MATTHIAS STEUP Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Hellems 169 232 UCB Boulder, CO 80309 (765) 993-7803 matthias.steup@colorado.edu Education Ph.D. in Philosophy, Brown University, 1985 Dissertation: "The Directly and Indirectly Evident" Dissertation Committee: Roderick Chisholm, Ernest Sosa, James Van Cleve M.A. in Philosophy, Goethe University (Frankfurt, Germany), 1981 AOS: AOC: Epistemology Metaphysics, Ethics, Logic Professional Experience University of Colorado, Boulder: 2016 Professor and Chair: since July Purdue University Professor and Department Head: 2008-2016 St. Cloud State University: Professor: 1995-2008 Department Chair: 1992-97, 2003-04 Associate Professor: 1991-95 Assistant Professor: 1989-91 Appointments as Visiting Assistant Professor: University of Wyoming, 1987-89 Grinnell College, 1986-87 St. Cloud State University, 1985-86 Book An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1996). Edited Collections Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2 nd edition (1 st edition 1992), co-edited with John Turri and Ernest Sosa. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2013).
A Companion to Epistemology, 2 nd edition, co-edited with Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010). Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Essays on Epistemic Responsibility and the Ethics of Belief. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). Articles 1. Critical Study: Scepticism and Perceptual Justification (Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, eds., Oxford University Press 2014), Analysis, forthcoming. 2. "Destructive Defeat and Justificational Force: The Dialectic of Dogmatism, Conservatism, and Meta-Evidentialism," Synthese, forthcoming. 3. Believing Intentionally, Synthese, forthcoming. Online First at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2fs11229-015-0780-7. 4. Foundational Justification, Meta-Justification, and Fumertonian Acquaintance, in Michael Bergmann and Brett Copenger (eds.), Intellectual Assurance. Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 5. Is Epistemic Circularity Bad? Res Philosophica 90 (2013): 215-235. 6. Does Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism s Dilemma? in Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism: 135-153. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 7. Belief Control and Intentionality, Synthese 188 (2012): 145-163. 8. Justification, Deontology, and Voluntary Control, in Stefan Tolksdorf, ed., Conceptions of Knowledge: 461-485 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012). 9. Belief, Voluntariness, and Intentionality, Dialectica 65 (2011): 537-599. 10. Evidentialist Anti-Skepticism, in Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and Its Discontents: 105-122. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 11. Empiricism, Metaphysics, and Voluntarism, Synthese 178 (2011): 19 26. (Special issue on the work of Bas Van Fraassen, edited by Otávio Bueno and Darrell Rowbottom). 12. Are Mental States Luminous? In William Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge: 217-236. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 2
13. Doxastic Freedom, Synthese 161 (2008): 375-392. (Special Issue on Epistemic Deontology, edited by Nicholaj Nottelman.) 14. Epistemology in the 20 th Century. In Dermot Moran (ed.), Routledge Companion to 20 th Century Philosophy: 469-523. Oxford: Routledge, 2008. 15. Reliabilism, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2 nd Edition, edited by Donald M. Borchert (New York: Macmillan, 2005). 16. Ernest Sosa, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2 nd Edition, edited by Donald M. Borchert (New York: Macmillan, 2005). 17. Epistemology, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, October 2005. 18. Knowledge and Skepticism, supplement to my Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry The Analysis of Knowledge. August 2005. 19. Contextualism and Conceptual Ambiguity, Acta Analytica 20, 2005, pp. 3-15. 20. Internalist Reliabilism, Philosophical Issues 14, 2004, pp. 404-425. 21. "Two Forms of Antiskepticism," in Susana Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (MIT Press, 2003). 22. "The Analysis of Knowledge," Stanford On-Line Encyclopedia of Philosophy (February 2001). 23. "Epistemic Duty, Evidence, and Internality. A Reply to Alvin Goldman," in Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 24. "Epistemic Duty and Doxastic (In)Voluntarism," Acta Analytica 24, (2000), pp. 25-56. 25. "Unrestricted Foundationalism," Grazer Philosophische Studien 60, 2000, 75-98. 26. "A Defense of Internalism", in Louis Pojman (ed.), The Theory of Knowledge, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1998). 27. "Critical Study: William Alston's Perceiving God (Cornell University Press 1991)," review essay, Noûs 31, 1997, pp. 408-420. 28. "Tidman on Critical Reflection," Analysis 56, number 4 (October 1996). 29. "Proper and Improper Use of Cognitive Faculties: A Counterexample to Plantinga's Proper Functioning Theory," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995). 3
This paper is a contribution to a symposium on Alvin Plantinga's two books Warrant: The Current Debate and Proper Functioning and Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford University Press, 1992. The other contributors were William Alston, Carl Ginet, Richard Swinburne, and James E. Taylor. For Plantinga's reply to my contribution, see pp. 443-449. 30. "Clifford, William Kingdon." The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. by Robert Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 31. "Epistemic Deontologism." The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 32. "Diallelus." The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 33. "The Problem of the Criterion." The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 34. "Proper Functioning and Warrant after Seven Vodka Martinis," Philosophical Studies 72 (1993) 89-109. 35. "The Problem of the Criterion." A Companion to Epistemology, ed. by Christopher Dancy and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). 36. "Memory." A Companion to Epistemology, ed. by Christopher Dancy and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). 37. "Truth as Coherence-Comments on Goldman," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 29, Supplement, 1991. 38. "BonJour's Antifoundationalist Argument," in Jack Bender (ed.), The Current State of the Coherence Theory: Critical Essays on the Theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence BonJour (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989). For BonJour's Reply to my paper, see the same volume, p. 276f. 39. "The Regress of Metajustification," Philosophical Studies 55 (1989) 41-56. The same issues of Phil. Studies contains a reply to my paper by Laurence BonJour. 40. "The Deontic Conception of Justification," Philosophical Studies 53 (1988) 65-84. Book Reviews 1. Linda Martin Alcoff: Real Knowing. New Versions of the Coherence Theory (Cornell University Press, 1996), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64, 2002, pp. 740-43. 2. Robert Almeder: Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy (Open Court, 1998), Philosophical Review 109, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 462-465. 4
3. Linda Zagzebski: Virtues of the Mind. An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1996), Dialogue, 1999. 4. Stephen Cade Hetherington, Epistemology's Paradox (Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), International Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 27 (1995). 5. Edward Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature (Oxford University Press, 1990), Philosophical Review 101 (1992), pp. 856-858. 6. William Alston, Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Cornell University Press, 1989), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992), pp. 228-232. 7. R. J. Bogdan (ed.), Profiles: Roderick M. Chisholm (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), Canadian Philosophical Reviews 88 (1988), pp. 435-37. Presented Papers, Commentaries, and Conference Participation 1. "Problems for Explanationist Evidentialism." Book Symposium: Kevin McCain: Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification. Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. San Francisco, April 2, 2016. 2. "Problems for Explanationist Evidentialism." 12 th Annual Russell Conference in Healdsburg, CA, March, 2016. 3. "Can Perceptual Justification Be Destroyed?" CU Boulder, November 30, 2015. 4. Can Phenomenal Conservatism be Refuted by Counterexample. 11 th Annual Russell Conference in Healdsburg, CA, March, 2015. 5. Belief Control, Compatibilism, and Intentionality. International Conference on Epistemology and Cognitive Science, Xiamen University, China, June 28-29, 2014. 6. Defending Doxastic Voluntarism: Recent Objections. University of Southern Denmark, Odense, June 5, 2014. 7. Defending Doxastic Voluntarism. Workshop Doxastic Agency & Epistemic Responsibility, Ruhr Universität Bochum: June 1-2, 2014 8. Foundational Justification, Meta-Justification, and Fumertonian Acquaintance. 6 th Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop, Orange Beach, Alabama, May 18-20, 2014. 9. Fumerton s Classical Foundationalism. 10 th Annual Russell Conference in Healdsburg, CA, March 9-11, 2014. 5
10. The Metaphysics of Free Belief. Aquinas Lecture, St. Thomas Aquinas University, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. January 23, 2014. 11. Recent Work on Doxastic Control and Intentionality. Doxastic Freedom and Normativity Workshop, Universität Regensburg, Germany, September 19-21, 2013. 12. The Metaphysics of Belief Control. Doxastic Freedom and Normativity Workshop, Universität Regensburg, Germany, September 19-21, 2013. 13. Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Evidence of Reliability. Big vs. Small Conference, Hamburg University, July 19-20, 2013. 14. Returning Participant. Rutgers Epistemology Conference. May 10-11, 2013. 15. Belief Control and Intentionality, presented at Robert Audi s Seminar on Action Theory. University of Notre Dame, April 9, 2013. 16. Comments on Clayton Littlejohn s Justification and the Truth Connection. Book Symposium. Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. San Francisco, March 30, 2013. 17. Evidence, Justification, and the Truth Connection. 9 th Annual Russell Conference in Healdsburg, CA, March 10-12, 2013. 18. Two Theories of Basic Belief: Monism and Holism. 8 th Annual Russell Conference in Healdsburg, CA, March 11-14, 2012. 19. The Irrelevance of Practical Interests: A Defense of Classical Epistemology. Northwestern University, Epistemology Brown Bag Series. May 11, 2011. 20. The Bank Case and Moderate Invariantism. 7 th Russell Conference in Healdsburg, CA. 21. Is Foundational Justification Possible? Read at the Feldmania Conference at University of Texas, San Antonio, February 18-19, 2011. 22. Intentional Belief, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant. Nov. 13, 2010. 23. Intentional Belief, Wayne State University, Detroit. Nov. 12, 2010. 24. Comments on John Turri. Annual Meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association. Wayne State University, Sep. 2010. 25. The Compatibilist Case for Doxastic Voluntarism. Epistemology: The Third Brazil Conference, Porto Alegre, Brazil. June 9-11, 2010. 6
26. The Compatibilist Case for Doxastic Voluntarism. Justification Revisited Conference, University of Geneva, Switzerland. March 25-27, 2010. 27. Alston on Doxastic Voluntarism. Read at the 6 rd Russell Philosophy Conference, Healdsburg, CA, March 11-13, 2010. 28. Alston on Doxastic Voluntarism. Invited talk at the annual meeting of the Indiana Philosophical Association. Chicago, March 18, 2010. 29. Comments on Andrew Moon, The New Evil Demon Problem for Internalism. Annual Meeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association. Chicago, February 17-20, 2010. 30. Comments on David Alexander, Basic Justification and Evidential Defeat. Annual Meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association, Illinois State University October 9-10, 2009. 31. Internalism s Dilemma. The Third Annual Midwest Epistemology Workshop, St. Louis University, September 25-26, 2009. 32. Comments on Josh Bright, The Alleged Impotence of Reflection: Owens on Belief and Control, read at the annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, Vancouver, April 8-12, 2009. 33. How You Know You are not a BIV, Presidential Address, read at the Annual Meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association, St. Paul, September 2008. 34. Evidentialist Anti-Skepticism: How You Know You are Not Deceived, read to the Philosophy Department at the University of Minnesota, Morris, April 2008. 35. Responding to BIV Skepticism without Begging the Question, 4 th Russell Philosophy Conference, Healdsburg, CA, March 2008 36. Evidentialist Anti-Skepticism, read to the Philosophy Department at Purdue University, February 2008. 37. Evidentialist Anti-Skepticism, read at the 2007 Bled Philosophy Conference on Epistemology. Bled, Slovenia, June 2007. 38. "The Easter Bunny Strategy for Anti-Skepticism, read at the 3 rd Russell Conference, Healdsburg, CA, March 2007. 39. Doxastic Freedom, read at the 2006 Bled Philosophy Conference on Freedom and Determinism. Bled, Slovenia, June 2006 7
40. Doxastic Freedom, read at the 2 nd Russell Conference, Healdsburg, CA, March 2006. 41. Returning Participant, Rutgers Epistemology Conference. New Brunswick, New Jersey, May 2005. 42. Easter Bunny Deception and the Failure of Skepticism, 1 st Russell Conference, Healdsburg, CA, March 2005. 43. Epistemology and the Law, symposium response to Christopher Green, Suing One s Sense Faculties for Fraud, read at the Eastern Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association, December 2004, Boston. 44. Contextualism and the Multiple Concepts Theory, read at the 2004 Bled Philosophy Conference on Contextualism. Bled, Slovenia, June 2004. 45. Comments on Stewart Cohen s Knowledge, Speaker and Subject, Sofia XV Philosophy Conference on Epistemic Principles, Circularity, and Externalism. Porto Alegre, Brazil, May 2004. 46. Sense Experience as a Source of Justification, read at the 1 st Mainz-Frankfurt Colloquium on Analytic Epistemology, January 5, 2004 University of Mainz, Germany. 47. Internalist Reliabilism, read at the Dubrovnik Philosophy Conference in Epistemology and Metaphysics, Dubrovnik, Croatia, August 25-30, 2003, Dubrovnik, Croatia. 48. The Reliability of Memory and the Problem of the Crystal Ball. Colloquium paper, Pacific Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco, March 2003. 49. The Reliability of Memory and the Problem of the Crystal Ball. Annual meeting of the Illinois Philosophical Association in Edwardsville, Illinois, November 1-2, 2002. 50. Comments on Chase B. Wrenn, Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity, Central Division Meeting of the APA, Chicago, April 2002. 51. "Reliability Knowledge and the Reliability of Our Faculties." Paper read at the 2002 Bled Philosophy Conference on Rationality. Bled, Slovenia, June 2002. 52. "Can I Know That My Memory Is Reliable?" Paper read to the Philosophy Department at the University of Minnesota, Duluth. April 5, 2002. 53. Returning Participant, Rutgers Epistemology Conference, April 2002. 8
54. Chair, Colloquium: Personal Identity, Central Division Meeting of the APA, May 2001 55. Discussant, Rutgers Epistemology Conference, April 27-28, 2001. 56. "Foundationalism, Sense-Experiential Content, and Sellars's Dilemma." Paper read at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA, San Francisco, March 2001. 57. "Nyaya Epistemology." Commentary read at the colloquium Indian Philosophy Meets Western Epistemology, at the Eastern Division Meeting of the APA, New York, December 2000. 58. "Do I Know I'm Not A Brain In A Vat?" Paper read at the Minnesota State University at Moorhead, December 6, 2000. 59. Session Chair, Roderick Chisholm Memorial Conference, Brown University, November 10-11, 2000. 60. "Reply to Greco." Commentary read at the conference Duty and Virtue in Epistemology, organized by Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski, held at the Center for Philosophical Education at the City College of Santa Barbara, November 1999. 61. "Internalism Explained." Paper read at the 1999 Bled Epistemology Conference, Bled, Slovenia, June 1999 62. "Epistemic Deontology and Doxastic (In)Voluntarism." Paper read at Wayne State University, December 1997. 63. "Epistemic Blameworthiness and Impermissibility." Commentary on James Montmarquet's colloquium paper "Epistemic Blameworthiness," read at the 1997 Meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association in St.Louis. 64. "Far-Out and Middle-of-the-Road Internalism." Commentary on Alvin Goldman, "Internalism's Internal Problems," presented at the symposium "The Internalism-Externalism Debate and Skepticism" (with Ernest Sosa and Laurence BonJour as the other two contributors) at the 1997 Central Division Meeting of the APA in Pittsburgh. 65. "Epistemic Deontology and the Voluntariness of Belief." Talk to the Philosophy Department at St. Olaf College, March 3, 1997. 66. "Epistemic Deontology and the Voluntariness of Belief." Paper read to the Philosophy Department at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, February 10, 1997. 67. "Is Belief Really Involuntary?" Paper read at the 1996 Annual Meetings of the Central States Philosophical Association (Kansas City) and the Minnesota Philosophical Society (St. Paul). 9
68. Comments on Peter Markie: "Degrees of Warrant." Colloquium commentary read at the Eastern Division Meeting of the APA (January 1995, New York). 69. "Proper and Improper Use of Cognitive Faculties: An Objection to Plantinga's Proper Functioning Theory." Colloquium paper read at the 1993 Pacific Division Meeting of the APA. 70. "Proper Functioning and Warrant after Seven Vodka Martinis." Colloquium paper read at the 1993 Central Division Meeting of the APA (Chicago). Also read at the Annual Meeting of the Minnesota Philosophical Society (October 1992, St. Paul). 71. "Epistemological Naturalism and Naturalistic Epistemology." Colloquium paper read at the 1992 Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (April 1992, Portland). 72. "Should We Value Justified Belief?" Paper read to the Philosophy Department the University of Minnesota at Minneapolis (January 1992). 73. "Justified Belief and the Causal Requirement." Read at the Annual Meeting of the Minnesota Philosophical Society (October 1991, University of Minnesota at Duluth). 74. Comments on Charles Wallis, "Bidding Aurevoir to BonJour." Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the Minnesota Philosophical Society (October 1991, University of Minnesota at Duluth). 75. "Particularism and the Justification of Epistemic Principles." Colloquium paper read at the Annual Meeting of the Minnesota Philosophical Society (October 1990, University of St. Thomas). 76. "Particularism and the Justification of Epistemic Principles." Colloquium paper read at the Central Division Meeting of the APA (April 1991, Chicago). 77. "Epistemic Criteria and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity." Colloquium paper read at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (March 1991, San Francisco). 78. "Moral Truth and Coherence: Comments on Goldman." Commentary read at the 1990 Spindel Conference on Moral Epistemology at Memphis State University. 79. "Positive and Negative Epistemic Duties." Colloquium paper read at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (March 1990, Los Angeles). 80. "Epistemic Duties and Doxastic Voluntarism." Paper read to the philosophy department at St. Cloud State University, January 1990. 81. Positive and Negative Epistemic Duties." Read at the annual meeting of the Minnesota Philosophical Society (October 1989, Winona State University). 10
82. Comments on Jane Duran, "Boydian Nightmares." Colloquium commentary, Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (March 1989, Oakland). 83. Comments on James Sennet: "The Evidence Base Model of Justification." Annual meeting of the Mountain Plains Conference (October 1988). 84. Comments on Scott Bodfish: "Deontic Consistency: A New Approach to Chisholm's Paradox." Annual meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association (November 1986, St. Louis). 85. "The Deontic Conception of Justification." Annual meeting of the Iowa Philosophical Society (October 1986, University of Iowa). Dissertation Supervision 1. David Coss, "The Case Against Interest-Relative Invariantism," director. 2. Mark Satta: "The Ambiguity Theory of 'Knows, director. Ph.D. conferred May 2013. 3. Jonathan Fuqua, "Metaethical Mooreanism", in progress, committee member. 4. Joshua White, "Epistemic Contingency and the Problem of Irrelevant Influences, committee member. Ph.D. conferred May 2013. 5. Phil Osborne, "Justification, Truth, and the Philosopher's Armchair," committee member. Ph.D. conferred May 2013. 6. David Anderson, Knowledge and Conviction, committee member. Ph.D. conferred May 2011. Courses Taught At Purdue Seminary: Dogmatic and Nondogmatic Theories of Perception (Spring 2016). Seminar: Phenomenal Conservatism (Spring 2014). Seminar: Epistemology, co-taught with Michael Bergmann (Spring 2013). Seminar: Freedom and Determinism, co-taught with Mark Bernstein (Spring 2012). Seminar: Knowledge and Practical Interest (Spring 2011). Seminar: Belief and Control (Spring 2010). Introduction to Philosophy (Spring 2009). 11
At St. Cloud State University Steup and Sosa (eds.): Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, William Alston: A Realist Conception of Truth, Richard Fumerton: Metaepistemology and Skepticism, Stephen Stich: The Fragmentation of Reason, Theory of Knowledge, Metaphysics, Symbolic Logic, Ethical Theory, Critical Reasoning. Refereeing Acta Analytica, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Dialogue, Erkenntnis, Grazer Philosophische Studien, International Journal of Philosophical Studies (Dublin, Ireland), Journal of Philosophical Research, Noûs, Philosophical Papers (Rhodes University, South Africa) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Theoria. Miscellaneous 1. Organizer and Host of Midwest Epistemology Workshop, Purdue Fall 2010. 2. President of the Central States Philosophical Association, 2008. 3. Vice President of the Central States Philosophical Association and Program Director for the Annual Meeting in Des Moines, October 5-6, 2007. 4. Participant in the 1987 NEH Summer Seminar Reasons, Justification and Rationality in Lincoln, Nebraska, directed by Robert Audi. 5. Participant in the 1986 NEH Summer Institute Theory of Knowledge in Boulder, Colorado, directed by Keith Lehrer and Alvin Goldman. 12