1 Against Plantinga's A/C Model: Consequences of the Codependence of the De Jure and De Facto Questions Rebeka Ferreira San Francisco State University 1600 Holloway Avenue Philosophy Department San Francisco, California 94132 rebekadferreira@gmail.com Abstract: Alvin Plantinga's tasks include illustrating that there is no objection to the rationality of theistic belief that does not presuppose theism's falsity, and that it is epistemically possible that theistic belief have warrant in a basic way. However, given Plantinga's conclusion that the co-dependence of the de jure and de facto objections prohibits the atheologian from showing that theistic belief is irrational, Plantinga is subsequently unable to argue for even the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being properly basic without also arguing for its truth. This paper will explore the circular nature of this argument as well as possible alternatives. Keywords: religious epistemology, Alvin Plantinga, rationality, epistemic possibility Word count: 5,599
2 0 Introduction The motivation of this paper comes from the initial potential of Alvin Plantinga's approach to proving theistic belief rational without argument, evidence, or proof by attempting to show that it is epistemically possible that it be properly basic, specifically with respect to warrant. By epistemic possibility, Plantinga means a proposition that either possibly, could be, or must be true, given what we know. In his rejection of the prolonged concentration on apologetics, Plantinga has abandoned the task of attempting to provide external proof of God's existence in favor of this more feasible task. In his 2000 book, Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga has proposed a model to illustrate the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being properly basic with respect to warrant. This attempt to show the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being properly basic in this way seemed to be the most auspicious venture religious epistemology had procured since Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin set the field's foundations in the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries. As this endeavor has prevailed as the best possible opportunity for theism to be shown as rational, it is deserving of even further consideration and exposition than has already been produced. While Plantinga's main project in Warranted Christian Belief (hereafter referred to as WCB) was to determine if there is a viable de jure objection to theistic belief, he concludes that in order to be successful, such an challenge must be independent of any de facto challenge, i.e., a decent objection to the rationality of theistic belief must not presuppose the falsity of theism. If he can prove his conclusion, Plantinga hopes to expunge the
3 prevalent attempt of atheologians to show theistic belief as irrational apart from proclaiming its falsity. While embarking on this project, Plantinga espoused a number of other tasks, not least of which involved illustrating the epistemic possibility of theistic belief having warrant in a basic way. The crux of the model Plantinga presents for it being epistemically possible that theistic belief be properly basic in this way, rests not only on the models possibility, but also on the model being beyond any philosophical challenge. Restated, Plantinga's argument for showing that his model (of how it is epistemically possible that theistic belief is warranted) is epistemically possible, relies almost entirely on the premise that there are no cogent objections to the model, i.e., to the proposition that the model is in fact true or actual, that do not presuppose the falsity of theism. 1 For the purposes of this paper, though it may be a lot to grant, we will not debate this point. However, even allowing this, Plantinga's secondary task falls to the culmination of his primary project. Granting that there is no de jure challenge independent of any de facto challenge, Plantinga is in as equally unsuccessful a position as the atheologian. For the same reason that the codependence of the de jure and de facto questions prohibits the atheologian from either showing that theistic belief is irrational or objecting to his model, Plantinga is unable to argue for even the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being properly basic (rational) without also addressing his commitment to theisms truth. Subsequently, just as Plantinga ultimately rejects the atheologian s challenges to the rationality of theistic belief due to their reliance on a 1 Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print. 169.
4 codependent de jure objection it will be argued that he too should abandon such an argument until it is no longer reliant on his presupposition of the truth of theism. This paper will explore the inconsistent nature of Plantinga s critique of the atheologians and positing of an epistemically possible model, as well as possible alternatives. The proposed alternative to this procedure will be one of two things; either we will accept Plantinga's conclusion, that any de jure and de facto questions are inextricably linked, and thus there is no way of arguing for the rationality of theistic belief without also presupposing its truth, or, we will accept that there has only yet to be an instance of a de jure challenge to theistic belief being independent of a de facto challenge. 1 Groundwork Plantinga s aim throughout the majority of his philosophical career has been to show that belief in God s existence is rational to accept without any argument, evidence, or proof by arguing that it is a properly basic belief. Following his refutation of Classical Foundationalism 2, Plantinga, along with other prominent philosophers of religion, such as William Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff, put forward a new viewpoint within religious epistemology which emphasizes the relation between faith and reason. This assemblage views their emphasis as a continuation of the aims of Thomas Aquinas (13 th CE) & John Calvin (16 th CE). Most notably, John Calvin asserted, in the Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 Plantinga, Alvin. Reason and Belief in God. Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1983. Print. 16-93.
5 that we have a natural belief-producing faculty, the sensus divinitatis, which, when functioning properly under various circumstances, triggers in us a feeling of strong conviction which generates true beliefs about God. This faculty happens to be the basis of Plantinga s epistemically possible model (the Aquinas/Calvin model), which attempts to show the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being properly basic with respect to warrant 3. Building upon these innovative views, the reformed epistemologist maintains the position that belief in God s existence is properly basic (rational) under a new criterion 4, which appeals to various epistemic statuses, and concurrently aims to address objections to theistic belief s rationality. 2 Arguments in Warranted Christian Belief 2.1 Project against Atheologians The development of reformed epistemology led Plantinga to what he takes up as his primary project in WCB, namely, the criticism of the atheologian's challenge to theistic belief. Plantinga brings to our attention the ever present claim that atheologians are making about the irrationality of theistic belief without addressing their presupposition that theism 3 For more on the nature of warrant and its criterion, see Alvin Plantinga s Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, Warrant: The Current Debate. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, and Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 4 For Plantinga s refutation of Classical Foundationalism, see Alvin Plantinga s Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print, Is Belief in God Properly Basic? APA Western Division Meetings 15.1 (1981): 41-51. Reason and Belief in God. Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. Plantinga, Alvin and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1983. Print. 16-93.
6 is false. This criticism goes something like Well, I don t know whether Christian belief is true (after all, who could know a thing like that?), but I do know that it is irrational (or intellectually unjustified or unreasonable or intellectually questionable). 5 Plantinga attempts to make the case that atheologians are unable to object to the rationality of theistic belief without presupposing the falsity of theism, despite their effort to do so. In this critique, Plantinga differentiates between two distinct challenges to theistic belief including de facto objections questioning the truth of Christian beliefs 6 and de jure objections arguments or claims to the effect that Christian belief, whether true or not, is at any rate not up to snuff from an intellectual point of view 7. Restated, the atheologian is attempting to make a de jure objection to theistic belief without also making a de facto one. Plantinga claims that if there is a viable de jure challenge to theistic belief, then it must be independent of any de facto challenge, i.e., to be successful, an objection to the rationality of theistic belief must not presuppose that Christian belief is false. 8 It will be assumed that the reason Plantinga finds such a presupposition to be problematic is that an objector (to the rationality of theistic belief) who presupposes the falsity of theism could never be convinced that holding such a belief was rational, given that it rests on something 5 Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print. xii 6 The conclusion of a de facto objection will be that Christian belief must be false (or at any rate improbable), given something or other we allegedly know. Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print. ix. 7 The conclusion of a de jure objection will be that there is something wrong with Christian belief something other than falsehood or else something wrong with the Christian believer: it or she is unjustified, irrational, rationally unacceptable, or in some way wanting. Ibid. 8 Ibid. x.
7 that they believe not to be true in the world. Further, the falsity of a presupposition such as that which the atheologians are making entails either the falsity or impossibility of the presupposing statement 9 resulting in what could be described as indefinable truth-values. All this is to say is that presupposing such a truth value places a constraint on both the possible and actual epistemic status of a proposition, in this case, the rationality of belief in God s existence. Thus, Plantinga stands firmly in his rejection of any challenge to the rationality of theistic belief which is accompanied by such a presupposition. Further, it can be inferred from this position that Plantinga believes any such challenge to the rationality of theistic belief ought to either, utilize only de jure objections which are independent of de facto ones (if there be any), if there be none, subsequently abandon any such objections, or set about arguing for the falsity of theism to back up their criticism of its irrationality. Given his account of what a successful challenge to the rationality of theistic belief would entail, Plantinga attempts to uncover such an instance. He maintains that there are three main candidates for viable de jure challenges 10 (in that they may potentially be independent of a de facto challenge): (1) that Christian belief is unjustified 11, (2) that Christian belief is irrational 12, and (3) that Christian belief is unwarranted 13. These being contenders in the sense that they are incorporated in Plantinga s reformed criterion for proper basicality, i.e., that a belief can only be properly basic with respect to one of these 9 Rescher, Nicholas. On the Logic of Presupposition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21.4 (1961): 521-527. Print. 522-23. 10 Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print. x. 11 Justification is being taken in its deontological sense being within one s epistemic rights. Ibid. 100 12 Rationality is being taken in the sense of proper function. Ibid. 110. 13 Warrant being the property or quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. Ibid. 325.
8 three kinds of epistemic status, and is such if it is held in the basic way and displays the property. 14 Plantinga concludes that a viable de jure challenge cannot be developed in terms of justification, rationality, or warrant because there aren't any decent de jure challenges that do not depend on de facto challenges 15. Since there is no de jure objection independent of any de facto objection(s), the atheologian cannot object to the rationality of theistic belief without also arguing 16 for, or at least addressing its falsity. 2.2 Project for Proper Basicality of Theistic Belief Along with this primary project, Plantinga takes on a number of other tasks including the effort to show that it is epistemically possible that belief in God be properly basic. Given that a belief can be properly basic with respect to one of three kinds of epistemic status, Plantinga expounds how theistic belief can be properly basic with respect to justification, rationality, and warrant. He claims that it is relatively uncontroversial that theistic belief can be properly basic with respect to justification and rationality 17, the 14 That is, S s belief that p is properly basic with respect to warrant (rationality, justification) just if S s belief that p is basic and is warranted (rational, justified). Plantinga, Alvin. Is Belief in God Properly Basic? APA Western Division Meetings 15.1 (1981): 41-51. Web. 15 For those objections which Plantinga entertains, see Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print. 16 The requirement of arguing for a propositions truth or falsity follows from the aforementioned inference about Plantinga s rejection of the atheologian critique. 17 Theistic belief can be properly basic with respect to justification since one need not flout any intellectual duties, obligations or correct maxims in accepting theistic belief on authority. Theistic belief can be properly basic with respect to rationality since a wide variety of beliefs can be accepted, including theistic belief, without cognitive dysfunction, on the basis of testimony, as long as the believer isn t aware of defeaters. Plantinga, Alvin. Is Belief in God Properly Basic? APA Western Division Meetings 15.1 (1981): 41-51. Web. For more on Plantinga's arguments for these points, see Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford 1993) and Warrant
9 demands of warrant, however, are more stringent. 18 Plantinga asserts that to show that theistic belief can be properly basic in this sense requires further support, namely via the epistemically possible Aquinas/Calvin model (hereafter referred to as the A/C model). Further, Plantinga maintains that it is imperative that theistic belief be shown to be properly basic with respect to warrant since warrant is often sufficient for knowledge. 19 In the preface to WCB, Plantinga claims that there is an epistemically possible model 20 (the A/C model) which illustrates that it is epistemically possible that theistic belief be properly basic with respect to warrant. Along with the pronouncement of his model, Plantinga asserts that there are no challenges to this model which do not presuppose the falsity of theism, similar to how there are no viable objections to the rationality of theistic belief which do not also presuppose the falsity of theism. Thus far, Plantinga s points may be granted for the purposes of this paper. However, before we resign Plantinga to ultimate success, in 6 of WCB, additions are made to his previous claims. Reiterated, he originally claimed only that (1) there is an epistemically possible model according to which it is epistemically possible that theistic belief has warrant in a basic way suggested by the nature of the faculty (posited by Calvin) by which we acquire true beliefs about God and (2) that there are no cogent objections to and Proper Function (Oxford 1993). 18 Ibid. 19 Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print. 179. 20 According to the A/C model beliefs about God are produced by a faculty known as sensus divinitatis. The sensus divinitatis is a belief-producing faculty that under the right conditions produces beliefs which are not evidentially based on other beliefs. The purpose of the sensus divinitatis is to enable us to have true beliefs about God when it functions properly in certain environments. This disposition is the faculty designed in us to generate true beliefs about the nature of God. Therefore, when it functions properly, sensus divinitatis ordinarily does produce true beliefs about God.
10 the model, i.e., to the proposition that the model is in fact true or actual, that do not presuppose the falsity of theism. He now accompanies these earlier assertions with the contention that not only is the model epistemically possible and beyond any philosophical challenge, it is also true. That is, if classical Christian belief is true, then this model, or something very much like it, is very likely also true. 21 However, it is curious that Plantinga neither claims to, nor acknowledges a need to, show that this model is true. While this will be addressed in the subsequent section, it is important to note the implication of this model on Plantinga s overall project. Due to his positing, not only the epistemic possibility of, but now actuality of the sensus divinitatis (or something very much like it), it must be noted that this argument presupposes the truth of theism. Along with his later assertion of the truth of the A/C model, Plantinga s suggestion that such a faculty is responsible for it being epistemically possible that theistic belief is properly basic with respect to warrant bears on the truth conditionality of the proposition 22. Simply put, even had he not claimed that the A/C model or sensus divinitatis were veritable, by postulating the faculty as John Calvin so meticulously described it, and requiring that the cognitive faculty function according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth 23, Plantinga s A/C model implicitly assumes the truth of theism. 21 Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print. xii. 22 The proposition being that it is epistemically possible for theistic belief to be properly basic with respect to warrant. 23 Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print. 156.
11 3 Inconsistency of Plantinga's Projects In WCB, Plantinga's main project is to show that the atheologians can no longer claim to show theistic belief as irrational without also committing themselves to the falsity of theism (which they have apparently been attempting to do). There is a secondary aim in this text which is to show that it is epistemically possible that theistic belief be properly basic with respect to warrant. To illustrate the latter, Plantinga points to the A/C model, claiming that, again, there are no challenges to this model which do not presuppose the falsity of theism. Plantinga goes on to say that, not only is this model possible and beyond any philosophical challenge, it is also true though he does not find it necessary to argue for this. However, given his conclusion about the codependence of the de jure and de facto questions, it would appear that his claim for the epistemic possibility, let alone truth, of this model, and theism, are entirely inconsistent. That is, his proclamation at least runs into problems in the same way that the atheologian s challenge to theism's rationality do. Plantinga claims that there are no cogent objections to the A/C model that do not presuppose the falsity of theism in the same way that there are no de jure challenges to theism which are not accompanied by de facto challenges. However, it is not only the case that there is no challenge to the A/C model which does not presuppose the falsity of theism, but it also follows that there is no way to argue that the A/C model is epistemically possible (that it is epistemically possible that theistic belief is properly basic with respect to warrant) which need not presuppose and argue for the truth of theism.
12 So, let us suppose that Plantinga is right in claiming that there is no de jure question independent of the de facto question. That is, not only is there a dependence of the de jure on any de facto challenge, but the two are codependent. Inherent in the nature of this relation is the implication that codependence not only applies to those posing objections, but that it equally applies to the party making the ontologically positive claim. Though it is clear that Plantinga does not try to present any argument for the model actually being true, he does say that he believes it is. Assuming that he would not make this assertion without good reason, though he deems it unnecessary to explicate, it will continue to be treated as a significant stance in his overall project. Simply put, Plantinga, in this case, is arguing for the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being properly basic with respect to warrant without addressing his presupposition of, or arguing for, the truth of theism. It follows that, for the same reason this disallows any possible objections to theistic belief being properly basic with respect to warrant, it also begs the question of arguing for its epistemic possibility. Since he claims that there are no challenges (to theistic belief's rationality) which do not presuppose its falsity, it follows that he cannot argue for theistic belief's rationality without also presupposing theisms truth. Simply put, since Plantinga argues for the codependence of the de jure and de facto questions, i.e., that the atheologian cannot argue for one without the other, then Plantinga too is unable to posit the rationality of theistic belief without addressing his presupposition of its truth and/or arguing for it. In addition to the implications of the codependence of the de jure and de facto questions is the fact that Plantinga grounded his rejection of the atheologian s challenge in
13 the questions interrelatedness. In WCB, Plantinga entertains a number of candidates for a viable de jure challenge to theistic belief. Divulging each instance is unnecessary for our purposes, so it will be sufficient to simply draw attention to Plantinga s validating of the codependence of the questions as grounds for rejecting possible counter-examples to his claim that there is no de jure challenge to theistic beliefs being properly basic, or to the A/C model, which is independent of a de facto challenge. Thus, in the exact line of reasoning Plantinga exercised in rejecting any atheologian critique of the rationality of theism, his argument too should be suspect until its presupposition of the truth of theism is addressed. In fact, if it comes to be that there are in fact no instances of a de jure question independent of a de facto one, as Plantinga so suggests, then his argument ought to be equally abandoned. 4 Possible Plantingian Objections 4.1 Distinction between Actual Warrant and Epistemic Possibility of Warrant Plantinga might consider it accurate that he cannot argue that (W) Theistic belief is warranted in a basic way unless he also argues that theism is true. He does of course make the distinction between internal and external rationality, and further argues for the "internal rationality" of theistic belief the establishment of the internal rationality then being independent of the truth of theism, concerning as it does intellectual rights and such. He would, however, most
14 certainly think it within his rights to argue that (E) His [Plantinga's] model (of how theistic belief is warranted) is epistemically possible without arguing for the truth of theism. That is, that there are no good objections to his model would not presuppose that theism is true, e.g., the fact that a particular objection to the proper basicality of theistic belief (with respect to warrant) fails would not entail that theism is actually true. So, yes, he cannot argue for the (external) rationality of theistic belief without arguing for the truth of theism, but he can argue that it is epistemically possible that theistic belief is (externally) rational without arguing for the truth of theism. 24 4.2 Dual Assertions of Epistemic Possibility There is another possible objection to the accusation of inconsistency in Plantinga s argument which addresses the point that he is not only arguing for the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being properly basic with respect to warrant, but that he is arguing for an epistemically possible model, according to which it is epistemically possible that theistic belief is properly basic with respect to warrant. Under the assertion that Plantinga's comments in 6 of WCB move his constraint on the atheologians over to his claim of epistemic possibility, it might be claimed that, even if this is the case, it is not as problematic to Plantinga's overall project as it is made out to be in this paper. That is to say, the implications of such an argument on Plantinga's task within the reformed tradition are 24 Comments by Michael Sudduth
15 not so great as to threaten his attempt to show theistic belief as properly basic without having to address or argue for the truth of theism. Such an objection addresses the fact that due to the dual assertions of epistemic possibility in Plantinga's argument, even if the argument for a relocation of epistemological constraint holds, the constraint only applies to the epistemic possibility of the model and not the remaining assertion of epistemic possibility within the model. Restated, even if it is acknowledged that Plantinga is ontologically positing the A/C model, i.e., the assertion that the model is true, the belief-producing faculty within the model, which is responsible for theistic belief being properly basic with respect to warrant, is still only epistemically possible. As such, the constraint he placed on the atheologians does not apply to this claim and he is not required to argue for the truth of theism which an ontological assertion would otherwise presuppose. 5 Response to Objections 5.1 Response: Distinction between Actual and Epistemic Possibility of Warrant In the preface of WCB, Plantinga does make clear that his official claim is only that the extended A/C model is epistemically possible; not that it is true. 25 This is followed by his main critique of atheologians; that they can no longer attack the rationality of theistic belief while attempting to remain neutral on the truth value of theism. Restated, Plantinga takes 25 Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print. xii.
16 the stance that there are no decent de jure objections to the rationality of Christian beliefs which are independent of de facto objections to the truth of Christian beliefs. 26 If this alone characterized Plantinga's position, then the aforementioned objection in 4.1 would hold. However, this is not the case. In his subsequent discussion about the A/C model in 6 of WCB, Plantinga makes a number of unabated assertions which depart from his prior claims made in the preface. 27 He states that There is an epistemically possible model, according to which: 1. it is epistemically possible that theistic (and Christian) belief has warrant in a basic way [suggested by the nature of the faculty (posited by Calvin) by which we acquire true beliefs about God], 2. there are no cogent objections to the model, i.e., to the proposition that the model is in fact true or actual, that do not presuppose the falsity of theism, 3. not only is the model possible and beyond any philosophical challenge, it is also true, and 4. if classical Christian belief is true, then this model, or something very much like it, is very likely also true. 28 Due to the latter two amendments, Plantinga's argument for the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being properly basic with respect to warrant is now subject to his criticism of the atheologian for two reasons. First, if we take his mere assertion 26 Ibid. xii-xiii. 27 Ibid. 168. 28 Ibid. 168-69.
17 regardless of a lack of support that the model is in fact true, his claim is now crossing the ontological divide from asserting the epistemically possible external rationality of the model and therefore of theistic belief's proper basicality to its actual external rationality. Thus, Plantinga's reformulated claim postulating the truth of the model becomes subject to his constraint on the atheologian. Second, even had he not made the third and fourth additions to his claims concerning the A/C model, given that Plantinga reformulated his original claim that there are no viable de jure objections to theistic/christian belief which do not depend on de facto objections to the claim that there are no decent objections to the model which do not presuppose the falsity of theism, he is redirecting his constraint on the actual warrant of theistic belief to its mere epistemic possibility. Consequently, the objection that Plantinga can argue for the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being properly basic without arguing for the truth of theism does not hold. Plantinga previously got out of the aforementioned kind of trouble by making a weaker claim; asserting only that it was epistemically possible for theistic belief to be properly basic with respect to warrant according to the A/C model. Since the atheologian s critique was of theistic belief's actual external rationality, his first project, of only showing how its rationality was epistemically possible, was not under the same constraint he places on the atheologian. As the objection above admits, if he were making that stronger claim that theistic belief has warrant in this way Plantinga would face a dilemma. Thus, as illustrated in 6, Plantinga is in fact making the stronger claim that the model illustrating theistic belief's proper basicality is true, and therefore, that theistic belief is properly basic
18 in this way. It follows from his rebuttal of the atheologian critique of both the rationality of theistic belief and of the model which demonstrates the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being rational that he too would not only be unable to make an argument for the actual rationality of theistic belief without arguing for and/or addressing its truth, but also for theistic beliefs rationality even being epistemically possible. So, again, for the same reason the codependence of the de jure and de facto objections prohibits the atheologian from showing that theistic belief is irrational, or from objecting to Plantinga's model, without also showing theism's falsehood, Plantinga is unable to argue for even the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being properly basic (rational) without also arguing for its truth. 5.2 Response: Dual Assertions of Epistemic Possibility While it may be the case that asserting the truth of the model does not entail positing that theistic belief is in fact properly basic with respect to warrant, Plantinga is still subject to his constraint on the atheologian because of the latter reason mentioned in 5.1. Reiterated, once Plantinga made the claim that there was no decent objection to the model because there was no objection which did not presuppose the falsity of theism, he redirected his constraint on the actual warrant of theistic belief to its mere epistemic possibility. In regards to the objection in 4.2, this reassignment of the codependence of the de jure and de facto questions applies to any number of assertions of epistemic possibility, not
19 only to that assertion which becomes an ontologically positive claim in 6 of WCB. Thus, even if the remaining claim in Plantinga's argument is that it is only epistemically possible that theistic belief be properly basic with respect to warrant, this assertion is still only acceptable if Plantinga also addresses his presupposition of and/or argues for the truth of theism. The reason for this is that Plantinga disallowed any objections to the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being properly basic with respect to warrant because of the codependence of these objections. So again, in doing so, he is subsequently prohibited from arguing for this epistemic possibility without also arguing for the truth of theism. 6 Alternative The alternative to this procedure, if it be necessary, will be one of two things; either we will accept Plantinga's conclusion, that any de jure and de facto objections are inextricably linked, or we will accept that there has only yet to be an instance of a de jure objection to theistic belief being independent of a de facto objection. Provided that we make the former admission, it seems to follow that the result will be the utter futility of the entire platform of this topic. What is meant by this is that, if it is in fact the case that there is no de jure question independent of any de facto question, then, in the same way Plantinga prohibits any atheologian s objection to the rationality of theistic belief, there is no way of arguing for the rationality of theistic belief without also arguing for its truth. Given the questionable success of positive apologetics, there is no undisputed
20 way to argue for the truth of God's existence. This is acknowledged by Plantinga s rejection of natural theology in that he holds that it does not have arguments that are strong enough to confer the degree of warrant on theistic belief needed for knowledge. Since, under this conclusion, the argument for theisms rationality depends on such proof, it too will remain unsuccessful. If, however, we are to assume the latter, we appear to be in the same situation we were in prior to Plantinga's contribution, i.e., having the focus on justifying the rationality of theistic belief as opposed to the truth of it. Only now, we have more stringent conditions for both the ontologically positive claims regarding God's existence, as well as the epistemic justification for accepting such claims. 7 Conclusion Alvin Plantinga's tasks in WCB include both illustrating that there is no objection to the rationality of theistic belief that does not presuppose the falsity of theism, and that, according to his model, it is epistemically possible that theistic belief have warrant in a basic way. Plantinga's conclusion about the codependence of the de jure and de facto objections, i.e., that there is no decent objection to the rationality of theistic belief that does not presuppose theisms falsity, prohibits the atheologian from continuing to argue that theistic belief is irrational without also arguing for its falsity. However, given this constraint, Plantinga is subsequently unable to argue for even the epistemic possibility of theistic
21 belief being properly basic without also arguing for its truth. That is, for the same reason that the codependence of the de jure and de facto objections prohibits the atheologian from either showing that theistic belief is irrational or objecting to his model, Plantinga is unable to argue for either the actual proper basicality of theistic belief, or the epistemic possibility of theistic belief being properly basic (rational), without also arguing for its truth or at least addressing his arguments presupposition that theism is true. The alternative to this procedure will be either the acceptance of Plantinga's conclusion, that any objections to theistic belief are codependent, i.e., that there is no way of arguing for one without the other; or the assent that there has only yet to be an instance of an objection to the rationality of theistic belief being independent of an objection to its truth.