School of Arts & Humanities Department of Philosophy 7AAN4021 General Philosophy Academic year 2014/15 Semesters 1 & 2 Basic information Credits: 40 Module Lecturers: - Semester 1: David Galloway (Epistemology); Maria Alvarez (Ethics), Alex Clark (Logic) - Semester 1: Andrea Sangiovanni (Politics); Mark Textor (Metaphysics); Meyer-Viol (Logic) Module Convenor: Dr Maria Alvarez (maria.alvarez@kcl.ac.uk); Office: 703; tel. ex. 2383 Seminar time and venue: Fridays, 15:00 17:30; Room 605, Philosophy Building. Office Hours for all Lectures: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/artshums/depts/philosophy/study/handbook/academic-year/hours.aspx Module description This module is intended for students who are converting into Philosophy at Master s level, and is designed to offer them a broad overview of the general state of play in four key branches of the discipline: Epistemology, Ethics, Political Philosophy and Metaphysics,. In essence, it will teach people who might opt to specialise in one area of Philosophy the kinds of basic things that they are likely to be expected to know about the others. There will be a five-week block devoted to each of these four areas. In addition, students will receive training in elementary Symbolic Logic through separate classes, following the main lectures across all twenty weeks. Students completing this module should gain: Awareness and understanding of the central concepts, theories and arguments of some of the main areas of Philosophy: Epistemology, Ethics, Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Logic. The ability to apply valid critical and argumentative techniques in an original way, to these and other areas of the subject A firm grasp on the formalism and techniques of elementary Symbolic Logic which can, again, then be reapplied in the context of debates belonging to more the discursive areas of Philosophy Familiarity with selected key texts, with the ability to summarise and analytically criticise the arguments and positions of others The ability to develop original philosophical views of their own, which they are prepared to defend or amend in the light of criticism from others 1
Teaching Arrangements - 1-weekly ninety-minute seminar followed by a one-hour logic class - The order of topics for the ninety-minute seminar is: Semester 1: Epistemology Ethics Semester 2: Political Philosophy Metaphysics Assessment methods and deadlines Formative assessment: 2 essays X 2,000 words each, normally one in each semester, plus regular Logic exercises. Essays are due on Friday 12 th December (1 st essay) and Friday 27 th March (2 nd essay) Formative essays must be completed by the deadline in order to receive feedback. This feedback is crucial for your summative assessment. Summative assessment: One three-hour end of year the examination in the May-June examination period. TOPICS Epistemology We study five topics central to contemporary epistemology. The main focus is on the nature of epistemic justification. Lecture 1 Value of knowledge Jonathan Kvanvig, Why should enquiring minds want to know?, The Monist 81 (1998) 436-451 Ernest Sosa, The place of truth in epistemology, In Linda Zagzebski & Michael DePaul (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. 155-180 (2003) Both are reprinted in Sosa and Kim Lecture 2 Gettier, justification and reliability Edmund Gettier, Is justified true belief knowledge?, Analysis 23 (1963) Linda Zagzebski, The inescapability of Gettier problems, The Philosophical Quarterly 44/177 (1994) Lecture 3 Justification and the internal Laurence BonJour, Externalist theories of empirical knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. V (1980) Page 2
Goldman, Alvin, What Is Justified Belief? in G. Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge (Dordrecht: Reidel 1079), reprinted in A. Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1992), and in Sosa and Kim. Lecture 4: Foundations, coherence and virtue Roderick Chisholm, The myth of the given, in Sosa and Kim (see Reading below for details). BonJour, Can empirical knowledge have a foundation?, American Philosophical Quarterly 15/1 (1978), reprinted in Sosa and Kim. Ernest Sosa, The raft and the pyramid, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5/1 (1980), reprinted in Sosa and Kim. Lecture 5: The a priori W. V. O. Quine, Two dogmas of empiricism, Philosophical Review 60 (1951), and Epistemology naturalized, in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press 1969), reprinted in Sosa and Kim. Hilary Putnam, There is at least one a priori truth, Erkenntnis 13/1 (1975), reprinted in Sosa and Kim. Reading If you have done no epistemology at all, and want a presupposition-free introduction to the main topics, I can recommend Duncan Pritchard, What is This Thing Called Knowledge?, 2 nd edition (London: Routledge 2009) For each topic, I give one or two main readings. Further readings will be given in the notes accompanying each lecture, available on Keats. Many of the readings are reprinted in Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, Epistemology: an Anthology, 2 nd edition (Oxford: Blackwell 2008) (referred to above as Sosa and Kim ). I give the original sources for all readings: a little bit of Googling will get you to free copies of most of them on line. Two other recent anthologies crop up often in the readings: Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (London: Blackwell 2004) Paul K. Moser, ed, The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (Oxford: OUP 2005) Finally, I recommend a recent debate between BonJour and Sosa on the nature of epistemic justification: Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification (London: Blackwell 2003) The books are all available from the library. Ethics This part of the course will focus on some of the major issues in moral philosophy. Questions to be considered include: What are ethical claims about? Can any of them be true? How should we work out which actions are morally right, and which morally wrong? Can we be morally responsible for what we do, and, if so, how? In what ways can moral theories help us with pressing practical questions? Lecture 1: Moral Objectivity and Moral Truths J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin Books, 1983), Chapter 1. Page 3
Lecture 2: Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (any edition), Chapter 2 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Short excerpt on the experience machine) Peter Vallentyne, Against Maximizing Act Consequentialism in Moral Theories, J. Dreier, ed. (Blackwell Publishers, 2006), pp. 21-37 Lecture 3: Morality and the Good Foot, P., A Fresh Start? in her Natural Goodness, OUP, 2001 (available in Oxford Scholarship Online via the library) Annas, J., 2006, Virtue Ethics, in David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 515 36. Lecture 4: Moral Responsibility Strawson, G., The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 75, No. 1/2 (1994), pp. 5-24. Strawson, P., Freedom and Resentment, in Proceedings of the British Academy, 48 (1962), 187 211. Reprinted in his Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974) and in Watson 1982. Lecture 5: Applied Ethics Pojman, L. P. (2005). A Defense of the Death Penalty (pp. 107-23) Nathanson, S. (2005). Why We Should Put the Death Penalty to Rest (pp. 124-138) Both in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman (eds.), Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. Further Reading and Formative Essay Questions In addition to the readings above, there will be further reading for each topic together with essay questions posted on KEATS. Please check KEATS regularly as useful material will be posted there. Political Philosophy In these lectures, we will discuss one of the central concepts in political philosophy, namely freedom. What is it, and why is it of value? NB: All required readings will be available online via KEATS. Lectures One and Two Negative Liberty: Constraints, and Money Required: Berlin, Isaiah Two Concepts of Liberty in Liberty Reader Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, ch. 21 Cohen, G.A. Freedom and Money, manuscript Ian Carter, A Measure of Freedom, selections Suggested: Steiner, Hillel (1974), Individual Liberty, in Liberty Reader Skinner, Quentin, Hobbes on the Proper Signification of Liberty, in Visions of Politics, Vol 2. MacCallum, Gerald C., Jr. (1967), 'Negative and Positive Freedom', The Philosophical Review 76: 312-34. Carter, Ian, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/ Page 4
Questions: Is there an unresolved tension in Hobbes s defense of negative liberty between his account of Natural Liberty and the Liberty of the Subject? Berlin fails to explain why BOTH coercion AND physical prevention make us unfree. On the best understanding of negative liberty, what kinds of interference make us unfree? Lecture Three Positive Liberty: Authoritarianism and Autonomy Required: Taylor, Charles, What s Wrong With Negative Liberty in Liberty Reader Christman, John, Liberalism and individual positive freedom, Ethics 101 (1991), pp. 343-59 Suggested: T.H. Green (1895), from Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, London: Longmans, in Liberty Reader Arneson, Richard, Mill versus paternalism Ethics (1980) 90: pp. 470-489. Questions: Taylor is right both that conceptions of negative liberty cannot discriminate between more or less serious infringements of freedom, and that reflection on this failure will lead us to an endorsement of positive liberty. Discuss. Compare and then evaluate the success of Christman and Taylor s defenses of positive freedom. Berlin is correct that any defense of positive liberty will either fall prey to the slide to tyranny or retreat to the inner citadel objections. Discuss. To lack money is to suffer not (liability to) interference, but lack of means. Discuss. Lectures Four and Five Republicanism and Nondomination Required: Pettit, Philip (1999), Republicanism (Oxford: OUP), ch. 2. Carter, Ian (1999), A Measure of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 237-45. Carter, Ian (2008), How are Power and Unfreedom Related?, in Republicanism and Political Theory, eds. Maynor and Laborde (Blackwell) Pettit, Philip (2008), Republican Freedom: Three Axioms, Four Theorems in Republicanism and Political Theory. Suggested: Skinner, Quentin (1998), Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: CUP), Chs 1 & 2. Questions: Non-domination is not a third conception of freedom; it is simply a refinement of negative freedom. Discuss. Republicanism [is]... just a wise insurance scheme for liberals interested in maximizing expected non-interference. (Carter) Do you agree? Evaluate Pettit s account of what constitutes an arbitrary interference. What role does the idea of tracking someone s interest play? Is there a way of improving the account of arbitrariness and interference, while retaining the spirit of republicanism? Metaphysics: Truth-making, Facts and Properties Page 5
Lecture 1: The Truth-Maker Argument Armstrong 2004, chapt. 1 and 2. Introduction to Beebee/Dodd 2005. Williamson 1999. Lecture 2: Facts as Truth-Makers Armstrong 1997, chapt. States of Affairs. Lecture 3: Tropes as Truth-Makers Mulligan, Simons & Smith 1984. Lecture 4: The Unity Problem for States of Affairs Vallicella 2000. Lecture 5: A Solution for the Unity Problem General Reading Armstrong D.M. 1989. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ---- 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ---- 2004. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Beebee, H.; Dodd, J. 2005. Truthmakers: The contemporary debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dodd, J. 1999. A Farewell to States of Affairs. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1999, 146-160. ---- 2007. Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles. Synthese 156. Lewis, D. 1992. Critical Notice of D.M. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70, 211-224. Mulligan, K.; Simons, P. & Smith, B. 1984. Truth-Makers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44, 287-321. Vallicella, W.F. 2000. Three Conceptions of State of Affairs. Noûs 34, 237-259. Williamson, T. 1999. Truth-Makers and the Converse Barcan Formula. Dialectica 53, Formative essay questions to be agreed with lecturer (Mark Textor) Logic This part of the module is an introduction to propositional logic and predicate logic. It will acquaint students with the notions of logical consistency and logical validity, syllogisms, the languages of propositional logic and predicate logic, truth-tables for propositional logic, and will introduce the truth-tree method to check for logical validity of arguments and consistency of sets of sentences in both logics. By the end of the module, the students will be able to demonstrate intellectual, transferable and practicable skills appropriate to a Level 7 module and in particular will be able to demonstrate: 1) formalization skills of simple logical arguments 2) understanding of logical formulas as they are used in philosophy. 3) detection of simple logical fallacies 4) methods to test for consistency and validity Page 6
Semester 1: (Teaching starts Monday 22 nd Sept) (Reading Week: 27 th 31 st October) Weeks 1 and 2: Consistency and Validity Weeks 3 and 4: Propositional Calculus: logical connectives Weeks 5 and 6: Propositional Calculus: logical connectives Weeks 7 and 8: Propositional Tableaux Weeks 9 and 10: Propositional Tableaux Semester 2 (Teaching starts Monday 12 th Jan) (Reading Week: 16 th -20 th February) Weeks 1 and 2: Predicate Calculus: predicates and designators Weeks 3 and 4: Predicate Calculus: quantifiers Weeks 5 and 6: Predicate Calculus: quantifiers Weeks 7 and 8: Predicate Logical Tableaux Weeks 9 and 10: Predicate Logical Tableaux Page 7