PL 399: Knowledge, Truth, and Skepticism Spring, 2011, Juniata College Instructor: Dr. Xinli Wang, Philosophy Department, Goodhall 414, x-3642, wang@juniata.edu Office Hours: MWF 10-11 am, and TuTh 9:30-10:30 am or by appointment in the afternoons Required Texts 1. Ram Neta and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Arguing About Knowledge, Routledge 2009 [AK] 2. Richard Feldman, Epistemology, Prentice Hall 2003 [EP] 3. 21 Handouts on P drive from the following books: Primary references: Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology, Oxford 2000 [KR] Sven Bernecker (ed.), Reading epistemology: selected texts with interactive commentary, Blackwell 2006 [RE] Paul Moser and Arnold Nat (eds.), Human Knowledge: classical and contemporary approaches, third edition, Oxford 2003 [HK] Michael Lynch (ed.), Nature of Truth: classical and contemporary perspectives, MIT 2001 [NT] Duncan Pritchard, What is this thing called knowledge? Second edition, Routledge 2010 [WK] Paul Moser, Dwayne Mulder and J.D. Trout, Theory of Knowledge: a thematic introduction, Oxford 1998 [TK] Richard Kirkham, Theories of Truth: a critical introduction, MIT 1995 [TT] Course Description The theory of knowledge or epistemology is the study of the nature of knowledge and justification of beliefs. Educated people agree that knowledge is valuable, but philosophers disagree on almost all major issues concerning knowledge that are at the heart of epistemology, such as: The possibility of knowledge: Is knowledge possible? Can we or do we know anything at all? What, if anything, can we or do we really know? The nature of knowledge: What is knowledge? What counts as to know that p? What, if any, are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? The nature of epistemic justification: What counts as a justified belief? How do we justify a belief? The sources of knowledge: What are primary sources of knowledge? How do we obtain knowledge; through our sense or our reason, or both? The forms of knowledge: If we can know something about the external world through perception, what exactly do we know and how do we know it? Can knowledge of the unobserved be rationally justified on the basis of the observed? Can we justify the existence of other minds? The nature of truth: what is truth? How can we know a belief is true? In this course, we investigate many contemporary treatments of these central issues of knowledge with focus on three conceptually related topics: (1) the nature and value of knowledge and the nature and structure of epistemic justification; (2) the nature of truth through discussing a few classical and contemporary theories of truth; (3) the challenges from skepticism and influential responses to it. Whenever possible, our class will proceed in the format of seminar. This means that class time will be devoted to lecture/discussion, with emphasis on class discussion. So it is essential for you to do the assigned readings faithfully and thoroughly before coming to each class (I will check from time to time). Your active participation in class discussion is an indispensable part of the success of our class.
2 Course Requirements 1. Attendance and participation (10 %) Attendance: class attendance is mandatory. It will be some deduction from your course grade for lectures you miss without good excuses. Readings: reading assignments will be made on a daily basis, more or less in keeping with the course outline provided below. You are strictly required to complete all of the assigned readings before each class. It is a good idea to take notes and raise questions as you read. Participation: you should be prepared to participate in the class discussion of assigned readings. 2. Pop-quizzes and small group discussions (10 points) There may be a few pop quizzes at the very beginning of some classes on the reading assignments (just to keep you on your toes to make sure that you do the readings). We will have many graded small-group discussions based on assigned questions in class. 3. One group presentation (10 points) A group of two students will be asked to give a brief presentation of one of the readings of the day (about 10-15 minutes long) and lead a class discussion afterward (maybe another 10 to 15 minutes) 4. Writing assignments (70 points) Three short essays (45 points): each should be 5-7 pages long (Time New Roman font 12, 1 inch margins, and double-spaced) One term paper (25 points): about 10 to 12 pages long. Suggested topics and guidance for each writing assignment will be distributed later. Rewrite options: you could rewrite any of the three essays. If you do choose to rewrite, each version will count as 50% of the grade for the essay. Rewrites will be accepted within 7 days after your graded essay is returned. For more information on philosophy writing, please refer to Philosophy department website http://departments.juniata.edu/philosophy/links.html for How to write a philosophy paper under Philosophy Research and Learning Tools. A late essay will result in a grade penalty. Tentative Class Schedule wk.01 (1/18-20) Section 1: Introduction What is epistemology? TuTh: (1) AK, general introduction; (2) EP, ch. 1; (3) Moser and Nat, Human knowledge: its nature, sources, and limits (from HK, on P drive) wk.02 (1/25-27) Part I. On Knowledge Section 2: What is knowledge? the nature of knowledge 2.1 The Gettier problem Tu: (1) AK, pp. 5-8; (2) Ayer: the right to be sure (AK, pp. 11-13); (3) EP, ch. 2 (traditional analysis); (4) Gettier, Is justified true belief knowledge? (AK, pp. 14-15); (5) EP, pp. 25-30 (the Gettier problem); 2.2 Responses to Gettier Th: (1) EP, pp. 31-33; (2) Keith Lehrer, knowledge, truth and evidence (AK, pp. 16-20) (3) Richard Feldman, an alleged defect in Gettier counter-examples (from KR, on P drive) [no-false-ground theory / internalism]; (4) EP, pp. 33-37; (5) Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson, knowledge: undefeated justified belief (from KR, on P drive) [no-defeater-theory / internalism]
3 wk.03 (2/1-3) Tu: (1) EP, pp. 81-86; (2) Alvin Goldman, a causal theory of knowing (from KR, on P drive) [causal theory / externalism] Th: (1) EP, pp. 86-90; (3) Robert Nozick, knowledge and what we would believe (AK, pp. 22-26) [truth-tracking theory / externalism] wk.04 (2/8-10) Section 3: Why do we value knowledge? the value of knowledge Tu: (1) AK, pp. 31-33; (2) Duncan Pritchard, the value of knowledge (from WK, on P drive); (3) Plato, the Meno (AK, pp. 35-36); (4) Jonathan Kvanvig, The value of knowledge is external to it (AK, pp. 37-54) Th: (1) Linda Zagzebski, the search for the source of epistemic good (AK, pp. 55-64) [virtue epistemology] ; (2) John Creco, the value of knowledge (AK, pp. 67-74) [virtue theoretical approach] wk.05 (2/15-17) Section 4: What is a justified belief? Epistemic Justification 4.1 The nature of epistemic justification: internalism vs. externalism Tu: (1) AK, pp. 151-154; (2) EP, pp. 39-49 (internalism); (3) Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, evidentialism (AK, pp. 174-189) [internalism] Essay #1 on the Gettier problem and its solutions due on Tu Th: (1) EP, pp. 90-99; (2) Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism: what is justified belief? (AK, focus on pp. 157-158, 163-167, 169-171, as marked) [externalism]; (3) Richard Foley, what is wrong with reliabilism (from RE, on P drive) wk.06 (2/22-24) Tu: William Alston, an internalist externalism (AK, pp. 192-202) 4.2 The structure of epistemic justification Th: (1) AK, pp. 211-214; (2) EP, pp. 49-60, 70-78; (3) Laurence BonJour, toward a defense of empirical foundationalism NO, a bad selection, replace by another (AK, pp. 233-246) [foundationalism / internalism] wk.07 (3/1-3) Tu: (1) EP, pp. 60-70; (2) Laurence BonJour, can empirical knowledge have a foundation? (AK, pp. 217-229) not a very good selection either [coherentism / internalism] Th: (1) Peter Klien, human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons (AK, pp. 249-264) [infinitism]; (2) Optional: Ernest Sosa, the raft and the pyramid (AK pp. 273-289) [mixed view] wk.08 (3/8-10) Spring Break! wk.09 (3/15-17) Part II. On Truth Section 5: How do we know a belief to be true? the nature of truth 5.1 Correspondence theory Tu: (1) Paul Moser, truth (from TK, on P drive); (2) Bertrand Russell, Truth and Falsehood (from NT, on P drive); (3) Richard Kirkham, The correspondence theory (on P drive, read pp. 119-124) Essay #2 on epistemic justification due on Tu
4 Th: (1) J. L. Austin, Truth (from NT, on P drive); (2) Richard Kirkham, The correspondence theory (from TT, on P drive, read pp. 124-140) wk.10 (3/22-24) 5.2 Coherence theory Tu: (1) Brand Blanshard, coherence as the nature of truth (from NT, on P drive); (2) Richard Kirkham, Brand Blanshard s coherence theory (from TT, on P drive) 5.3 Pragmatism Th: (1) William James, pragmatism s conception of truth (on P drive); (2) Richard Kirkham, William James instrumentalism (from TT, on P drive) wk.11 (3/29-31) 5.4 Semantic theory and deflationism Tu: (1) Alfred Tarski, the semantic connection of truth and the foundation of semantics (from NT, on P drive); (2) Richard Kirkham, Alfred Tarski s semantic theory (from TT, on P drive) Th: (1) Harry Field, correspondence truth, disquotational truth, and deflationism (from NT, on P drive); (2) The deflationary thesis (from TT, on P drive) both are bad selections wk.12 (4/5-7) Part III. On Skepticism Section 6: What can we know? Skepticism 6.1 Skepticism arguments Tu: (1) AK, pp. 429-435; (2) EP, pp. 108-119, 141-143; (3) Roderick Chisholm, the problem of criterion (AK, pp. 441-450) Essay #3 on truth due on Tu Th: (1) Jorge Borges, the circular ruins (AK, pp. 437-440); (2) O.K. Bouwsma, Descartes evil genius (AK, pp. 455-461); (3) Peter Unger, an argument for skepticism (AK, pp. 466-478) wk.13 (4/12-14) 6.2 Responses to skepticism Tu: (1) EP, pp. 119-128, 143-155; (2) G.E. Moore, certainty (AK, pp. 462-465) [Common-sense approach] Th: LAS, no class wk.14 (4/19-21) Tu: Robert Nozick, knowledge and skepticism (from KR, P drive) [Relative alternatives approach] Th: David Lewis, elusive knowledge (AK, pp. 479-493) [Contextualism approach] wk.15 (4/26-28) Tu: Michael Williams, realism and skepticism with commentary (from RE, on P drive) [contextualism approach]. Th: (1) Hilary Putnam, brains in a vat (from KR, on P drive); (2) Bernecker & Dretshe, Putnam on semantic externalism (from KR, P drive) [Semantic approach] wk.16 (5/3) Tu: final reflection
Term paper on a significant topic of your choice due on the reading day (Wed, 5/4/2011) 5