Subjectivism & Objectivism Dr. Clea F. Rees ReesC17@cardiff.ac.uk Centre for Lifelong Learning Cardiff University Spring 2013
Outline Objectivism & Subjectivism Objectivism Mackie s Scepticism Content vs. Status of Claims Various Scepticisms Scepticism vs. Subjectivism Initial Questions Varieties of Objectivism Varieties of Convergence A Disanalogy Initial Analysis Reflective Enquiry & the Unexamined Life
Objectivism & Subjectivism Objectivism Objectivism & Subjectivism Objectivism Last time, we said: Definition ( Objectivism) Objectivism states that what is morally right (wrong) is determined, at least in part, independently of cultural or subjective acceptance (rejection). That is, at least some moral claims are true (false) regardless of what any individual, or any culture, believes.
Objectivism & Subjectivism Objectivism Objectivism & Subjectivism Objectivism There are different senses of objectivity and subjectivity. Something may be objective in one sense but not another. Important to get clear about authors usage of these terms. Cannot assume that everyone is using the terms to mean the same thing. It is sometimes difficult to figure out how an author is using a term. In general, whole philosophical literatures can be built on issues of interpretation especially, although not exclusively, when the original author is dead.
Mackie s Scepticism Content vs. Status of Claims Mackie s Scepticism Content vs. Status of Claims J. L. Mackie explains his moral scepticism in a way which may help in understanding Williams s position. Distinguishing claims about content from claims about status We can distinguish two levels of moral discourse: First order: claims about the content of morality. e.g. Torturing innocent philosophers is wrong. e.g. Kindness is good. Second order: claims about the status of first order moral claims. e.g. claims are cultural artefact. e.g. claims express approval and disapproval. e.g. claims are the result of Freudian sublimation.
Mackie s Scepticism Various Scepticisms Mackie s Scepticism Various Scepticisms Mackie then distinguishes different kinds of moral scepticism: Scepticism First order: scepticism about the content of morality. e.g. A rejection of the morality of one s culture or religion. e.g. A rejection of any moral demands whatsoever everything is permissible. Second order: scepticism about the status of first order moral claims. e.g. There are no moral entities in virtue of which moral claims are true (or false). e.g. There are no objective moral values. [This second order moral scepticism is Mackie s own view.]
Mackie s Scepticism Scepticism vs. Subjectivism Mackie s Scepticism Scepticism vs. Subjectivism Mackie does not characterise his view as moral subjectivism due to concerns about ambiguity even at the second order level: Subjectivism First order: everyone ought to act according to his/her own conscience. Second order: the view that first order moral claims are in some sense subjective. e.g. Helping people in need is right means I approve of helping people in need. e.g. Mackie s moral scepticism. i.e. The primarily negative view that there are no objective moral entities, properties or relations; moral values are not out there in the world independently of valuers.
Initial Questions Initial Questions What is Williams s main thesis or conclusion? Which terms are important in this article?
Varieties of Objectivism Varieties of Objectivism Objectivism Williams distinguishes two kinds of ethical objectivism: objectivism 1 : in this sense, ethical objectivism is the view that the ethical is analogous to the scientific; that ethical knowledge is relevantly similar to scientific knowledge; and that there are ethical truths in much the same way that there are scientific truths. objectivism 2 : in this sense, ethical objectivism is the view that the nature of human begins provides a common basis for shared ethical understanding independent of cultural and individual differences.
Varieties of Convergence Varieties of Convergence World-Guided Concepts A concept is world-guided if correct usage tracks truth. e.g. Lucy is a cat. The concept cat is correctly applied to Lucy iff Lucy is, in fact, a cat. If you don t understand that cat is supposed to pick out a feature of the world, then you don t really understand the concept at all. (Perhaps you think it is a term of endearment or an honorific.) Of course, you could be mistaken or lying without misunderstanding the concept. In fact, you cannot use the concept to tell a lie unless you understand it as world-guided.
Varieties of Convergence Varieties of Convergence Williams argues that scientific claims are world-guided: they are true or false in virtue of how the world actually is.
Varieties of Convergence Varieties of Convergence Action-Guiding Concepts A concept is action-guiding if its role is to guide action. e.g. Torture is wrong. The concept wrong is action-guiding. The claim is perfectly consistent with there being lots and lots of torture. It is about what oughtn t to be done or what would be bad to do. No amount of torture or lack of torture would show the claim to be false as it is not supposed to track truth in that sense it is not hostage to how things actually are.
Varieties of Convergence Varieties of Convergence Williams argues that ethical claims are action-guiding: the world needs to fit them rather than their fitting the world!
Varieties of Convergence Varieties of Convergence Convergence Williams understands these two types of ethical objectivism in terms of two kinds of convergence: Convergence 1 : ethical objectivism 1 is the view that (properly conducted) ethical enquiries will converge and that this convergence can be explained by the way that the world actually is. c.f. We can explain why independent enquirers have converged on a view of the Earth as round by noting that the Earth is round and that scientific enquiry is world-guided i.e. aimed at truth. Convergence 2 : ethical objectivism 2 is the view that (properly conducted) ethical enquiries will converge and that this convergence can be explained by the nature of human beings.
A Disanalogy A Disanalogy Williams s Prognosis Williams argues that: 1. and scientific enquiry are importantly disanalogous. 2. objectivism 1 is unintelligible. We cannot even imagine how ethical enquiry could converge in virtue of how the world actually is. 3. objectivism 2 is intelligible but probably incorrect. We can understand how ethical enquiry could converge in virtue of our nature as human beings but it is unlikely that ethical enquiry actually will converge. Most of Williams s argument focuses on establishing claim 1. Claim 2 plays an important role in his argument for 1.
Initial Analysis Initial Analysis What is the logical structure of Williams s argument?
Virtue ble ss i Per mi Et h ible iss Im per m al hic l ica Un et V i ce First Objection We cannot explain convergence in the scientific case in terms of how the world actually is. I No conception of the world will do b/c it will either build our beliefs in or be entirely empty. i.e. The world : all the stuff we believe in e.g. grass, quasars and violins. or The world : independent of any representation of it i.e. nothing can be said of it at all. b
Virtue ble ss i Per mi Et h ible iss Im per m al hic l ica Un et V i ce Williams replies by distinguishing two conceptions of the world : Our particular conception The absolute conception b
Second Objection enquiry can be understood as converging where convergence is explained by how the world actually is. Definition (Thick Concepts) Substantive or thick ethical concepts are: both world-guided; and action-guiding.
Thick ethical concepts are both world-guided and action-guiding.
The objection, then, is that: Thick ethical concepts are world-guided. So, convergence in ethical enquiry can be explained by how the world is. e.g. We agree that Luke Skywalker is brave because Luke Skywalker is brave. i.e. Luke behaves in brave ways, is appropriately motivated etc.
Possible reply: Thick ethical concepts such as brave actually consist of two distinct elements: 1. a world-guided, descriptive element; e.g. Luke fights rather than leaving the scene etc. 2. an action-guiding, prescriptive element: e.g. Stay to fight rather than fleeing! etc.
Problem: Doubtful we can separate the world-guided and action-guiding elements out. How we describe the world ethically is as much a matter of what we value as of how the world is.
Williams: True that somebody cannot use our term brave without understanding something about the behaviour/character we value as brave. But somebody could understand our usage, could know how to use our thick ethical concepts without endorsing that usage. i.e. Somebody could understand our think ethical concepts without being able to (sincerely) make the same claims as us.
Is this somebody committed to saying that we are mistaken? cf Imagine a culture which believes that aliens called Frebbles visited Earth and founded their religion. We can understand their claim that The Frebbles told us what to write in our Holy Books ; we can be predict when people may say We must do this in obedience to the Frebbles and when such claims will be accepted as reasons for action. We, however, cannot appeal to the Frebbles authority as a reason for action because we do not accept that they existed.
We would view people s appeals the Frebbles as mistaken. We could say, These people believe that the Frebbles visited them in the past but this is false. That is, we would argue that they do not have knowledge of the Frebbles. They have false scientific beliefs. But in other cases, there is no inconsistency with the results of scientific enquiry.
Reflective Enquiry & the Unexamined Life Reflective Enquiry & the Unexamined Life Recall Mackie s first and second orders. Williams argues that: First-order ethical claims torture is wrong, courage is good can be known. The social worlds we construct produce this knowledge. Such claims are true (or false) within a particular way of life and particular ethical practice. Second-order ethical enquiry destroys first-order ethical knowledge. i.e. reflection undermines first-order knowledge. Second-order ethical enquiry cannot yield second-order knowledge. i.e. reflection undermines first-order knowledge and fails to produce second-order knowledge.
Reflective Enquiry & the Unexamined Life Reflective Enquiry & the Unexamined Life Williams claims: Reflection on scientific practice reinforces/produces scientific knowledge. Reflection on ethical practice undermines/destroys ethical knowledge.
Reflective Enquiry & the Unexamined Life Reflective Enquiry & the Unexamined Life Hence, The disanalogy between the scientific and the ethical is not just a matter of what justifies scientific or ethical claims. It is not just a matter of how likely convergence is or what would explain convergence. The disanalogy extends to the effects of reflection. It goes to the heart of philosophical enquiry: Socrates claimed that the unexamined life was not worth living. If Williams is right, then the examined ethical life involves little knowledge. Socrates might be unsurprised by that claim. But if Williams is right, then the unexamined ethical life is remarkably knowledgeable. Socrates would, I think, be rather more surprised by that claim.
Reflective Enquiry & the Unexamined Life Reflective Enquiry & the Unexamined Life Williams: There would be a radical difference between ethics and science, even if ethics were objective in the only way in which it intelligibly could be 1. However, this does not mean... that there is no ethical knowledge. There is some, and in the less reflective past there has been more. (155) 1 Williams is referring to what I called ethical objectivism 2.