CURRICULUM VITAE AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION AREAS OF CONCENTRATION Ethics (including Meta-, Normative, and Applied Ethics), Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law Aesthetics, Epistemology, History of Modern Philosophy EDUCATION 2007-2010 Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh Thesis: The Standpoint of the Collective Committee: External Examiner, Professor Jonathan Wolff (UCL); Internal Examiner, Dr. Campbell Brown (Edin.); Supervisors, Professor Mike Ridge and Dr. Matthew Chrisman 2006-2007 Master of Arts Department of Philosophy, Memorial University of Newfoundland Thesis: Paul Grice and Donald Davidson on the Conditions of the Possibility of Communication Supervisor: Dr. Arthur Sullivan 2005-2006 Completed coursework for Bachelor of Arts (Jt. Hons.) Department of Philosophy, Memorial University of Newfoundland 2002-2005 Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick 1998-2002 Bachelor of Arts (Hons.) Department of History, Memorial University of Newfoundland Thesis: Religious Motives for the Trial and Execution of Charles I Supervisor: Mr. Thomas Evans (retired) PAPERS Shelby s Approach to Solidarity and the Problem of Compatibility, Accepted, Journal of Social Philosophy in June 2010. Why Uniqueness Matters, submission expected Summer 2010. Relationships or Individuals: Kolodny on what we love, submission expected Summer 2010. Principled Tyranny, submission expected Summer 2010. Love, Care and Respect, submission expected Summer 2010. Rescuing Justice from Equality, submission expected Fall 2010. The Nature of Legitimacy, submission expected Fall 2010. 1
ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE July 2010 Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Vienna - July 2012 Research and some administrative responsibilities with the European Research Council funded Distortions of Normativity project. This project examines the implications of the National Socialist (Nazi) legal and political system for contemporary legal and political philosophy with the use of primary documents. Fall 2010 Adjunct Lecturer, University of Vienna Responsible for lesson planning, assessment and classroom instruction for an introductory seminar in contemporary ethics, and for coordinating these activities with other members of the department. Winter 2009, Adjunct Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh Winter 2010 Lesson planning and classroom instruction of between 150 and 300 students in pre-honours Moral and Political Philosophy. In the two-semester 2009 course I taught sessions on Mill and the Utilitarian Tradition (three weeks) and on Political Philosophy (three weeks). In the single semester 2010 course I will teach a session on Value (one week). Spring 2007 & Winter 2006 Instructor, Faculty of Arts, Memorial University Course development, classroom instruction and examination for one section of Introduction to Law and Society (per semester), involving up to 45 students Winter 2007 Director s Assistant, Writing Centre, Memorial University - Spring 2007 Regular tutoring duties, with a focus on special needs students; Supervising Undergraduate and Graduate Writing Tutors, including staff reviews; Conducting on-line tutorials; Conducting class room presentations on various aspects of academic writing; Additional administrative duties as required by the Director Fall 2006 - Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, Memorial University Winter 2007 Marking and tutoring for Principles of Human Knowledge (2006) and Moral Philosophy (2007) Fall 2006 - Winter 2007 Graduate Tutor, The Writing Centre, Memorial University Working by appointment with graduate students to improve their proofreading skills PRESENTATIONS Why Uniqueness Matters, Tenth Annual Southampton Graduate Conference: Me, Myself, and I, 12 June 2010 (Funding provided by the University of Edinburgh). Love, Care and Respect, Faith, Hope and Love: Heythrop College Interdisciplinary Graduate Conference, 15 May 2010 (Funding provided by the University of Edinburgh). Rescuing Justice from Equality, 3rd CEU Graduate Philosophy Conference, Department of Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, 20-21 March 2010 (Funding provided by Central European University and the University of Edinburgh). 2
PRESENTATIONS, CONTINUED PROFESSIONAL SERVICE Reconciling Solidarity and Autonomy, The Politics of Social Cohesion, Centre for the Study of Equality and Multiculturalism, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 10 September 2009 (Funding provided by the University of Edinburgh. - VII Pavia Graduate Conference on Political Theory, University of Pavia, Italy, 25 September 2009 (Funding provided by the University of Edinburgh). Neighbourliness: A Conceptual Analysis, Legal Theory Research Group Presentation, University of Edinburgh, 13 May 2009; and - The Human Person: Graduate and Research Conference, Heythrop College, London, 23 May 2009. Reply to Justifying Liberal-Democracy in Pluralist Societies, by Sandra Lindgren, 2008 Law and Political Philosophy Graduate Conference, Stirling University, 11 December 2008. After the Self: What Remains for the Communitarian Critique?, Presentation - Brave New World Conference in Political Theory, Manchester Centre for Political Theory, 1 July 2008 (Funding provided by the University of Edinburgh). Spring 2009 Organizer, Scottish Network for Normative Philosophy Practical Reasoning Workshop Logistics and administration for a workshop involving 8 guest speakers, with a budget of approx. 6,000 and funding from the Scots Philosophical Club and the Carnegie Foundation 2007-2010 Member and Presenter, Ethics Reading Group and Aesthetics Reading Group 2008-2010 Member, Department of Philosophy Staff-Student Consultative Committee 2008-2010 Reviewer, British Undergraduate Philosophy Society Conference 2004-2005 Chair, Board of Directors, Brunswickan Publishing Corporation, Fredericton, New Brunswick Winter 2005 Research Assistant, UNB Faculty of Law 2003-2004 Associate Editor, University of New Brunswick Law Journal AWARDS 2010 Honorary Fellow, Chair Hoover in Economic and Social Ethics, Université Catholique de Louvain 2007-2010 Rothermere Fellowship, Rothermere Foundation and Memorial University of Newfoundland (tuition, fees and living allowance of approx. 14,000/year, renewable for three years) 2008-2010 Research Support Grants, University of Edinburgh, (total approx. 2,300) 3
AWARDS, CONTINUED 2010 Travel Award, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary (approx. 250) 2009 Young Scientists Travel Award, University of Hokkaido, Japan, 40,000 (approx. 250) (Declined - unable to attend conference) 2008 Finalist, Chancellor s Award for Graduate Student Leadership, Memorial University of Newfoundland 2008 Fellow of the School of Graduate Studies, Memorial University of Newfoundland 2006-2007 Graduate Fellowship, School of Graduate Studies, Memorial University of Newfoundland ($10,400) 2005-2006 Dean s List, Faculty of Arts, Memorial University of Newfoundland 2005 Special Award for Lifetime Service to the Student Press, The Brunswickan, University of New Brunswick - Fredericton 2002 Recipient, Newfoundland Law Foundation Scholarship ($5,000) 2002 Recipient, New Brunswick Law Foundation Scholarship ($2,500) 2002 Finalist, Birks Award for Student Leadership, Memorial University of Newfoundland 1998 Centenary of Responsible Government Scholarship, Government of Newfoundland ($1,000) REFERENCES Professor Michael Ridge, Chair of Moral and Political Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, mridge@ed.ac.uk, (44/0)131-650-3657 Dr. Matthew Chrisman, Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, matthew.chrisman@ed.ac.uk, (44/0)131-650-3648 Professor Duncan Pritchard, Chair of Epistemology, Deputy Head of Department and Head of Graduate Studies, Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, dpritcha@staffmail.ed.ac.uk, (44/0)131-651-1784 Dr. Alasdair Richmond, Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, a.richmond@ed.ac.uk, (44/0)131 650 3656 Dr. Arthur Sullivan, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Memorial University of Newfoundland, arthurs@mun.ca, (1)709-737-8333 4
THESIS ABSTRACT My thesis was an attempt to explore the possibility of combining communitarian and liberal accounts of justice. I begin with the methodological claim that the major task of moral and political philosophy is the balancing of the demands of two different standpoints: the standpoint of the individual and the standpoint of the collective. I believe contemporary liberal philosophers, notably Joseph Raz, have done an excellent job both in explaining what autonomy is and why it is a necessary principle for a just society, I believe the two standpoints methodology accurately explains its shortcomings. While we are individuals who, in a just society, must be treated autonomously, this is not all that we are. In the opening chapter I set out a version of autonomy that I believe best reflects our ethical reality and that is consistent with the contemporary liberal mainstream. The failure of the original communitarian project including such eminent philosophers as Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer was that their efforts to put forward a positive account of what communitarian justice would require were always infected by their attempt to refute the liberal claim that justice required autonomy. My alternative approach, then, tries to put forward a communitarian principle which I call fraternity to sit alongside autonomy as the representative of the standpoint of the collective. In the first part I explain why I believe a communitarian principle is necessary. While autonomy represents the standpoint of the individual it is ill suited to explain many of our basic intuitions about the legitimacy of non-voluntary obligations, among other basic political features. In the second part I examine three options for what the standpoint of the collective might require. While I dismiss conceptions of fraternity based in tradition, impartiality and two types of solidarity, I believe a third type of solidarity has promise. I call this type of solidarity Moderate Ethical Solidarity. In the third part I how MES can work with a basic ethical obligation of consideration to provide us with a justification for a great many non-voluntary obligations. I conclude this third part by showing how to reconcile the version of autonomy from part one with the version of fraternity developed in parts two and three. To adequately represent the two standpoints, the demands of each principle must be assessed independently and a maxim or policy must be found legitimate according to both in order for it to be genuinely just. CURRENT AND FUTURE RESEARCH My current position is with the Distortions of Normativity project, an ERC funded unit of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. Broadly speaking, the project focuses on the implications of the moral, political and legal culture of the Third Reich for contemporary philosophy. I am dealing with questions of the nature of legitimacy and with the legitimacy of moral judgements, political decision and legal standards within the grossly distorted normative order of the National Socialist system. I am writing a paper on the nature of legitimacy. In much of the literature of legal and political philosophy exactly what legitimacy is and how it works is problematically unclear. In my paper I propose a common understanding of what legitimacy in all its forms requires and then attempt to explain, through a series of dismabiguations, how different authors use different accounts of legitimacy. Once we understand what the different kinds of legitimacy are philosophers at large will be in a better position to explain whether particular moral judgements are legitimate or illegitimate and what they mean by that. This has particular importance given the nature of morality and of individual moral decisions within the horrendously immoral order of the National Socialist system. I am also, along with Professor Herlinde Pauer-Studer, leading the organization of two conferences: one on the work of David Velleman who will be a visiting fellow of the Institute and the Project in the spring of 2011; another on the Law, Coercion and Legitimate Authority currently planned for the winter of 2012. Finally, along with Professor Pauer-Studer and my colleague in the project Dr. Julian Fink, I am translating and editing a collection of works by major thinkers during the Third Reich. This work should, for the first time, bring to an English-speaking audience a fuller understanding of the ideological and philosophical self-understanding of the moral and political culture of National Socialism. 5
CURRENT AND FUTURE RESEARCH, CONTINUED While my work on legitimacy, justice and legality will be my main contribution to the distortions project, I am working on a series of essays on basic ethical concepts that I hope can provide a backdrop against which the self-understandings of the culture of the Third Reich can be assessed. I am currently writing two papers on the nature of love. The first assesses Niko Kolodny s claim that what we love when we love is not another individual but a relationship we have with that individual. In this paper I claim that his argument against the Frankfurtstyle individual account is mistaken and that Kolodny s own relationship account is defective. The second paper advances a different conception of what love is than is found elsewhere in analytic philosophy. Kolodny and Frankfurt both agree that love is, at its most basic, a form of caring, while David Velleman claims that love is a version of respect. Neither approach can adequately explain the full demandingness of love. To that end, I offer an alternative a conception of love based on subordinating one s own interests to those of the beloved. Another paper on basic ethical concepts deals with equality. Put simply, I claim that equality does not matter. This is not to claim that individuals ought to be discriminated against on the basis of gender or race, or that the state is justified in allowing some individuals to starve despite the great wealth of others. Rather, it is to claim that equality can play no normative work in justifying any of the policies that are advocated on its behalf. All contemporary egalitarians, including liberal egalitarians, combine an account of formal equality with a substantive principle usually a principle of the moral worth of persons to reach the claim that inequality is unjust. What I demonstrate is that the substantive principle alone, with its implicit claim to moral desert, does all the normative work, leaving equality at best epiphenomenal and at worst potentially misleading. I expect this work to result in a publishable paper before Christmas of 2010. In addition to the work connected with the Distortions project, I have another major area of research interest that I can only pursue passively while working on the Distortions project. I believe there is a common failing among Kantian, Consequentialist and Virtue-based approaches to ethics and that this common failing points towards a different understanding of what makes an action right or wrong. None of the mainstream moral philosophies can explain why it is wrong to act inconsiderately. At the outset I hope to defend the claim that acting without due regard to one s ability to impact on another is intrinsically morally wrong. While I believe the case for this is ultimately intuitive for Kantians and Virtue Ethicists, I also develop a consequentialist argument for the intrinsic wrongness of acting from a wrong intention. I then demonstrate that neither approach can adequately explain what is wrong with acting from a callous intention. Consequentialists can recognize it as indirectly wrong, but cannot account for intentions as something that can make a situation wrong since they are not, on even the most intention-sympathetic accounts, consequences. Kantians cannot explain the wrongfulness because a genuinely callous individual can consistently universalize their callousness. Virtue Ethicists often have more of a story to tell about the wrongfulness of callous intentions but their prioritization of character traits over particular intentions means that they miss the mark in explaining the intrinsic wrongfulness of callousness. I hope to argue that an ethical obligation of consideration can explain why it is wrong to act from a callous intention. Consideration requires that we act as others should, normatively but not morally speaking, wish us to act. Acting from a callous intention is inconsiderate because it is a failure to adequately recognize a significant part of what we owe to one another. Furthermore, I believe a principle of consideration can serve as the basis for a different version of the moral law. While this approach resembles the Kantian version of the moral law, it adds a reflective element that closes the loophole that allowed callousness through. Furthermore, I believe consideration is self-justifying in much the same way as the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative. Acting considerately is a moral requirement because failure to act so would be inconsiderate. Naturally this project will take a long time to come to fruition but because of its impact on such a wide array of fundamental topics in normative and metaethics I believe it should be a good candidate for major research funding and should provide me with several publishable papers in addition to a full-length work on callousness, consideration and morality. 6