Introduction It isn t easy to feel up to reflection on climate change. It can seem that you are unequal to it, and you can find yourself overwhelmed very quickly. Thinking about climate change is, partly, thinking about planetary upheaval, the deaths of countless living things, human suffering on an enormous scale, and all sorts of other horrors. It is possible to bracket your entirely normal and understandable reaction to all of that, put it off in a corner of your head and just get on with it. That s what I suggest you do if you find yourself feeling overwhelmed. It will pass. However, you ll need those normal reactions if you want to find your way through all of this to an honest, human conclusion or two. Your reactions are as important as fine-grained analysis. Anyway, I promise to keep as much of a lid on the horrors as I can. The ethics of climate change is not all about the horrors. It has more to do with the fact that science alone cannot help us with the answers we need. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and you will be hearing more about it in this book has this to say about the role of science in our thinking about what to do about our warming world: Natural, technical, and social sciences can provide essential information and evidence needed for decisions on what constitutes dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. At the same time, such decisions are value judgments determined through socio-political 1
processes, taking into account considerations such as development, equity, and sustainability, as well as uncertainties and risk. 1 Science can give us a grip on the facts, but we need more than that if we want to act on the basis of those facts. The something more which is needed involves values. Climatologists can tell us what is happening to the planet and why it is happening, they can even say with some confidence what will happen in the years to come. What we do about all of this, though, depends on what we think is right, what we value, what matters to us. You cannot find that sort of stuff in an ice core. You have to think your way through it. This book is a start on those sorts of thoughts. It is not exhaustive or comprehensive, not the last word but a few first words. It is an introduction, in plain language, to the ethics of climate change, to where the moral weight falls on our changing planet and how that weight ought to translate into action. It has something to do with the conviction that our societies and our lives have to change, and the role of value in the changes ahead. You might already wonder what value means, exactly, in this context. Some people insist on definitions at the outset, but I m with Socrates in thinking that definitions come at the end of an inquiry if they come at all, not the start. I m happy for you to stick with whatever definition you like at any rate, we ll narrow things down in chapter two. If I can get away with avoiding definitions for a while, probably I do owe you a short outline of the book. It might help you follow the arguments if you know what s coming. A philosophy book is no place for suspense. 2
This book begins with two chapters intended largely to shoo away distracting thoughts about the science of climate change and the nature of moral philosophy. The first chapter is about the settled scientific opinion on the climate of our warming world. I hope, by the end of it, that you will have some grip on the changes already underway, as well as the prospects for us and for the planet generally through the next hundred years or so. A large aim of the chapter is to put to one side the thought that there is uncertainty where it counts about climate change. A secondary aim is to be a little clear about the prospects for human beings, in both the immediate and more distant future. The arguments to come depend at least a bit on the science of climate change. The second chapter is about moral philosophy and, in particular, the nature of justifications for moral beliefs. Again, the main aim is to put some distractions to one side, for example variations on the thought that we can never really justify our moral claims. I also hope, in a backhanded way, to give you a grip on at least a few moral theories which will figure into later arguments, as well as the approach to environmental ethics favoured in this book. Above all, I hope you come around to the conclusion that justifications for our moral beliefs matter, and the further conclusion that acting on the basis of those justifications matters too. Maybe it matters quite a bit. Preliminaries aside, the third chapter takes up the nature of responsibility and climate change. We ll face up to several sorts of complexity, as well as a few troubles associated with collective rationality. We ll think about who should take action on 3
climate change and come to some conclusions based on historical conceptions of justice, present entitlements and capacities, and sustainability. Once we have some arguments on the table, arguments which amount to a moral demand for action on climate change, the fourth chapter will take up some pleas for inaction or minimal action. There might be other arguments for inaction, but the ones we ll consider seem to me to be the largest or anyway loudest. We ll find them all wanting in the end. The fifth chapter is about action on climate change itself: what the world has done and what it should do. We ll identify several criteria which might be used to judge the moral adequacy of proposals for action, whatever they might be. We ll apply them to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and two different kinds of proposals for further or future action. The final chapter narrows the focus from moral questions associated with global or governmental action on climate change to the moral status of individual choices, rights and wrongs in individual lives. There are some uncomfortable arguments to consider, and some conclusions to reach. In the end, I suppose, I ve left a lot of the reflection to you. Applied philosophy, as it is sometimes called, concerns itself with practical moral problems. Such things as abortion, euthanasia, genetic modification, healthcare, cloning, and on and on raise philosophical questions which might be of interest to just about anyone. However, you can, all the while, be a little thankful that the problems are way over 4
there, off at a safe distance. No one is about to clone you. With luck, you ll never be faced with problems having to do with abortion or euthanasia or the rest. However, you are lumped with the problem of climate change. It s a moral problem for you, right now. You have some decisions to make about how to live, some choices which concern your everyday life. There is some moral pressure on every one of us to come to some conclusions. Some people who have helped me come to some conclusions, and others owed thanks for other sorts of help are: Laura-May Abron, Quill Brogan, Crisis, Sarah Douglas, Endeavour and crew, Judy Garvey, Kim Hastilow, Ted Honderich, Julia LeMense, Justin Lynas, Alex Mooney, Anthony O Hear, associates at the Orwell, The Rock Ethics Institute, Ian Sillitoe, Barry Smith, Jeremy Stangroom, UCLU Jitsu, If you know the work of the growing number of philosophers who have devoted time to climate change in particular, Stephen Gardiner, Dale Jamieson, Peter Singer, and Henry Shue you will recognize a number of other debts. If you don t know their work, take this book s bibliography to a library and get started. I have also relied, a lot, on the work of the IPCC, for which I am grateful. This book is printed on paper from sustainable sources, in accord with the rules of the Forest Stewardship Council. A portion of the royalties due both to the publisher and to me have been donated to green charities. I m glad to be associated with a publisher like Continuum Press. 5
Finally, this book is dedicated to Yolonne MacKenzie, with thanks for help with my shoelaces. 1 IPCC (2001) TAR, Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers, available at http://www.ipcc.ch. 6