27 CHAPTER XX..SafesMlary..Alliance and its tentacles. The subsidiary alliance in India owed its origin not to the British but to the French. The British got the idea of the alliance from the French. The French general Bussy who had placed Salbat Jung on the throne of Hyderabad in 1751, was there with his corps to protect him against his enemies. The Nizam agreed to bear the cost of the contingent, which amounted to two and a half lakhs of rupees a month. But the amount proved to be a heavy burden upon the exchequer of Hyderabad and consequently the Nizam was unable to meet the d on and of the French corps regularly. In June, 1753 the pay of the French troops fell in arrears for three or four months. Bussy realised that the only method regular payment was to obtain the grant of some districts the revalues of which would be collected by the French. The Nizam agreed to the proposal of Bussy. So, a treaty was signed in the month of December, 1753 by which it was provided that four districts of Mustafanagar, Ellur, Rajamahendri and Ghlcakol (Srikakolam) collectively known as the Northern Sarkars^should be made over to the French for the support of the French army so long as a certain strength should be maintained (1)'. Here we i. find the ^Irst Instance of Subsidiary alliance in its rudimentary form. The history of Hyderabad provides us not only with the origin of subsidiary alliance but also with all the phases of its development. With the recall of Bussy in 1758 from Hyderabad where he had been for seven years as the power behind the throne of Salbat Jung, the French influence in Hyderabad came to an end for the time being. The door was now open to the British influence. Hhile Lally was engaged in besieging Madras, the British General Forde was sent from Calcutta to attack the Northern Sarkars so (1) History of the French in India - Malleson - P.379.
28 as to direct a portion of the French army from the siege of Madras. With the arrival of Forde in the Northern Sarkars a portion of the French army was seat to oppose the advance of the British army. But the French army was routed and Forde proceeded to besiege the port of Masulipatam. Salbat Jung was requested by the French to help them in the Northern Sarkars. This Salbat Jung did. But after the Capitulation of Masulipatam the British became the masters of the Northern Sarkarsy and Salbat Jung realising his position concluded a treaty with the English East India Company in 1759 by which he agredd to expel the French troops from his dominion and gave to the English East India Company as a free gift the whole of the 1 circar of Masulipatam, with eight districts, as well as the circar of Nizampatam, and the districts of Condavir and Wacalmanner. Sanads in respect of these districts were granted to the English Company in the same manner as had been done to the French (2).' This is the first occasion on which the Nizam East came into direct relation with the Ehglish/India Company. In 1765 Lord Clive returned to India for the second time and he advised the authorities of the East India Company to apply for a sanad for the whole of the Northern Sarkars. It may be mentioned here that by the treaty of 1759 Mauslipatam and some districts which formed a portion of the Northern Sarkars had been given to the English Company as free-gift,, and for the remaining portion the Raja of Fizianagram had to pay tribute to the Nizam. Lord Clive desired to acquire the whole of the Northern Sarkars from the Emperor of Delhi without informing the Nizam. By the firman of 1765, the Emperor granted the whole of the Northern Sarkars to the English East India Company as free-gift. This enraged Nizam ill, who had succeeded in the meantime his brother Salbat Jung, for it was unusal for the Baperor a of Delhi to grant sanad for districts which were under the immediate (2) Aitchison - Vol IZ (1929) - Hyderabad No.l - P21,
jurisdiction of the Nizam. The Madrasubvernment apprehending trouble sent General Calliaud to Hyderabad to settle the matter amicably. This was done and a treaty was concluded on the 12th November, 1766 between the Nizam and General Calliaud on behalf of the English East India Company. By this treaty the English East India Company in return for the 'free-gift' of five Sarkars viz: Sarkars of Ellur, Chlcakol, Rajamahendri, Mustafanagar and Murtizanagar (Guntur) t which constituted the "Northern Sarkars", promised to provided the Nizam with a body of troops ' to A&Jt settle affairs of Hyderabad whenever itarequired by the Nizam. In whatever year the assistance of the British troops should not be required, the English East India Company would pay as 'pes^kush -J- to the Nizam five Lakhs of rupees for the three Sarkars of Rajamahendri, Ellur and Mustafanagar and two lakhs each for the two Sarkars of Chicakol and Murtizanagar. If the Nizam required the services of the troops of the Ehglish East India Company, the expenses of such troops should be adjusted with peskush* payable to the Nizam. By the 13th Article of the treaty it was also stipulated that the Nizam would assist the Company with his troops when required. But nowhere in the treaty any mention was made of last India Company's bearing the expenses of the Nizam' s troops to be supplied in accordance with the 13th Article of the treaty. This was something like subsidiary alliance between the Nizam and the English East India Company (3). But this alliance did not last long. In 1767 the Nizam along with an army of the Company invaded Mysore. He was, however, persuaded by Mahfuz Khan, brother,,^ a rival of Muhammad ALi of the Carnatic, to leave the English and join Hyder Ali. But this new alliance also did not last long. The defeat which the Nizam and Hyder Ali suffered at the hands of the Ehglish opened. Murtizanagar was at that time held by Basalut Jung, the Nizam' s brother. The East India Company promised not to take possession of it until it was made over to them by the Nizam or until the death of Basalut Jung. + 'Peshkash' (Peskush) means tribute. (3) Aitchison - Vol IX (1929) - Hyderabad No.II - PP 23-25.
30 the eyes of the former. Hyder All was soon abandoned by the Nizam who again joined the English and entered Into 1 another treaty of the strictest friendship and alliance' on the 26th February, 1768. The Nawab of the Carnatic was also a party to this Treaty. In order to perpetuate the friendship among the three powers it was stated in the treaty that the enemies of any power should be regarded as the enemies of the other two powers, and the friends of any power should be treated as friends of all. The stipulation of the former treaty about mutually xxs& assisting each other with their troops Then required was omitted in this treaty. The Company, however, was to provide the Nizam with 1 two battalions of sepoys and six pieces of artillery, manned by Europeans' whenever he required them and the situation of the Company's affairs sk would allow such a body of troops to march into Hyderabad. The Nizam was to bear the expenses of the troops so long as they would remain in his services (4). These two treaties have some common features. First, the troops had to be furnished upon a requisition from the Nizam. Secondly, the troops were to be requisitioned for temporary assistance and had to be withdrawn after they had finished the work for which their services were required. Thirdly, there was no fixed subsidy, the Nizam was required to pay the actual expenses of the troops. These two treaties provide us with examples of subsidiary alliance^ of a very rudimentary stage. The more developed types of subsidiary alliance^; of 1798 and 1800 were formed during the regime of Lord Wellesley. Lord Wellesley came to India in April 1798 when the position of the British in India was very critical. On the 1st July of the same year Napoleon landed in Egypt and was thinking of striking a blow at the rising British power in India. Though the French (4) Aitchison - Vol V (1768) - No.Ill - Art 6 - P.24.
31 power in India had outwardly been crushed in the bat tel battle of Wandiwash (1760) and by the treaty of Paris, 1763, they strengthened their position lateraen the some of the Indian States. French Commanders were appointed by important Indian princes to organise their armies and in the armies of Hyderabad, Mysore and the Maratha States the French Commanders acquired predominant position. Raymond hadm* 14,000 soldiers under him in Hyderabad and after his death his mantle fe&l upon Piron, a French General. Sindhia' s army organised and trained by Count de Boigjjfe was under Perron, another French General. In Mysore not only the army was under the control of the French Commanders, but Tipu himself became a member of the Jacobin Club and sent emissaries to France and Isle of France (Mauritus). With Napolean in Egypt and the armies of prominent Indian princes under the command of the French Generals, it was natural that Lord Wellesley would feel some concern about the safety of the British dominion In India. Under these circumstances, his policy was to invite these Indian princes to accept subsidiary alliance and dismiss their French Commanders. Lord Wellesley on his arrival in India found that Tipu had fairly recovered from the defeat which he had suffered in the hands of the English, the Marathas and the Nizam in 1792. On the other hand the triple alliance formed between the Siiglish, the Marathas and the Nizam in 1790 for the purpose of checking the power of Tipu was on the point of dissolution. The internecine war in the Maratha Confederacy had precluded the Marathas from fulfil in g the object of the alliance. Moreover the two members of the alliance, the Marathas and the Nizam had fallen out and the latter wa Awantea in the battle of Kharda. The failure of the English to help the Nizam in that battle had estranged the latter from the English. The French general Raymond was not slow to take advantage of this estrangement of feeling between
1 32 the English and the Nizam* He having fought for the Nizam in the battle of Khurda found favour with the latter and graduallyacquired great influence in the Court as well as in the army of Hyderabad. He was anti-british and perhaps pro-tipu, for Tipu at that time had both open and secret relations with the French. Wellesley was intent upon crushing the power of Tipu and for that purpose he wanted to revive the triple alliance of 1790. The Nizam was willing to join his old friends, but he had some difficulty. Between the years 1795 and 1798 the Nizam s had fallen under the influence of the Marathas. They had large claims upon the Nizam. Some of these claims were founc^upon the treaty of Kharda, but these were afterwards given up and others were advanced which had no legal basis but were cleverly devised to further the purpose of their overbearing extortion. The Marathas brought forward these claims at different times and threatened ths- Nizam with invasion of his territory. The Governor-General endeavoured in 1798 to prevail upon the Peshwa to become a party to the treaty and allow the.english East India Company to arbitrate in the matter of the Maratha claims on Hyderabad. There was another difficulty. Some territories were tributaries both to the Nizam and the Marathas and there was no end of quarrel between than in relation to these tributaries. Lord Wellesley could not give any assurance of assistance to the Nizam against the Marathas before and during the war against Tipu lest the Marathas instead of helping the English should turn against them. So, though the Peshwa did not join the war against Tipu, yet for the maintenance of good relation with the Peshwa it was stipulated in the treaty of 1798 that a portion of the territory which might be acquired from Tipu after his defeat would be offered to the Peshwa provided he acceded to the treaty. The offer of territory was a very diplomatic move on the part of Wellesley. The Peshwa remained neutral during the war against Tipu. But the treaty with the Nizam (1798) failed
33 :- to solve the questions at Issue between the Marathas and the Nizam. It only kept in abeyance those questions for future adjustment. It was, however, stipulated in the 8th Article of the treaty of 1798^ that should differences arise between the two States the government of the East India Company by interposing their mediation in a way suitable to rectitude, friendship and union would try to adjust those differences 'conformable to propriety, truth and justice.' But AzIm-ul-Umara^. considered that as the 8th Article of the proposed treaty did not afford solid security against ±k: all future unprovoked aggression on the part of the MarathasV the Nizam would quit 'the substance to follow shadow' in consenting to disband 'fourteen thousand effective troops of his own (meaning thereby the troops of the French corps) and in taking six thousand of those of the Company into his pay for ever in their room.' Azim-ul-UmaraJ^ wished therefore ' to know at least verbally before the finishing hand was put to the promoting (sic) negotiation what he was to trust to in the event of any future attempt at mediation on the part of the Company between his State and fcs that of Poona proving fruitless.' In short, the minister wanted to know what protection the Company would give to the Nizam in case the Marathas refusing to accept the mediation of the Company proceeded to hostilities against the Nizam. The British Resident assured him that in such case his 'state should trust entirely to the generosity and ability of the British Government', but the Resident gave the minister to understand that he 'would not devise any other mode of meeting the latter's wish regarding the point In debate (5).' The Treaty of 1798 was of a ' temporary nature and contracted for a special purpose.' It did not premise the Nizam any assistance against the Marathas who were to be dealt with after the power of Tipu had been crippled. It aimed at enabling (5) Sec. Con - 1798-18th Sept - No.7.
34 :- the Nizam to raider effective help to the English in the coming struggle against Tipu. Under these circumstances the subsidiarytreaty of 1798 was concluded. In accordance with this treaty the subsidiary force was raised from two battalions to six each consisting of one thousand sep ys. The annual amount of subsidy s to be paid was settled at Bs. 24,17,100/- to be paid in four equal instalments. Any instalment falling in arrears, such arrears would be deducted from the current instalment of peshkash payable to the Nizam for the Northern Sarkars (6). This treaty differs from the former two on two points. First, in the treaty of 1798 it was stipulated that the subsidiary force was not only to be permanently maintained but wa3 to be stationed within the territory of the Nizam. Secondly, the subsidy to be paid was fixed. In these respects this treaty was an improvement on the former two (from the British point of view) and helped to establish British influence on a sound footing. But the Nizam could not be expected to render any help to the Ehglish unless he was flax freed from the French influence. So the British felt it necessary that the French corps should be disbanded and it French officers should be handed over to the British Resident. But although the disbandment of the French corps was agreed upon by the parties$ the Nizam suggested that the question of delivery of the French military officers into the hands of the British Resident should not be incorporated into the main body of the treaty as 'it might hereafter tend to injure his reputation in the eyes of mankind at large.' He, therefore, requested the British Resident to expunge it and and substitute it by a secret and separate article to a similar effect (7). The significance of the treaty of 1798 can be best expressed by quoting the remark of Mir Alam, the minister for (6) Aitchi si on (1864) Voi. V - No. VIII - Art 3 - P.50. (7) Sec. Con - 1798-18th Sept. - No. 17.
35 'English affairs' and a friend of the English. He remarked, "It would raise the British Government in the scale of political A, CO weight and importance, so would it have ^tendency to lower that of His Highness who would scarcely be numbered any longer among the sovereigns of India but like the Nawabs of Oude and Arcot be considered as a mere dependent of the Company (8)." But the most developed kind of subsidiary alliance was formed in 1800. Hie' treaty of 1798 had not solved the questions at issue between the Nizam and the Marathas especially Sindhia. The latter had been threatening the Nizam with the invasion of his territory. After the fourth Anglo-Mysore war the Nizam' s dominion constituted the only barrier between the territories of the Coup any and the Marathas in the Deccam on the side either of Mysore or of the Carnatic. Any attack on Hyderabad by the Marathas having for its object either the material reduction of the Nizam' s resources and power or the attainment of a preponderant influence in his court would have not only weakened that barrier between the English and the Marathas, but would have at once increased the power of the Marathas. The English would have to face in that case a formidable and dangerous rival at the frontier of their territory instead of an ally (9). So, it was to the Interest of the Company as well as of the Nizam that the former should protect the latter against any aggression. Under these circumstances negotiation for a defensive alliance between the Company and the Nizam was started. Instructed by the Governor-General the Resident submitted a draft of the proposed treaty to Azim-ul-Umara^. The minister delivered a counter proposal to the Resident for the consideration of the Governor-General. The draft of the treaty which had been delivered by the Resident to the Minister was purely of a defensive nature. (8) Sec. Con - 1798-18th Sept. - No.7 (8) (i) To Court (Secret) - 31st Aug. 1800 - paras 41 & 42. (ii) Wellesley s despatches etc. - Martin Vol.II - No.LXXVIII - para 14.
36 But Azim-ul-Umara^ engrafted ' on a treaty declaredly defensive propositions of a nature the most offensive, encroaching and unjust, and levelled equally against Paishwa -whose power it was one part of the Governor-General* s plan to re-establish as against Dowlat Rao Sindhia whan it was the Governor-General's object to restrain and overawe, and not to attack and subdue (ID).' So, this proposal of Azim-ul-Umara^ was rejected. Another proposal of Azim-ul-UmaraJ^, which was rejected by the Governor-General was 'the appointment and residence of an agent or ambassador on the part of the Nizam in Qigland (11)? Azim-ul-Umara^ was perhaps aware that the Nizam was going to be a dependent ally of the Company by the proposed treaty and this was a ruse to place the Nizam on a footing of equality with monarch of Si gland. The Governor-General agreed to the proposal of Azim-ul- Umarai^ of defending the Nizam not only against Slndhia but against all enemies. But at the same time he introduced in the draft treaty some amendments which were calculated, first, to secure to the Company such an assignment of territory as would not only preclude any pecuniary loss on account of subsidy, but in some measure defray the eventual charges of defending the Nizam' s frontiers against all enemies; secondly, to provide that the territory should be so situated as to complete the Company's line of frontier and barrier' against any sudden incursion of hostile troops into the countries situated to the southward of the Tungabhadra and the Krishna; thirdly, to obtain the cession e- of the proposed territory in perpetuity and in entire sovereignty so as to close for ever all questions of account between the Company and the Nizam with regard to the subsidiary force; fourthly, to secure the full use and benefit of the entire resources of the (10) Sec. Con - 1800-20th Nov. - No.8. (11) Ibid.
37 Nizam's government in the event of a future war (12). All the amendments of the Governor-General were accepted. By this treaty the subsidiary force was raised from six battalions to eight battalions of sepcys and two regiments of cavalry. Like the former subsidiary force this force was also to be stationed permanently in the Nizam's dominion. In order to ensure regular payments of the augmented subsidiary force and thereby to avoid hitch between the two allies, the territories acquired by the Nizam under the Treaty of Serin gapatam in 1792 and the Treaty of Mysore in 1799 were ceded to the Company in perpetuity. For the purpose of rendering the boundary line of the Company's territory well-defined the Nizam retained these territories ceded to the Company under the subsidiary alliance of 1800 and in lieu thereof ceded in perpetuity to the Company other territories to the south of the river Tungabhandra and the Ktishna. The Company accepted these territories 'as full and complete satisfaction for all demands on account of the pay and other charges of the subsidiary force? If the revenue of the ceded districts proved inadequate in future to meet the expanses of the subsidiary force, no demands were to be made by the Companyy'on the Nizam. By ceding territory in perpetuity for the payment of the subsidiary force, the Nizam mitered into an alliance which could not be dissolved. For by ceding territory in perpetuity he had paid in perpetuity for the subsidiary force. Up to this point there is no marked difference in principle between the treaty of 1800 and that of 1798 excepting the commutation of money payment by cession of territory. But other features of the treaty of 1800 mark it as a class by itself. By the second article of this treaty the Nizam was assured of protection by the Company against the unprovoked aggression of any power or state. Thus the protection which the Nizam had sought against the Marathas in 1798^ was at (12) To Court (secret) - 31st Aug. 1800
38 t- last granted by the treaty of 1800. But it was also stipulated by the fifteenth article of the same treaty that the Nizam should not enter into 'any negotiations with any other power whatever without giving previous notice and entering into mutual consultation' with the Company's government. These two articles of the treaty of 1800 converted the state of Hyderabad from an independent state into a protectorate of the h English East India Company. Though the subsidiary alliance with Hyderabad was an unalloyed blessing to the Company it was not so in the case of Hyderabad. It enabled the Company to station an efficient army without any burden on their exchequer beyond their political frontier in the heart of the Deccan from where it could be hurled against its enemies in South India. The Nissan was also benefitted by the subsidiary alliance. In the eighteenth century there were four important powers in the Deccan viz: the Ehglish, the Marathas, Tipu and the Nizam. Of these four powers the Nizam was the weakest and in almost all the wars in which he engaged himself with the Marathas and Tipu he was worsted. Without the protection of the Thgllsh East India Company, which the Nizam secured by the Subsidiary i Alliance it would have been impossible for him to preserve the integrity of his dominion in the face of attacks from the Marathas and Tipu. The Subsidiary Alliance with the English also brought In territorial as well as monetary gains to the Nizam. At the end of the third and the fourth Anglo»Mysore wars, in which the Nizam joined the Ehglish, he shared with the English the territories which Tipu Sultan had to surrender to the English and their allies. But as has already been stated the Nizam had to cede these territories to the Ehglish in 1800 in commutation for the money which he had to pay for the maintenance of the subsidiary force. The last two Anglo-Maratha wars in which the Nizam sided with the English were no less profitable to him than the last two Anglo-
39 Mysore wars. By the treaty of Surji An jangaon (December, 3303) Daulat Rao Sindhia ceded all his territories situated between the Ajanta hills and the Godavari to the English East India Company and its allies. By the Partition Treaty of Hyderabad with the Nizam in 1804 these territories were transferred to the Nizam in perpetual sovereignty (13). But the greatest gain which the Nizam obtained in the second Anglo-Maratha war was the establishment of his absolute supremacy in Berar. Since 1724 whan Mubariz Khan, Governor of Khandesh, was defeated in the battle of Sh ak arkh el mia by Asaf Jah, the first Nizam, Berar had always been nominally subject to the Nizam. But the Bhovisla Rajas of Nagpur posted their officers all over Berar; they occupied it with their troops; they collected more than.half of the revenue; but the Nizam maintained his title as dejure ruler of the province with the exception of some pargana3. In 3303 after the defeat of the Marathas at Assaye and Argaon the BhoVtsla Raja ceded in perpetual sovereignty to the English East India Company and its allies all the territories of which he had collected revenues In participation with the Nizam and those of which he might have been in doubtful possession (14). All these territories which constituted the province of Berar were ceded by the fii&lish East India Company to the Nizam in perpetual sovereignty by the Partition Treaty of Hyderabad in 3304 (15). Apart from these territorial gains the Nizam s alliance with the Company enabled him to get rid of the vexations demands of Chauth on the part of the Peshwa. The Peshwaship was abolished in 1833 and the Peshwa's territory and demands of Chauth upon Hyderabad passed off to the Company. The Company released the Nizam in perpetuity from the payment of all Chauth due to the Peshwa (16). But the benefit which Hyderabad derived from the Subsidiary Alliance was more than counterbalanced by the calamity which befell the State after the treaty of 3300. This treaty saved the State of (13) Altchison - Vol. V (3376) - No.XLVII. (14) Imperial Gaz (Berar) - P.3.1. (15) Aitchison - Vol.V (3376) - No.XLVII. (16) Ibid - Vol. Ill (3363) - No.XIV - Art 2.
.40 :- Hyderabad from extinction at the cost of its external sovereignty which it lost by the treaty. The internal sovereignty which was left to it was honoured more in breach than in observance. For the smooth operation of the subsidiary alliance, the Company wanted to have ministers of their own choice, who would be guided by the British Resident. Even when the Nizam was allowed to appoint a minister of his own choice as in the case of Manir-ul-mulk, die deputy minister Chandu Lai was entrusted with real power and he was supported by the Governor-General in Council not only against the nominal minister but even against the Nizam. Being disgusted with the Company1 s attitude in supporting a minister against his will and entrusting him with all the power, the Nizam Sikandar Jah gave up taking any interest in the administration. Moreover the habit of depending too much upon die British since 1798 had so much undermined the self-reliance of the Nizams that even when Lord William Bentinck announced in 1829 that the Company would no longer interfere with the internal administration of Hyderabad, the Nizam Nasir-ud-daulah would not appoint a minister without the approval of the British Resident. Hyderabad was not the only State which suffered from this evil. Bareda, Oudh and Mysore experienced the same baneful effect of the subsidiary alliance. Truly says Dr. M.S. Mehta, "There appears to be a t resemblance between the sullen retirement of Nizam Sikandar Jah and the imbecility of An and Rao Gaikwar, between the demoralisation of the Wa^jLr of Oudh and the incompetence of the Maharaja of Mysore. Since the time when their predecessors had wielded great authority was not remote, they were naturally all discontented with their controlled positions. In all four major States mentioned, there were ministers ruling at one time or another, whom the reigning princes suspected as agents of the British power. But these princes were concious of their utter weakness (17).n (17) Lord Hastings and the Indian ' State - PP. 200-201.
-: 41 Another striking evil, effect of the closer connection between the Indian States and the Company s Government established by the subsidiary alliance was the 'premature decrepitude' of the Indian States (IS). In the opinion of Sir John Malcolm the effect of the subsidiary alliance upon the Indian States was different in different situations and varied in accordance with the characters of the princes, their ministers and the British representative employed in their courts (19). In Hyderabad the prince, the minister and some of the British Residents helped to aggravate the evil tendency which was inherent in the subsidiary alliance. a This was the opinion of Sir John Malcolm who had been acquainted with the dtate of affairs in Hyderabad for forty years aid Henry Russell who had been there for eleven years as Assistant Resident and ten years as Resident. The condition of Hyderabad before the subsidiary alliance was not an ideal one.nizam Ali and his minister Azim-ttl-Umarafy were not able administrators and both of them were oppressive towards the people. But the people were not then as helpless as they became subsequent to the subsidiary alliance and the oppression of the Nizam and his minister was resisted by the people with all their might. The oppression of the Nizam was followed by the uprising of the people. So, in time of x± crisis he had to rely on his people and seek their co-operation. But having been protected by subsidiary alliance from foreign aggression and from 'all rebels and exciters of disturbance in the dominion', the Nizam' s government had no longer any inducement to strengthen itself against external aggression by conciliating the affection of the people. The result was that the Nizam' s government became more rapacious and oppressive as the military expenses of the government increased after the subsidiary alliance. The treaty of 1800 stipulated that in case of a war between the Company and any (33) Par. Pap - Vol.14 - H.C. 735 VI (1S31-32) - Russel's evidence - P.1Q (19) Ibid- Malcolm's evidence PP 28-34.
-: 42 : - other power six thousand Infantry and nine thousand horses of the Nizam's own troops should join the subsidiary force for the purpose of opposing the enemy. But as the Nizam s troops proved themselves inefficient in war, a portion of the Nizam' s army had to be reformed so that it might render efficient service to the Company. Russell, the British Resident, toofc upon himself the task of reforming this portion of Nizam' s army, which came to be known as the Nizam' s contingent.* British military officers* with high salaries were appointed in the contingent and some times unnecessary posts were also created for them. Thus the military expenses of the Nizam increased after he had entered into the subsidiary alliance with the Company. To meet the increased military expenses the Nizam enhanced the rent and imposed oppressive taxes upon his subjects. The rent and the taxes were realised with oppression. This oppression, according to Henry Russell, was to seme extent due to the fact that the ruling class belonged to one religion (Islam},while the bulk of the people belonged to another (20). Before the subsidiary alliance such oppression had been resisted by the ryots, but now the Nizam' s power being strengthened by the British alliance the ryots dared not rise against their ruler. British protection to the Nizam was thus an indirect curse to his subjects. This was realised by a<2- Metcalf^ the British Resident at Hyderabad, and he was of opinion that the East India Company had a moral obligation to protect the subjects of Hyderabad against the oppressive and rapacious officers -to of the Nizam. This led^ts- British^interference in the civil administration of Hyderabad. *It was officially known as 'Nizam' s Contingent' before 1853 and as 'Hyderabad Contingent' after that year. It was first designated as 'Hyderabad Contingent' in the treaty which was concluded with the Nizam in 1853. But among the public it was known as 'Hyderabad Contingent' even long before 1853. A brief account of 'Hyderabad Contingent' will be found in the Sixth Chapter of this thesis. (20) Par. Pap - Vol.14 -{H.C}735 VI (1831-32) H.Russell's evidence (para 110).
43 To provide for the regular payment of the Nizam' s Contingent Chandu La}., at the suggestion of Russell, made an arrangement -with the firm of Palmer and Company which had obtained in 1816 a licence from the Governor-General-in-Council to carry on banking business with the Nizam' s Government. By this arrangement it was settled that the firm would disburse the pay of the Contingent for which they received the assignment of tie revenues of certain districts. Some clandestine transactions of this Company with the Nizam' s Government through Chandu Lai brought the State of Hyderabad on the verge of bankruptcy. These transactions were *e. detected by Metcalf, the Resident at Hyderabad and consequently the Governor-General-in-Council passed an interdict banning its future transactions with the Nizam' s Government. This being -the main business of the firm it went into liquidition after fe its transactions with the Nizam' s Government had been interdicted. When the firm of Palmer and Company went into liquidation, the pay of Nizam' s contingent began to fall in arrears. The English East India Company from time to time disbursed the pay of the Contingent from their own treasury, still there were arrears. At last the Company demanded the cession of Berar and some other districts to ensure the regular payment of the Contingent. The Nizam had to cede these territories in 1853. Of course by rendering useful services to the Company, during the Great Mutiny of 3857, Salar Jung, the renowned minister of Hyderabad, succeeded in recovering other ceded territories from the Company as reward, but Berar remained in their hands. Thus the British interference in the appointment of ministers and in civil administration, the formation of Hyderabad Contingent under the control of the British Resident, lending money by Messrs. Palmier and Company to the Government of Hyderabad
-i 44 for the payment of the Contingent, cession of Berar by the Nizam to pay off the arrears of the contingent and for making provision for its regular payment are the tentacles of the subsidiary alliance. These tentacles which determined the relations of the Bast India Company with Hyderabad will be dealt with in the following Chapters. In short, the subsidiary alliance is the basic factor which determines all aspects of the relations between Hyderabad and the East India Company for the period, 1798-IB57. -:000:-