Kant s Ethics and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate - An Introduction

Kant s Ethics and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate - An Introduction

Christopher Arroyo Kant s Ethics and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate - An Introduction

Christopher Arroyo Philosophy Department Providence College Providence, RI, USA ISBN 978-3-319-55731-1 DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55733-5 ISBN 978-3-319-55733-5 (ebook) Library of Congress Control Number: 2017937895 Springer International Publishing AG 2017 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Printed on acid-free paper This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For Amy

Preface I conceived of this book as a way to bring together two of my academic interests, Immanuel Kant s ethics and the debate over same-sex marriage. My conviction was, and still is, that Kant s ethical theory is viable and should be able to help us work through important practical ethical issues. Since the debate over same-sex marriage is one such practical issue, I wanted to write a book explaining the ways in which Kant s ethics can be a resource for those of us engaged in this debate. I realized from the start, however, that I would have to justify writing on Kant s ethics when it comes to same-sex marriage, since Kant s is far from the first name that comes to people s minds when they think of sexual ethics or the same-sex marriage debate. As I started writing, I realized that the prejudice (for that is what I think it is) against relying on Kant s ethics as a resource for a practical ethical issue such as same-sex marriage is born of an influential though mistaken reading of Kant s moral theory. Unless you are a Kantian ethicist, or someone who otherwise has reason to be familiar with contemporary Kant scholarship, chances are that the account of Kant s ethics with which you are familiar is one that is informed by Elizabeth Anscombe and those critics of Kant who have taken their cue from her. The Anscombian reading, as I shall call it from here on, finds its source material in Elizabeth Anscombe s Modern Moral Philosophy (1958). In this essay, Anscombe, though a strong advocate of objective moral truth, recommends that the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty indeed, the concepts of morally right and wrong ought to be rejected by modern moral philosophers because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and [these concepts] are only harmful without it (1). Anscombe believes that the concept of moral obligation, as it is used by modern moral philosophers, is a harmful concept leftover from an ethical theory that no longer holds sway; she concludes that this concept poses a serious impediment to doing moral philosophy well. 1 1 Anscombe s basic argument criticized what Bernard Williams (1985) would eventually call morality, which he argues is a special system of ethical thought. vii

viii Preface While Anscombe s essay has been widely influential, Alasdair MacIntyre has articulated the clearest and most extensively developed version of her reading of Kant s ethics. MacIntyre s After Virtue (1984) lays out this reading of Kant by attributing several features to Kant s moral theory. 2 According to MacIntyre, the main features of Kant s ethics, which takes moral obligation as its central concept, are as follows: (1) It is committed to moral rigorism, which means that moral obligation applies universally and equally to all humans, regardless of circumstances; moral rules are like the rules of arithmetic (MacIntyre 1985, 45). 3 (2) It is a version of ethical formalism, which means that universal moral rules are determined solely by a rational process of testing maxims, which entails an ethical intuitionism (MacIntyre 1986, 45; 236). 4 (3) It abstracts from all material conditions, which means that Kant s ethics brackets any empirical considerations with respect to human beings and their circumstances and, therefore, severs all connection between human goodness and human desires, making the moral life a struggle against one s own wants and emotions (MacIntyre 1985, 44; 140). 5 This Anscombian reading of Kant s ethics, unfortunately, is the reading of Kant s ethics that some of my readers will hold. It is unfortunate because each feature of it is demonstrably false or misleadingly exaggerated. Such a misreading is due largely to the fact that proponents of the Anscombian reading (as I shall call it) base their interpretation of Kant solely on his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason, which constitute but a fraction of Kant s writings on ethics, and not even the most important or substantive part of his moral theory. As a result, the Anscombian reading leaves one with a view of Kant s ethics that is remarkably unable to speak to many aspects of our moral lives, including concerns we may have regarding the ethics of sex and marriage. In response to the Anscombian reading, and spurred in large part by the work of Mary J. Gregor (1963) and John Rawls (1971), contemporary Kant scholars and defenders of Kant have developed more holistic readings of Kant s practical philosophy, readings that draw on works that had been long ignored by Englishspeaking philosophers. As a result, these Kant scholars present us with accounts of 2 Onora O Neill (1983) criticizes MacIntyre s reading of Kant in the first edition of After Virtue. She identifies four features of MacIntyre s reading of Kant that she claims are mistaken. Although I agree that the four features she identifies involve misreadings of Kant, I think MacIntyre s mistakes are greater in number. 3 Cf. MacIntyre (1985, 43 44): If the rules of morality are rational, they must be the same for all rational beings, in just the way that the rules of arithmetic are; and if the rules of morality are binding on all rational beings, then the contingent ability of such beings to carry them out must be unimportant what is important is their will to carry them out. 4 According to MacIntyre, Kant believes that the project of discovering a rational justification of morality therefore simply is the project of discovering a rational test which will discriminate those maxims which are a genuine expression of the moral law when they determine the will from those maxims which are not such an expression (44). 5 As MacIntyre puts it, To act virtuously is not, as Kant was later to think, to act against inclination; it is to act from inclination formed by cultivation of the virtues (149). On MacIntyre s Anscombian reading of Kant, the Kantian virtuous person is either completely unfeeling or constantly struggling against her feelings in order to act in ways that are morally worthy.

Preface ix Kant s ethics that are quite different from the one we get from authors such as Anscombe and MacIntyre. Commenting on what I am calling the Anscombian reading, Allen Wood makes the following observation: Critics have often questioned the deep distrust of human nature exhibited in Kant s insistence on the opposition of reason and inclination. But they display shortsightedness when they condescend to this feature of Kantian doctrine, making snide references to Kant s personality quirks or pietistic upbringing. They miss the connection between Kant s deep suspicion of our natural desires and his well worked-out theory of human nature and its history, which is generally optimistic rather than pessimistic in tendency and potentially quite radical in its social implications. (Wood 1991, 327). I think Wood is onto something here. Indeed, I believe that one cannot have an adequate and charitable understanding of Kant s normative ethical theory, or of the practical implications of it, without seriously coming to grips with what he has to say about human nature. This conviction motivates my reading of Kant and the plan for the book, which I have divided into two parts. Part I develops a response to the Anscombian reading of Kant. I am aware that my interpretation of Kant s normative ethical theory and philosophical anthropology in Part I is rather apologetic, but this is because I am eager to disabuse readers of the Anscombian view (not because I think that there are no concerns with these parts of Kant s philosophy). Part II turns to a more critical discussion of Kant s treatments of gender, sex, and marriage and relies on these discussions in order to argue that Kant can be a valuable resource to those of us engaged in the debate over same-sex marriage. Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter in which I lay out the most significant moral arguments against and for legalizing same-sex marriage. Although I present arguments that bear on the same-sex marriage debate in general, readers should realize that I am an American writing in an American context, which is what I know best. I do not think that what I have to say is inapplicable to those outside of the USA, but I think that I should acknowledge my cultural perspective at the outset. In Chap. 2, I present the basics of the Anscombian reading of Kant s ethics and develop a reading of Kant on moral obligation to which Anscombe s criticisms do not apply. In Chap. 3, I present Kant s philosophical anthropology, which takes unsocial sociability to be the central feature of human nature. I argue that Kant s understanding of humans as unsocially social motivates his practical philosophy as a whole and can help us understand the critical stance he takes toward human sexual relations. In Chap. 4, which concludes Part I, I present Kant s theory of virtue, which serves to further disabuse readers of the Anscombian reading and anticipates the way in which Kant s ethics can help us develop a solution to the problem of sexual objectification. Part II of the book turns more specifically to Kant s treatments of sex and marriage. In Chap. 5, I give an account of Kant s views on gender and sex, explaining the way in which Kant s philosophical anthropology and his sexist views on the relations between women and men inform his critique of sex acts as objectifying.

x Preface In Chap. 6 I distinguish between the legal problem of sexual objectification and the moral problem of sexual objectification and argue that Kant s account of marriage can only address the former. I then draw on Kant s account of friendship to develop a response to the latter, one that in principle can apply to both different-sex and same-sex couples. In Chap. 7, which is the conclusion of the book, I develop a defense of same-sex marriage by drawing on Kant s writings, and I revisit the arguments I presented in Chap. 1 and evaluate them in light of the defense of same-sex marriage that I develop. This book was a long time in the making. For various reasons, I was unable to finish the manuscript as quickly as I had planned. That I managed to finish it at all is due largely to the many people who helped me work through this project. First of all, I want to thank Neil Olivier, the executive editor of Social Sciences and Humanities at Springer. Neil is the first person to affirm my idea for this book, and he has patiently stood by me and encouraged me while I finished. For similar reasons, I also want to thank Diana Nijenhuijzen, Neil s assistant editor and the person with whom I ve had the most contact at Springer. Diana, like Neil, has been a pleasure to work with, and I am forever grateful for her constant encouragement and seemingly infinite supply of understanding. Parts of Chaps. 3 and 4 appear in my paper, Kant on the emotion of love, which is published in the European Journal of Philosophy. I am grateful to the journal for permission to use those portions of my article. Various people have read and commented on drafts of this manuscript and material that informed parts of the manuscript. I want to thank Eric Bennett, Sarah Braunstein, Licia Carlson, Peter Costello, Brian Davies, Joseph Gulezian, Bill Hogan, Michael Kelly, Darra Mulderry, Jeffery Nicholas, Anne Ozar, and Amy Peters for their feedback on the texts that I gave them. Nancy Kendrick invited me to Wheaton College in order to present some of my early work from Part II. I want to thank her, M. Theresa Celeda, John Partridge, and the philosophy students at Wheaton who attended my talk and gave me helpful feedback. Each of these people has, at various times and in various ways, been a source of strength and encouragement that helped me push through and get the manuscript finished. Providence, RI, USA Christopher Arroyo References Anscombe, G.E.M. 1958. Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy 33.124: 1 19. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1984. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. O Neill, Onora. 1983. Kant After Virtue. Inquiry 26.4: 387 405. Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wood, Allen W. 1991. Unsocial Sociability: The Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics. Philosophical Topics 19.1: 325 351.

Contents Part I The Same-Sex Marriage Debate & Some Basics of Kant s Ethics 1 For Better or for Worse: An Overview of the Same-Sex Marriage Debate... 3 1.1 The Case Against Same-Sex Marriage... 4 1.1.1 The Definitional Objection... 4 1.1.2 Marital Norms and the Harms of Same-Sex Marriage... 6 1.1.3 Same-Sex Marriage and the Harm Done to Children... 7 1.1.4 The Moral Objection to Homosexuality... 8 1.1.5 The Liberal Case Against Same-Sex Marriage... 11 1.2 The Case in Defense of Same-Sex Marriage... 12 1.2.1 The Equal Treatment Argument... 12 1.2.2 The Benefits of Same-Sex Marriage... 14 1.2.3 The Conservative Case for Same-Sex Marriage: Normalizing Homosexuality... 16 1.2.4 Marriage, the Changing Institution... 17 1.2.5 Opening Up Marriage... 18 1.3 Looking Ahead... 19 References... 20 2 Finitude & Dependency: Kant s Conception of Moral Obligation... 23 2.1 Anscombe on Moral Obligation... 25 2.1.1 Anscombe s Brief History of Modern Ethics... 25 2.1.2 Moral Obligation: A Case of Language Gone on Holiday... 27 2.2 Kant on Moral Obligation... 29 2.2.1 Finite Wills vs. Holy Wills... 30 2.2.2 Moral Necessitation and Human Imperfection... 33 2.2.3 Kant pace Anscombe on Moral Obligation... 36 xi

xii Contents 2.3 Kant s Account of Autonomy of the Will... 37 2.3.1 Setting the Stage: Autonomy and Heteronomy as Metaphors... 38 2.3.2 Kant s Moral Realism: Legislator versus Author of the Law... 39 2.3.3 Self-Legislation and Kant s Natural Dialectic... 42 2.4 Looking Ahead... 44 References... 45 3 Such Crooked Timber: Kant s Philosophical Anthropology... 47 3.1 Unsocial Sociability and Radical Evil in Human Nature... 49 3.1.1 Human Development and Unsocial Sociability... 50 3.1.2 The Predispositions to Good and Propensities to Evil in Human Nature... 53 3.2 Desire and Emotion in Kant s Account of Sensible Nature... 60 3.2.1 Sensible Nature in the Metaphysics of Morals... 60 3.2.2 Moral Worth and Pathological Feelings in the Groundwork... 62 3.2.3 Affects and Passions as Detriments to Moral Disposition... 65 3.3 The Natural Desire for Happiness and Its Place in Kant s Ethics... 68 3.3.1 The Complete Satisfaction of All of One s Inclinations... 68 3.3.2 Worthiness to Be Happy... 70 3.4 Looking Ahead... 71 References... 72 4 All You Need Is Love, Respect, & Autocracy: Kant s Virtue Ethics... 75 4.1 Kant s Doctrine of Virtue: Morally Obligatory Ends & Strength of Will... 77 4.1.1 Choice, Inner Constraint, & Morally Obligatory Ends... 78 4.1.2 Kant s Argument Against Virtue as Habit... 81 4.2 Misunderstanding Kantian Virtue: Self-Mastery and Sensible Nature... 83 4.3 Understanding Kantian Virtue: Controlling and Cultivating Sensible Nature... 85 4.4 Kant s Doctrine of Virtue: Self-Perfection and the Happiness of Others... 87 4.4.1 Self-Perfection and the Happiness of Others as Ends of Virtue... 89 4.4.2 Kant s Account of Respect for the Moral Law... 91 4.4.3 Kant s Account of the Emotion of Love... 94 4.4.4 Respect, Love, & Our Relations with Others... 98 4.5 Looking Ahead... 99 References... 100

Contents xiii Part II Gender, Sex, and Marriage in Kant s Ethics 5 Dependency & Domination: Gender & Kant s Practical Sexual Ethic... 105 5.1 Kant on the Character of the Sexes... 107 5.1.1 Kant on Feminine Nature... 109 5.1.2 Feminine Virtue, Masculine Virtue, and the Moral Agency of Women... 111 5.1.3 Kant on Gender Relations and the Precarious Status of Women... 114 5.2 Kant s Account of Bodily Discipline and the Sexual Impulse... 119 5.2.1 Self-Perfection and Bodily Discipline... 120 5.2.2 Kant on Sexual Appetite... 122 5.3 Kant on Lust and the Crimina Carnis... 124 5.3.1 Crimina Carnis Secundum Naturam... 127 5.3.2 Crimina Carnis Contra Naturam... 130 5.4 Looking Ahead... 132 References... 135 6 Love & Respect Redux: Kant on Sex, Marriage, and Friendship... 137 6.1 Kant on Marriage... 139 6.1.1 Marriage and the Marriage Right... 141 6.1.2 The Marriage Right, Reciprocity, and Legally Permissible Sex... 144 6.1.3 Kant s Incomplete Solution: The Legal Problem & the Moral Problem of Sexual Objectification... 147 6.2 Kant on Friendship... 152 6.2.1 Sex, The Enjoyment of Humanity, and Moral Friendship... 157 6.2.2 Sex, Reciprocity, and Moral Friendship... 159 6.3 Looking Ahead... 161 References... 162 7 Conclusion: Kant s Ethics & the Same-Sex Marriage Debate... 165 7.1 Kant s Evaluation of Same-Sex Sexual Relations... 166 7.1.1 Sexual Activity and Procreation... 166 7.1.2 Same-Sex Sexual Activity and the Forfeiture of One s Person... 169 7.1.3 Same-Sex Sex Acts and the Behavior of Non-human Animals... 170 7.2 The Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage... 171 7.2.1 The Definitional Objection and Kant s Conception of Marriage... 171 7.2.2 Marital Norms and the Alleged Harms of Same-Sex Marriage... 172 7.2.3 Same-Sex Marriage and the Alleged Harm Done to Children... 173 7.2.4 The Liberal Case Against Marriage... 173

xiv Contents 7.3 The Case in Defense of Same-Sex Marriage... 174 7.3.1 The Equal Treatment Argument... 175 7.3.2 The Benefits of Same-Sex Marriage and the Conservative Case... 176 7.3.3 Marriage the Changing Institution... 178 7.4 Conclusion... 179 References... 180 Index... 181

Abbreviations 6 A CL CPR CPrR G HL IUH Kant, Immanuel. 2007 (1798). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Robert B. Louden. In Anthropology, History, and Education. Ed. Robert B. Louden and Günter Zöller, 227 429. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1997 (1784 1785). Collins Lecture Notes, trans. Peter Heath. In Lectures on Ethics. Ed. J.B. Schneewind and Peter Heath, 37 222. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1997 (1781/1787). Critique of Pure Reason, trans. And ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1996 (1788). Critique of Practical Reason. In Practical Philosophy. Trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, 133 271. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1996 (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In Practical Philosophy. Trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, 37 108. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1997 (1762 1764). Herder s Lecture Notes, trans. Peter Heath. In Lectures on Ethics. Ed. J.B. Schneewind and Peter Heath, 1 36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 2007 (1784). Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, trans. Allen W. Wood. In Anthropology, History, and Education. Ed. Robert B. Louden and Günter Zöller, 107 120. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6 Given the frequency with which I refer to some of the works of Immanuel Kant, for the sake of ease and brevity, I decided to use abbreviations to refer to these works. The following is an alphabetical list of the abbreviations I use to refer to the works of Kant I cite, with the corresponding bibliographic information for each work. When I cite Kant s works in the text, I follow scholarly custom and refer to the volume and page number of the German text in the Academy Edition of the works of Immanuel Kant. xv

xvi ML MM R TP VL WIE Abbreviations Kant, Immanuel. 1997 (1785). Mrongovius Lecture Notes, trans. Peter Heath. In Lectures on Ethics. Ed. J.B. Schneewind and Peter Heath, 223 248. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1996 (1797). Metaphysics of Morals. In Practical Philosophy. Trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, 353 603. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1996 (1793). Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. George di Giovanni. In Religion and Rational Theology. Ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni, 39 215. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1996 (1793). On the Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice. In Practical Philosophy. Trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, 273 309. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1997 (1793). Vigilantius Lecture Notes, trans. Peter Heath. In Lectures on Ethics. Ed. J.B. Schneewind and Peter Heath, 249 452. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1996 (1784). An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? In Practical Philosophy. Trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, 11 22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.