Lassina Zerbo: «Israel and Iran could and should be next to ratify CTBT»

Lassina Zerbo: «Israel and Iran could and should be next to ratify CTBT» Lassina Zerbo, Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty, in interview with Olga Mostinskaya, Editor-in-Chief of the Security Index - According to the most recent data available, what type of device was tested in the DPRK? Can it be assumed to be a hydrogen bomb, and what would this mean for the development of the North Korean nuclear program? - As I said at the CTBT and the International Monitoring System, we focus on whether it is a test or not. That is the first thing, because any test intended to improve or develop a nuclear weapon is what we are trying to ban through the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Even before the DPRK announced its test, we detected suspicious events in the peninsula at a location that was basically a test site that they use. Then they confirmed that they did something at that particular location that was identified by our system. We came out with a preliminary analysis showing that the event was similar to that of 2013, not only in terms of location, which is the same location as that of the three previous ones, but also in terms of magnitude. The magnitude being similar, or even lower, led to speculations from experts that it is unlikely to be caused by a hydrogen bomb. That is not something that the CTBT focuses on. But any scientist will be aware that there is indeed a big difference between a fission bomb and a fusion bomb in terms of the yield that can be produced, and even in the magnitude that this will generate in terms of earthquakes. So in that sense, we follow what the scientific community says. But as we stand today, the first conclusion we have come to is that it is indeed a man-made explosion. We have published what we call our Reviewed Event Bulletin to that effect, to say that it is definitely not a natural event, but a man-made explosion. What we are waiting for is any sniff of a radioisotope that could give an indication that it is indeed a nuclear test to our state signatories. Our first samples come to normal concentration, but sampling continues. This is where we stand today. 1

- So in order to collect air samples, the wind would have to blow in the direction of one of the stations? - Air currents coming from the peninsula reached the first station in Japan 24 and 36 hours after the test was announced. But the question is if there is venting, and venting could occur after a short time, or it could take longer. In 2013, we did not have venting until 55 days after the event. But if you take 2006, it took 12 days to have a sniff of a radioisotope, not only in Japan, but also 12 days for it to reach Canada. As we stand now, the 36 hours that have passed have given no specific abnormal reading. But that doesn t mean that we won t have any. It depends, because it has to seep through the cracks of the ground and then come in the air before it can be taken by the wind. Right now, winds are favorable to the direction of Japan, and this is why we are monitoring this particular station closely. So, regarding your question whether it is a hydrogen bomb and if that means that they have improved their technology: Before we even get to address the nature of the bomb, if we allow somebody to conduct one, two, three, four tests, each test is an improvement on the previous one because they master the technology. And this is what we are focusing on. We have to make sure that there is no possibility to even carry out a test, whether it is an A-bomb, an H- bomb, or any other type of bomb. - About a month ago, when suspicious activity was detected at the test site, many did not believe that another test would be conducted. Was the date of the test chosen for political or technical reasons? - I was among those who didn t believe in a test. If you recall, in the beginning of December I stated that it is probably a bluff. I said this because at that particular time, the two Koreas were talking together; they were even talking about allowing the brothers from the North to see their brothers from the South. In diplomacy, we call this a warming of relations. Under these circumstances, even if some satellite imagery from other institutions indicated movements at the test site why would you do that if you are holding talks with your neighbors? Having said this, what we have seen from the Korean leaders since the beginning of the tests or any event they hold is that they always use a particular moment in history to do something, to show the international community: We are here. Do not forget about us. As far as I know, the test was conducted two days before the birthday of the leader. - As a birthday gift? - Whether it was his birthday or whether he wanted to remind the international community of his existence, these factors should be taken into account and should not be neglected. Having said this, there is another milestone in May. The Party will meet in May for the first time in 35 years. Some are speculating that if we are not careful, they might do something in May. If we assume that this test has not been a success, they might use that as another opportunity. That is what we are reading in the media. 2

But my point is that we should not even allow that. They are able to do this because of the passivity of the international community. I think we have been too passive with regard to North Korea. Other issues have taken priority over the North Korean issue for a reason, such as Syria, Iraq or Iran. There have been sanctions, but are sanctions paying off? I think President Obama was mentioning Cuba. For over sixty years, they have been under sanctions. If after sixty years you do not manage to come to an agreement, you have to change your attitude in sustained negotiations. We have proven it with Cuba, we have proven it with Iran it was possible to gather around the table and reach a deal despite the sanctions. No matter how impossible this may seem, we still have to try to resume the six-party talks with the Koreans. - In order for the CTBT to enter into force, eight more countries will have to ratify the treaty, including the U.S. Which arguments could be used to convince American leaders and lawmakers to ratify the agreement? Many believe that the U.S. ratifying the treaty could prove a powerful stimulus to the ratification by the remaining Annex 2 countries. - People speculate on that, but let me put it this way: We have eight countries whose ratification is necessary for the entry into force of the treaty. I have often said that I do not believe in a distinction between 800-pound gorillas or 150-pound gorillas. They are all the same, because even if the smaller one does ratify the treaty, it will still not be in force. So, it means that they are all 800-pound gorillas, if you will. But indeed people see a difference between the eight. The only difference I see is that there are two P5 countries among them China and the United States under the NPT. For me, the ratification of those two will show leadership in non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. That could create a chain reaction in the international community s effort to further non-proliferation and deal with the issue of disarmament. It is true that the U.S. and Russia are engaged in the START treaty. We all applaud this effort and welcome the trust that it could build in the long run, but I think we need leadership from China and the U.S. But having said this, any other of the eight ratifications could influence decision-makers in the U.S. or China to ratify the treaty. In this particular context, with North Korea announcing and - if it is confirmed conducting its fourth nuclear test, I want this to be the last signal to the international community that the CTBT is a matter of urgency. I will not dissociate the CTBT from the North Korea issue, because we are talking about tests. And when you talk about tests, you are not talking about any other institution than the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and its Preparatory Commission. So we cannot say we are making Korea an emergency issue and not the treaty. We cannot say that we are making the treaty an emergency issue and not Korea. We have to address these two issues together. It is time that the international community focuses on dealing with North Korea at the same time as they are dealing with the entry into force of the CTBT. The only way to stop North Korea or any other country from carrying out a nuclear test explosion is through the entry into force of the CTBT. It would be legally binding and anyone who will carry out a test will face consequences stemming from the implementation of the treaty. This is what we should put in place. 3

- Even before North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test, you suggested that Israel could become the next state to ratify the CTBT. Do you still think so? If so, could this happen within the context of the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East? - I have always argued that the way to a WMD-free zone in the Middle East is via a nuclear test-free zone in the Middle East. The low-hanging fruit is a test-free zone in the Middle East because all Annex 2 countries in the Middle East have signed the treaty. If they sign the CTBT, it means that they have made a step towards the implementation of the treaty. What we have to do is to get them to ratify the CTBT as a means to build the trust necessary to strengthen non-proliferation and ultimately, to further the disarmament process that will make the Middle East a zone free of WMD. This is how I see it. If you cannot achieve a test-free zone in the Middle East, how on earth can you achieve a WMD-free zone in the Middle East? I firmly believe that the WMD-free zone is a great goal that we are all trying to achieve, but we have to find the best means to achieve that goal. And one of the key elements in that process is the CTBT ratification by all countries in the Middle East as part of the Middle East test-free zone. - But what are the chances that Israel will do so? And why is the ratification of the CTBT not part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for Iran, especially considering that there are CTBT monitoring stations on Iranian territory, they are just disconnected. - I have passed this message to Foreign Minister Lavrov, who is a great supporter of the CTBT just as the whole of Russia, when I met him. I have heard both from Minister Lavrov and President Putin that the CTBT is an important treaty for them. My first point to Foreign Minister Lavrov even before Iran was: Given Russia s standing there, why didn t you get Syria to ratify and sign the CTBT? Syria may not be an Annex 2 country, but Syria s ratification of the CTBT creates the trust that is necessary in the Middle East for the ratification by others. In that sense, we have missed an opportunity. I still believe that we did also miss an opportunity in the Iran deal, but I understand that the difficulty there lay in the fact that not all parties involved have ratified the CTBT. So they were indeed in a difficult position to bring that on the table. If you tell me that my doorstep is dirty and yours is dirty as well, I will tell you: What about yours? While it was a difficult task at the moment, I see an opportune time now to bring the issue on the table during the implementation of the deal. Iran has proven its intentions through the Iran deal and the ratification of the CTBT would reinforce this impression. If Iran should do so, I think this could create the conditions of trust that Israel wants with regard to a neighbor that has always been a problem for them, and Israel could join Iran in the ratification of the CTBT. If Israel and Iran ratify, I think we are creating the conditions and the incentive to make Egypt, Syria and all other countries join the CTBT in the framework of the test-free zone. 4

- Are there any discussions with the Iranians on this issue, be it on the expert or the political level? - At the expert level, we have started talking to them. You have mentioned the stations. Experts from Iran are participating fully in our work at the CTBT and the technical secretariat here. They have been engaged in all matters, from maintenance to sustainment and the operation of the network. They have given data from their station at some point. There is probably a reason why the stations are not connected, but I think now, the Iran deal makes it more relevant to connect those stations and to engage in a discussion on the ratification of the CTBT, for whatever time that will take. But I have engaged in discussions at the expert level, and it is my intention to find a way to visit Iran, brief them on the status of the CTBT and on where we stand politically and technically, and engage them in a discussion at a higher level than the expert level that we have, once the turmoil is over and we start the implementation. I have mentioned this to Foreign Minister Zarif a year ago, before the agreement on the deal. I haven t seen him since, but I hope to meet him soon and then to engage in this discussion with him and see how helpful it could be in re-energizing what we had with Iran in the past. - North Korea remains the only country to conduct nuclear tests in the 21 st century. Many believe the Western states to be too civilized to resume nuclear testing. It needs to be stated, however, that the development of nuclear military technologies continues in the form of computer simulations rather than physical tests. Do you think that there is a risk that Western countries may wish to conduct another round of nuclear tests to gather data to update their computer models to further develop their nuclear military technology? - I appreciate your question, because your approach follows the scientific framework that says that to improve your technology, you need tests. If the CTBT is in force, those who have ratified it will not be able to improve their technology because, as you correctly pointed out, you need more and more data to improve your model. Your data could be outdated if it is fifty years old, or thirty years, or a hundred years. So the longer you go without conducting tests, the less plausible it is that your model is efficient. So your argument is in line with what we are saying let s get the CTBT into force so that those who have ratified the test will not improve as those who have not yet ratified it develop their technology. If we can focus on disarming those who have ratified, the relevance of having and keeping a deterrent will fall slowly, as those who have ratified realize that they cannot improve, so that ultimately all are on the same level. - But what if the Annex 2 countries were allowed to conduct one more round of tests in exchange for universal ratification afterwards? - You are talking as a diplomat. A diplomat would probably suggest this, but as a scientist with the diplomatic knowledge that I have developed since working here, I would not go that route. For me, the best way is to stop it now and forever and get the treaty into force. The idea of saying: Let s allow everybody to test to gather sufficient data is basically to delay 5

the process, because in fifty years, some will still say: We need to test again, let s pull out of the CTBT and test! Do you see what I mean? The point is to not even test. If people need to test, it is because they know that now, if this treaty enters into force, there is no possibility to improve their models any further. So let us stop it now, because that is what the CTBT and the National Monitoring System were designed and put into place for. Ultimately, the verification regime needs to be put in place at entry into force of the treaty. That is what we are working for, and then we are ready to assume that responsibility as an organization. - In 2016, we will celebrate the 20 th anniversary of the CTBT. What has the organization accomplished, and where is it going from here? - It would be better to say commemorate. I would celebrate those twenty years if I could get the U.S. and China to ratify, as a first step, or get Israel, Egypt and Iran to ratify, or convince North Korea, India or Pakistan to join the Moratorium on Nuclear Testing, not the voluntary moratorium, but a legally binding moratorium on this treaty. That would be a cause for celebration. And that is why we are actively engaging with them any step that India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Iran, the U.S., China, or North Korea will make towards this treaty would be room for celebration for me. Having said this, as part of the commemoration, we want the 20 th anniversary to be a year of reflection on where we stand. Are we serious about this treaty? If so, what can we do? Nobody knew that we would start anniversary year with tests by North Korea. North Korea is basically announcing its presence. So we should take this seriously. If they are able to do tests, they are creating a threat around them, first for South Korea, second for Japan, China, the U.S., and any other country in the international community that is worried that this country is building a deterrent that could be dangerous for international peace and stability. I have talked to students in Japan and Korea, and what they tell me is: Mr. Zerbo, why are you telling us not to test? We have ratified the treaty, and then you are allowing North Korea to do tests. Because they think we are the ones allowing North Korea to do tests. We are talking about students who are 18 to 20 years old, who are the leaders of tomorrow. If the leaders of tomorrow have in their heads that if they are doing it, we should find a way to do the same, that is a risk for stability in the region, in the Korean peninsula, and internationally. And this is why the entry into force of the CTBT is a matter of urgency. I understand that many issues are urgent, but I think we shouldn t be this passive, just waiting for tests and then saying: You know, even if they conduct a test, we do not have to worry because they do not have the financial strength to go into developing the technology to be at the level of fission. They do not have the financial means to be able to develop a technology to create that deterrent, to miniaturize the weapon and put it on an engine that could be deployed at 5.000 kilometers and so forth. But even if they can do it at 150 or 70 kilometers, they still hit South Korea. That s the problem, and that shouldn t happen. We have been too passive because we think that they are still playing a game. But it is by game that people develop technology. You have seen many kids that start working with little wires and then all of a sudden, they say they have developed a computer. I mean, take Apple, which started in a 6

garage. Anything can start somewhere as a game and then become reality. So we should stop the game of allowing a country to do this type of testing. And this is why we should find a way to discuss with Korea. Sanctions are great, but we have imposed sanctions and they are still doing tests. - Which of the remaining Annex 2 countries could realistically become the next to ratify? - I still believe Israel and Iran could and should be next. Or the U.S. why not? Or China why not? They could probably do it together. But I think those four are those who are potentially in a position to do something without incurring any damage. If you take Iran, they have engaged in the implementation of a deal that makes the ratification of the treaty relevant. And as for Israel, what do they have to lose? They have a lot to gain in building trust in the region, and now, they are getting assurance that Iran is not in the process of doing anything more than using energy for peace. We have shown this assurance through the Iran deal, so let us ratify and create conditions of trust. As for the U.S. and China President Obama has made it his priority and they have been working hard to create the conditions for ratification. We want to be able to help them through the excellent job that the staff of this secretariat has been doing, proven again by detecting a suspicious event in real time in the Korean peninsula. It means that tax payers money from the U.S. is not wasted. I think for me that is a good enough reason for them to consider the ratification. But more importantly, what I want to stress for the international community today is the fact that the magnificent system that we have put together, the efficiency that we are showing to the international community, remain fragile. It is fragile because if we don t do something, we can lose all that we have built, simply because countries start testing and pulling out of this treaty. If it doesn t enter into force, we lose twenty years of technology and hard work, and we lose fifty or sixty years of negotiations to put this treaty into design, and a dream we have not realized yet. That is a risk that the international community should see coming if we do not get this treaty into force. - Let us hope that this year brings not just nuclear tests, but some positive changes. L.Z.: And this is why we need people like you, to be able to talk more about the necessity of this treaty and about what we should do next. 7