concluding that there are good reasons to believe that it does. The argument draws on several

Comments on Does it Matter Whether Morality is Objective? The author examines the question of whether the objectivity of morality has any import, concluding that there are good reasons to believe that it does. The argument draws on several recent studies that suggest that objectivist attitudes are more likely to result in corresponding behavioral effects. Moreover, the author states, that it is better, from one s own standpoint, to host those behavioral effects that are derivative from objectivist attitudes, because if we are to implement these behaviors in our lives (such in political institutions or cultural communities), we would much rather have set of values that we agree with to be implemented rather than those of our opponents. Thus, if we subjectify our beliefs we are at risk of being trampled upon by the objectivist attitudes of our opponents, and so it is better to hold objectivist attitudes rather than relativistic ones. First, the type of moral objectivity that the author is considering is the one that says that moral facts exist and are independent of our beliefs, theories, desires, etc. The example that is cited says [s]o for example, on this conception of the objectivity of morality, when Jane claims that the Iraq War was wrong, she is asserting the existence of a moral fact (that it was wrong), and claiming that this fact would obtain regardless of anyone s attitudes about it (e.g. if Sam believes it was right, his belief would be false) (p. 1). Therefore, if I make a claim about some moral claim or state of affairs being right or wrong, I would be asserting that there is a moral fact that corresponds to that claim or state of affairs. The first question to be raised draws on the linguistic considerations of right and wrong. It is unclear as to how right and wrong avoid being translatable to claims equivalent to I like it or I don t like it. If I say The Iraq War is wrong, the author claims that I am claiming that the Iraq war was, in some sense,

immoral. Yet, it is equally plausible that when I say The Iraq War was wrong I am asserting a statement along the lines of I do/did not approve of the Iraq War or I don t like that Iraq War occurred. Evidently, the author has offered an account of what definition of morality he working with is, yet, it isn t obvious as to whether we can talk about any sort of objectivity the author mentions without first extinguishing the fact that moral statements can be translated as approval/disapproval statements or behavioral results that correspond to such claims. Further on, the author elegantly lays out his argument for his position. I summarize it such: 1) Having objectivist attitudes about morality makes one more likely to act according to those beliefs. 2) From one s own standpoint, it is better to have those beliefs than not. 3) Therefore, it is better to have objective belief rather than not. Regarding (1), I am unable to take issue with the premise without being steeped in the literature and research. As the author includes, several studies have shown that participants who are primed with (moral) objectivity texts or are imbibed with a sense of moral objectivity will tend to become more charitable, be less likely to cheat, and be less likely to support shady business transactions. However, as the author points out, objectivist attitudes are closely related to moral conviction, or the strong belief that something is right or wrong. Persons with strong moral convictions will tend to distance themselves from other who disagree with them, reject implementations of procedures that disagree with their moral beliefs, and become dissatisfied at a contrary outcome, even when it comes about through fair or normal means.

Here, the point that the author is concerned with is (1), whether objectivist attitudes actually influence a person s behavior. It is evident that, through psychological and sociological research, that (1) is true. However, this point seems double-edged. Even though there is sufficient evidence that suggests objectivist attitudes will affect behavior (especially in many positive ways), there are correlations with objectivist attitudes having negative effects. Secluding this point from the rest of the argument, it is obvious that, yes, objective morality does matter, but in a way that might not actually beneficial for one or the community. It may turn out, for instance, that having objectivist moral attitudes may be useful for a society in their short-term effects but be detrimental in the long run. For instance, if I hold a view such as it is wrong to give women the right to vote that will undoubtedly be detrimental for the society, especially if I have a strong moral conviction regarding (anti)feministic beliefs. In addition, if I act on such a belief, that might benefit me (as I oppress another person therefore granting me a sort of tyrannical authority), but can also be equally detrimental (as then feminists might revolt against me). Thus, the question, in tandem with the evidence that suggests that objectivist attitudes do in fact influence behavior, is whether we actually should adopt objectivist attitudes especially considering that objectivist attitudes can produce inexcusable and destructive behavior. (Note that the author does not install his argument for objectivist attitudes here the way I am critiquing. The author s argument is not we should adopt moral objectivity because it results in useful behavior, despite it also resulting in negative behavior. My criticism is, however, this very notion.) Regarding (2), the author points out that the term better must be unpacked as to avoid question-begging criticisms. He writes: In order to avoid begging any questions, it seems clear that we must take seriously the possibility that moral objectivity fails to obtain. Taking that

possibility seriously means that the moral claim this argument invokes might only be true relative to a particular system of moral beliefs (yours), or that such claims are literally not true at all (p. 3). While this argument does not purport to assume that there is a moral dogma or privileged set of morals, one concern arises from this view. If we are to understand this system, and take seriously the possibility that our moral beliefs might not be true, and if we contend a moral relativism, then we would be unable to hold that any, including our own, beliefs as objective. It is not evident whether the argument is whether we should act as if our views are objective, or if we should seriously entertain that our beliefs may indeed be false (or incomplete), yet objectify them regardless. The concern is more than an issue of ambiguity what if we understand our beliefs to be possibly false (or incomplete), resulting in adopting moral relativism: doesn t this, then, annihilate the possibility of thinking that our moral beliefs can be objective? It is unclear how the argument gets around this concern. Further on, the paper offers a thought experiment. Suppose I have a strong moral belief, such as ties to feminism. Suppose someone tells me how to implement that belief, namely that my belief in feminism should not inform my decision to implement procedures correlated to feminism. In addition, I should accept, for instance, reports of a university committee s accounts of numbers of rape cases, and that instead of flipping off a worker who catcalls a woman, I should engage in conflict resolution with that individual. If I am to understand the thought experiment correctly, the idea is that our beliefs should (according to the author) inform our decisions to implement them in different avenues of our lives. However, provided that this account is accurate, one, perhaps unwanted, outcome is that this argument excuses the circumstantial ad hominem fallacy and the fallacy of exclusion. If for instance, I am at a senate that is searching for effective procedures to install in an environment

(such as, for instance separate opportunities for the sexes that benefit them equally but in different ways) and I argue that the proposal is wrong/invalid/misguided/bad, not because of any fault of the argument but because I have a specific situation or circumstance that the argument does not acknowledge, then the validity of the argument or usefulness of the proposal will be clouded by the circumstances surrounding the proposal or argument. The argument or proposal would be, say, false or invalid because I don t agree with the premises or the promises, not because of whether the proposal is actually cogent. And while this may be one unfortunate but necessary outcome of the author s argument, many find accepting fallacies to have a place in rational argumentation to be counterintuitive. Finally, the author offers what he calls a strong a priori argument against the possibility of us reaping the rewards of moral tolerance (p. 5). (Note that he distinguishes between moral tolerance and tolerance in general. The latter is that we can allow people to {express} their beliefs and commitments in their own spaces. The former is that we coexist with a group who holds particular beliefs and commitments, in which both parties can implement their beliefs, even if they are contradictory.) The author borrows a sort of Prisoner s Dilemma form (with parallels of Pascal s Wager in the margins). If you objectify your beliefs and your opponent subjectifies his, you gain the most desirable outcome, while your opponent is at a loss. On the other hand, if you subjectify your beliefs while your opponent objectifies his, then the reverse occurs: your opponent has the ability to implement objective principles while yours remain subjective (and thus will remain unimplemented). The interesting questions, according to the author, is (3) what happens when both parties subjectify their beliefs, and (4) what happens when both parties objectify their beliefs.

If (3) and both parties (you and your opponent) subjectify their beliefs, then you still benefit, because at least your opponents don t implement their beliefs in objective fashions. That is, while your beliefs may not become objectified (and thus, you will be unable to inform relevant policies, delegate tasks and roles to others which correspond to those beliefs, have the ability make others follow your advice, etc.) and must rely on being subverted to merely a subjective status, your opponents will equally be the position where they are powerless to institutionalize their beliefs as well. However, if (4) and both parties objectify their beliefs, then at least neither party is trampled over by the other. Your beliefs can (equally) become standardized as well as your opponents, but neither will be privileged as dominating the other. Moreover, some of our opponents include radical extremists such as ISIS, who will view their beliefs as indubitably(!) objective. That is, extremist parties such as ISIS will refuse to subjectify their beliefs, resulting in that our only option will be to hold our beliefs as objective as well, such that we are not subjugated by the beliefs of our opponents. Thus, it is better to hold objective beliefs rather than subjective ones we have much more to lose if we subjectify them. There are a few quibbles I have with argument presented here, and a one worry which I will address after I present some of my quibbles. First, the author draws a distinction between minor moral disagreement (where moral tolerance is unnecessary) and deep moral disagreement (in which the status of which set of moral beliefs become the dominant doctrine must be determined), which the latter was focused on. The former however, is glossed over as trivial, and that the results of minor moral disagreement are not particularly disastrous from the moral perspective of each disputant (p. 6). Yet, it is plausible to think that even minor moral disagreement can result in unwanted consequences. As seeds grow mighty oak trees, a minor

moral disagreement can be the precedence to a deeply-rooted set of values that become ingrained in a how a person behaves in the world. Even if two parties have underlying disagreements but ultimately agree on the macro level for some moral beliefs, the author suggests that moral tolerance is not needed. However, because morals tend to branch off and structure other aspects of our lives, it is/should be important to restructures a person s similar-yet-distinct beliefs. How one views the world when they are sixteen is influenced, in part, by how she viewed the world when she was six. The quibble here, thus, is that it isn t clear that moral tolerance is really unnecessary in minor moral disagreement: instead, it seems as though it lays the seeds for one s future beliefs. A second quibble that the author ought to be concerned with is that there could be a factof-the-matter about which beliefs are better than others ( Even if it is objectively better if ISIS subjectifies its beliefs, and as a result they are less compelled to conduct suicide bombings and beheadings, they certainly will not see it that way, p. 6, italics in original). However, there seems to be a slight disassociation here: the beliefs that we hold and want to be objective are those which we think to be objective. That is, the reason why I hold that I shouldn t steal or kill is not because it benefits me (directly), but rather because I think that stealing and killing are objectively wrong. ISIS conducts suicide bombings and beheadings because they think that their beliefs correspond to the facts-of-the-matter. The issue is that the argument seems to presuppose that we can get to the fact-of-thematter apart from our own beliefs. While I personally think that it would be objectively better for ISIS to cease their activities and their existence, they would equally think that it would be objectively better for me to cease mine. It is unclear how one can even talk about the fact-ofthe-matter without the mesh of their moral beliefs overlaying those facts. More accurately, it is

unclear what objectively better even means here, as the only ability to talk about it would inherently be tied to what one believes is right and wrong. Whatever is objectively better is bound up (or tied down to) some subject or mind, and it is unclear how to dissociate the subject s objectivity to the actual objectivity. Next, the author states that our moral opponents such as ISIS will not subjectify their beliefs, and thus we should objectify our own such that we aren t dominated by the belief of our opponents. On the outset, this seems prima facie accurate that people who are entrenched in their ways to such extreme ends will require an enormous amount of opposition (such as evidence, rhetoric, argumentation, and benefits) to change their beliefs. However, there is no reason to think that under no conditions will our moral opponents change their moral commitments. Evidence and argumentation have immense power to alter one s own thinking. Of course, it is impractical and irresponsible to believe that all ISIS members will flip their beliefs with any measly crumb of evidence. However, many people have altered their beliefs in light of new evidence (or lack thereof) or through compelling arguments. I see no reason to think that any moral opponent of mine will be so tenacious such that their beliefs are not subject to revision under any circumstance. My last quibble will be a semantic one: the author claims that this argument is an a priori one. However, including the nature of entities such as Maoist guerillas, ISIS nationalists, and Trump supporters, and their position in this argument, it is hardly viable to call this an a priori argument. Even the Prisoner s Dilemma requires psychological knowledge that is rooted in empiricism, so categorizing the original dilemma as a priori would be somewhat of a disservice. My final concern regarding the argument is that it seems to presuppose doxastic voluntarism that we can, at will, change our beliefs. This objection, which also afflicts Pascal s

Wager, says that belief doesn t come merely from volition and choice, and that our moral beliefs cannot be changed on a whim. Suppose one believes that the sum of two and two is four. If doxastic volunterism is true, then at any moment, the same person can authentically and genuinely believe that the sum of two and two is five. Or, situated in the moral sphere, if I believe that any murder against innocent people is unjustified, then, if doxastic volunterism is true, I can alter my beliefs (when I so choose to) to believe that murder against innocent people is morally permissible. The concern here is that not only do many find doxastic volunterism counterintuitive or even false, the argument here uses it as an assumption: that, after understanding the argument I can go from relativism to objectivism. This does not seem to be a plausible choice of action: if one is a relativist, he could not simply choose to be an objectivist. It is unclear how the argument can get off the ground if one is to deny doxastic volunterism, which poses a threat to the argument here. I find the author s argument interesting and in some ways, intuitive. The argument is clever and expertly crafted, and offers a compelling reason to be objectivistic about morality. Perhaps the concerns I ve raised here can be easily accommodated by the theory behind the argument, and I look forward their repudiation.