A. Aristotle D. Descartes B. Plato E. Hume

A. Aristotle D. Kant B. Plato E. Mill C. Confucius 1....pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends. 2. Courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil. 3.... the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle.... 4. There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim you can at the same time will to become a universal law. 5. Without acquaintance with propriety, it s impossible to establish one s character. 6. If you're serious, you won't be treated with disrespect. If you're generous, you'll win all hearts. If you're sincere, you'll be trusted. If you're diligent, you'll accomplish much. If you're kind, you'll enjoy the service of others. 7. But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception. 8. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action. 9.... the human charioteer drives his in a pair; and one of them is noble and of noble breed, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble breed; and the driving of them of necessity gives a great deal of trouble to him. 10. If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible. 11. there is not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of what is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; but that of all three there is one science only.... 12. Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. 13. So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only. 14.... anger at times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things. 15. The value of the Way depends on man; the value of man doesn t depend on the Way. 16. When you know something, to maintain that you know it; when you don t know something, to admit that you don t know it this is knowledge. 17. Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. 18. Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. 19. Human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue. 20. The proper and inestimable worth of an absolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of action is free from all influence of contingent grounds. A. Aristotle D. Descartes B. Plato E. Hume

C. Laozi 21. Renounce sagacity, discard wisdom, people will profit a hundredfold. 22... how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? 23. But what then am I? A thing which thinks. 24. I shall proceed by setting aside all that in which the least doubt could be supposed to exist... 25. Accomplish great things while they are small. 26.... all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid... 27. All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning. 28. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something. 29. Repay injury with De. 30. Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason. 31. The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. 32. Therefore the sage manages affairs without acting, and teaches without speech. 33.... the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images. 34. I shall therefore suppose not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius of the greatest power and cunning, who has employed all his energies to deceive me. 35. The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one. 36. they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble. 37....how do I know that I am not deceived every time I add two and three, or count the sides of a square? 38.... there are two ruling powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible.... 39. All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal. 40. Now it is evident by the natural light that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect. 41. [P]rimary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. 42....there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep... 43. obviously that which 'is' primarily is the 'what'. 44. Although it is not necessary that I happen upon any thought of God, nevertheless, as often as I would like to think of a being first and supreme- and bring forth the idea of God as if from the warehouse of my mind- it is necessary that I attribute all perfections to it, even though I do not then enumerate them all, nor attend to them one by one. This necessity plainly suffices so that afterwards, when I notice that existence is a perfection, I rightly conclude that a first and supreme being exists. A. Aristotle D. Kant B. Zhuangzi E. Nietzsche

C. Locke 45.... the true sage rejects all distinctions of this and that. 46. The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts is to show that these concepts are a priori conditions of the possibility of all experience. 47. Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. 48....both separability and thisness are thought to belong chiefly to substance. 49. The objective emanates from the subjective; the subjective is consequent upon the objective. 50. Men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions. 51. There are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance... 52. These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. 53....it is the work of one science to examine being qua being... 54. Before objects, are given to me, that is, a priori, I must presuppose in myself laws of the understanding which are expressed in concepts a priori. To these concepts, then, all the objects of experience must necessarily conform. 55. For, where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them. 56. Consciousness alone unites actions into the same person. 57. Therefore it is that, viewed from the standpoint of Dao, a beam and a pillar are identical. 58. division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any other body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body. 59....men admire [beautiful women], at the sight of whom fishes plunge deep down in the water, birds soar high in the air, and deer hurry away. Yet who shall say what is the correct standard of beauty? 60. Everything that philosophers say about man is no longer fundamental, but tells us something about the men of a very limited period of time. 61. These two, I say, viz. external material things, as the objects of SENSATION, and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of REFLECTION, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. 62. What do you believe? This: that the weights of all things must be determined afresh. 63. Separation is the same as construction: construction is the same as destruction. Nothing is subject to either construction or destruction, for these conditions are brought together into One. 64. This idea of permanence is not itself derived from external experience but is an a priori necessary condition of all determination of time. 65. It being one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the same person...

66. Had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies, and the real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different ideas in us. 67. The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. 68. For, if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. 69. What if this chemistry would reveal that in these areas too the most glorious colors arise from low, despised materials? 70. For the manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even although I am not conscious of them as such), they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together in a common self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. 71. When Socrates implies that you must be able to define courage and defend your definition to know what courage is, he is assuming a.realism b.skepticism c.relativism d.internalism e.externalism 72. The view that knowledge is true belief arising from a reliable process is a. externalist b. foundationalist c. internalist d. rationalist e. skeptical 73. The empiricists' method: analyze the content of ideas by finding their a. origins in innate ideas b. origins in experience c. practical effects d. relations to other ideas e. definitions 74. That different people see things differently, and there's no way to tell who's right, is a classic argument for a. atheism b. skepticism c. relativism d. internalism e. empiricism 75. Our idea of necessity, Hume says, has its source in

a. reason b. our experience of causal connections c. the principle of induction d. our feeling of expectation e. innate ideas and principles 76. According to Hume, questions about identity are really about a. objects b. essences c. language d. properties e. nothing at all 77. For Socrates, every virtue amounts to a. courage b. justice c. a mean between extremes d. rational activity e. knowing what to do and what not to do 78. The function of a human being, according to Aristotle, is a. to glorify God b. to be self-conscious c. to reflect on the meaning of life d. to act according to rational plans e. to have virtue 79. We become good, Aristotle says, by a. knowing what to do b. doing good things c. observing tradition d. having a good will e. studying philosophy 80. There is only one categorical imperative, says Kant, because a. moral imperatives are universal b. there is only one unqualified good c. virtues are ultimately one d. all virtue rests on knowledge e. God sets the moral law 81. Aristotle, in saying that "to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true," articulates a. the liar paradox b. relativism c. the correspondence theory of truth

d. the coherence theory of truth e. the pragmatist theory of truth 82. You can think the same thought today that I thought yesterday, Plato says, by a. abstracting from the same perceptions b. abstracting from similar perceptions c. attending to the same forms d. picturing the same situation e. extrasensory perception 83. The chief problem facing Plato's theory of forms is a. how we can know about them b. how things can participate in them c. how they can relate to each other d. how God could have created them e. how we can perceive objects 84. The principle of sufficient reason states that a. reason should prevail over desire b. reason is all you need in life c. every event has a cause d. everything has a reason for being the way it is e. people act rationally 85. Kant effects his Copernican revolution to explain a. analytic knowledge b. synthetic knowledge c. a posteriori knowledge d. synthetic a priori knowledge e. synthetic a posteriori knowledge 86. Kant is a skeptic about the possibility of knowledge of a. a priori truths b. a posteriori truths c. synthetic a priori truths d. truths beyond the bounds of the categories e. truths beyond the bounds of experience 87. Primary qualities a. are inseparable from bodies b. are possessed by atoms c. resemble the ideas they produce in us d. determine secondary qualities e. all of the above 88. Locke identifies the real essence of an object with its

a. primary qualities b. secondary qualities c. nominal essence d. internal constitution e. concept 89. Berkeley attacks the distinction between primary and secondary qualities on the ground that a. we perceive nothing but our own ideas b. the idea of resemblance of an idea to a thing makes no sense c. perceptions of primary qualities vary d. to be is to be perceived e. all of the above 90. According to Kant, the categories do NOT apply to a. appearances b. objects of experience c. phenomena d. noumena e. space and time 91. Borges argues for realism on the ground that a. it's the simplest explanation of our experiences b. we cannot perceive abstract objects c. there are no synthetic a priori truths d. we perceive things-in-themselves directly e. all knowledge comes from experience 92. Realists often hold that we can know things-in-themselves or real essences through a. experience b. reflection c. sensation d. natural science e. mathematics 93. All the following are included in the classical conception of God, EXCEPT a. omniscience b. omnipotence c. omnipresence d. compassion e. contingency 94. The view that God includes the world but also transcends it is a. theism b. deism c. panentheism d. pantheism

e. the via negativa 95. The argument that God exists because nothing else could have caused our idea of God is called a. the argument from thought b. the ontological argument c. the cosmological argument d. the teleological argument e. the practical argument 96. Anselm defines God as a. the perfect being b. the greater than which cannot be thought c. something than which nothing more sublime exists d. the necessary being e. the being that exists without a cause 97. Color qualities of objects are a. simple b. complex c. primary d. secondary e. essential 98. Having atomic number 79, on Locke's theory, is gold s a. primary quality b. secondary quality c. nominal essence d. real essence e. all of the above 99. Who would say that universals are real and mind-independent? a. realists b. idealists c. skeptics d. internalists e. externalists 100. Anselm defines God as a. the perfect being b. the greater than which cannot be thought c. something than which nothing more sublime exists d. the necessary being e. the being that exists without a cause 101. Plato s divided line separates the realm of forms from

a. innate ideas b. the kingdom of ends c. the realm of ideas d. the visible world e. things in themselves 102. All other categories, for Aristotle, depend on a. relations b. quantities c. qualities d. substance e. something, I know not what 103. If I can lack a property while still being me, I have that property a. accidentally b. essentially c. primarily d. secondarily e. in name only 104. Complex ideas, for Locke, a. are composed of other ideas b. always reflect external objects accurately c. are always adequate d. are always inadequate e. are sometimes innate 105. The Buddhist conception of objects is closest to that of a. Plato b. Aristotle c. Descartes d. Locke e. Hume 106. Kant thinks we can have a priori knowledge of a. appearances b. God c. real essences d. things in themselves e. everything 107. Kant rejects most arguments for God s existence, but accepts a. the ontological argument b. the cosmological argument c. the argument from design d. the moral argument

e. the argument from thought 108. Hegel and Nietzsche agree that truth about the world a. is innate b. comes solely from experience c. is relative to a historical era d. is unattainable e. is gained only in natural science 109. Something that has multiple instances is a a. concept b. relation c. substance d. particular e. universal 110. A conceptualist holds that universals a. exist and are innate b. exist and are mind-independent c. exist and are mind-dependent d. exist and are linguistic e. do not exist