Lecture 2: What Ethics is Not Jim Pryor Guidelines on Reading Philosophy Peter Singer What Ethics is Not 1
Agenda 1. Review: Theoretical Ethics, Applied Ethics, Metaethics 2. What Ethics is Not 1. Sexual Morality 2. Good in Theory, but Not in Practice 3. Necessarily Religious 4. Relative or Subjective 3. Reading Philosophy Preview Annotate Evaluate Do it again 2
What is Ethics? Theoretical Ethics (Normative or First Order Ethics) Provides systematic accounts of what makes an action right or wrong or what makes someone virtuous or vicious Applied Ethics (Practical Ethics) Considers what should be done on specific practical issues Metaethics (Second Order Ethics) Studies the nature of morality (for example, is morality objective or subjective? or what are the origins of morality?)
Should We Have an Ethical Theory? A systematic account of right action or virtuous character may help guide our behavior or enable us to live better lives. In particular, an ethical theory can help us to resolve moral dilemmas or to make difficult ethical decisions. An ethical theory can unify (and revise) our particular moral judgments on various issues. An ethical theory can help provide our (practical and moral) identity with coherence in terms of how we see ourselves and live our lives. 4
What Ethics is Not According to Peter Singer, ethics is not: 1. Sexual morality 2. An ideal system that is only good in theory but not in practice 3. Only intelligible in a religious context 4. Relative or subjective 5
NOT: Sexual Morality Is it really true that sex raises no unique moral issues at all and that there are more important ethical issues [than sexual morality] to be considered (2)? Sure, puritanical prohibitions about sex may not be especially important to philosophize about. However, sex work, sexual assault, embodiment, relationships, and love are important ethical issues. 6
NOT: An Ideal Good in Theory, Not Practice The reverse of this is closer to the truth: an ethical judgment that is no good in practice must suffer from a theoretical defect as well, for the whole point of ethical judgments is to guide practice (2). 7
NOT: Only Intelligible in a Religious Context Should ethics be a completely secular endeavor? Why or why not? Plato famously argued that if the gods approve of some actions it must be because those actions are good, in which case it cannot be the gods approval that makes them good (3). In other words, truths about ethics (or goodness) must be independent of what God or the gods think. 8
NOT: Relative or Subjective Ethical Relativism: Ethics is relative to particular societies. Ethical judgments are only true or false for a given society. Ethical Subjectivism: Ethics is relative to particular persons. Ethical judgments are only true or false for a given individual. Ethical Objectivism: Ethics is objective, and not relative to particular societies or persons. Ethical judgments are true or false (period) for all societies and all individuals. Why might one believe ethical relativism, subjectivism, or objectivism? What are the motivations underlying these positions? 9
NOT: Relative or Subjective Criticisms of Ethical Relativism: 1. There is no basis for choosing between conflicting moral views from different societies. 2. Relativism cannot account for the nonconformist. 10
NOT: Subjective Criticism of ethical subjectivism: 1. Ethical subjectivism cannot account for ethical disagreement. 11
More Nuanced Theories of Subjectivism Some more nuanced theories of subjectivism deny there are moral facts existing independently of us. Expressivism: ethical judgments are neither true nor false. They do not describe any objective moral facts, but instead express attitudes. (C. L. Stevenson) Ethical judgments are commands, but not statements of facts. (R. M. Hare) Thinking that there are objective moral standards is an error (J. L. Mackie). How do these more nuanced theories of subjectivism avoid some of the problems besetting less sophisticated versions of ethical relativism or subjectivism? 12
Ethical Reasoning It doesn t follow from the claim that there are no moral facts, that ethical judgments are immune from criticism, that there is no role for reason or argument in ethics, and that, from the stand point of reason, any ethical judgment is as good as any other (7-8). Do you agree or disagree with this claim by Peter Singer? Why? The non-existence of a mysterious realm of objective ethical facts does not imply the non-existence of ethical reasoning (8). 13
Deontologists, Consequentialists, and Utilitarians Deontologists think that ethics is a system of rules. Consequentialists start not with moral rules but with goals The classical utilitarian regards an action as right if it produces as much or more of an increase in happiness of all affected by it than any alternative action, and wrong if it does not (3). 14
Theoretical Ethics 1. Utilitarianism 2. Mohism (A Kind of Utilitarianism?) 3. Deontology 4. Virtue Ethics 5. Confucianism (A Kind of Virtue Ethics?) 6. The Social Contract Theory 7. Feminist Ethics 15
Reading Philosophy Every time you read, make sure you get PAED. Preview the text Skim the text to find its organizational structure. Try to find its main conclusion. Active reading Annotate and highlight. Circle key terms or definitions. Write questions and objections in the margins. Diagram or outline the article s main argumentative pieces. Identify reasons and premises offered in favor of an argument. Evaluate Do you agree or disagree with article s main argument and why? What flaws might there be in an author s reasoning? Is the author making assumptions that you think should be challenged? Do it again! Reread, reread, reread! 16
Chapter 2: What utilitarianism is The doctrine that the basis of morals is utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong in proportion as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is meant pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness is meant pain and the lack of pleasure. 17
Chapter 2: What utilitarianism is The doctrine that the basis of morals is utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong in proportion as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is meant pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness is meant pain and the lack of pleasure. 18
Chapter 2: What utilitarianism is The doctrine that the basis of morals is utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong in proportion as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is meant pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness is meant pain and the lack of pleasure. Annotate/Evaluate: One implication of what Mill says here is that rightness and wrongness is a sliding scale and comes in degrees. Actions are right or wrong in proportion as to whether they tend to promote happiness or unhappiness. 19
Higher and Lower Pleasures It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. In estimating the value of anything else, we take into account quality as well as quantity; it would be absurd if the value of pleasures were supposed to depend on quantity alone. What do you mean by difference of quality in pleasures? What, according to you, makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, if not its being greater in amount? There is only one possible answer to this. Pleasure P1 is more desirable than pleasure P2 if: all or almost all people who have had experience of both give a decided preference to P1, irrespective of any feeling that they ought to prefer it. 20
Higher and Lower Pleasures It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. In estimating the value of anything else, we take into account quality as well as quantity; it would be absurd if the value of pleasures were supposed to depend on quantity alone. What do you mean by difference of quality in pleasures? What, according to you, makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, if not its being greater in amount? There is only one possible answer to this. Pleasure P1 is more desirable than pleasure P2 if: all or almost all people who have had experience of both give a decided preference to P1, irrespective of any feeling that they ought to prefer it. Mill: Some pleasure are more valuable than other pleasures because of their quality, not just their quantity. 21
Higher and Lower Pleasures It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. In estimating the value of anything else, we take into account quality as well as quantity; it would be absurd if the value of pleasures were supposed to depend on quantity alone. What do you mean by difference of quality in pleasures? What, according to you, makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, if not its being greater in amount? There is only one possible answer to this. Pleasure P1 is more desirable than pleasure P2 if: all or almost all people who have had experience of both give a decided preference to P1, irrespective of any feeling that they ought to prefer it. Mill: Some pleasure are more valuable than other pleasures because of their quality, not just their quantity. Objection: How do we determine whether a pleasure is more valuable because of its quality? 22
Higher and Lower Pleasures It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. In estimating the value of anything else, we take into account quality as well as quantity; it would be absurd if the value of pleasures were supposed to depend on quantity alone. What do you mean by difference of quality in pleasures? What, according to you, makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, if not its being greater in amount? There is only one possible answer to this. Pleasure P1 is more desirable than pleasure P2 if: all or almost all people who have had experience of both give a decided preference to P1, irrespective of any feeling that they ought to prefer it. Mill: Some pleasure are more valuable than other pleasures because of their quality, not just their quantity. Objection: How do we determine whether a pleasure is more valuable because of its quality? Mill s Answer: If all or most people who have experienced both pleasures prefer one over the other pleasure, then that pleasure is more valuable. 23
Setting the Standard too High? The objectors to utilitarianism can t be accused of always representing it in a discreditable light. On the contrary, objectors who have anything like a correct idea of its disinterested character sometimes find fault with utilitarianism s standard as being too high for humanity. To require people always to act from the motive of promoting the general interests of society that is demanding too much, they say. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and confuse the rule of action with the motive for acting. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we can know them; but no system of ethics requires that our only motive in everything we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so if the rule of duty doesn t condemn them. 24
Setting the Standard too High? The objectors to utilitarianism can t be accused of always representing it in a discreditable light. On the contrary, objectors who have anything like a correct idea of its disinterested character sometimes find fault with utilitarianism s standard as being too high for humanity. To require people always to act from the motive of promoting the general interests of society that is demanding too much, they say. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and confuse the rule of action with the motive for acting. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we can know them; but no system of ethics requires that our only motive in everything we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so if the rule of duty doesn t condemn them. 25
Setting the Standard too High? The objectors to utilitarianism can t be accused of always representing it in a discreditable light. On the contrary, objectors who have anything like a correct idea of its disinterested character sometimes find fault with utilitarianism s standard as being too high for humanity. To require people always to act from the motive of promoting the general interests of society that is demanding too much, they say. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and confuse the rule of action with the motive for acting. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we can know them; but no system of ethics requires that our only motive in everything we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so if the rule of duty doesn t condemn them. What if the objector criticized utilitarianism as a rule of action and not just as a motive for action? Criticism: Utilitarianism demands too much from people, not in terms of what their motives should be, but in terms of what they have to do in order to act morally. 26