On Breaking the Spell of Irrationality (with treatment of Pascal s Wager) Selmer Bringsjord Are Humans Rational? 11/27/17 version 2 RPI

Similar documents
Who Has the Burden of Proof? Must the Christian Provide Adequate Reasons for Christian Beliefs?

Contra Darwin, Humans are Rational Animals, But Mere Animals are Not; and Darwin is Irrational in Thinking Otherwise

Is it rational to have faith? Looking for new evidence, Good s Theorem, and Risk Aversion. Lara Buchak UC Berkeley

The significance of faith proven by decision theory Pascal s wager game is correct and refutes atheism completely

Construing faith as action won t save Pascal s wager

Aquinas Cosmological argument in everyday language

There are various different versions of Newcomb s problem; but an intuitive presentation of the problem is very easy to give.

Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly *

Logic and Theism: Arguments For and Against Beliefs in God, by John Howard Sobel.

A DEFINITION OF BELIEVING. R. G. Cronin

Rationality & The Meaning of Life

Based on the translation by E. M. Edghill, with minor emendations by Daniel Kolak.

Why Christians should not use the Kalaam argument. David Snoke University of Pittsburgh

On Interpretation. Section 1. Aristotle Translated by E. M. Edghill. Part 1

Simplicity and Why the Universe Exists

Class #14: October 13 Gödel s Platonism

Artificial Intelligence Prof. P. Dasgupta Department of Computer Science & Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur

Ramsey s belief > action > truth theory.

Today we begin our discussion of the existence of God.

Kierkegaard is pondering, what it is to be a Christian and to guide one s life by Christian faith.

On A New Cosmological Argument

Is Faith Worth Believing?

Evidential arguments from evil

NICHOLAS J.J. SMITH. Let s begin with the storage hypothesis, which is introduced as follows: 1

CHAPTER III. Of Opposition.

Chance, Chaos and the Principle of Sufficient Reason

What God Could Have Made

Cognitive Deductive R

15 Does God have a Nature?

= (value of LEAVE if rain x chance of rain) + (value of LEAVE if dry x chance of dry) = -20 x x.5 = -9

Introductory Matters

Bounded Rationality. Gerhard Riener. Department of Economics University of Mannheim. WiSe2014

Jeffrey, Richard, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 140 pp, $21.99 (pbk), ISBN

Leibniz, Principles, and Truth 1

Rational dilemmas. Graham Priest

1 Introduction. Cambridge University Press Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice Andrés Perea Excerpt More information

Bayesian Probability

First Principles. Principles of Reality. Undeniability.

Predicate logic. Miguel Palomino Dpto. Sistemas Informáticos y Computación (UCM) Madrid Spain

DISCUSSIONS WITH K. V. LAURIKAINEN (KVL)

The St. Petersburg paradox & the two envelope paradox

WILL THEY TURN THE OTHER CHEEK? CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING AND VICTIM S RELIGIOUS SELF-IDENTIFICATION

Think by Simon Blackburn. Chapter 5d God

The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Free Will

175 Chapter CHAPTER 23: Probability

Keywords precise, imprecise, sharp, mushy, credence, subjective, probability, reflection, Bayesian, epistemology

Is the Existence of the Best Possible World Logically Impossible?

Précis of Empiricism and Experience. Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh

Pollock s Theory of Defeasible Reasoning

2014 THE BIBLIOGRAPHIA ISSN: Online First: 21 October 2014

Semantic Entailment and Natural Deduction

Betting on God: Pascal, Probability Theory and Theology. nevertheless made surprising contributions to the field of religious philosophy.

Is Innate Foreknowledge Possible to a Temporal God?

The Cosmological Argument

(Some More) Vagueness

Religious Belief and Atheism are not Mutually Exclusive. Viviana A. Weekes-Shackelford and Todd K. Shackelford. Oakland University

Logic I or Moving in on the Monkey & Bananas Problem

DALLAS BAPTIST UNIVERSITY THE ILLOGIC OF FAITH: FEAR AND TREMBLING IN LIGHT OF MODERNISM SUBMITTED TO THE GENTLE READER FOR SPRING CONFERENCE

Module 1-4: Spirituality and Rationality

Accuracy and epistemic conservatism

INTERMEDIATE LOGIC Glossary of key terms

Prisoners' Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem

PLANTINGA ON THE FREE WILL DEFENSE. Hugh LAFoLLETTE East Tennessee State University

STEWART COHEN AND THE CONTEXTUALIST THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION

The Backward Induction Solution to the Centipede Game*

How Gödelian Ontological Arguments Fail

PHIL 251 Varner 2018c Final exam Page 1 Filename = 2018c-Exam3-KEY.wpd

2nd International Workshop on Argument for Agreement and Assurance (AAA 2015), Kanagawa Japan, November 2015

McCLOSKEY ON RATIONAL ENDS: The Dilemma of Intuitionism

Abstract. Coping with Difficult, Unanswered, and Unanswerable Questions

Does the Skeptic Win? A Defense of Moore. I. Moorean Methodology. In A Proof of the External World, Moore argues as follows:

Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality

Moral Relativism and Conceptual Analysis. David J. Chalmers

Robert Nozick s seminal 1969 essay ( Newcomb s Problem and Two Principles

VAGUENESS. Francis Jeffry Pelletier and István Berkeley Department of Philosophy University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

Chalmers, "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature"

A solution to the problem of hijacked experience

Artificial Intelligence: Valid Arguments and Proof Systems. Prof. Deepak Khemani. Department of Computer Science and Engineering

1/7. The Postulates of Empirical Thought

RATIONALITY AND SELF-CONFIDENCE Frank Arntzenius, Rutgers University

Today s Lecture. Preliminary comments on the Problem of Evil J.L Mackie

Prospects for Successful Proofs of Theism or Atheism. 1. Gods and God

Why Have Consistent and Closed Beliefs, or, for that Matter, Probabilistically Coherent Credences? *

Anthony P. Andres. The Place of Conversion in Aristotelian Logic. Anthony P. Andres

Rationalism. A. He, like others at the time, was obsessed with questions of truth and doubt

WHY SHOULD ANYONE BELIEVE ANYTHING AT ALL?

part one MACROSTRUCTURE Cambridge University Press X - A Theory of Argument Mark Vorobej Excerpt More information

UNR Joint Economics Working Paper Series Working Paper No To Believe or Not Believe or Not Decide: A Decision-Theoretic Model of Agnosticism

Pascal s wager: tracking an intended reader in the structure of the argument 1

A CRITIQUE OF THE FREE WILL DEFENSE. A Paper. Presented to. Dr. Douglas Blount. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. In Partial Fulfillment

Review Tutorial (A Whirlwind Tour of Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion)

(Refer Slide Time 03:00)

Searle vs. Chalmers Debate, 8/2005 with Death Monkey (Kevin Dolan)

Here s a very dumbed down way to understand why Gödel is no threat at all to A.I..

The Unbearable Lightness of Theory of Knowledge:

Fourth Meditation: Truth and falsity

The Moral Problem of Other Minds

The Problem of the External World

When is Faith Rational? 1. What is Faith?

2.1 Review. 2.2 Inference and justifications

Transcription:

On Breaking the Spell of Irrationality (with treatment of Pascal s Wager) Selmer Bringsjord Are Humans Rational? 11/27/17 version 2 RPI

Some Logistics

Some Logistics Recall schedule: Next three classes on Steeples of Rationalistic Genius.

Some Logistics Recall schedule: Next three classes on Steeples of Rationalistic Genius. Last mtg is Test #3. Must understand our Gödelian coverage! You can plan now to need to take a stand on R, or some aspect thereof, in one of your essays. And you will need to anticipate and rebut at least one powerful objection to your stand/argument.

Some Logistics Recall schedule: Next three classes on Steeples of Rationalistic Genius. Last mtg is Test #3. Must understand our Gödelian coverage! You can plan now to need to take a stand on R, or some aspect thereof, in one of your essays. And you will need to anticipate and rebut at least one powerful objection to your stand/argument. Now some particulars for particular students

Well Kyle, thx! See:

For those writing on Newcomb s Problem: Pollock & http://www.univpgri-palembang.ac.id/perpus-fkip/perpustakaan/american%20phylosophy/nozick%20r.%20the%20nature%20of%20rationality.pdf

For those writing on Newcomb s Problem: Pollock & http://www.univpgri-palembang.ac.id/perpus-fkip/perpustakaan/american%20phylosophy/nozick%20r.%20the%20nature%20of%20rationality.pdf

On Religion & Rationality versus

The Book Found this on W3: http://skepdic.ru/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/daniel_c_dennett_breaking_the_spell_religion.pdf

Once Broken, Religious People are Freed to be Truly Rational

Here s how it works:

Here s how it works: Theists and atheists share an affirmation of, and both in fact use, a common thing: thinking tools (= cultural software ) that cut(s) across all human beings.

Here s how it works: Theists and atheists share an affirmation of, and both in fact use, a common thing: thinking tools (= cultural software ) that cut(s) across all human beings. Human beings, blessed as they are with a capacity for meta-reasoning and meta-representations and metarepresentational capacity (recall recursion and hierarchical reasoning from PHP & our discussion of their BBS paper), can be brought to a realization that thinking tools, suitably deployed, entails the truth of atheism.

Here s how it works: Theists and atheists share an affirmation of, and both in fact use, a common thing: thinking tools (= cultural software ) that cut(s) across all human beings. Human beings, blessed as they are with a capacity for meta-reasoning and meta-representations and metarepresentational capacity (recall recursion and hierarchical reasoning from PHP & our discussion of their BBS paper), can be brought to a realization that thinking tools, suitably deployed, entails the truth of atheism. So, deploy these tools and join the enlightened community of atheists!

Key Text in BTS

Key Text in BTS

Key Text in BTS

Key Text in BTS

Key Text in BTS

A Key Part of Meta-Logic We All Share Contradictions imply falsity. Avoid contradictions!

And so

And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one).

And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.

And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. No one can be true. Dennett None are likely to be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.

And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. No one can be true. Dennett None are likely to be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true. But this inference is illogical, and hence irrational.

And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. No one can be true. Dennett None are likely to be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true. But this inference is illogical, and hence irrational. My, that s ironic.

And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. No one can be true. Dennett None are likely to be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true. But this inference is illogical, and hence irrational. My, that s ironic.

And so The many creeds corresponding to the many main religions are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular religion (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Dennett Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true. But this inference is illogical, and hence irrational. My, that s ironic.

After all, consider The many interpretations corresponding to the many main interpretations of quantum mechanics are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular interpretations (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.

After all, consider The many interpretations corresponding to the many main interpretations of quantum mechanics are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular interpretations (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.

After all, consider The many interpretations corresponding to the many main interpretations of quantum mechanics are pairwise contradictory a brute fact we can see when we step above any particular interpretations (including our own, if we have one). Therefore,? They can t all be true. No two can be true. None are true. None are likely to be true. No one can be true. Each is unlikely to be true. It s unlikely that any are true.

More Sophisticated Direction?

More Sophisticated Direction? The mark of the vicinity of truth is a small number of contending frameworks among smart, learned people; and the mark of the vicinity of falsity is a large number of contending frameworks among people

More Sophisticated Direction? The mark of the vicinity of truth is a small number of contending frameworks among smart, learned people; and the mark of the vicinity of falsity is a large number of contending frameworks among people But how do you actually count the frameworks, in science and religion?

A Better Pascal s Wager

Pascal s Decision Matrix (= M) G not-g Bet on G 1 v1 Bet on not-g v2 v3 where background propositions include if G, then repentance secures infinite bliss etc..

The Optimality Principle (OP) (recall from coverage of Newcomb s Paradox) When choosing between alternative actions a1 and a2, rationality dictates choosing that action that maximizes expected value, computed by multiplying the value of each outcome that can result from each action by the probability that it will occur, adding the results together, and selecting the action associated with the higher utility.

The Optimality Principle (OP) (recall from coverage of Newcomb s Paradox) When choosing between alternative actions a1 and a2, rationality dictates choosing that action that maximizes expected value, computed by multiplying the value of each outcome that can result from each action by the probability that it will occur, adding the results together, and selecting the action associated with the higher utility. (This principle is taught to students in every introductory economics or decision-theory class, and is at least usually a key thing to follow in the pursuit of rational behavior.)

MV 13 CC 13-Strength-Factor Continuum Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

13-Strength-Factor Continuum Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

13-Strength-Factor Continuum Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

13-Strength-Factor Continuum Epistemically Positive Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

13-Strength-Factor Continuum Epistemically Positive Epistemically Negative Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

13-Strength-Factor Continuum Epistemically Positive Epistemically Negative Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

13-Strength-Factor Continuum Epistemically Positive Epistemically Negative (12) (11) (10) (9) (8) (7) (6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) (0) Certain Evident Overwhelmingly Likely Beyond Reasonable Doubt Likely More Likely Than Not Counterbalanced More Unlikely Than Not Unlikely Beyond Reasonable Belief Overwhelmingly Unlikely Evidently False Certainly False

The Optimality Principle (OP*) (based on 13-valued scheme used in solving Lottery Paradox) When choosing between alternative actions a1 and a2, rationality dictates choosing that action that maximizes expected value, computed by multiplying the value of each outcome that can result from each action by the likelihood (0 to 13) that it will occur, adding the results together, and selecting the action associated with the higher utility.

A rational person must bet that God exists. B. Pascal

A rational person must bet that God exists. B. Pascal Proof: We employ that any natural (or, for that matter, real) number n multiplied by/added to an infinite utility value yields an infinite utility value (unless n = 0). We observe that the likelihood God exists is at minimum evidently false (1). But then the expected utility value of betting on G is infinite, whereas the expected utility value of betting that God doesn t exists is finite. (Why, exactly?) Hence, by OP, a rational agent will bet on G (= bet that G exists). QED

slutten