UNIVERSITY OF NIŠ The scientific journal FACTA UNIVERSITATIS Series: Philosophy and Sociology Vol.2, N o 6, 1999 pp. 101-111 Editor of series: Gligorije Zaječaranović Address: Univerzitetski trg 2, 18000 Niš, YU, Tel: (018) 547-095, Fax: (018)-547-950 THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN THE BALKANS UDC:316.6 Georgi Fotev Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria Abstract. Religions are of a key importance for the meaningful construction and constituiting of the societies which they are embedded in. In the traditional societies this is obvious in a most direct way. In the secularized (modern) societies this function of the religions is most often too mediate and in many cases it is even expressed through derivatives. For instance, a large portion of people in the national societies and ethnic groups in the Balkans nowadays are not religious in the meaning of believers but as a rule they determine themselves as Orthodox Christians, Moslems, Catholic, etc. on the basis of their belonging to the respective traditional religion. For historical and geopolitical reasons there are neighbourhoods of various religious communities in the Balkans. From a typological point of view the study of the neighbourhood and its classification embrace a considerable variety of this type of relations. The religious belonging is mirrored in all the aspects of the polydimensional phenomenon of neighbourhood. The negative experience piled up throughout the historical developments in the Balkans brings forward the acute problem of "Kolakovski" which can be projected in respect to each and everyone of the traditional religions as well as to the newly born religious movements. The report focuses on the problems which arise along the path from the attitude towards "the other" in the meaning of "the hostile", "the antagonistic other" to the constituting of good neighbourliness. World secularization, which is connected, with the emergence and the growth, as well as the expansion of modernity is a process of weakening the inner integrity characteristic of the big and most significant religious communities, a process of weakening and, eventually, of liquidating theocracy and theonomy, pushed out by the autonomy principle [1], by the principle of the step-by-step "privatization of religion" [2] Received November 25, 1997
102 G. FOTEV and, as a whole, by the principle of pushing out and weakening the fundamental significance of the religious communities in the social world and life as a whole. From the sporadic trends in the epoch which saw a decline in conventional societies, secularization in the conditions of modernity has become a historic and will become, in the long run, a global process. Nevertheless, the religious communities of the world and significant religious communities are far from being a problem of the remote historic past alone. No matter how the present state of religions and religious communities are assessed, having in mind their paradigmatic and initial significance for the big cultures and for civilization, modernity has been challenged once again by the staple role of the actual religious communities, though they are being manifested in entirely new ways. As disputable as Huntington's sensational large-scale concept may be, it is still, in many respects, full of suggestion since it urges the consideration of the contradictory globalization processes through the religious map of the world [3]. Huntington's large-scale theory might be unacceptably one-dimensional but, undoubtedly, it reminds one of the fact that the subject and the problems, referring to the open and latent role religious communities play in the periodical crises of modernity, is unjustifiably underestimated and ignored. It is impossible for us to understand the dramatic past and present, nor dare we foresee the near future of religiosity in the Balkans, since we have not clarified the subjects and the problems the key religious communities and their neighbourhood are to solve. We have an even stronger motivation to look upon the Balkans through the prism of the map of religious communities and their neighbourhood, taking into consideration not merely the latent but also the transparent enough and even too striking functions of the religious communities in the complicated integrative and disintegrative processes which, following the definition, should be completely free of religious meaning and contents. Meanwhile, the subject and the problems being too wide-spreading the schematizations in a brief presentation like this are inevitably too engaging and teeming with reefs. Keeping this well in mind, our objective and task is to suggest a matter for speculation rather than to have any pretension of building a theory of multi-dimensional explanatory power. What we need, however, are methodological descriptions and theories that might be a result from systematical research, different viewpoints, new scientific research, which bears the mark of creativity. * * * There are three bigger religious communities of special significance within the borders of the Balkan region. Firstly, the Christian Orthodox community, the largest in number, which is of key significance for the history of the Balkan nations. Greece and part of Cyprus are inhabited by the traditionally Christian Orthodox population. The Moslem population in Greece is insignificant in number and its historic roots date back to the time of the Ottoman Empire. The split of the Cypriate state is based on religious and ethnic differences. Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia (the rest of former Yugoslavia) are also traditionally Christian Orthodox. In Bulgaria Moslems account for nearly 10% of the country`s population. Macedonia also belongs to the world of Christian Orthodoxy but there the percentage of Moslems is significant. There is traditionally a Christian Orthodox population in Albania, as well as within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Neighbourhood of the Religious Communities in the Balkans 103 Turkey is a traditionally Moslem state and the number of Christians is insignificant. Albania`s population is Moslem in the main. A significant portion of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina is Moslem. Slovenia and Croatia are Catholic countries by tradition. Part of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also Catholic. There are Catholics and Catholic communities in all the Balkan countries, though small in number, in some cases their proportion being too insignificant, indeed. As a rule, the religious map of the Balkans coincides with that of the ethnoses. There is, of course, an exception to this rule. For example, the Bulgarians are Christian Orthodox and the ethnical Turks are Moslems, but there are, though few in number, Bulgarian Catholics and Protestants as well as Bulgarian Moslems, the way there are Gypsies, whose religion is Christian Orthodox, and Gypsy Moslems. As a rule, the Moslems in the Balkans are ethnical Turks, with the exception of the Bulgarian Moslems, the Moslems in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not necessarily ethnical Turks. There are Moslems in Macedonia and Kosovo who are ethnical Albanians. In Greece, as well as in some other Balkan countries, one can meet Moslems who are not ethnical Turks and this is another exception to the rule in the Balkans. When we speak about the stability of the religious community map of the Balkans (for the 20th century at least), we take into consideration the map of the national communities and the national states as well. By the way, we should bear in mind that the borders of the national communities in the Balkans do not necessarily coincide with those of the national states, since from the period of formation of national states in the region in the 19th century and even much later, up to this day, the borders of the national states have been repeatedly moved and this negative historic experience has been of key significance for the formation of the unique term of "Balkanization", which is charged with a negative meaning [4]. What has been said so far entails the necessity of making the category of a religious community more concrete in order to differentiate the varieties of neighbourhood and divide them into types. * * * From a historic point of view, it was in the region of the Balkans that Christian Orthodoxy and the Christian Orthodox community were formed within the borders of Byzantium as a specially constituted religious community, suggesting an inseparable unity of Christian Orthodoxy and Orthopraxis. From the viewpoint of Christian Orthodoxy it is not Christian Orthodoxy that turned into something peculiar, but rather the authentic and genuine universality, Catholicity, while Roman Catholicism after the 1O54 Schism, due to Roman Catholicism itself, is considered a diversion from Christian Orthodoxy and Orthopraxis. Catholicism, in its turn, claims just the opposite. One way or another, Constantinopole and Rome turned into two symbols of two mutually exclusive universal, Catholic Christian prospects and of two mutually hostile Christian universal communities. The initial and teleologic universality, Catholicisity of Christian Orthodoxy means that all the Orthodox Christians in the world belong to one united religious (which also means Church) community. In this sense all Orthodox Christians who inhabit the Balkans, who have lived and who will be born in this region, are united in a community
104 G. FOTEV irrespective of ethnos, sex, age, social status, nationality, etc. To what a degree this unity and infinite integrity is affected by the conditions of modern times in the Balkans, by the conditions of world secularization, etc., is a matter for special consideration. The Christian Orthodox Church, being an universal Church and the Christian Orthodox Community, being an universal Community, are in their totality neighbouring "the others", as, for instance, the Moslem community (constituting itself in its own way as universal in principle and in purpose), or the Catholic community, the Protestant community and so on and so forth. In the modern world there exists a neighbourhood of religious communities with atheistic and pseudo-religious communities. The confined community, which forms a religion and church in the very sense of its denomination, is in practical terms localized. By the way, it is the localization and the implantation of the religious communities that make it possible for the drawing of a map of religious communities in a global and regional aspect alike. The more integrated a universal religious community is, i.e. the more alive the connection between all who profess a religion is, the less the significance of the real physical, geographic distance for them is. For example, the Moslems living in Bosnia and Herzegovina feel much closer to the rest of the Moslems in the world, than to their neighbours - Orthodox Christians, Catholics or Protestants. This, however, might hold true for people included in some other universal religious communities. As far as the Catholics in the Balkans consider themselves part of the world Catholic community, they are closer to the Catholics who live much further from them, than to the neighbouring Orthodox Christians, Protestants or Moslems. The same holds true for the Orthodox Christians. This is the reason why it is of great significance and only too logical to take into account the neighbourhood of the universal religious communities in the first place, because in one way or another it reflects on the neighbourhood of the religious communities of more confined localities, getting down to the microlevel neighbourhood - e.g. to the neighbourhood between families of different religious affiliations or individuals of different religions. * * * Much to our regret the category of "neighbourhood", which is a purely sociological one, has not been elaborated as it should be - modern sociology has in fact shelved it, quite unjustifiably at that [5]. It is not used in the theories and the empirical research of sociology. The term "neighbourhood" has entered sociological science, coming from the everyday language and it is this comparatively frequent and widely spread usage of the word in our everyday life that is well known. This generalized fact is portentous in itself. Incidentally, the everyday natural adjustments and the typizations we use in our everyday life in connection with neighbourhood are included in the subject of sociological research of the neighbourhood of religious communities. In any case, neighbourhood is localized. Neighbours inhabit houses or flats, bordering each other or living in close proximity, which determines the face-to-face relations among them. Topological proximity, however, refers to a neighbourhood, entirely different in nature and meaning. It could be characterized by mutual good will, mutual assistance and solidarity on one occasion or another. It is quite possible, however, for the neighbourhood to be characterized by mutual mistrust and hostility in which each
The Neighbourhood of the Religious Communities in the Balkans 105 of the neighbours considers the other "the hostile other" or manifests complete alienation in the sense of profound indifference, as if "the other" does not exist at all. Working place neighbourhood might be analogical - the actors operate in close proximity, each of them fulfilling his own duties, which are sufficiently different so that we cannot speak about a collective actor (subject). When the neighbours belong to different religious communities, there arises the question: to what degree and in what way is neighbourhood as an everyday experience determined by the difference in religion and belonging to different religious communities? To the degree at which the world we live in is secularized, the everyday character of neighbourly relations has mediators that stand beyond the religious beliefs. It is on this basis that good neighbourliness is established - relations, not disturbed by any of the heterogeneous religious factors [6]. There is, however, a certain difference when the word "neighbourhood" refers to bigger compact religious communities, such as whole settlements and regions within the national state. In these cases the neighbour (neighbours) is looked upon as "the generalized other". The status of the other religious community in the society as a whole comes to the fore. Since the national society and the national state are constituted and function on principles, different from those of the compound religious communities, there arise a whole series of problems which have no solution at all or lack a simple solution. In modern constitutional and democratic states the Religion and the Church, being a religion`s institutionalization, are separated from the state and freedom of religion is guaranteed. But this is far from solving the problems of religious life and religious communities. For cultural, historic and for some other reasons as well, a religion has a constitutionally recognized status of an official religion which means, among other things, that it is of special significance for the integrity of the national society and the consistency of the national state. This does not automatically mean a negative attitude towards the other religions in the smaller communities. Nevertheless, from the immanent religious viewpoints the differences in status are a source of latent and sometimes even open tension, which might lead to conflicts. All this has its influence on the neighbourhood between religious communities. What is of significance here is what adjustments are formed by a religion in respect to another religion, of religious communities. The informal but, of course, legitimate religious community in a state might feel itself much closer to the transnational religious community, whose natural part it is: the comparatively smaller Catholic community finding itself in a Christian Orthodox environment might consider itself part of the universal Roman-Catholic community; the Moslem communities in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc. might consider themselves closer to the universal Islamic community or to the Moslem community in Turkey, the latter being an Islamic state by tradition, since Islam there has been recognized as an official and traditional religion, although Turkey is a secular state. The neighbourhood of the religious communities within the territory of a national state is constituted through the interpretation strategy of each of the communities in respect to the others. Most often an interpretation strategy is perceived by the others as one full of prejudice. There arises the question of the eventual consequences that would reduce the prejudice to its minimum. Is this possible in principle, when religion is at stake? We shall return to this question later in this paper. The problem of the neighbourhood of religious communities considered through the prism of the neighbourhood of the national societies and states has a specifics of its own
106 G. FOTEV which comes to the fore as compared to the neighbourhood of such communities within an individual national or multinational state. Local determination is, of course, of significance here again. It is reflected in the borders of the respective national and state territory. Even this circumstance alone is telling enough. The state and the general adjustment of the national society is not indifferent to what the attitude of the religious communities to the territorial borders, the neighbourhood of the national states and the strengthening and defendinse of national sovereignty is. A conflict of interests, a conflict of interpretations and a conflict of adjustment and strife are not excluded under certain circumstances. The paradigmatic attitude of religion to the secular government, to the state, is a key significance for the involvement or disinvolvement of the religious community in the neighbourhood of the national communities and national states. When there is a religious calling for backing up the state and of seeing the state's self-recognition in its might, the religious community in a national state might even go further in its particularism, forgetting about its inner closeness to the universality of the community it feels close to. Since existing in the Christian Orthodoxy are the autocephalous churches which, as a rule, cover the Christian Orthodox community within a national society and a national state, the consequent behaviour of the religious community might go too far in its synchron with the problems of neighbourhood in the aspect of the national states and the religious community might be involved in the process of solving the problems of this neighbourhood. The nets of neighbouring religious communities on a microlevel and within the framework of the national societies and states, on the level of the states of a given region, the nets of this region and its surroundings and of the neighbourhood of universal religious communities and the intertwining of these nets with those of a neighbourhood of a non-religious nature, raise questions regarding the principles which constitute various religious communities. In our case it is necessary to turn our attention to the immanent teleology and principles which constitute both the Orthodox, Muslim, Catholic communities and the attitude, respectively, to the "others", set as a premise by each one of them. It is not the common features between the religious communities but the distinctions between them that determine their relationship. What is more, the more evident the common characteristics are and even externally the more insignificant the distinctions are, the sharper the mutual irreconcilability introduced by these distinctions is. Such dependency seems paradoxical and absurd from the point of view of common sense and the "logic" of the profane social world. The case of Orthodoxy and Catholicism is too indicative of this. They are one and the same religion. The doctrinal reasons for the schism and the distinctions developing later through the centuries still remain essentially nuances, which, from an external point of view, in most cases do not seem to be fatal but are in fact considered as such from an Orthodox and Catholic point of view. For this reason the alienation and the hostility of the two large Christian communities lead into oblivion of their common identity. Here it is not possible to thoroughly juxtapose and compare Christianity to Islam. Let us show, however, some important points. Both religions are monotheistic. They are unthinkable without the Old Testament from which they have drawn religious content and meaning, borrowed one and the same religious formulas and a great number of one and
The Neighbourhood of the Religious Communities in the Balkans 107 the same questions to which one and the same answers are essentially given. However, the distinctions, which from an external point of view are not so essential and insurmountable, God's incarnation excluded, have unachievable dividing strength. The common and the uniform remain invisible for both perspectives. The rational arguments presented by philosophy, science and common sense are originally enervated. This is because religious faith, religious life and religious unity among people can hardly be reduced to cognitive questions. Man does not become a Christian or a Muslim, an Orthodox or a Catholic as a result of merely rational, rational-cognitive inferences. Religious belief is superrational and the religious world irrespective of its likeness to the other man's world, is incommensurable with them. The incommensurability stems, above all things, from the nature of the sacred. The Qur'an (Koran) as the sacred book of Islam and the Bible as the sacred book of Christianity are considered as such just because nothing can be given to and nothing can be taken away from them. The sacred is the absolute perfection which is incompatible with any absence or relativism, whatsoever. That is why the Christians have one holy book and this is, of course, the Bible, and for the Muslims there is no other book equal in holiness to the Qur'an. The name of God is also sacred. It is inadmissible for the Muslims to recognize, except for Allah, also the Trinity of Christian God as God-Father, God-Son and the Holy Spirit. For Christianity it is also inadmissible to call God Allah. The sacred in a religious world cannot be imitated or carried away into another religious world. The sacred forms the inner unity of the corresponding religious world and due to this reason each change - giving or taking, which comes from the outside has far reaching effects of distortion and abandoning a given religion. The inner unity of religious communities impedes the dialogue between them and makes it even impossible. Dialogue is impossible due to the inability to translate the religions' own languages. The mutual tolerance between the religious communities seems impossible in principle. This is illustrated by numerous examples. Nevertheless, the ideal-typological questions should not become mixed up with the real life and the living neighbourhood of the religious communities. Besides the schemata, shown above, which lead in the ideal-typological sense to final conclusions, other immanent beginnings of the religions, which are of interest to us, should be taken into consideration. Participation in the religious community, on the one hand, and Excommunication, on the other, are such key principles. Both Christianity and Islam, emerging as quite small communities, as was partially mentioned above, spread over the whole world, no barriers along this road were considered insuperable. In other words everyone can become a member of the corresponding religious community, the only condition being that he meets purely religious requirements. Apostle Paul puts it: "For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit." [7] Social status, ethnic identity, sex, age, etc. are of no importance to Islam as well. Both religions exclude both the forced or open adherence to faith and participation in the religious community. The openness in this sense and the exclusion of violation in co-opting new members predetermine the attitude of the religious community to everybody who is outside it. Both for the Christian and the Muslim communities the "others", including the neighbours, are potentially "our own". Such a possibility determines also the tactics of neighbouring with a view to the final aim of uniting.
108 G. FOTEV At first sight the evident reciprocality of the strategies and tactics of Christian and Muslim communities should give rise to good neighbourly relations. However, namely the reciprocality of the basic attitudes is turned into a source of tension. If both sides exclude the compulsion, it is with a view to the final aim, religious vocation being of each side to be able to finally "engulf" the other one. Besides, each religious community shows concern for its inner integrity. That is why everything, which is an obstacle to integrity and threatens it, mobilizes the community against potential or actually existing hostile forces. In Islam the issue concerning its propaganda, expansion, protection and defence against outside threat has been expressed by the specific term of "holy warfare" (jihad). It goes along with the four basic obligations of the "true faith". Jihad is actually one of the five "pillars" of this faith and of the Muslim community. From an empirical and historical point of view, however, the understanding of jihad is rather contradictory and in some cases the understanding and the practicing of the requirement is regarded unacceptable by the majority of Muslims, as well as by the refined interpreters of the Koran and the Islamic laws. In extreme cases it is considered that in the name of the "true faith" all means are allowed. What is forgotten is that, according to the Prophet, the great jihad refers to the true believer who must struggle against everything in himself, which prevents him from submitting to God's word while the small jihad is directed against the outside enemies [8]. It turns out, however, that to direct the energy for struggle against the outside opponent is often easier and more profitable. It becomes still more dangerous when religious faith is used as an instrument for achieving aims which are alien to religion. It is necessary to take into consideration that Islam has a differentiated attitude to Judaism and Christianity, on the one hand, and, as the ancient texts put it, to polytheism or the "truly Godless", on the other [9]. The Koran admits that both Jesus Christ and the prophets from the Old Testament have partially uttered God's truth but not the whole truth and God's final word. In this sense the Jewish people and the Christians have not succeeded in reaching the "true faith" and they must be treated in a more different way than the "truly Godless" on whom one should wage total war. The neighbourhood of religious communities was originally loaded with controversy. The holy ingredients, each one of the universal religious communities, which constitute them respectively, are mutually exclusive and mediators between them are unthinkable, and this makes them non-dialoguical and deeply hostile. At the same time the imposition of religious faith by force has been excluded. The principles of universality, however, determine the search for ways, ones relevant to religion for ceaseless expansion, which, as a matter of fact, continuously feeds mutual suspicion. Things become even more complicated with the interference of visible or invisible profane elements, nonreligious aspirations and objectives, as well as with using non-religious means for achieving religious ends, etc. * * * The expansion of the Ottoman empire and the conquest of the Balkans during the 14th-15th century was motivated and legitimized for the Ottoman conquerors by the universal calling of Islam. The direct encroachment on the Christian communities and the
The Neighbourhood of the Religious Communities in the Balkans 109 local Christian churches, respectively, which spread through the whole region, could be explained by the popular understanding of the message of Islam, by undiscerning understanding of that message and the distortions which would not be avoided. During the period of the Ottoman empire Islamization of the native population on the Balkans had been carried out [10]. It is true that although discriminated against the Christian churches were nevertheless tolerated and actually remained the most stable fortress against the total assimilation of the Christian population in the course of 5 centuries. It is no coicidence that the corresponding autocephalous churches and the religious self-consciousness of the emerging national societies are of key importance for the genesis of national societies, the struggle for national liberation, the liberation from Ottoman rule, as well as for the emergence of national states in the Balkans. There are many essential non-religious reasons for the collapse of the Ottoman empire and for the liberation of the Balkans but among a constellation of factors the stability of the Christian and Orthodox communities in the first place in the Balkans, the Orthodox legitimized aspirations and the Messianic role of the Russian empire as well as the role of Christian Europe are undoubtedly of key importance. It is necessary to point out here again that the great change that took place during the 19th century in the Balkans could hardly be explained simply as a response of Christianity, mostly of Orthodoxy against Islam, but the role of this century-old struggle between the two world religions cannot be completely ignored. The formation of national states in the Balkans was turned into a basis for the acceleration of secularization and further stimulation of it. In the newly formed and developed national states Christianity and the churches, being an extremely important prerequisite, are separated from the corresponding states. In the 20th century Turkey has also been turned into a secular state and the status of Islam is analogous to the autocephalous Orthodox churches in the remaining Balkan national states. The secular authorities, however, do not miss the existing opportunities of using the churches and the traditional religious self-consciousness of the society for their own purposes, mainly that of feeding rational or aggressive nationalism, in some cases chauvinism, as well as of mobilizing the population in cases of aggression or defence. Since the end of the 19th century and during the 20th century mechanisms of using the affiliations of religious community for the straining of relations between neighbouring countries have begun to play a special role. These mechanisms become possible and functionable due to far going merging and even of the identification of religious and ethnical, religious and national communities. Having taken the road of modernization the Balkan countries remain captives of historical memory, of national, ethnical and religious memory. The tendencies for redefining, reinterpreting the national, ethnical and cultural identity, as well for traditional religious affiliation, respectively, with a view both to the new conditions, which modernity has brought into existence and the new perspectives of European mankind, are making their way with difficulty. The constitution of identity is not possible without memory. But in order for human and sociocultural creativity to have a place we need both to base it on and release it from the memory. Thus identity, national, ethnic and cultural identity included, exceeds the bounds of the static and the closeness and become more dynamic. Such a prospect from a creative point of view makes the neighbourhood dynamic. The neighbourhood is filled with dialogue, as a means for finding out what connects and unites people and communities. The distinctions and the
110 G. FOTEV varieties are placed in a new living environment in which they are not a factor inciting alienation, prejudices, tensions and conflicts. Is it possible in such a case to redefine the neighbourhood of the religious communities? In other words, is there a possibility for one religious community to be tolerant of another and of other religious communities? Taking into consideration the mixed religious map of the Balkans there is no doubt that this question is of particular importance. First of all, it is necessary to point out once again that the religious communities in the Balkans, as a result of the processes of secularization that have taken and are taking place, are to a considerable degree quasi-religious since the firm believers in all cases are comparatively less in number while the majority of the population of the countries consider themselves Christians or Muslims mainly due to tradition, they are not actual religious believers, they will not practice their religion nor perform one or other religious rituals in a cultural and historical sense. Nevertheless, no matter how motivated the religious-community affiliation could be, it remains a fact which occurs frequently and is entirely rejected by a comparatively small number of outspoken and aggressive atheists. Each one of the influential religions and the major religious communities could, without being disloyal to their basic constitutive principles, give a new meaning to love of people, to the moral principles and objectives, to the rejection of violation and other forms of compulsion, as well as to peace as a supreme value in all religions. Each one of the religious communities could learn a lesson from the negative historical experience, which most often was connected with distortions of the subtle meaning of religious faith. The religions take on a heavy responsibility if they allow themselves to be used as instruments or if they do not act as an obstacle to the emergence of some type of religious fundamentalism which could be harmful also to those following their own vocation. Goodneighbourly relations in the religious communities in the Balkans might be of key importance to the integrative processes which are so necessary to this European region, which have known so much suffering. REFERENCES 1. Fotev, G. Modernity and Religious Identity. In: Sociological Problems, No 1, Winter 1995, p. 106 et al. (in Bulgarian). 2. Burger P. Shrinking Transcendence, Expanding Religion? In: Sociological Analysis, vol. 51, No 2, 1967, pp. 127-138. 3. Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilisations? In: Foreign Affairs, vol.72, Summer 1993; Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilisations and the Remarking of World Order. Simon and Schuster, 1996. 4. Fotev G. Europa Magna: Une alternative a la balkanisation. In: Les Balkans et l'europe face aux nouveaux defis. IRESCO. Paris, 1995, pp. 9-17. 5. Ferdinand Tonnies introduces the category of "neighbourhood" in his famous book "Community and Society" In: F. Tonnies. Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Leipzig (1887), 1935. 6. Tomova, I. Peculiarities in the Religiosity of Moslems and Christians in Bulgaria. In: Relations of compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Moslems in Bulgaria. MCPMKV, Sofia, 1994, p. 340 (in Bulgarian). 7. The Bible. The First Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians. 12:13. 8. Grigoriev, Vl. The Religions over the World. Hemus Publishing House, Sofia, 1995, p. 210 (in Bulgarian). 9. Ibid., p. 209. 10. Zheliazkova, A. Spreading of Islam in the West Balkan Lands over Ottoman Rule during the 15th-18th Century. Sofia, 1990 (in Bulgarian).
The Neighbourhood of the Religious Communities in the Balkans 111 SUSEDSTVO VERSKIH ZAJEDNICA NA BALKANU Georgi Fotev Vere su od ključnog značaja za značenjsku izgradnju i konstituisanje društava u koja su ugrađene. U tradicionalnim društvima ovo je očigledno na najneposredniji način. U sekularizovanim (modernim) društvima ova funkcija vera je često previše posredna i u mnogim slučajevima ona se čak izražava preko svojih derivacija. Na primer, veliki broj ljudi u nacionalnim društvima i etničkim grupama na Balkanu danas nije religiozan u verničkom smislu, već, po pravilu, oni se deklarišu kao pravoslavci, muslimani, katolici na osnovu pripadanja tradicionalnoj veri. Iz istorijskih i geopolitičkih razloga postoje susedstva raznih verskih zajednica na Balkanu. Sa tipološkog stanovišta izučavanje susedstva i njegova klasifikacija obuhvataju širok spektar ovog tipa odnosa. Religijska pripadnost se ogleda u svim vidovima polidimenzionalnog fenomena susedstva. Negativno iskustvo, nagomilano tokom istorijskih zbivanja na Balkanu, stavlja u pravi plan akutni problem "Kolakovski" koji se može projektovati u odnosu na sve i svakog u tradicionalnim, kao i u novostvorenim verskim pokretima. Ovaj rad je usredsređen na probleme koji se javljaju na putu od odnosa prema "drugom" u značenju "neprijateljskog", "antagonističkog drugog" do stvaranja dobrog susedništva.