LEADERSHIP OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND NON- LEAGUE ORGANIZATIONS

Chapter IV LEADERSHIP OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND NON- LEAGUE ORGANIZATIONS Apart from the Indian Union Muslim League, numerous organizations have been working among the Muslims of Kerala in the socio-political, educational, cultural and religious spheres since the first quarter of the 20 th century. Each group offers different interpretations to various religious issues, customs and practices, and social change and modernity. Some organizations among them are political in nature, outlook and function whereas others harbour social and religious ideals and objectives. Whatever be the primary concerns of these organizations, all of them ultimately consider Muslim community and its affairs as the reference point. Stated differently, though these organizations differ from each other and compete among themselves for a niche among the Muslim masses, they primarily focus at least outwardly on the issues affecting the community. This Chapter seeks to discuss the role of these organs in social change in the community. The Chapter is divided into two sections: first section is a discussion on the nature and history of various types of Non-League political outfits and the second section seeks to analyse the same with regard to various socio-religious and educational organizations. Non-Muslim League political organizations viewed both in a political and social sense are numerous in number, though some of them have already become defunct. Cochin Muslim Education Association (1917), All Travancore Muslim Association (1935), All India Muslim Majilis (1945), Travancore State Muslim League (1945), Travancore-Cochin Muslim League (1949), All Kerala State Muslim League (1957), All India Muslim League (1973), People s Democratic Party (1993), National Democratic Front (1993) and Indian National League (1994) are/were formations which could be considered political in nature. On the other hand, Jamat-e-Islami (1941), Kerala Naduvathul Mujahid (KNM, 1950), and the two Sunni factions (1989) are religious in character whereas Muslim Educational Society (MES, 1964), and Muslim Service Society (MSS, 1980) mainly cater to the 107

social and educational needs of the community. As already stated, some of these formations have become non-entities in the socio-political landscape of Kerala whereas few others have only token presence. Among the existing organizations, the following needs elaborate discussion in regard to their history, objectives and activities so that a discerning student of Muslim sociology and politics could gather a comprehensive picture of the subject matter. 1.1. All India Muslim League and Indian National League Of the Non-Muslim League organizations, All India Muslim League (AIML) and Indian National League (INL) need primary mention. One obvious reason for this is that both of them are break-away factions of the Indian Union Muslim League. These parties separated themselves from the parent organization on various grounds and at various periods. Further, when compared to other Non- League political formations for instance, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and National Democratic Front (NDF) both these parties have established themselves in the state s political mainstream and have also shared political power by associating themselves with the two alliances, United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Left Democratic Front (LDF). Also other parties PDP and NDF, for example - have the stigma of extremism attached to them. Of the above two political parties, All India Muslim League was the first to be formed. As is the case in majority of the instances, here also it was political power and influence which gave birth to dissident activities in the League and the resultant formation of AIML. In order to understand the circumstances leading to its formation, it is necessary to have a brief look at the power struggle within the Muslim Legue since 1960. Two such struggles were the ones that took place on the eve of the 1960 Assembly elections and the other in 1966. In a sense both struggles had a Communist connection to them. For instance, 1960 saw a minor split in the League when a new outfit Progressive Muslim League (PML) - was carved out of it by a section of the party men which was alleged to be the creation of CPI with a view to fragment the Muslim votes [Radhakrishnan, 2004: 85]. In the election (1960), the new outfit even contested in some constituencies with the tacit support 108

of the Communist Party though after the election, nothing more was heard about it [Azeez, 1992: 63]. The second split had an even more explicit Communist connection as fierce debate took place in the League over its relationship with the Congress Party and, hence, about the need to have a better understanding with the Communists. This actually resulted in the formation of two lobbies (pro and anti- Communists) - in the party subsequently leading to the next split and formation of the Samasta Kerala Muslim League [Panicker, 1976: 116]. However, both splits were short-lived and were also of little consequence as far as the League was concerned. Thus it proved that it could easily manage such dissident activities and showed that the base of the party was strong enough to be challenged by these groups who had little popular clout. However, later, in the 1970s, dissident activities within the League began to assume a menacing proportion once again. Trouble broke out on the eve of the Lok Sabha by-election to Manjeri (1973) when C.H. Mohammed Koya, MLA representing Kondotty constituency and Minister for Education in the then United Front Government headed by C.Achutha Menon, was asked to resign from the Cabinet to contest the by-election. It was alleged that Mohammed Koya unwillingly left the Ministry on the demand of Bafaky Thangal (President) who, according to this account, took such a decision in the interest of a splinter group within the party. However, the issue persisted even after the death of Bafaky Thangal as the new President - Pukkoya Thangal - had to name a Minister and a candidate for Kondotty. Inspite of pressure from certain quarters to make M.Moideen Kutty Haji as Minister and P. M. Aboobakar as the candidate, he acted on his own and nominated Chakeeri Ahmed Kutty and M.P.M. Abdulla Kutty Kurikkal respectively as Minister and the candidate for election. Soon infighting broke out among the top leaders of the party and gradually it percolated to the lower ranks [Azeez, op.cit., 108-09]. There was also another reason for aggravating the situation which was related to the handling of the Home Portfolio by the Congress Party. Many in the League were dissatisfied with this and also there was much heart burn in regard to the Land Reform Bill, Forest Protection Bill and Agricultural Workers Bill moved by the United Front Government. Difference of opinion between the two parties now reached a point of no return 109

and hence demand for the withdrawal of the League from the Ministry became vocal. In fact the group led by Ummer Bafaky Thangal and C.P Mammukeyi raised this issue very strongly. The League Executive and State Council meeting on 9 th March 1974 witnessed a heated debate and the meeting concluded with the decision to empower the President to take an appropriate decision in this regard [Azeez, op.cit., 109-10]. In the meantime the dissidents under the leadership of Ummer Bafaky Thangal also began to level criticisms against the League Ministers besides fanning the flame of anti-congress feelings [Radhakrishnan, op.cit., 146]. Thus the immediate objective of the dissidents was loud and clear to pull out of the Ministry failing which press for a split in the party and they soon opted for the latter course and as a prelude to this a split occurred in the Calicut Municipal Corporation Council. It may be recalled that a Congress-League Alliance, called Poura Munnani (People s Front) was in power in the Corporation. Some disturbances took place there when a Congress Municipal Councilor (Vice- Chairman), joined the League and subsequently defected to the Congress fold. It was alleged that the Congress had breached faith and showed political immorality in this issue. Dissidents under P. M. Aboobakar, the Muslim League leader in the Corporation, decided to break away from the Poura Munnani, without consulting the City League Committee or League Working Committee which naturally invited disciplinary actions against them. In the meantime, the dissidents also organized a Youth League Conference at Calicut against the plea of the party President. Soon dissident leaders, Ummar Bafaky Thangal and C.K.P. Cheriya Mammukoyi, were removed from the Direct Board of the Chandrika, party daily. As a reprisal to it, the dissidents expelled Avukhaderkutty Naha (Minister) from the Legislature Party leadership and elected Moideen Kutty Haji as the leader. Further, on 31 st March 1975, the dissidents decided to withdraw their support to the Ministry and Moideen Kutty Haji, the then Speaker and the group leader, resigned from office. The official group sharply reacted to this and suspended all dissident MLAs except K. P. Raman from the League Assembly Party. With this the rift between the two groups was complete and on 2 nd April, 1975, the All India 110

Muslim League was formed at a meeting held at Thalassery [Azeez, op.cit., 210-12]. Following the split, the AIML became a constituent of the LDF led by the CPI(M). After the 1967-69 alliance between the Communist Party and the Muslim League, it was the second experiment of the former to align with a Muslim outfit to gather Muslim votes. However, the sojourn of the party with the LDF was short-lived. Though it shared power along with the Front following the 1982 election to the Legislative Assembly, the relationship between AIML and the CPI(M) was not all that smooth. The Supreme Court judgment on Shabanu Case (1985) 1 and proposal for a Common Civil Code sealed the fate of this relationship. It was a controversial divorce law suit that created considerable debate and controversy about the desirability of having different civil codes for different religions, especially for Muslims in India. The Muslims felt threatened by what they perceived as an encroachment on the Muslim Personal Law and, therefore, naturally protested against it. On the other side, some non-religious organizations and activists strongly argued in favour of the judgment. E.M.S. Nambudirippad, a master-brain of CPI(M), joined issue in the ongoing debate arguing for a uniform civil code in his writings and public speeches. On the other side, various Muslim outfits, both political as well as social, came around and they put up a brave front against the CPI(M) stand and argued for the continuance of Islamic Shariat. This placed the All India Muslim League in a tight spot. While its social base consisting solely of the Muslim population stood for a religion-based law of inheritance, the political front of which it was a partner articulated a diametrically opposite stand. Party leadership rightly understood that continuance of the alliance with the CPI(M) would be suicidal for it. By now, India Union Muslim League also changed the rigid stand it had taken earlier and sent clear signals to the AIML leadership for a truce. This, in fact, was a straw as far as that party (AIML) was concerned and hence it took the final initiative to end the more than half-a-decade old alliance with the Left Democratic Front, and to merge with the Muslim League (August 1985). 111

Needless to say, the All India Muslim League at the time of the split from the parent party wanted to project itself as an alternative to the Muslim League, both politically as well as socially. Its calculation was that if it could emerge as the predominant, if not the sole voice of the Muslim masses, it could make use of that position to mobilize them politically and make a hard bargain with the LDF from a position of strength. LDF, particularly the CPI(M), on its part also wanted to foist AIML as a counter to the League so that its influence among the Muslim population could be neutralised or at least balanced. This was the cold calculation on both sides. However, electoral statistics belied all expectations which was clear from the performance of the party at the polls in all the three election since its inception as a separate political party. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 make this clear. Note Table 4.1 Assembly Constituencies AIML Contested (1977 1982) Sl.No Constituency Results of the contest 1977 1980 1982 1. Kasargod F Nil F 2. Peringalom Nil Nil W 3. Edakkad W W Nil 4. Meppayur F W W 5. Kozhikodu II W W W 6. Kunnamangalom W W W 7. Manjeri F F F 8. Malappuram F F F 9. Kondotty F F F 10. Thirurangadi F Nil Nil 11. Thanur F Nil Nil 12. Thirur F F F 13. Kuttippuram F F F 14. Mankada F F F 15. Guruvayoor F Nil Nil 16. Alwye F Nil Nil 17. Mattancherry Nil W F 18. Kazhakkuttom F Nil Nil Total Contested 16 11 12 Secured 03 05 04 : F Failed; W - Won Source : Election Commission of India, Statistical Reports on General Election to the Legislative Assembly of Kerala, 1977, 1980 and 1982, Election Commission, New Delhi. 112

Table 4.2 Voting Trend in Assembly Constituencies AIML Contested (1977 1982) Votes polled by the AIML and its Opponents Sl.No Constituency 1977 1980 1982 AIML Opponent AIML Opponent AIML Opponent 1. Kasargod 22619 29402 ML Nil Nil 15643 25676 ML 2. Peringalom Nil Nil Nil Nil 38825 19973 INC 3. Edakkad 34266 30947 INC 39843 29886 JP Nil Nil 4. Meppayur 34808 40642 ML 43851 36044 ML 42022 34835 ML 5. Kozhikodu II 33531 32433 ML 40160 34931 JP 35109 29155 Ind 6. Kunnamangalom 30289 SC 28601 CPI 35234 SC 31173 INC 28901 SC 27266 Ind 7. Manjeri 16807 43626 ML 21905 43209 ML 19031 38681 ML 8. Malappuram 15724 39362 ML 17272 36602 ML 13500 35464 ML 9. Kondotty 20159 41731 ML 26650 41848 ML 20885 37671 ML 10. Thirurangadi 21479 40540 ML Nil Nil Nil Nil 11. Thanur 12158 42886 ML Nil Nil Nil Nil 12. Thirur 26127 41675 ML 36201 38469 ML 30571 36315 ML 13. Kuttippuram 12023 36367 ML 15703 33863 ML 13263 31521 ML 14. Mankada 26207 33597 ML 31861 35623 ML 28845 33208 ML 15. Guruvayoor 20071 34063 ML Nil Nil Nil Nil 16. Alwye 36259 37017 INC Nil Nil Nil Nil 17. Mattancherry Nil Nil 26543 24757 JP 24031 25589 ML 18. Kazhakkuttom 22637 37014 INC Nil Nil Nil Nil Total Total votes 385164 589903 335223 386405 310626 375354 Contested 16 16 11 11 12 12 Secured 03 13 05 06 04 08 Notes : CPI - Communist Party of India; INC Congress; JP Janata Party; Ind. - Independent (UDF); ML - Muslim League; SC - Reserved for SC. Source : Election Commission, op.cit. 113

As stated earlier, in electoral politics the AIML was supposed to be a force to bring the Muslim votes to the LDF fold. That was why in the 1977 election, first election since its formation, it was given sixteen seats to contest, mostly against the parent organization. However, the election result showed that the All India Muslim League could not prove to be a strong opponent to the League in its strongholds in Calicut and Malappuram districts [Radhakrishnan, op.cit., 153]. Out of the 16 candidates fielded by the party, 12 had as their opponent candidates belonging to the Muslim League, including eight in Malappuram district, where the League had a clear edge. Among the three seats it won only one (Kozhikode II) was snatched from the parent organization. On the whole, it got 3,85,164 votes as against 5,89,903 votes harnessed by its opponents and this meant 4.39 per cent of the total valid votes at the state level and 39.86 per cent of the total valid votes in the seats it contested [Election Commission, 1977: 8]. In the 1980 elections, the party contested five seats less than it did in the previous election. To put it plainly it was given only eleven seats this time as against 16 in the 1977 election. This ineffect meant a realization by the LDF of its declining importance vis-à-vis the Indian Union Muslim League. And of these eleven seats, the party this time won five seats, two more than its previous tally with 3,35,223 votes against 3,86,405 of its opponents. This was 3.51 per cent of the state total and 46.08 per cent of votes polled in all the eleven seats taken together, and this meant an increase of 6.22 per cent from the 1977 polls. The success rate also increased this time with 45.45 per cent compared to the 18.75 percent in the previous case. In 1980, there were seven constituencies, including six in Malappuram district, where the AIML had a face-to-face fight with IUML. Among them, the former had won only one (Meppayur) along with other four. The last election AIML contested as a separate political party was the one which was held in 1982. It was given twelve seats and in four of them the party candidates got elected. Nine seats, including six in Malappuram district, witnessed a fight between the two League outfits. This time around also it could win just one seat Meppayur and in all the rest Muslim League emerged successful. Votes polled came to 3,10,626. It was 3.25 per cent of the total valid votes in the state and 40.86 percent of the votes in the constituencies contested. 114

Table 4.3 AIML- IUML Contests in Malappuram District, 1977-1982 Constituency 1977 1980 1982 AIML IUML IUML IUML AIML IUML Manjeri 16807 43626 21905 43209 19031 38681 Malappuram 15724 39362 17272 36602 13500 35464 Kondotty 20159 41731 26650 41848 20885 37671 Thirurangadi 21479 40540 Nil Nil Nil Nil Thanur 12158 42886 Nil Nil Nil Nil Thirur 26127 41675 36201 38469 30571 36315 Kuttippuram 12023 36367 15703 33863 13263 31521 Mankada 26207 33597 31861 35623 28845 33208 Total 150684 319784 149592 229614 126095 212860 Difference 169100 (52.88 per cent) Source : Election Commission, op.cit. 80022 (34.85 per cent) 86765 (40.76 per cent) Electoral performance of the AIML thus gave a clear indication that it would not be able to act as a match to the Muslim League as it failed to make dent in the traditional support which the Muslim community has been extending to that party. In the contests between the two parties in the three elections, the AIML had won a total of 2,61,713, 1,93,443 and 1,65,769 respectively against 4,56,324, 2,65,658 and 2,64,125, respectively of the IUML [Election Commission, 1977, 1980 and 1982]. Thus, IUML had a clear edge over its rival by securing a margin of 1,94,611 (42.65 per cent) votes in 1977; 92,215 (27.18 per cent) votes in 1980; and 98,356 (32.24 per cent) in the 1982 elections. This shows that the AIML lost each seat to the League for an average vote share of 16,218 in 1977, 10,316 votes in 1980 and 10,928 in 1982. Again, interestingly, in the case of the constituencies where the League won against the AIML, the margin of victory was notable: 1,87,828 in 1977, 64,408 in 1980 and 91,169 in 1982. This means that AIML lost each seat for an average difference of 17,075 (1977), 10,735 (1980) and 11,396 (1982). At the 115

same time, the margin in seats where the AIML defeated the League was very small 6,783 (1970), 7,807 (1980) and 7,187 (1982) votes. This would be clear if one looks at the Malappuram district. The League had a thumbing victory both in terms of seats and votes, all the time. The party defeated its AIML opponents with a sizeable margin, fairly better than the margin of victory it had in other constituencies. Calculations show that the League had a huge difference of 1,69,100 (52.88 per cent) with an average surplus of 21,138 votes in each seat in 1977; 80,022 (34.85 per cent) with a surplus of 13,337 votes in 1980; and 86,705 (40.76 per cent) with a surplus of 14,461 votes in the 1982 elections. 1.2. The Indian National League Significantly the next round of split in the IUML and the consequent formation of the Indian National League (INL) were also related to the party s relationship with the Indian National Congress. This time around, the immediate provocation was the demolition of the Babri Masjid 2 on 6 th December, 1992. A section of the League under the leadership of Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait argued for the immediate termination of the alliance with the Congress and as the leadership did not pay heed to this demand, they walked out of the party along with U. A. Beeran (the then Thirurangadi MLA) and P. M. Aboobaker (the then Guruvayoor MLA), and formed another political party INL [Radhakrishnan, op. cit., 224-25]. Officially, it was launched in 1994 and, compared to IUML, its social base was confined to certain strong holds in the Malappuram district, viz., Tanur, Parappanangdi and Manjeri. Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait, a leader with a nation-wide appeal, was the moving force behind the party. To him, the Left parties were more sensitive than the Congress on many issues affecting the secular fabric of the country and also on issues affecting the Muslim population. As far as the LDF was concerned, calculation was that erosion of the League in its strongholds meant eroding the strength of the UDF in state politics. All these created an atmosphere in favour of a close relationship between the INL and the LDF though, till now, this continues only as electoral understanding without accommodating the party either in the Front as a full 116

partner or in the Ministries led by the CPI(M). This touch-me-notism of the LDF and its leader CPI(M) has been a heartburn for the INL leadership. It is well aware of the fact that to keep its social base intact it has not merely to find accommodation in either of the two political fronts but also has to gain a share in political power. Being in power actually has two implications : only under such a situation it could serve the interest of the Muslim community, at least in a minimal sense; and the same (sharing of power) is also needed for distribution of patronage. Out of power perpetually, therefore, means political wilderness and erosion in the social base. For, after all, without political power or atleast a prospect of obtaining it, how could a party survive? The question assumes a rare salience in the Kerala situation where politics is bipolar and also where politics is controlled, to a certain extent, by caste/communal forces. This is the greatest dilemma INL faces and this has also been a major issue of discussion within the party. In fact this has even resulted in a minor split in the party with a splinter group led by Siraj Sait merging with the IUML prior to the Assembly poll of 2011 [Malatyala Manorama, 2011]. After the emergence of the INL, the first election to be held in the state was the one to the civic bodies in 1995. Along with the People s Democratic Party (PDP), another non-league political platform, INL formed an alliance called People s Front, with the primary object of taking on the League in its strongholds. It contested (People s Front) on its own in certain Muslim majority constituencies and in others lent tacit support to the LDF. In this election, the Muslim League faced defeat even in the Malappuram district. The party lost its hold in all the five Municipalities in Malappuram district, first ever in the electoral history of Kerala. Thus, the CPI(M) got an opportunity to get a space in Muslim pockets with the help of the INL. Another experiment was in the by-election to the Guruvayoor constituency, following the resignation of P.M.Aboobaker who joined INL. In the election, LDF fielded P.T.Kunju Muhammed, an independent, against Abdul Samad Samadani of the Muslim League. The INL extended wholehearted support to the LDF and in Kerala politics, this is described as the Guruvayur Strategy. Since the 1996 elections to the Legislative Assembly, INL began to contest the 117

general elections with the support of the LDF. Following Table makes clear its electoral performance. Table 4.4 Performance of INL in Constituencies it Contested alone: 1996 Election Name of Constituency Votes polled Percentage Kannur 4476 4.85 Edakkad 115 0.10 Koilandy 389 0.31 Perambra 390 0.32 Koduvally 1968 1.74 Kozhikode - II 138 0.14 Beypore 146 0.11 Kunnamangalam (SC) 296 0.27 Wandoor (SC) 458 0.40 Manjeri 301 0.29 Mankada 528 0.48 Mannarkkad 337 0.29 Total 9542 3.94 Source : Election Commission of India, 1996, op. cit., pp. 8 & 155-65 In the 1996 elections, held simultaneously to the Lok Sabha and Assembly, INL candidates got the support of the LDF in two Assembly segments, Malappuram and Kuttipuram [Radhakrishnan, op. cit., 229-30]. The party polled 54,319 votes as against 99,536 polled by the League. Besides this, the INL also contested on its own in 12 constituencies, including two constituencies reserved for Schedule Castes (Table 4.4). However, it could gather only 9,542 votes from all these constituencies. As per the official data of the Election Commission, the party got only 0.45 per cent of the total valid votes in the state and 3.94 per cent of votes in the seats contested [Election Commission, 1996: 8]. In the Lok Sabha (1996) Election, the presence of the PDP and INL resulted in the fragmentation of the Muslim votes which proved fatal for the League candidates. In Manjeri, votes polled by the League came down to 47.25 per cent and in Ponnai to 48.98 per cent 118

in the place of 51.3 and 53.08 per cent, respectively in 1991 [The New Indian Express, 1996]. In the Civic Elections (2000), the INL contested alone and the result, as could be inferred, was unimpressive. In the 2001 Assembly elections, the scenario underwent a drastic change with CPI(M) offering electoral support to the party (INL). Table 4.5 Assembly Constituencies where INL Contested During 2001 2011 Elections Constituencies Votes polled by INL and its Opponents 2001 2006 2011 NL Opponent NL Opponent NL Opponent Kasargod NC NA 27790 38774 ML 53068 43330 ML Kannur 38947 58080 NC NA NC NA Kuthuparamba NC NA NC NA 53861 57164 Kozhikodu II NC NA 51130 37037 ML NC NA Manjeri NC NA 61274 76646 ML NC NA Vengara NC NA NC NA 24901 63138 ML Tirur 45511 58270 ML NC NA NC NA Total Votes 84458 (38.98) 116350 (53.70) 140194 (40.61) 152457 (44.16) 131830 (28.55) 163632 (51.98) Notes : ML - Muslim League; NL - National League; NC Not Contested; NA Not Applicable (National League had not contested in the constituency, this time) Sources : Election Commission, Statistical Reports On General Election to the Legislative Assembly of Kerala - 2001, 2006 and 2011, Election Commission, New Delhi. In the elections the party fielded two candidates as LDF independents in Kannur and Tirur constituencies, but lost to the Congress and the Muslim League, respectively. It had polled only 38.98 per cent votes from these seats, while the opponents polled 53.70 per cent. In the next election to the civic bodies (2005) CPI(M) entered into local alliance with the INL and reaped rich dividend out of it. For instance, it came to power in Tenjippalom Panchayat with the support of the lone INL member and the same also stood in good stead for the party in Talannur Grama Panchayat. In the 2006 Assembly election, this relationship continued and 119

INL contested three seats (Kasargod, Kozhikode-II and Manjeri) out of which it won one (Kozhikode II) against the Muslim League. In the simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha, the CPI(M) gained Manjeri seat (Lok Sabha) and the support of the INL here proved crucial. Further, Muslim League had to sweat profusely for winning the Manjeri seat to the Legislative Assembly due to the active presence of the INL there [Prakash, 2010]. The INL polled an aggregate of 1,40,194 votes, which was 0.90 per cent of the state average and 40.61 per cent of votes in the seats contested. It is, however, worth noting that despite the electoral alliance, INL did not get any berth in the cabinet. Instead, it was given the chairmanship of a Board and a Corporation. 3 In the 2011 Assembly poll, INL contested in three constituencies (Kasargod, Kuthuparamba and Vengara), with the active help of the LDF. The election, however, proved disastrous for the party all of its candidates failed and the votes polled by them also fell drastically. Its three candidates altogether won only 28.55 per cent of the votes (95,229 in absolute terms) while the opponents got 51.98 per cent. In the Kasargod constituency, INL was reduced to the third position where the BJP became the immediate opponent of the League with 37.08 per cent of the votes polled. In Vengara constituency in the Malappuram district, it got only 25.05 per cent votes when its League opponent got 63.53 per cent. The only saving grace for the party came from Koothuparamba where its candidate (S.A.Puthiyavalappil) put up a decent show by polling 45.93 per cent votes against 48.75 per cent of the Socialist Janata Dal. 1.3. The People s Democratic Party The People s Democratic Party (PDP) was formed in 1993 and its origin could be really traced back to the Islamic Seva Sangh (ISS) formed in 1989, a militant Islamic group led by Abdul Nazar Mau dani with the aim of protecting the interest of the community from the assault of Hindu fundamentalist groups. Mau dani was a religious scholar and an eloquent orator whose speech attracted a section of the Muslims, especially the youth. In passing, it needs to be mentioned that the ISS was the first militant organization among the Muslims of Kerala 120

though it was not received well by the mass of the people who were very much part and parcel of a plural culture and secular world view. It is another thing that the organization was banned by the Central Government due to its militant nature and extremist outlook. It was under this circumstance that it changed its nomenclature and formed a new party with the name PDP. The Party, according to its Constitution, stands for the uplift of all marginalized sections irrespective of religious or communal considerations and, since its inception it was highly critical of the Muslim League for its failure in protecting the interest of the community. Interestingly, both the LDF and UDF continue to have covert or overt understanding with the PDP with a view to reducing the influence of the Muslim League [Radhakrishnan, op. cit., 260]. For instance, in 1996, the LDF arranged a platform for Abdul Nazar Mau dani in Thalassery, when E.K.Nayanar, the then Chief Minister, contested in the byelection to the Assembly against Adv. Asif Ali. Not to be left behind in this race, United Democratic Front also tried to woo the party a number of times, particularly during periods of elections. In electoral politics, PDP had tried to make its presence felt since the civic polls of 1995. Here it is important to note that the party contested the election by fielding its own candidates in only two elections, 1995 and 2011 Assembly elections. In the elections that were held in between (between 1995 and 2011), the party merely extended its support to either of the two Fronts LDF and UDF. For instance, in the 2001 election the support was for the UDF and in 2006 it offered support to the LDF. Its role along with INL was expected to jolt the fortunes of the Muslim League atleast in Malappuram district. Needless to say, the popular base of a political party is tested mainly through its performance in elections to the various representative bodies, whether it is the State Legislature or the Parliament. In Kerala, such an opportunity came to the PDP for the first time in 1996. In the elections, it adopted a policy to field its own candidates in constituencies (Legislative Assembly) wherever it has a sizable base and which is strong enough to challenge League candidates, and in the case of Lok Sabha, Manjeri and Ponnai were selected as a test case. However, for the remaining seats, both in the 121

Assembly and Lok Sabha, it did not have a clear stand. Following Table shows its performance in the election to the Legislative Assembly. Table 4.6 District-wise Performance of PDP in 1996 District PDP contested Votes polled Votes percentage Kannur 02 607 0.29 Kozhikode 03 1211 0.35 Malappuram 11 22753 2.19 Palakkad 07 6292 0.88 Ernakulam 04 14562 3.85 Kottayam 02 800 0.46 Alappuzha 05 8761 1.74 Pathanamthitta 02 1606 0.84 Kollam 06 24599 4.03 Thiruvananthapuram 08 21035 2.76 Total 50 102226 0.21 Note : Votes and percentage distribution are calculated on the basis of the total votes polled in the constituencies wherever the PDP contested. Source : Election Commission, 1996, op. cit., pp. 156-89. To the Assembly, PDP contested in 50 constituencies from 10 districts. Among the candidates so fielded, 16 were non-muslims including four in constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes. The highest number of candidates was in Malappuram district where 11 candidates including three non-muslims were on the fray. On the whole, from all the seats contested, it polled 1,02,226 votes, which was 0.72 per cent of the total votes polled at the state level and 2.04 per cent of the aggregate votes in the seats the party contested [Election Commission, 1996: 8]. District-wise analysis of votes shows that Kollam, the home district of Mau dani, stands first (24,599) followed by Malapppuram (22,753), Thiruvanthapuram (21,035) and Ernakulam (14,562). It is to be noted that it gained only 22,753 votes from the largest Muslim populated district (Malappuram), 122

though it contested 11 seats. The party got the highest number of votes (4,803) from the Ponnani constituency, where the UDF fielded a non-muslim candidate (P.T. Mohanakrishnan) against Paloli Muhammed Kutty (CPI - M, won by a Table 4.7 Constituencies in which PDP polled 2000 and above votes (1996) Sl.No Constituency Votes polled Votes percentage 1. Wandoor (SC) 2827 2.48 2. Manjeri 2014 6.93 3. Malappuram 2046 2.23 4. Tanur 3182 3.51 5. Tirur 2160 2.00 6. Ponnani 4803 4.65 7. Mattancherry 5238 8.83 8. Alwaye 7485 6.14 9. Alleppey 3847 4.34 10. Kayamkulam 2646 2.70 11. Chadayamangalam 3258 3.73 12. Kunnathur (SC) 7231 6.52 13. Karunagapally 8314 8.51 14. Eravipuram 3012 2.62 15. Chathanoor 2447 2.33 16. Vamanapuram 5758 5.70 17. Ariyanad 2381 2.61 18. Kazhakuttam 4479 4.27 19. Trivandrum West 4614 5.52 Source : Election Commission, 1996, op. cit., pp.156-89. margin of 8618 votes). Constituency-wise trend shows that its votes ranged from 75 to 8,314 with an average of 2,045. There were 19 constituencies in which PDP polled above 2000 votes and in constituencies like Karunagappally (8,314), Alwaye (7,485), Kunnathur (7,231) and Mattancherry (5,238) this was above 5000. Among 123

them, Karunagappally and Kunnathur (SC) are very close to the native place of Mau dani. PDP succeeded in giving a shock to the League in Mattancherry where the LDF candidate (M.A.Thomas) defeated the party s (League s) nominee, T.A.Ahamed Kabeer, by a nominal margin of 425, while the PDP got 5,238 votes. Table 4.8 Performance of PDP : 2011 Assembly Election Constituency Votes District 1. Vallikkunnu 2. Tirurangadi 3. Tirur 4. Kottakkal 5. Thrithala 6. Pattambi 7. Perumbavoor 8. Kunnathur (SC) 9. Eravipuram 2666 (2.63) 4281 (4.27) 1802 (1.42) 3027 (2.56) 590 (0.48) 718 (0.61) 1094 (0.87) 1354 (0.94) 3234 (3.10) Total votes18766 (0.11 per cent) Malappuram Palakkad Ernakulam Kollam District total 11776 (2.57) 1308 (0.54) 1094 (0.87) 4588 (1.58) Note : According to the Official Report of the Election Commission, PDP contested only in seven seats and it got 14,178 votes ( 0.08 %). This was because Kunnathur and Eravipuram seats were not included in PDP account. Source : Election Commission 2011, op. cit., p. 46. Performance of PDP in this election was very poor. It got an aggregate of 18,766 votes (0.11 per cent of the state total) and 1.76 per cent of the votes polled in the constituencies in which it contested. The highest polling in favour of the party 124

was registered in Eravipuram Constituency in Kollam district where its candidate Mylakkad Shah, a close camp follower of Abdul Nazar Mau dani, got 3,234 (03.10 per cent) out of 1,0,4083 votes polled. The party candidate in Kunnathur constituency, situated in the native place of Mau dani, got only 1,354 (0.95 per cent) votes out of a total of 1,42,990. In Malappuram district, in Kottackal constituency, the party candidate polled the highest with 3,027 (02.56 per cent) votes [Government of Kerala, 2011: 7]. Thus the electoral data show that, like INL, PDP s dream of emerging as an alternative to the Muslim League has proved futile. It is nowhere near even putting up a strong challenge to the League. One prominent reason for this is the bipolar nature of state politics where a party has to identity itself with either of the two fronts LDF and UDF or face political oblivion. Further PDP has never tasted power and it did not have control over the vast political patronage which power gives. In both counts, Muslim League stands above PDP and there is no comparison between the two either in terms of support of the Muslim community or in the matter of helping the community to achieve progress in various fields. 1.4. Other Non-League Political Outfits There are a few other political outfits who are desirous of obtaining a political space among the Muslims of Kerala. Of theses, mention should be made of National Democratic Front (NDF)/ Popular Front of India (PFI)/ Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI). Compared to the Indian Union Muslim League, it is a mere splinter group/party with hardly any clear-cut socio-political programme or a mass base. It does not have the recognition of the Election Commission of India as it has not shown its electoral presence in a meaningful sense. Actually this party, which bears different titles - NDF, PFI and SDPI - is different manifestations of the same political force. For instance, NDF 4 was formed in 1993. Later in 2006, it merged with the Karnataka Forum for Dignity and Manitha Neethi Pasarai of Tamilnadu to form the Popular Front of India [PFI, 2011]. Again in 2009, PFI together with like-minded organizations, viz., 125

Association for Social Justice (Andhra Pradesh), Citizens Forum (Goa), Social and Educational Forum (Rajastan), Nagarik Adhikar Suraksha Samiti (West Bengal) and Lillong Social Forum (Manipur) decided to form a strong political party at the national level [Times of India, 2009]. The Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI) was the product of this ambitious plan. The SDPI published its manifesto on October 18, 2009 at its first National Delegates Meet with the slogan Freedom from Hunger, Freedom from Fear and since then it has been demanding balanced representation of all social groups in legislatures and all administrative bodies nominated by the government in proportion to their population [Bari, 2009]. Article 3 of the Party Constitution declares its aims and objectives as the fulfillment of a socio-political system emphasizing Justice, Freedom, Equality and Fraternity, and to bring all the deprived sections under the roof of a national political organization. Further, it aims at upholding a political ideology promoting dignity and safety of marginalized sections, and to empower the communities which are backward and in a minority in India [SDPI, 2009: 1]. It means that it mainly focuses on the political empowerment of the downtrodden and marginalized sections belonging to all religions and sections of the Indian society. Briefing the circumstances which led to the formation of NDF and later of the SDPI, Nazaruddin Elamarum says, since independence, the Muslims and other downtrodden sections have remained marginalized and the mainstream political parties have utilized them only as their vote-banks without addressing the basic issues they confront or having any concrete programmes for their upliftment [Elamarum, 2011]. It has since then been trying to rope in disgruntled Muslim youths who felt that the Indian Union Muslim League had not done anything concrete for the Muslim cause [The New Indian Express, 2009]. It highlights the inefficiency of the Muslim League on the one side and the weaknesses of the secular parties, like Communists and the Congress on the other, in solving problems that the community confronts [Radhakrishnan, op.cit., 270]. Here it is worth noting that the real target of the SDPI was the disgruntled and unemployed youth who began feeling insecure when the Sangh Parivar elements started harassing the Muslims in different parts of the country on different issues. Demolition of Babri Masjid and communal riots in Kerala and in various places in 126

India offered added reasons for the sustenance of a party like SDPI. Further, the perceived failure of the Muslim League to measure up to outfits like RSS has been widely propagated among the youth to rally them under its banner [Kurup and Ismail, 2008 : 233]. Interestingly, even global issues like American imperialism and its occupation of the Muslim countries for its own vested interests were used (and are being used) to aggravate Muslims feeling of insecurity. The SDPI and its earlier versions used (still use) an explosive mix of Pan-Islamism 5, Muslim League s failure on various counts and the alleged insecurity of the community nationally as the raison d être for their existence. These outfits which consider RSS as their main adversary play the twin role, of a protagonist of Islamic extremism and the mouthpiece of Islamic revivalism [Kurup and Ismail, op.cit., 357-358]. Whatever may be the aims and objectives of the party, it needs to be noted that the latter avatars like PFI and SDPI are suspected of extremist activities. The organization has been categorized as a militant group which was under the scrutiny of the Union Home Ministry in 2006 for fanning fanaticism along with some other hardline groups. In the beginning, the NDF was not interested in participating in electoral politics as it then thought it prudent first to consolidate itself organizationally before taking a plunge into the electoral arena. And only after its change of identity into SDPI that the party began to participate in elections very seriously and, that too, on the basis of its conviction that empowering the Muslims politically was the only answer to many of the problems faced by the community in the country [The New Indian Express, 2009]. The first ever election it contested was the by-election to the Kannur Assembly seat in November 2009. In the election, its candidate, P Abdul Majeed Faisy, General Secretary of the party, could get only 3,500 votes. But in the civic elections of 2010, it opened its account in some of the Grama Panchayats, in one Block Panchayat and in a couple of Municipalities, though its performance was not very convincing. The following Table shows the wards where the SDPI could prove its strength. 127

It is seen that SDPI has won one seat each in Kannur, Thodupuzha and Pathanamthitta Municipalities without any support from others and one Independent candidate is elected to the Palakkad Municipality with its support. In Grama Panchayats, it has won four seats without any support and two independents were elected from two wards and in one seat (Kunnikkara) its candidate polled the same number of votes its Muslim League opponent got. In the Table 4.9 Wards where SDPI Proved its Strength : Civic Elections 2010 No. Ward Name of LSGI District Category 1 Kasanakotta South Kannur Municipality Kannur Female 2 Keerikode Thodupuzha Municipality Idukki Female 3 Kulashekharapathi Pathanamthitta Municipality Pathanamthitta Female 4 Municipal Office Shornor Municipality Palakkad Female 5 Mathakkal Erattupetta Grama Panchayat Kottayam SC 6 Pazhunnan Chowannur Grama Panchayat Thrissur Female 7 Machampady Manjeswaram Grama Panchayat Kasargode Female 8 Mayyathumkara Poruvazhi GramaPanchayat Kollam Female 9 Mannadisseri Kulashekharapuram Grama Panchayat Kollam General 10 Areekulam Vengara Grama Panchayat Malappuram Female 11 Kunnikkara Kadungallur Grama Panchayat Ernakulam Female 12 Vanchinadu Vazhakkulam Block Panchayat Ernakulam General Source : Chief Electoral Officer, Kerala, ceokerala.gov.in Block Panchayat, it has won one seat. This victory is very notable as its candidate, Prof. Anas, contested the election while in detention as an accused in having given 128

protection to those who attacked Prof. Joseph 6. He has won from Vanchinadu division in Vazhakkulam Block in Ernakulam district by a margin of 1,903 votes. He bagged 3,992 votes while the UDF s M.A. Muhammed (Congress (I)) got 2,089 and LDF s Muhammed Kunju Sulaiman (Cong-S) got only 1,666 votes [twocirlces.net, 2010]. An analysis of the election result also brings to the fore a strange fact that SDPI has succeeded mostly in constituencies reserved for women. Also among the elected was one candidate who was a Non-Muslim. Another interesting thing is that the party could not disturb in any manner the vote banks of the Muslim League in the Malappuram district. Its achievement in the district was confined to the election of an independent candidate in the Vengara Grama Panchayat. However, the first Assembly election contested by the party was that of 2011. It fielded 82 candidates in the election and bagged a total of 1,61,096 votes, which was 0.92 per cent of the total polled votes in the state. And this formed 1.60 per cent of the votes polled in the 82 constituencies it had contested [ceokerala.gov.in, 2011]. In the Malappuram district, the party fielded candidates in all the 16 constituencies and polled 44,415 votes (02.34 per cent). The highest tally of votes was in Vengara constituency where Abdul Majeed Faisy, State General Secretary, gained 04.71 per cent (4,683) votes. Among other districts, in Kozhikode it got 14265 votes (0.99 per cent); in Kannur 16,046 votes (1.84 per cent); in Ernakulam 17,338 (1.82 per cent); in Idukki 7,154 (2.03 per cent) and in Kollam 12,923 votes (2.49 per cent). There were three constituencies - Azhikode, Manalur and Vadakara- where SDPI polled votes higher than the margin of votes obtained by LDF/UDF. The aforesaid analysis shows that Non-League political formations have little political clout among the Muslim masses of Kerala. Many of these formations were formed at various periods either as products of the power struggle within the Muslim League or due to differences of opinions with it (League) on certain social and political issues. Among the latter, one major issue over which one of the longest and more thorough going discussions that took place was on the question relating to League s relationship with the Indian National Congress in Kerala. 129

Table 4.10 District-wise Performance of SDPI : 2011 Assembly Election Constituency Total Votes Polled Votes polled by SDPI District Total SDPI Contested District-wise In SDPI contested Constituencies Votes % to the total of SDPI contested Constituencies % to the District Total Kasaragod 05 03 653316 381048 4266 01.11 00.65 Kannur 11 07 1390131 867579 16046 01.84 01.15 Wayanad 03 02 394944 249841 3939 01.57 00.99 Kozhikode 13 11 1678277 1438708 14265 00.99 01.42 Malappuram 16 16 1897444 1897444 44415 02.34 02.34 Palakkad 12 07 1468267 879869 14299 01.62 00.97 Thrissur 13 03 1687397 399840 6704 01.67 00.39 Ernakulam 14 08 1711598 948120 17338 01.82 01.01 Idukki 05 03 578543 352402 7154 02.03 01.23 Kottayam 09 02 1052683 225345 4486 01.99 00.42 Alappuzha 09 04 1212527 539565 3813 00.70 00.31 Pathanamthitta 05 03 646958 382978 1985 00.51 00.30 Kollam 11 04 1387240 519802 12923 02.49 00.93 Thiruvananthapura m 14 09 1628326 933873 Kerala 140 82 1738765 1 Source : Election Commission 2011, op. cit., p. 46. 10016414 16109 6 9463 01.01 00.58 01.60 00.93 Such debates even bordered on picking up and playing with the age old enmity between the Congress and the Muslim League of Mohammed Ali Jinnah s vintage, though nothing of any serious consequence happened apart from a couple of minor and inconsequential splits in the parent organization. Also of significance were the debates on issues like the Muslim Personal Law and the demolition of Babri Masjid. However, the Non-League political parties were not able to make political gains on these issues so as to pose any serious challenge to the prominence of the 130

Muslim League. This has created a situation in which one League Goliath is surrounded by many Non-League Lilliputians who, by themselves, were/are not capable enough to address many a social, cultural, economic and political issue affecting the community. At best they are capable enough to make sounds and furies signifying nothing. By implication, this means that these organizations are hardly capable enough to exploit and make beneficial use of situation in which the identity and political behaviour of the Muslim community are changing in subtle ways. 2. Non-Political Organisations Figure 3 Religious Sects among Muslims and their Comparative strength 4% 4% 12% 38% 8% 33% EK Sunni Faction A P Sunni Faction Other Sunni Faction Mujahid Faction Jamat-e-Islami Other Muslims Source : Wikipedia Besides political formations, various non-political organizations - social and educational agencies are also active among the Muslims of Kerala. These 131

organizations could be distinguished from their political counterparts on the basis of their involvement or absence of such involvement in things, political. These organs, therefore, do not harbor any political ambitions. As such they primarily focus on the social and religious issues festering the community. Sometimes they act in unison and at other times, they function in isolation in realizing their aims and objectives. These organizations include religious sects like Kerala Naduvathul Mujahidin (KNM), Jamat-e-Islami and the two Sunni factions, educational agencies like MES and MSS and forum for social activism like the Jama at Federation. All these contribute, in varying degree, to the well-being of the community. 2.1. Religious Organizations: 1. Kerala Naduvathul Mujahideen Earlier organizational attempts in Kerala to reform the Muslim community initiated through the Islam Dharma Paripalana Sanghom of Vakkom Abdul Khader Moulavi and the Kerala Muslim Aikya Sanghom led by K.M.Moulavi could not mobilize the community in the desired measure and direction. Also ordinary Islahi workers had no platform to coordinate their activities in respect of spreading the universal message of Thouhid. 7 The formation of Kerala Naduvathul Mujahid (KNM), on 20 th April 1950, as a popular Islamic Organization, a subsidiary to the Kerala Jamiyat-ul- Ulama, bringing within its fold all classes of people was basically aimed at this [Ahamedkutty, 1995 :75]. The organization otherwise called as the Mujahid Movement of Kerala, is affiliated to the All-India Ahle- Hadith, an organization with identical aims and objectives [Ibid., 70]. Its membership is opened to all those who accept and agree with the preaching of the Prophet Muhammad, in its purity and genuine tradition. It was registered under the Societies Act in 1957 and K.M. Moulavi and N.V. Abdussalam Moulavi were its founding President and Secretary, respectively. The main objective of KNM is to unite the Muslims of Kerala in the light of Holy Quran and Sunnah (practices of the Last Prophet) and thereby to eradicate superstitious beliefs and practices that prevailed/prevail among the Muslims [angelfire.com, 2010]. Following the measures initiated by earlier reformists, it has tried to reform the community through promoting religious and secular education. 132