosques in the Pakistani capital had already been a source of controversy. The CDA claimed it had legal authority to demolish the 1 Qandeel Siddique. "The Red Mosque operation and its impact on the growth of the Pakistani Taliban". Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, October 8, 2008, pg 11-12. http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00115/qadeel_siddique-lal_115013a.pdf 2 Shahzad Malik. "Two mosques demolished in Islamabad over security threat". Daily Times, January 21, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\01\21\story_21-1-2007_pg7_5

mosques since they were illegally built on government-owned land. In 2006 three mosques were destroyed for the expansion of Murree Road (now renamed Benazir Bhutto Road). The Council of Islamic Ideology provided religious cover for the demolitions, ruling that the construction of mosques on encroached land without written permission or a sales deed from the owner was un-islamic. 3 However, the demolitions remained controversial. On January 21, female students from the Red Mosque's Jamia Hafsa madrassa occupied the Government Children's Library, demanding that the two mosques be reconstructed and that no more mosques be destroyed in the future. 4 Later that week, Maulana Abdul Aziz, chief cleric of the Red Mosque, backed up the students' demands with threats of suicide bombings. 5 Ejazul Haq, minister for religious affairs, began negotiations with Jamia Hafsa, and by February 8, the issue was discussed in the National Assembly. Deputy interior minister Zafar Iqbal Waraich told the Assembly that the government wanted to end the stand-off peacefully, but would consider force as a last resort. 6 February 10, the students withdrew from negotiations and the Interior Ministry authorized the Islamabad district administration to remove the students. However, Minister Haq asked Islamabad Chief Commissioner Khalid Pervez to delay the operation. At that time intelligence agencies reported that Jaish-e- Mohammad militants were traveling to the Red Mosque to back up Abdul Aziz. 7 Two days later, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao brokered a deal with Abdul Aziz's deputy and younger brother, Abdul Rashid Ghazi. The government agreed to rebuild the two mosques whose demolition sparked the occupation of the children's library and to set up an 11-member committee (consisting of seven clerics and four government representatives) to 3 Mohammad Imran. "Mosques on encroached land illegal, un-islamic" Daily Times, January 5, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5c01%5c05%5cstory_5-1-2007_pg1_3 4 Shahzad Mailk. "Mosque demolition: Girl students occupy government library". Daily Times, January 22, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\01\22\story_22-1-2007_pg1_6 5 "Editorial: Suicide bombers threaten Pakistan". Daily Times, January 28, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\01\28\story_28-1-2007_pg3_1 6 "Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid occupy 1 acre illegally, NA told". Daily Times, February 9, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\02\09\story_9-2-2007_pg7_10 7 Irfan Ghauri and Shahzad Malik. "Jamia Hafsa admin, students pull out of talks with govt". Daily Times. February 11, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007/02/11/story_11-2-2007_pg1_6

resolve other disputes. In return, the students agreed to allow children to access the library, but would continue occupying it until the CDA rebuilt all the mosques it had demolished and granted 81 other mosques legal claim to the land they had encroached. 8 The Red Mosque's madrassa students mostly stayed out of the news until March 27 when they committed their first kidnapping. Female students from Jamia Hafsa raided the home of a government employee and kidnapped his mother, Shamim Akhtar, as well as his sister, wife, and six-month-old daughter, accusing them of running a brothel. Police responded by arresting two Jamia Hafsa teachers. Students from the Red Mosque's male madrassa, Jamia Fareedia, then took two police officers hostage. The police and Jamia Fareedia exchanged prisoners, but Jamia Hafsa continued to hold the family, demanding the release of five other students who had gone missing and former Pakistani intelligence official Khalid Khwaja. 9 The students released the family after Shamim read a public confession and promised to vacate the house. Shamim later claimed she was beaten until she agreed to the confession. 10 The students said they would target other brothels as well as music and video shops until they closed. Islamabad Deputy Commissioner Chaudhry Mohammad Ali said the national government told the district administration to "take a lenient view of the situation." Officials apparently believed that the madrassa students were trying to gain media attention while the government was distracted with unrest caused by President General Musharraf's decision to fire Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. 11 A week later, chief cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz announced that the Red Mosque had formed a court to implement sharia law in areas under its control and gave the government one month to close all brothels, gambling houses, video and music stores, and any places selling alcohol in Islamabad. By 8 Mohammad Imran. "Partial breakthrough on mosque row". Daily Times, February 13, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\02\13\story_13-2-2007_pg7_3 9 Shahzad Malik, Naveed Siddiqui and Mohammad Imran. "Capital tense after seminary students raid brothel ". Daily Times, March 29, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\03\29\story_29-3-2007_pg1_3 10 "Madrassa students humiliated me: Shamim: Brothel owner freed after forced confession". Daily Times, March 30, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\03\30\story_30-3-2007_pg1_4 11 Rana Qaisar. "Talibanisation of society: Madrassa students getting leniency". Daily Times, March 30, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\03\30\story_30-3-2007_pg1_5

May 18, he added the end of coeducation and music television shows to his demands. 12 He added that throughout ongoing negotiations, the government had failed to take his demands seriously and had ignored his deadlines for the reconstruction of mosques and the implementation of sharia law throughout Pakistan. Abdul Aziz also threatened to respond with suicide attacks if the government resorted to force against the Red Mosque. 13 Meanwhile, his students continued their campaign of abductions. On May 18, Jamia Fareedia students kidnapped four policemen, demanding the release of eleven students who had been arrested for burning CDs and video cassettes at local stores. 14 District officials negotiated with mosque officials and police began ordering video shops to remove tapes of objectionable material in response to militant threats. 15 The students later released two officers after district officials agreed to release four of the arrested students. 16 Red Mosque students and leaders finally crossed a red line on June 23 with the abduction of five Chinese nationals from a massage parlor that the students claimed was a front for a brothel. 17 Chinese Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang officially asked Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao to take stronger measures to protect Chinese citizens living in Islamabad. 18 The final stand-off with the Pakistani government began June 27 when Rangers, a Pakistani paramilitary, deployed to the Red Mosque and set up barbed wire and placed weapons around the complex. 19 12 "Lal Masjid chief wants end to co-education" Daily Times, May 19, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\05\19\story_19-5-2007_pg7_8 13 "Government warned of suicide attacks in case of resistance; Qazi court to work on pattern of panchayat and jirgas". Daily Times, April 7, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\04\07\story_7-4-2007_pg1_1 14 "Hostage policemen: Case filed against Lal Masjid admin". Daily Times, May 19, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\05\19\story_19-5-2007_pg1_2 15 "Cops relay threat to CD vendors". Daily Times, May 19, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\05\19\story_19-5-2007_pg1_9 16 "Govt bows to Lal Masjid mullahs". Daily Times. May 20, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\05\20\story_20-5-2007_pg1_1 17 "Five Chinese held hostage at Lal Masjid". Daily Times, June 23, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\06\23\story_23-6-2007_pg1_2 18 "China tells Pakistan to better protect Chinese citizens". Daily Times, June 28, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\06\28\story_28-6-2007_pg1_6 19 "Rangers deployed near Lal Masjid". Daily Times, June 28, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\06\28\story_28-6-2007_pg1_5

Stand-off at the Red Mosque Maulana Abdul Aziz immediately demanded the removal of the Rangers and threatened retaliation if his demands were not met. On July 2, students began fortifying the mosque with their own barbed wire and shut down adjacent streets. On July 3 began the first exchanges of gunfire, with ten people killed. The following day, President Musharraf authorized Operation Silence, sparking the heaviest gun battles of the siege. 750 students surrendered. Chief cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz was arrested while trying to escape. On July 5, an additional 1,500 students surrendered, with many reporting that the mosque was no longer under the control of Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid, but of thirty to fifty militants. Abdul Aziz made an appeal on television for students still inside the mosque to surrender or escape. Amid gun battles on July 6, the militants fired tear gas canisters at government troops, reportedly stronger than the tear gas used by security forces. By July 11, government forces had ended the siege, with 50 to 285 people estimated dead. That number was later revised to 75. The Golden Temple Completed in 1604 by Guru Arjan Dev Ji, the Golden Temple is Sikhism's holiest site. In the middle of the 18th century, a declining Mughal Empire ceded Punjab to the Afghan Ahmad Shah Abdali. However, Sikh attacks against his troops and caravan led him to assault Amritsar, blow up the Golden Temple, fill the holy pool surrounding the temple with slaughtered cattle, and to tear down the Akal Takht, which stood across the pool from the temple. After the Sikhs rebuilt the Golden Temple and Akal Takht, no army had entered the temple complex until Indira Ghandi launched Operation Blue Star. 20 The Return of Indira Gandhi and Punjabi Politics Indira Gandhi became prime minister for the first time in 1966 thanks to a group of elderly 20 Mark Tully and Satish Jacob. Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle. (New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 1985), pg 21.

politicians within the Congress Party known as "the Syndicate". Following the death of Pandit Nehru's successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Syndicate backed Mrs. Gandhi as a compromise candidate whose inexperience would make her easy to control. 21 However, in 1969, believing that the Syndicate was about to remove her from power, Mrs. Gandhi split the Congress Party. 22 In 1975, the Allahabad High Court in Uttar Pradesh found Mrs. Gandhi guilty of corrupt electoral practices. The actual charges were relatively minor, so her advisors recommended that she resign as Prime Minister pending an appeal to the Supreme Court. Instead, she declared a state of emergency, allowing her to claim extraordinary powers (used chiefly to suppress opposition) and to suspend general elections. In 1977, troubled by the damage to her international reputation from the suspension of democracy, Mrs. Gandhi called a general election. The Congress Party-Indira lost and the pro-hindu Janata Party took power nationally and in the state of Punjab. 23 Mrs. Gandhi's son, Sanjay, wanted to bring his mother back to power. The obvious solution would be to drain Hindu support from the Janata Party to Congress-Indira. Since breaking the Congress Party, Mrs. Gandhi had to differentiate her politics from her former party. Her solution was to move away from secular democratic politics towards Hindu revivalism, seeking to tap into a widespread sentiment among many Hindus that secularism had empowered Muslims, Sikhs, and Untouchables at the expense of higher caste Hindus. 24 When it came to draining support from Janata in Punjab, however, the state's former Chief Minister, Sikh politician Zail Singh, advised Sanjay to target Janata's coalition partner, the Akali Dal, instead. The Akali Dal was founded in the early twentieth century as part of the Singh Sabha movement, which sought to define a Sikh identity separate from Hindus and to gain control over Sikh temples from the government. To this end, the Akali Dal formed the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC). After gaining control over Sikh temples through the 1924 Sikh Gurdwaras Act, the SGPC 21 Tully and Jacob, pg 43. 22 Tully and Jacob, pg 13. 23 Tully and Jacob, pg 55-56. 24 Tully and Jacob, pg 11.

became a de facto parliament for the Sikh community. 25 Although Sikhs have a distinct religion, Hindus and Sikhs have always intermingled and intermarried, with conversion back and forth between the two communities. However, Hinduism has a history of absorbing distinct religions. The Akali Dal, therefore, has always sought to preserve a Sikh identity. In 1966, it successfully agitated to split the state of Punjab into two states: Haryana and a Punjab with a slight Sikh majority. However, since this majority was only 56% and Sikhs did not vote for Akali Dal as a bloc, the religious party could only hold power in Punjab in coalition with a Hindu party. To split the Akali Dal from the Janata Party and turn support towards Congress-Indira, Zail Singh recommended finding an even more devout Sikh leader than those in the Akali Dal. Though this may seem like a strange tactic for a party historically based on secular democracy and turning towards Hindu revivalism, Zail Singh had risen to power in Punjab and within Congress-Indira by playing up his Sikh orthodoxy, giving sermons at Sikh festivals starting public functions with a prayer. 26 A devout Sikh could use the same tactics to win support for Congress candidates in Punjab. That devout Sikh was Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Build up to Operation Blue Star Bhindranwale's campaign of violence and Sikh separatism lasted much longer than the Red Mosque's attempt to impose sharia law on its neighborhood in Islamabad. Bhindranwale was named as a suspect in the April 24, 1980, murder of Baba Gubachan Singh, Guru of the Narankiri sect, an offshoot of the Sikh religion. He briefly took refuge in the Guru Nanak Niwas, part of the hostel complex near the Golden Temple. He left the rest house after Zail Singh told Parliament that he had no role in the murder. 27 Bhindranwale was briefly arrested as a suspect in the 25 Proshanta K. Nandi. "Socio-Political Context of Sikh Militancy in India". Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol 31, nos 3-4, 1996, pg 182. 26 Tully and Jacob, pg 64. 27 Tully and Jacob, pg 66.

September 1981 murder of Lala Jagat Narain, a newspaper publisher highly critical of Bhindranwale and the Sikh nationalist movement in general. Although Bhindranwale escaped from arrest by Haryana police thanks to Zail Singh's protection, he was arrested by Punjab police under the orders of Punjab Chief Minister Darbara Singh, a rival of Zail Singh within Congress-Indira. This sparked a wave of violence by Bhindranwale supporters. Sikhs on motorcycles opened fire on Hindus at markets in Jullundur and Taran Taran, killing a total of five Hindus and injuring twenty-five. A group of Sikhs also hijacked an Indian Airlines flight to Lahore to demand Bhindranwale's release. A bomb was thrown into the offices of the Deputy Inspector General of police in Patalia, one of the officers sent to arrest Bhindranwale in Haryana. The DIG escaped unharmed. Bhindranwale was finally released in October 1981, after Zail Singh told Parliament that he had no connection to the Narain's murder. 28 On April 23, 1983, Deputy Inspector General A.S. Atwal of the Punjab police was shot and killed while leaving the Golden Temple through the main gate. It was believed he was there acting on a tip from an informant, and may have been murdered in revenge for an operation in March that killed a key militant linked to Bhindranwale. Despite a national outcry, no action was taken against Bhindranwale's miltant organization, which by now was operating out of the Guru Nanak Niwas. 29 Punjab Chief Minister Darbara Singh had authorized the police to pursue "encounters" with Bhindranwale's men a euphemism for assassinations. This sparked revenge killings that demoralized the police force. 30 On October 5, Sikhs hijacked a bus, separated Hindu passengers from Sikhs, and shot the Hindus, killing six and injuring one. This incident led Indira Gandhi to suspend the Punjab government and to declare martial law in several districts. 31 However, this was not enough to stop the violence. In November, Sikhs hijacked another bus, this time killing four Hindus. 32 28 Tully and Jacob, pg 66-69. 29 Tully and Jacob, pg 96-98. 30 Tully and Jacob, pg 105-106. 31 Tully and Jacob, pg 104-105. 32 Tully and Jacob, pg 108.

A private army under the command of Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, a rival of Bhindranwale's within the Akali Dal, forced Bhindranwale and his men out of the Guru Nanak Niwas. Bhindranwale then sought refuge in the main temple complex in the Akal Takht, a shrine symbolizing God's temporal authority. High Priest Giani Kirpal Singh objected; none of the ten Gurus had ever lived in the Akal Takht, and Bhindranwale would be living above the holy book of the Sikhs, the Guru Granth Sahib, an act of sacrilege. However, with support from other Akali Dal leaders, Bhindranwale moved in on December 15. 33 In February of 1984 came a series of riots. Sikh militants forced Hindu-owned shops to close in a general strike. Hindus responded with their own general strike which led to rioting. Anti-Sikh riots broke out in Haryana state as well. 34 Sikh violence continued at Bhindranwale's urging. Finally, on June 2, 1984, Mrs. Gandhi authorized Operation Blue Star and deployed the army to Punjab. The next day, a 36-hour curfew was imposed on Punjab with communications, electricity, and transportation services suspended. On June 5, seven tanks took up position around the Golden Temple complex and troops entered the temple grounds. After many gun battles with Bhindranwale's militants, soldiers finally took control of the Golden Temple on July 7. By the end of the operation, 493 people were killed, according to government figures. Many of the casualties were civilian pilgrims. 35 Before Operation Blue Star, Bhindranwale's organization had killed 165 Hindus and 39 Sikh opponents. Including deaths from riots, police "encounters", and other violent incidents, the total number of casualties reached 410 killed and 1,180 injured. 36 Government Intervention Looking at the events that led to military operations against both the Red Mosque and the 33 Tully and Jacob, pg 110-111. 34 Tully and Jacob, pg 116-117. 35 Tully and Jacob, pg 185. 36 Tully and Jacob, pg 147.

Golden Temple, a central theme emerges: in both cases, the local government appeared willing to act against the challenge to state authority but was held back by the central government. In both cases, the central government restrained local officials for similar reasons: fear of public backlash and political connections between national politicians and militants. Fear of Backlash In the case of the Red Mosque, the potential for public backlash derived from two sources. First, the cause that catapulted the Red Mosque leaders to national attention, opposition to the government destruction of mosques, had widespread popular support. Clerics and religious parties framed the issue as an official effort to de-islamize Pakistan under US and European pressure. They argued that many of the mosques targeted for demolition were built before the creation of Pakistan, and so could not have encroached on government land. They also claimed that the demolitions favored other religious groups. For example, clerics claimed that Christian churches that had encroached on government land were not a part of the demolitions orders, and that the CDA even avoided cutting down a tree because it was revered by Buddhists. 37 The Red Mosque's response was backed by Qazi Hussain Ahmed, president of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a coalition of religiously-based political parties. Qazi framed the demolition as a matter of corruption, arguing that the CDA did not target encroachments committed by army generals and other influential people, and called on Muslims to practice itikaf (retreat for prayer) in threatened mosques to protect them. 38 The second reason for fear of public backlash was President Musharraf's decision to fire Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, which had sparked widespread demonstrations. However, another reason for the government's reluctance to launch a military operation against the mosque was the presence of Jaish-e-Mohammad militants, who had began gathering at the mosque in February 2007. 37 Shahzad Malik. "Two mosques demolished in Islamabad over security threat". Daily Times, January 21, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\01\21\story_21-1-2007_pg7_5 38 "Qazi demands withdrawal of warning notices". Daily Times, February 16, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\02\16\story_16-2-2007_pg7_16

In the case of the Golden Temple, the fear of backlash also played a role. After Deputy Inspector General A.S. Atwal was murdered while leaving the main temple complex, Punjab Chief Minister Dabara Singh argued for police to be sent into the Guru Nanak Niwas to apprehend Bhindranwale, but was refused by Delhi due to fear of Sikh backlash. 39 However, if the government had any wish to arrest Bhindranwale, the outcry following Atwal's murder would have proven an ideal moment. Many Sikhs were outraged by the murder on temple grounds and the Guru Nanak Niwas was not properly a part of the temple complex. Political Connections Several local governments in India had opportunities to apprehend Bhindranwale, but were apparently restrained by politicians in Delhi. After the murder of newspaper publisher Lala Jagat Narain in September 1981, a warrant was issued for Bhindranwale's arrest while he was preaching in Chando Kalan in Haryana state, east of Punjab. According to journalist Kuldip Nayar, Zail Singh phoned Haryana Chief Minister Bhajan Lal to instruct him not to arrest Bhindranwale, an order he followed out of a desire to prove his usefulness to Indira Gandhi. 40 Bhindranwale was arrested in Punjab a week later, but released after less than a month in prison when Zail Singh told Parliament that there was no evidence against him in Narain's murder. He was released by a government order rather than a court verdict. 41 The order appears to have come from Mrs. Gandhi herself; Santokh Singh, thenpresident of the Delhi Gurudwara Management Committee, reported that he personally pleaded with Mrs. Gandhi for his release. 42 To celebrate his release, Bhindranwale led a procession of eighty supporters, many of them armed, through the streets of Delhi, and the local police, under the control of then-home Minister Zail Singh, made no attempt to arrest him. 43 39 Tully and Jacob, 98. 40 Tully and Jacob, 67. 41 Tully and Jacob, 69. 42 Tully and Jacob, 71. 43 Tully and Jacob, 70.

The role that political connections played in protecting Red Mosque leaders from police is less clear-cut. From the beginning, national officials were involved in the negotiations with the Jamia Hafsa students over the occupation of the children's library and demolition of mosques. The initial deal was brokered by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao. Religion Minister Ejazul Haq wanted to resolve the conflict with Red Mosque students peacefully from the beginning, but Hafiz Mehmood Raja, general secretary of the Islamist party Pasban-e-Millat, accused Haq of trying to sabotage peaceful negotiations. 44 Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, president of the Pakistan Muslim League "Quaid-i-Azam" (PML-Q), actively tried to broker a peaceful resolution after the Red Mosque students began holding hostages. 45 The Red Mosque had enjoyed the support of high ranking government officials since the 1980s. However, while Red Mosque students were always politically active, it seems their activities were on behalf of Islamist politics in general rather than any particular political party. This research has found no reports that any one politician or party was instrumental in holding back a military operation against the mosque. If political patronage did play a role, it was probably through the general influence of sympathetic officials rather than direct intervention by a particular patron, as was the case with Zail Singh and Bhindranwale. Even the presence of Jaish-e-Mohammad militants fits within this interpretation. Pakistan has a complex relationship with militant groups operating in its territory. After the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) encouraged militant groups to relocate to Jammu and Kashmir to operate against Indian forces. JeM is an offshoot of one such group, Harkat-ul- Mujahideen. These groups eventually developed supply networks that allowed them to operate independently of the Pakistani government, and even to oppose it. For example, JeM targeted General Musharraf for assassination several times during his presidency. Despite such attacks, Pakistan is reluctant to give up militant groups as an instrument of foreign policy, given India's military superiority 44 "Ministers accused of sabotaging Shujaat s peace initiative". Daily Times, April 13, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\04\13\story_13-4-2007_pg7_28 45 "Lal Masjid breakthrough soon: Shujaat". Daily Times, April 12, 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\04\12\story_12-4-2007_pg1_1

and Pakistan's lack of strategic depth. It is important to remember that the relationship between Pakistan and militant groups is constantly shifting. Sometimes they enjoy direct support as instruments of foreign policy; sometimes they are simply tolerated; at other times they are actively suppressed by the government. Often they enjoy support from government officials pursuing their own personal agendas. This makes it difficult to determine precisely how the presence of JeM militants affected officials' decision to tolerate the Red Mosque's violent activities. However, links between JeM and ISI appear to have played some role in the Red Mosque crisis. JeM militants at the Red Mosque may have prompted its clerics to demand the release of Khalid Khwaja, a former ISI official. These apparent links have given rise to many conspiracy theories that the Pakistani government staged the Red Mosque stand-off, though what strategic or tactical advantage it would gain by such theater is unclear. What is clear is that patronage of militants groups and extremist clerics gave the Red Mosque clerics and students the freedom to impose their own law within an neighborhood of the capital. Militant Motives A striking difference between the Red Mosque and Golden Temple militants is the nature of their demands. Bhindranwale's demands were rooted in the history of Sikh politics, while the demands of Red Mosque leaders seem to have been hastily put together once they realized they had a media spotlight. In the case of the Golden Temple, Sikh political parties had long been negotiating with the central government for the implementation of the 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution. The resolution was adopted by the Akali Dal as a tool for political action. When in power in Punjab always in coalition with the Janata Party the Akali Dal would negotiate with the central government over its implementation. When out of power, the Akali Dal used the resolution to foment Sikh nationalism to

gain support in the next election. The resolution included a number of provisions the central government could never grant, such as limiting its authority in Punjab to foreign affairs, defense, currency, and communication. Such a concession would grant Punjab de facto autonomy against the principles of the Indian constitution. 46 However, a number of its demands represented practicable, if controversial, political goals, such as a greater share of the river waters running through Punjab, full control of the city of Chandigarh (capital of both Punjab and neighboring Haryana state), and the right for Sikhs to carry their traditional swords on domestic flights (which was granted). Other demands, such as nationalization of the trade of food grains, 47 while impractical, resemble demands made by other political parties. However, some demands based on the Sikh religion, such as the recognition of Amritsar as a holy city, would have threatened India's secular foundations. The ability of the Akali Dal to achieve some of these demands would serve as a basis of political legitimacy among Sikhs. Indira Gandhi tended to back out of deals with the Akali Dal at the last minute, making it appear weak and allowing Bhindranwale to offer himself as an alternative willing and able to achieve the full implementation of the resolution. While the Anandpur Sahib Resolution had aspects of a workable political program, the demands of Malauna Abdul Aziz were mostly based on religious morality. These included the closure of all brothels, gambling houses, alcohol vendors, and video and music stores, as well as an end to coeducation and the implementation of Sharia law throughout Pakistan. The basic practicable demand was an end to mosque demolition and the reconstruction of demolished mosques. Like the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, these demands were carefully chosen so that Abdul Aziz could refuse to negotiate and claim that the government had not gone far enough and therefore was not serious about negotiations. In the case of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, it would be Indira Gandhi's government that would back out of any deal, weakening the Akali Dal and empowering Bhindranwale. As for the Red Mosque, it would be Maulana Abdul Aziz who would always have the option to back out, making 46 Tully and Jacob, pg 46. 47 Tully and Jacob, pg 47.

the government look weak while he implemented his own extralegal enforcement of sharia law. Another key motive in both cases is the preservation of identity against perceived threats from outside. The Akali Dal was originally created to prevent Sikhs from being absorbed by India's Hindu majority. In the case of the Red Mosque, the perceived threat was secularization. Here, the role of identity is a little more subtle. It is easy to see the Red Mosque students as having been indoctrinated by Islamic fundamentalism, but many of the students came from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Moving from a rural, traditional society to an urban setting with music stores and massage parlors would certainly have been a culture shock for these students. Seeing such activities not only permitted but protected while mosques are destroyed could have easily seemed like a subversion of Islam. Role of Religious Sites in Public Opinion A key difference between the Red Mosque and the Golden Temple is the role both sites play in religious imagery. The Golden Temple, completed by the fifth Guru, Guru Arjan Dev Ji, in 1604, is the holiest site of Sikhism, while the Red Mosque, the oldest mosque in Islamabad, was built only in 1965. Entering the Golden Temple complex was problematic because Sikhs would see it as a desecration of the heart of their religion. The building Bhindranwale occupied, the Akal Takht, also housed the Guru Granth Sahib, the holy book revered by Sikhs as the living embodiment of the ten Gurus. While the military operation against the Red Mosque was opposed by many Pakistanis, that opposition derived from a general respect of mosques as places of worship and support for Islamist politics especially in context of mosque demolitions that led to the stand-off rather than any reverence for the Red Mosque in particular. The Grand Masjid, which houses the Kaaba in Mecca, would make a better example of a Muslim site that plays a role similar to the Golden Temple in the Sikh religion. Unfortunately, there are few data on public opinion regarding the two operations. A study published by the United States Institute of Peace in 2008 found that 64% of Pakistanis polled thought

the use of force to take over the Red Mosque was a mistake, while only 22% thought it was necessary; 56% disapproved of the government's handling of the Red Mosque situation in general, while only 31% approved. 48 In the case of Operation Blue Star, one study compared the reaction of Sikh and non-sikh officers in the Indian military. Although the data show the reaction of only a specific portion of the Sikh community former officers it also shows a marked contrast between Sikhs and non-sikhs. When asked how large a role the central government played in creating the circumstances leading up to Operation Blue Star, no Sikhs responded "none" compared to 5% of non-sikhs; 56% of Sikhs answered "a lot" compared to only 30% of non-sikhs. 49 When asked whether Operation Blue Star was absolutely necessary, 6% of Sikh officers answered "yes" compared to 68% of non-sikh officers; 88% of Sikhs answered "no" compared to 26% of non-sikhs. 50 However, due to legal and cultural difficulties associated with interviewing Indian military officers, the study has a small sample: only 96 former officers, 16 of whom were Sikhs. 51 Militant Use of Religious Sites Another key difference in resolving the two confrontations lies in how militants used their respective religious sites. Students from Jamia Fareedia and Jamia Hafsa used the Red Mosque complex as a base of operations. This affected the Pakistani government's approach toward dealing with the Red Mosque. The Red Mosque had always housed and educated orphans and poor children, making a military operation risky. 52 Confronting the problem at its root, the leadership of Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Gazi, would require entering the mosque itself under intense media scrutiny. Bhindranwale, in contrast, used the Golden Temple as a last refuge. It was only in December of 1983, 48 C. Christine Fair, Clay Ramsay, and Steve Kull. "Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the US". United States Institute of Peace, February, 2008, pg 24. http://www.usip.org/pubs/working_papers/wp7_pakistan.pdf 49 Apurba Kundu. "The Indian Armed Forces' Sikh and Non-Sikh Officers' Opinions of Operation Blue Star". Pacific Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), pg 54. 50 Kundu, pg 57. 51 Kundu, pg 53. 52 Siddique, pg 11.

nearly seven months before Operation Blue Star, that Bhindranwale took residence in the Akal Takht; before then, he took refuge in the Guru Nanak Niwas, part of the hostel complex across the street from the Golden Temple. For much of his campaign for Sikh nationalism, Bhindranwale moved freely throughout Punjab and as far away as Delhi. Although the central government never used these opportunities to apprehend Bhindranwale, these opportunities existed. The use of the Red Mosque as a base of operations made it attractive to other militant groups looking to confront the Pakistani government, particularly Jaish-e-Mohammad. Press reports indicate that JeM militants began moving into the Red Mosque complex in February 2007. JeM leader Maulana Masood Azhar gave a speech at the Red Mosque speaking out against General Musharraf. 53 Some considered Masood Azhar's brother, Mufti Adbul Rauf, to be guiding Abdul Aziz ideologically. After Operation Silence began and students fled the complex, many of them reported that JeM militants had taken charge of operations inside the mosque; officials claim the body of Maqsood Ahmed, a close associate of Masood Azhar, was discovered on the first day of Operation Silence. 54 Conclusion In both Operation Blue Star and Operation Silence, the government of India and of Pakistan found itself facing a challenge to its authority. In both these cases, that challenge resulted from its own internal political machinations. The Red Mosque was backed by Jaish-e-Mohammad, an offshoot of a militant group funded and trained by Pakistan to fight Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir. Despite its alliance with the United States after September 11, Pakistan has been reluctant to dismantle the terrorist networks it once nurtured, choosing instead to to keep them under the radar until needed in the future. However, these groups have developed their own supply networks independent of Pakistan and their own strategic objectives. Pakistan has refused to deal with this threat strategically, resorting only to tactical reactions. The Red Mosque signifies that until Pakistan decisively neutralizes these networks, 53 Siddique, pg 39. 54 Siddique, pg 38.

they will be able to challenge the state at a time and place of their choosing. The showdown with Bhindranwale at the Golden Temple resulted from similar calculations. In an effort to seize political control of Punjab from opposition parties, the Congress government of Indira Gandhi nurtured a militant organization that eventually sought its own objectives. However, while Pakistan cultivated militant networks to launch a proxy war against a neighbor it considers a strategic threat, Indira Gandhi cultivated the Bhindranwale network as a tool for electoral politics. The level of violence the ruling government was willing to endure for the sake of election is striking. In describing the leadership style of Mrs. Gandhi, Mark Tully writes: "[...] Mrs. Gandhi had fallen into the trap of so many oriental potentates; she had surrounded herself with sycophants who told her what she wanted to hear, not what she ought to have heard." 55 Indeed, throughout this history we see that its was the hand of Mrs. Gandhi's Home Minister Zail Singh that protected Bhindranwale from arrest. It was Zail Singh, working with Sanjay Gandhi, who developed the plan to use Sikh religiosity to split the Akali Dal. During the 1977 Emergency, it was Sanjay who wielded emergency powers to suppress opposition to the Congress Party, while Mrs. Gandhi's advisors assured her that reports of human rights violations were merely exaggerations. 56 In both the case of the Red Mosque and the Golden Temple, we see that local forces were ready to act against the threat, but were held back by the central government. However, Pakistani intelligence was aware of the Jaish-e-Mohammad militants gathering at the Red Mosque since February 2007. While it may seem shocking that Pakistan would allow a mosque to act as an independent legal authority while abducting citizens and foreign nationals, occupying government buildings, and destroying private property, perhaps more shocking is the idea that, when compared to the Indian government's handling of the Golden Temple, the Pakistani government may actually have been in control of the situation. If that is the case, the only question is why it lacked the will to respond. 55 Tully and Jacob, pg 11. 56 Tully and Jacob, pg 56.

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