Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion

Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion

Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion General Editors: D. Z. Phillips, Rush Rhees Research Professor, Umversity of Wales, Swansea and Danforth Professor of the Philosophy of Religion, the Claremont Graduate School, California; Timothy Tessin At a time when discussions of religion are becoming increasingly specialized and determined by religious affiliations, it is important to maintain a forum for philosophical discussion which transcends the allegiances of belief and unbelief. This series affords an opportunity for philosophers of widely differing persuasions to explore central issues in the philosophy of religion. Titles include: Stephen T. Davis (editor) PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE D. Z. Phillips (editor) CAN RELIGION BE EXPLAINED AWAY? D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin (editors) KANT AND KIERKEGAARD ON RELIGION RELIGION WITHOUT TRANSCENDENCE? RELIGION AND HUME'S LEGACY Timothy Tessin and Mario von der Ruhr (editors) PHILOSOPHY AND THE GRAMMAR OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion Series Standing Order ISBN 978-0-333-71465-2 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles m this senes as they are published by placmg a standmg order. Please contact your bookseller or, m case of difficulty, write to us at the address below With your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer ServiCes Department, Macmillan DistributiOn Ltd, Houndmills, Basmgstoke, Hampshue RG21 6XS, England

Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion Edited by D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin

First published in Great Bntain 2000 by MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-0-333-79023-6 First published in the United States of America 2000 by ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 978-1-349-62908-4 ISBN 978-1-349-62906-0 (ebook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-62906-0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kant and Kierkegaard on religion / edited by D.Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin. p. cm. - (Claremont studies in the philosophy of religion) Includes bibliographical references and index. I. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804-Religion-Congresses. 2. Kierkegaard, Siilren, 1813-1855-Religion-Congresses 3. Religion-Philosophy-History -Congresses. I. Phillips, D. Z. (Dewi Zephaniah) II. Tessin, Timothy. III. Series. B2799.R4 K35 2000 210'.92'2-dc21 99-086014 Selection and editorial matter D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin 2000 Text Claremont Graduate School 2000 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2000 978-0-312-23234-4 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or m accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be Identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustamed forest sources. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00

Contents Acknowledgements vii Notes on the Contributors viii Introduction: Why Kant and Kierkegaard? xi D. Z. Phillips Part I Kant, Kierkegaard and Metaphysics 1 1 Kant and Kierkegaard on the Possibility of Metaphysics 3 C. Stephen Evans 2 Kant and Kierkegaard on the Possibility of Metaphysics - a Reply to Professor Evans 25 Michael Weston Voices in Discussion 45 D. Z. Phillips Part II Leaving Room for Faith 3 Faith Not without Reason: Kant, Kierkegaard and Religious Belief Jerry H. Gill 4 Making Room for Faith - Possibility and Hope M. Jamie Ferreira Voices in Discussion D. Z. Phillips Part III The Individual 5 The Individual' in Kant and Kierkegaard R. Z. Friedman 6 'The Individual' in Kant and Kierkegaard- a Reply Hilary Bok Voices in Discussion D. Z. Phillips 53 55 73 89 93 95 107 122 v

vi Contents Part IV Religion and Morality 129 7 Kant and Kierkegaard on the Need for a Historical Faith: an Imaginary Dialogue 131 Ronald M. Green 8 The Ethical and the Religious as Law and Gospel 153 Jack Verheyden Voices in Discussion 178 D. Z. Phillips Part V Eternal Life 185 9 Kant and Kierkegaard on Eternal Life 187 John H. Whittaker 10 Kant and Kierkegaard on Eternal Life- a Reply 207 Mario von der Ruhr Voices in Discussion 236 D. Z. Phillips Part VI Philosophy of Religion after Kant and Kierkegaard 243 11 Philosophy of Religion after Kant and Kierkegaard 245 Stephen Palmquist 12 Kant's Divine Command Theory and its Reception within Analytic Philosophy 263 John E. Hare 13 Dialectic of Salvation in Solidarity 278 Anselm Kyongsuk Min Voices in Discussion 295 D. Z. Phillips Index 301

Acknowledgements The symposia in the present collection were presented at the 1998 Philosophy of Religion conference at Claremont Graduate University. These conferences, the present one being held, the past one being seen through the press, and the future one being planned, need administrative support each side of the Atlantic. I am extremely grateful to Helen Baldwin, Secretary to the Department of Philosophy, University of Wales, Swansea, and to Jackie Huntzinger, Secretary to the Department of Religion, Claremont Graduate University, for all their help. I also want to thank the invaluable help given by graduate students during the conference. Special thanks are due to my research assistant John Lee for organizing this help so ably. The conference would not be possible without financial support. I gratefully acknowledge the generosity of Claremont Graduate University, Pomona College, and Claremont McKenna College in this respect. Most of the royalties from Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion go to the fund which supports the conferences. I am grateful to the participants, not only for their contributions, but for their agreement which makes this support possible. D. Z. P. Claremont vii

Notes on the Contributors Hilary Bok is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pomona College. She is the author of Freedom and Responsibility. C. Stephen Evans is Professor of Philosophy and Dean for Research and Scholarship at Calvin College. His recent publications include The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith, Passionate Reason and Faith Beyond Reason. M. Jamie Ferreira is a Professor of Philosophy of Religion in the Departments of Religion and Philosophy, University of Virginia. She is the author of Doubt and Religious Commitment: the Role of the Will in Newman's Thought, Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt: the British Naturalist Tradition and Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith. R. Z. Friedman is Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Toronto. His publications include papers on Kant, Kierkegaard, Maimonides, Freud and Nietzsche. jerry H. Gill is semi-retired and is presently Adjunct Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Pima County Community College and Academic Co-ordinator of Borderlands Theological Center, both in Tucson, Arizona. His publications include A Mediated Transcendence: a Post Modern Reflection, Learning to Learn: Towards a Philosophy of Education, Merleau-Ponty and Metaphor, If a Chimpanzie Could Talk and Other Reflections on Language and The Tacit Mode: Michael Polanyi's Post-Modem Philosophy. Ronald M. Green is John Phillips Professor of Religion at Dartmouth College and Director of Dartmouth's Ethics Institute. His publications include Religion and Moral Reason, Kierkegaard and Kant: the Hidden Debt and over a hundred papers in scholarly journals. john Hare teaches at Calvin College, Michigan. He is the author of The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits and God's Assistance and papers in scholarly journals on Augustine, Kant and Kierkegaard. viii

Notes on the Contributors ix Anselm Kyongsuk Min is Professor of Religion at Claremont Graduate University. He is the author of Dialectic of Salvation: Issues in Theology of Liberation and co-author of Korean Catholicism in the 1970's. He has published numerous articles on Hegel, Levinas, religious pluralism and various areas of systematic theology. Stephen Palmquist is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Hong Kong Baptist University. His publications include Kant's System of Perspectives, Four Neglected Essays by Immanuel Kant and The Tree of Philosophy. As well as many scholarly papers, mostly on Kant, he has also constructed an award-winning web site, located at http:// www.hkbu.edu.hk/-ppp/. D. Z. Phillips is Danforth Professor of Philosophy of Religion at Claremont Graduate University and Rush Rhees Research Professor, University of Wales, Swansea. He is the author of The Concept of Prayer, Faith and Philosophical Enquiry, Death and Immortality, Moral Practices (with H. 0. Mounce), Sense and Delusion (with Ilham Dilman), Athronyddu am Grefydd, Through a Darkening Glass, Belief, Change and Forms of Life, R. S. Thomas: Poet of the Hidden God, Faith After Foundationalism, From Fantasy to Faith, Interventions in Ethics, Wittgenstein and Religion, Writers of Wales: f. R. Jones, Introducing Philosophy, Recovering Religious Concepts and Philosophy's Cool Place. He is editor of Swansea Studies in Philosophy, of Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, and of the journal, Philosophical Investigations. He is editing the work of Rush Rhees. Mario von der Ruhr is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Wales, Swansea. He is co-editor of Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief and contributor to Can Religion Be Explained Away? in this series. He has also contributed to a collection on Particularity and Commonality in Ethics. Jack Verheyden is Richard Cain Professor of Theology and Ecclesiology at the School of Theology at Claremont and Professor of Religion at the Claremont Graduate University. He has worked extensively in nineteenth century philosophy of religion and theology, especially in the thought of Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard. Michael Weston is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Essex. He is the author of Morality and the Self and Kierkegaard and Modem Continental Philosophy as well as articles on religion, ethics and the philosophy of literature.

x Notes on the Contributors John W. Whittaker is a Professor of Philosophy and Director of Religious Studies Program, Louisiana State University. He is the author of Matters of Faith and Matters of Principle: Religious Truth Claims and Their Logic and The Logic of Religious Persuasion.

Introduction: Why Kant and Kierkegaard? In 1997 the Claremont Conference on Philosophy of Religion was on religion and Hume's legacy. 1 No one raised an eyebrow at the appropriateness of the topic, so obvious was it to all concerned. Not so in 1998, when we discussed Kant and Kierkegaard on religion. Why bring these two together? After all, is not Kant the advocate of a rational moral theology, and is not Kierkegaard the irrationalist par excellence where religion is concerned? Whether one thinks this is a genuine contrast, or a caricature, the reaction to it is misplaced. This is because, in arriving at their mature views, Kant and Kierkegaard raise issues which still dominate contemporary philosophy of religion. This is evident in the contributions of the symposiasts in the present collection. No doubt these issues are discussed after Kant and Kierkegaard by many thinkers of lesser stature. But that gives us all the more reason to return to them for enlightenment. This does not mean that we will agree with everything these thinkers say, but, in philosophy, much of what we learn comes from working out why we disagree with something that has been said. The symposiasts in this collection disagree, not simply with various features in Kant's and Kierkegaard's thought, but with each other. This made for a lively conference and has made for an equally lively collection. In this brief introduction, I shall simply list what I take to be the main issues which the study of Kant and Kierkegaard forces us to face. I shall do so without naming any of the symposiasts. The first issue concerns the relation of religious belief to metaphysics. Is either Kant or Kierkegaard an enemy of metaphysics? The question is not meant to imply that either would say that one learns nothing from discussing metaphysical questions. The crucial issue is whether one gives metaphysical answers to them. It is generally agreed that Kant and Kierkegaard deny that we can have a theoretical knowledge of God. God's reality is not to be found among the things we can be said to know. Religious people say that they believe in God, rather than that they know that he exists; we have to do with belief rather than knowledge. Were it otherwise, it is said, we would be robbed of our freedom with respect to God. There would be no possibility of coming to believe, struggling to believe, or losing hold on belief, if this were the case. The xi

xii Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion matter would be settled, once and for all. But things are not like this. Kant says that what we can know is to be found within our experience and the categories of human consciousness. God is not to be found there. Kierkegaard agrees, saying that we have no objective certainty of God's existence. Kant and Kierkegaard are not content with noting what cannot be said of God. They also offer alternative, positive accounts. Kant says that belief in God, as it actually operates, is to be found, not in the realm of theoretical reason, but in the realm of practical reason. Kierkegaard says that the kind of truth to be found in religion is a matter of subjectivity. Kant and Kierkegaard emphasize the importance of the character of our beliefs in practice. They ought to be free of impurity and self-deception. The problem facing us is that philosophers who seem to agree with these conclusions on the surface mean very different things by them, or, at least, draw very different conclusions from them. These differences take us to the heart of disputes in contemporary philosophy of religion. When Kant says that religious belief is to be found in the realm of practical reason, and Kierkegaard connects faith with subjectivity, some philosophers do not take them to be denying the metaphysical truth of God's reality. Religious belief, rather than knowledge, is what is open to us as finite beings. Some philosophers embrace the view that we are not only finite, but fallen, our reason being as impaired as other aspects of our nature. We know in part, and see through a glass darkly. It may be experience that gives us reason to have religious hopes, but, it is insisted, what we hope is theoretically determinable; it is simply that it cannot be determined during our earthly existence. We have good reason to trust that 'how things are' is such-and-such, but we cannot know 'how things are'. 'How things are' is quite independent of what we say and think. As far as religion is concerned, we are put to the test by being asked to believe now what we shall know later. This view, and various relations to it, is often called realism. It is sometimes said, against such a view, that it offers no way of determining the right to say that we shall know certain things when this life is over- that we shall know how things are. We do not know how to go about either agreeing or disagreeing with this claim. In reply, however, it is said that this criticism is a form of verificationism. It assumes that whatever we cannot verify is unimaginable. In reply it is said that since I can imagine what is false, I can clearly imagine what is unverifiable. In religious belief we may have experiential grounds for believing that

Introduction xiii something is, or will be, the case, although we cannot know that it is, or will be, the case. This is so where God's existence and immortality are concerned. As against this view it is argued that Kant can be seen, and Kierkegaard would be seen, as marking out the conceptual space that religion occupies. Thus, Kant would be seen as saying that religious belief is a practical, moral belief of a certain kind. It is true that Kant says that belief in God's existence and immortality arise from reflection on our moral experience, but it is important to remember that the beliefs so generated are themselves practical, regulative ideas. It would be confused to search for their theoretical counterparts, since that places the beliefs in a category to which they do not belong. Similarly, when Kierkegaard says that God's existence is objectively uncertain, he is not referring to an inadequacy on our part, to be contrasted with the certain existence of God in itself. Rather, he is saying that in the objective, factual realm the most we get are uncertainties. But an uncertain God does not meet the requirements of faith. The 'God' of faith is the God who could only be experienced, or be conceived of, in the realm of subjectivity. It would not make sense to talk of God in the objective realm. The 'objective' realm is not one which has any priority over 'subjectivity'. 'Existence' is made up of many realms and it is important not to confuse them. The philosophical realist wants to speak of a reality which transcends any conceivable realm, but the attempt to do so is vacuous. The objection is not to distinguishing between the real and the unreal, but to the assumption that that distinction is simply given. We have to look to the ways this distinction is used to see what it comes to - and it doesn't come to the same thing in every context. When it is said that we cannot do anything with a context-free conception of 'the real' or 'existence', this is not an instance of verificationism. Rather, it is the exposure of the illusion that concepts can have a meaning free of the surroundings, the applications, in which they have their sense. The philosophical difference I have outlined affects the second issue of the sense in which Kant and Kierkegaard leave room for faith. It could be put, from one point of view, by saying that Kant and Kierkegaard tried to extend our conceptions of rationality. They are no longer seen as philosophers who, because religious belief is not rational, try to locate it in alternative accommodation. Rather, they attempt to show that an attempt at a purely rational defence of religion is subject to a rational critique, whereas a resort to the irrational is simply irresponsible. It must make a difference whether we believe in one thing rather than another. In this way, we are shown possibilities that we would miss otherwise.

xiv Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion The context-free metaphysical concept of 'the real' is abandoned on this view. Let me put the issue in a non-kantian way. Suppose that instead of the categories of human consciousness, or the limits of human experience, we speak of the kinds of discourse we find in our language. It is then important to recognize that the forms of discussion do not say anything, or describe anything. We make descriptions, and say something in a form of discourse. Our descriptions and statements may be true or false, but the discourse in which we agree is the condition of making true or false statements. Thus, it is within our agreements about colours that we can make true or false statements about the colours of things. I may say 'This is red', pointing to a colour chart. This is one way of teaching the meaning of the word 'red'. I am not describing anything. I am giving a rule for the use of the word. But when I say, 'That box is red', I am not talking about the word 'red', but about the colour of the box. Similarly, religious language is where we find the meaning of the word 'God'. But when we praise God we are not talking about language, but praising God. But there is one big difference between this case and our previous example. If I say 'There is no red box here' I am using the same form of discourse as someone who says, 'There is a red box here'. But when I say 'There is no God' I am rejecting a kind of reality. I am saying that a spiritual reality means nothing. This is not like making a negative statement within a form of discourse. It is the rejection of a whole form of discourse. What bearing does this have on Kant? It has a great bearing, and affects many of the issues the symposiasts go on to discuss. As we have seen, Kant locates religious belief, not in the realm of theoretical reason, but in the realm of practical reason. In that latter realm, however, the belief is said to be generated by reflection on the moral gap between what we are and what we ought to be, and the gap between virtue and happiness. It is in this way, it is said, that we are led to postulate immortality, in which, presumably, the moral gap may be, at least, made less; and to postulate God's existence, since God is the only one who can bring about the marriage between virtue and happiness. How are these postulates to be understood? If we take the realm of practical reason to be a form of discourse in the sense already discussed, then any postulate made within it should share the logic of the discourse in question. If 'the existence of God' and 'immortality' are postulates of practical reason, it seems that the logic of these expressions should be the same as that of the discourse in which they are made. If,

Introduction xv however, the hopes refer to states of affairs which have a theoretical status, even if they cannot be verified in this life, we have the difficulty of ascribing hopes, which have 'theoretical' states of affairs as their objects, to a form of discourse in which such hopes are not supposed to make sense. In this way, Kant would be seen as reintroducing theoretical beliefs into the context of practical reason to which, initially, they were said not to apply. It is argued, in this connection, that there is a difference between Kant's first Critique and the second Critique. In the former, religious belief is treated as a logical possibility, but in the second Critique, we are told, God and immortality are offered as real possibilities. But it is the possibility of a hope. What is more, reflection on the moral law shows that this hope is a necessary one. It follows from the nature of the moral law. Kant, it is said, is a minimalist in this respect. He offers us the necessary possibility of a real hope although it cannot be justified theoretically. Yet, even if we grant that Kant is a minimalist in this sense, I do not see how it circumvents the question of the nature of the hope that is a necessary possibility, or the question of the nature of the object of the hope. As we saw in the discussion, some could accept this minimalist picture by asserting that the God and immortality hoped for, while not theoretically justifiable here, will be theoretically justifiable in the hereafter. In that case, there is no grammatical difference between what is discussed theoretically in the first Critique and what is the object of a practical hope in the second Critique. This would mark a real philosophical difference from those who see Kant elucidating a different grammatical sphere in the second Critique. A parallel disagreement arises in the treatment of Kierkegaard in our discussion of faith. The issue can be put in this way: we have already noted that if we had theoretical knowledge of what is now faith, it would be a denial of our freedom. Are we to understand this as meaning that what we believe, say that God exists, does have a theoretical status, but that this is denied us in this life, so that we may be free to believe or not through faith? Or are we to say that turning spiritual reality into theoretical knowledge destroys its very character and that is what faith recognizes? It does not make sense, on the latter view, to speak of these matters in theoretical terms. This was a central issue for the conference, as it is in contemporary philosophy of religion. I suspect that these issues cannot be resolved in Kantian terms. It would require, as some symposiasts suggest, a rejection of the dualism between the phenomenal and the noumenal which lies behind many of these problems. I am reminded of

xvi Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion similar difficulties which Wittgenstein faced in the Tractatus in his distinction between the ethical, transcendent will, and the phenomenal will. He wanted the former to make a real difference to the lives people lead, but to make that difference it would have to do so in the ordinary world from which he had banished it, on the mistaken assumption that the will was an event antecedent to an action, subject, like all actions, to causal laws. Similarly, Kant's postulates of freedom, God and immortality may require the same radical change of outlook concerning human activity that Wittgenstein underwent after the Tractatus. But this is a matter I mention for further reflection and cannot be pursued here. There is an additional difficulty in Kant's claims that led to a third issue, namely, the relation of morality and religion. As we have seen, Kant holds that reflecting on morality necessarily leads to a hope of God and immortality. This claim depends on viewing morality as a homogeneous phenomenon. Once we grant the heterogeneity of morals such a claim becomes problematic. Any morality would not lead in this direction. It is argued that in Kant and Kierkegaard we see attempts to come to belief in God via a concern with the self. Such an attempt, it is said, is doomed to failure. What needs emphasizing is not an attempted ascent from the self to God, but a God-centred perspective from the outset. The conclusion is that we look in vain for such a perspective in Kant and Kierkegaard. How are we to react to this view? The symposiasts do so in different ways. On the one hand, there is the view that there is indeed a similarity between Kant and Kierkegaard in what they say about the individual's moral will, but that is how it should be. Both emphasize the ideal of integrity and freedom from impurity and self-deception. Both are realistic, however, and realize that our moral endeavours are permeated with risk and uncertainty. Having said that, however, it is argued that, in some respects, Kant is superior to Kierkegaard. Willing the good, in Kierkegaard, can be read in one of two ways. The first is a disaster, namely, to claim that as long as we will with infinite passion, we are guaranteed to do the right thing. The second is more promising, namely, to claim that, as a matter of fact, it is only by willing in this way that right actions get done. What the second alternative does not give us is any reason why we should will in this way in the first place. Kant has a conception of an objectively right answer that we do not find in Kierkegaard. So while there may be huge differences between what Kant and Kierkegaard say about Christ, they are similar in what they say about the individual.

Introduction xvii A very different reaction denies that Kant's notion of the objectively right answer makes sense. Kant's notion comes from the assumption that morality is a homogeneous phenomenon. But a comparison of a religious morality with the dominant picture of morality in Kant's Groundwork should disabuse us of that fact. The most striking contrast in Kierkegaard is to be found in his discussion of God's command to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, and Abraham's faith that, somehow or other, God would give Isaac back to him. I am not sure we know now what to make of child sacrifice, or what its significance was. Symposiasts differed in their understanding of it, but I think we should heed Kierkegaard's, or his pseudonym's, warning not to take the shudder out of any account we give. Whatever of that, it would be hard to find any place for the notion of the teleological suspension of the ethical in Kant's thought. Similar issues arise when we turn to Christianity itself. It seems difficult there to separate what one thinks of the individual from what one thinks of Christ. For the Christian, it is in Christ that he lives, and moves and has his being. As one contributor said, 'Maybe there is a teleological suspension of the ethical every time God looks on us.' God is said to look on us, not as we deserve to be looked at, but in the forgiveness of grace. Kierkegaard brings out the difference in the Philosophical Fragments in his discussion of the difference between following Socrates and following Christ. Although we will probably fail, it makes sense to attempt to follow Socrates. But if Christ is the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world, how can we follow that? The grace of Christ informs the Christian's very conception of endeavour, whereas, for Kant, Jesus does not really become more than a moral exemplar, although we are said to benefit from the moral surplus he accrues. Both Kant and Kierkegaard recognize the fact of radical evil, but Jesus becomes the exemplar of the moral rededication which Kant saw as the means of salvation. Kierkegaard, it is said, turns Kant's argument against itself since how can grace be available if we do not believe in the divinity of Christ? Kant was afraid of easy grace, and this fear contributed to his making Jesus no more than a moral exemplar. The differences between Kant and Kierkegaard can be brought out if we remember that what comes between them is Romanticism, with its emphasis on individuality. Kierkegaard transforms this notion in his treatment of the individual before God. The background for his work is the Lutheran Confession. Kierkegaard argues that just as reason did not prevent Abraham from believing, so Lutherans did not think that the rejection of transubstantiation should lead to calling the bread and

xviii Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion wine mere symbols or metaphors. Reason does not prevent one from assenting to the words, 'This is my body' and 'This is my blood'. It may be said that Kant on grace is very much work in progress, but his conception of grace seems to be that of a 'top-up' by God after we have done what we can. The Christian conception of grace, however, expresses a very different conception of God's relation to the world. For Kant we have to be worthy of grace by virtue of our general moral disposition. By contrast, in Christianity the gift of grace is a mystery. Some contributors think that this reference to mystery simply refers to our ignorance about how it works. Others, however, disagree and regard 'mystery' as a category in its own right. It refers to the 'given' character of grace. There is no underlying explanation. It is as though we are offered a way of looking at ourselves and are told, 'There it is! It is offered freely! Grasp it lovingly.' These issues lead naturally to a discussion of the kind of hope involved in belief in eternal life. Some symposiasts argue that we are led down a confused path if we think this hope concerns the prediction that a soulsubstance will enjoy endless duration after death. They argue that both notions are conceptually confused. Others agree that the former notion is confused, but still think that the idea of some kind of bodily survival after death makes sense, as does the notion of endless duration. The latter idea certainly deserves further attention, since its intelligibility is simply taken for granted. Some symposiasts thought it important to distinguish between two senses of hope. In one case, we hope for something unrealized on the basis of our present limitations. In the other sense of hope, it is a spirit one abides in. In terms of this distinction, hope is either seen as a hope for survival after death, or as a dwelling in the eternal, dwelling in eternal verities. Even within the second conception there can be disagreement about the nature of the abiding. A dispute we have mentioned previously returns: is grace an enabling gift which allows us to progress further than we would unaided; or is grace a gift in terms of which we understand our lives whether we progress or not, an understanding which is our God-given salvation? Within the second alternative, there is a temptation to emphasize the eternal present at the expense of death as the end of all things. This need not be the case, since death still occupies an extremely important position as 'the end of all things' which marks the eternal destiny of the soul, what I am for all eternity. The main issue, however, is whether acceptability in God's eyes depends on a redirection of the will or whether acceptability is rooted in the Godgiven possibility of our being seen other than we deserve ethically.

Introduction xix I have said enough already to indicate the kinds of questions which Kant and Kierkegaard have bequeathed to us. In the case of Kant, the problems are a result of his epistemology. In the first Critique we are given the limits of perception, but in the second Critique, according to some symposiasts, we are allowed to peep over them, by means of what is called the practical realm. As we have already seen, this notion of 'peeping over the boundaries' is logically problematic. Little wonder that what we are supposed to find there has no clear epistemic status. Do we find an answer to this problem by extending the Kantian tradition via a new conception, the analytic a posteriori, or by questioning Kant's epistemological notion of boundaries and his distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal? When we turn to Kant in the analytic tradition, it is difficult to recognize the philosopher for whom, even in the Groundwork, moral obligations were the commands of God. We mistakenly see Kant as subject to the dilemma of a Divine Command Theory Ethics: is it good because God wills it, or does God will it because it is good? Again, Kant is often seen as someone who contradicts his initially austere ethic of duty, with a late appeal to eternal happiness as the telos of moral action. Is it not important to see Kant in the pietistic context he grew up in? If this were done, we might find conceptual space in his work for the notion of submissive autonomy in relation to God. Having said that, however, we would still need to discuss whether the conceptual space provided by Kant does justice to the notion of grace in Christianity. Looking at the contributions to the collection, it is clear that while some symposiasts see Kant and Kierkegaard as far apart, others want to emphasize what they have in common. While some see the task of going beyond them as extending their tradition or traditions, others see our need as one of recasting the dualisms they find in these authors. Both Kant and Kierkegaard, it is argued, need to give more attention to the coercive force of social conditions, the political significance of religion and the religious significance of politics, and to the dangers of too sharp a distinction between the secular and the sacred. These future needs are not supposed to convince those without faith. They are addressed to Christians in the modern world. This raises a more general issue which appeared at various points in the papers and in the discussions of them: the nature of moral philosophy and what it makes sense to expect of it. Some symposiasts welcomed the fact that Christian philosophers have gone beyond the notion of philosophy as disinterested inquiry. What they objected to most in this view of philosophy was the view

xx Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion that one should divest one's inquiries of any semblance of personal commitment. They saw this as one result of the secularization of our times. Others argued that this is an inaccurate reflection of post-nietzschean European philosophy which has sought, whether successfully or not, to free religion from dependence on metaphysics, something of which Kierkegaard would have approved. Yet, some argued, within this tradition, teaching has an ethical purpose. If Kierkegaard is taught well, it is claimed, the lives of students are transformed. They are brought to see what is involved in 'choosing a self'. In a related way, others welcomed the change in the philosophy of religion in the sixties when, under the auspices of the Society for Christian Philosophers, Christians no longer felt the need to be defensive about religion. Others questioned whether this is as great a progress as some imagine; whether the academy at large is engaged in the discussion of religion as it was in the discussion of religious language from the fifties to the seventies. Is there not a danger of philosophers separating off from each other within perspectives whose presuppositions do not need to be criticized? This is a question which calls for further examination. Some contributors argued for a contemplative conception of philosophy, one which is born of wonder at the variety of the world and is engaged in open-ended dialogue concerning it. This contemplative conception does not entail the view that all perspectives can be assessed in terms of common evidence or a common rationality. In this introduction, I mention the main issues which you will find in the papers and the discussion. I do not apologise for repeating them, since my purpose, after all, is to give an indication, at this stage, of the topics which are discussed in far greater detail in the collection. As you see, each symposium is followed by a discussion. The discussions are the result of notes I took during the conference. They do not purport to be exact accounts of what various contributors said, and that is why I have used letters instead of names in the discussions. My aim is to give you some indication of the discussions which took place. Most reviewers of previous volumes have found that the discussions added to the value of the collection. I hope that will be found to be the case in the present volume. Up until the previous volume, I included 'Voices in Discussion' as one long essay at the conclusion of the volume. At the suggestion of a reviewer, however, I began placing 'Voices in Discussion' at the end of each symposium. My method is not without its flaws. In some cases, it

Introduction xxi is easy to identify the speaker to whom my letter refers, but, for obvious reasons, that cannot be avoided. One reviewer noted that the letters outnumber the symposiasts. This is because in each session an opportunity was given for contributions from the audience. Sometimes, when the same point is elaborated, or a closely related one is made, I have not hesitated to place it under a single voice if this is philosophically or stylistically desirable. That has been done less in the present volume, however, than in those published previously. The Voices do not take into account changes in the papers after the conference. Having come to the end of this collection, you may find yourself among those who think we need to go beyond Kant and Kierkegaard. What is clear, however, is that it is extremely difficult to go round them. Along with Hume, they have determined many of the issues which still have to be faced in contemporary philosophy of religion. Of course, we can ignore their questions, but we would be all the poorer for doing so. Note 1. Religion and Hume's Legacy, ed. D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin (Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1999).