Preliminary Remarks on Locke's The Second Treatise of Government (T2) Locke's Fundamental Principles and Objectives D. A. Lloyd Thomas points out, in his introduction to Locke's political theory, that there are a number of principles held by Locke that, while radical in the seventeenth century, are taken for granted in contemporary liberal democracies. Thomas states these principles as follows: 1. The citizens of a state, no matter what differences might exist between them in social status, authority, or wealth, are basically equal in political standing. (II.95) 2. Each citizen is equal to all the others in that each possesses certain individual rights which limit what any citizen may do to any other. These rights also limit what the state may do to any of its citizens. 3. Those who hold authority in the system of government, or in other political institutions, are to be regarded as doing so not for their own gain, advantage or prestige, but in order to further the good of their fellow citizens. 4. Government is instituted to ensure that the rights of all citizens are respected, and to promote the good of the citizens. 5. As governments are instituted only for the benefit of the citizens, if the citizens no longer consent to how they are being governed and wish to be rid of their governors, the government ceases to have any moral right to be in power. In these circumstances the use of force by the people, if necessary, is morally justified as a last resort. 1 Locke's aim was to construct a theory of political authority consistent with these five principles. There also existed at the time an opposition between natural equality (a radical view defended by Locke) and natural hierarchy (a position defended by Sir Robert Filmer and widely accepted at the time). Note the latter is very different from the conservatism of authoritarians such as Hobbes, who would have accepted (1) and (3) above. 2 In his Second Treatise Locke wants to show two things about the state. The first is that there can be a legitimate state, i.e. one the existence of which is consistent with its citizens' natural rights. Here Locke stands in opposition to those anarchists who deny that a legitimate state, in this sense, is possible. The other is that armed rebellion, all-out revolution, can be justified when the conditions for the legitimacy of government cease to be satisfied. Locke is conscious of the conservative objection that if you support the legitimacy of government then you cannot also say that rebellion is sometimes justifiable. He proposes to meet this objection by developing a 'core' social contract theory from which both the possibility of legitimate government, and of justifiable rebellion, can be derived. 3 1 D. A. Lloyd Thomas, Locke on Government, London: Routledge, 1995, 12. 2 Ibid. 12f. 3 Ibid. 14. Page 1 of 5 T2-preliminaries.doc T. R. Quigley 2/26/06
Natural Law, Rights, and Property 4 To fully understand Locke's argument for these propositions, let's start with the role played by natural law and natural rights in his political theory. Natural Law 1. When Locke talks about natural law he's talking about something that is normative, not descriptive. In other words, natural law does not describe the way people actually behave. Rather it stipulates how people ought to behave. This means that civil laws are not necessarily in harmony with natural law. The two are logically independent. The political objective, according to Locke, is to get the civil laws to be consistent with the natural law. 2. The law of nature is a law of reason. We also learn what the natural law is through the use of reason. [These claims are distinct. The former is logical; the latter epistemological. Is that what Locke intended?] 3. Natural law is established by the will of God and is revealed in the scriptures. Human beings are required by God to act in accordance with the natural law. Thus, the natural law as understood by reason should be the same as the natural law revealed in the scriptures. In other words, the will of God is consistent with reason. 4. The law of nature is universal and applies to all people in all places at all times. However, this leaves open the possibility that different cultures will have different ways of expressing and conforming to the natural law. There is no reason to expect all social customs and laws to be identical. Notice that this account says neither what the specific law of nature is nor how we are supposed to use our reason to discover it. According to Locke, the fundamental law of nature (FLN) is that human life, as much as possible, should be preserved. 5 [II.183] The FLN specifies an end to be achieved, but says nothing about the means to achieving that end. (In this sense, Locke's view is teleological, i.e. goal directed.) Thus, the FLN is a kind of rule to guide the determination of other, secondary or derivative laws of nature (DLN) that indicate how we should behave in order to achieve the preservation of human life and, thus, live in harmony with God's will and reason. So, how can reason function as a guide to achieving the goal of preservation? Since the FLN specifies only an end and not the means to an end, natural rights must follow from derivative laws of nature, not from the fundamental law of nature. Each DLN follows logically from the FLN and the normal circumstances of life. 4 Ibid. 15-17. 5 Ibid. 16 Page 2 of 5 T2-preliminaries.doc T. R. Quigley 2/26/06
Consider, for example, Locke's views on property in 26. All human beings have access to the earth and its fruits for their sustenance. This is a DLN. It follows from the FLN because without such access we would perish. Therefore, it follows that people cannot justly be denied access. Locke's justification of the harm principle in 6 is another instance of a DLN following logically from the FLN. It also introduces Locke's assumption that human beings are the creation and property of God. Locke further assumes that since God created us, His intention is that we live as long as He chooses. Thus, we have no right to take our own lives or the lives of others. Natural Rights As we saw above, natural rights are rights conferred by derivative natural laws. They derive from the DLN because the FLN specifies only the goal and not the means to attain that goal. In general, natural rights in Locke's view seem to be rights of self-ownership. [II.27] 6 These rights protect our freedom to control our own lives consistent with the rights of others to do the same. This raises a question: The natural right of self-ownership seems to contradict Locke's claim that humans are created by and are, for that reason, the property of God. Is there a way to resolve this apparent contradiction? Perhaps, as Thomas suggests, Locke is considering ownership from two different perspectives. With respect to our relationship to God, we have no more than a lease hold on our lives and cannot terminate them if we are so inclined. With respect to our relationship to one another, we have a free hold on life. 7 Locke seems to treat natural rights as something one owns. Persons also own themselves. But there are other natural rights that are not property rights, e.g. the right to that which was promised to you. 8 We'll return to the topic of property when we examine the arguments in detail. For now, notice that Locke defends private property not for the sake of the rich and against the poor, but "against possible unconstrained encroachment by the state". [Section #?] Thus, Locke's views on property play a surprising and significant role in his argument for limited political authority. State of Nature Locke seems to allow only two mutually exclusive possibilities of political organization: the state of nature or civil society. The burden of T2 is to show how one can legitimately get from the former to the latter. In the state of nature "all persons are free, equal, and independent" free, that is, to act in accord with the law of nature. 9 [II.4-6] By equality he means that everyone has the same natural rights 6 Ibid. 18. 7 Ibid. 18f. 8 Ibid. 19. 9 Ibid. 20. Page 3 of 5 T2-preliminaries.doc T. R. Quigley 2/26/06
(except for children, idiots, and the insane) simply in virtue of the fact that they are persons. [II.59-60] Political authority entails moral inequality due to the fact that if one person has political authority over another, then the one with authority has a moral right to the obedience of the other in certain respects. So, for Locke, if there can be justifiable inequalities it must be possible to show how this can be so, starting out from a position of moral equality. The equality of persons in the state of nature also refers to the idea that in the state of nature people are in an equal position to know what the law of nature is, for the law of nature is known by reason, and all 'normal' people have reason. 10 As noted above, the law of nature says what people ought to do, not what they will do. So it's possible that some will violate the rights of others. When they do, those whose rights are violated have the second-order right to try to enforce their first-order rights. This is known as the "executive power of the law of nature". [II.7-13, 74, 87, 105] It has three aspects: 1. The right to judge whether or not a law of nature has been violated. 2. The right to use force, if necessary, to prevent such violations. 3. The right to assess offence and impose appropriate punishment. Locke justifies the right to punish with the following argument [II.7]: The law of nature would be 'in vain' if there were no power to enforce it. God does nothing in vain. Therefore, as God has made such a law there must be an appropriate power. Now in the state of nature there is no civil power, and therefore the earthly power to enforce the law of nature must lie in the hands of persons as individuals. The standing of persons is equal in the state of nature. Therefore if anyone has the power to enforce the law of nature, everyone must have it. So, everyone has it (with the usual exceptions, such as children and the insane). 11 Since the exercise of these rights may very often lead to complications and conflicts, it makes sense for people to give up some of these rights to a political authority responsible for their proper and rational execution. Locke defines political authority and power in the following way: Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the public good. 12 [II.3] 10 Ibid. 20. 11 Ibid. 21. 12 Ibid. 23. Page 4 of 5 T2-preliminaries.doc T. R. Quigley 2/26/06
Lloyd Thomas notes that: Although Locke thinks that there is good reason why the executive power of the law of nature should come to be in the hands of a single authority, that authority would not be legitimate unless the original owners of the executive power of the law of nature consented to relinquish it. Thus Locke is committed to giving a contract argument for legitimate government. 13 One final note: Any right the government has must come from the rights of individuals in the state of nature. But all rights in the state of nature are natural rights. Thus, all rights held by the government are, or are derived from, natural rights. T. R. Quigley, 2003 Last revision: 26 Feb 06 13 Ibid. 25. Page 5 of 5 T2-preliminaries.doc T. R. Quigley 2/26/06