IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION THE WAY INTERNATIONAL, Plaintiff, vs. JAMES TRIMM and SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF NAZARENE JUDAISM, Defendants. CASE NO. 4:09-cv-00338-A JUDGE JOHN MCBRYDE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS JAMES SCOTT TRIMM AND SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF NAZARENE JUDAISM S MOTION TO DISMISS MADE PURSUANT TO RULES 12(b(1 AND (6 Larry Meadows Texas Bar No. 24010835 P.O. Box 1084 Brownwood, Texas 76804 (325 200-4420 (512 287-3130 Email: lm@meadowsllp.com ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS JAMES TRIMM AND SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF NAZARENE JUDAISM March 8, 2010 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION 4 II. III. STATEMENT OF THE LAW REGARDING ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTRINE AND PROPERTY DISPUTES EACH OF PLAINTIFF S ALLEGED CAUSES OF ACTION CHALLENGES ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTRINE IN SCRIPTURE INTERPRETATION; ADDITIONALLY, ALL OF PLAINTIFF S ALLEGED CAUSES OF ACTION FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM FOR WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED 11 15 VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 15 2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES United States Supreme Court Cases Page Attorney General v. Federal Street Meeting-house, 66 U.S. 262. 12 Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116. Pp. 720-724 (1952 Maryland & Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367 (1970 Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969 15 12 8 8, 9, 12-14 Serbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963 374 U.S. 398 5 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13Wall. 679 (1871 U.S. Constitution U.S. Const. Amend. I 8, 12, 13, 14 11 Bible 1 Cor. 2:12-16 6 James 1:5 6 1 John 2:27 6 2 Tim. 2:15 10 Concordances The Concordance to the Peshitta Version of the Aramaic New Testament; Published by The Way International 5 3
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS JAMES SCOTT TRIMM AND SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF NAZARENE JUDAISM S MOTION TO DISMISS MADE PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b(1 AND (6 TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE COURT: Defendants James Scott Trimm and Society for the Advancement of Nazarene Judaism (SANJ file this Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b(1 and (6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and would respectfully show the following: I. INTRODUCTION The Way International ( TWI filed this suit under the Court s Copyright jurisdiction, seeking recovery of damages and an injunction against James Scott Trimm and SANJ, for alleged copyright infringement and other related causes of action in relation to the Aramaic English Interlinear New Testament ( AEINT. The Way International ( TWI filed this suit, under the Court s copyright law jurisdiction, seeking recovery of damages from and injunction against The Society for the Advancement of Nazarene Judaism ( SANJ and its president, James Scott Trimm. TWI claims copyright infringement by James Scott Trimm and SANJ. TWI states in their Original Complaint: 8. TWI is a non denominational biblical research, teaching and fellowship ministry. TWI has provided religious educational services since its inception. 9. As a provider of religious educational services, TWI has produced a wide range of religious education materials. 10. Among TWI s published materials is the three-volume Aramaic-English Interlinear New Testament (the AEINT. 13. the AEINT shows three texts of the New Testament side by side The left-hand page is divided into two columns. The right column is TWI s word-by-word translation of its Aramaic text. 22. Defendant Trimm has made certain 4
limited word substitutions throughout the HRV for the words used by TWI in the AEINT. Original Complaint 8, 9, 10, 13, 22. TWI refers to the AEINT as a New Testament which is a translation of the Aramaic text and as religious educational material derived from religious education service as part of TWI s biblical research, teaching and fellowship ministry. Clearly, religious education material and religious education services which are part of the teaching of a ministry are doctrine by the very definition of the word. The Bible is doctrine to a biblical research, teaching and fellowship ministry by definition. If a ministry s teaching and religious educational services/materials are not its doctrine then the word doctrine can have no meaningful definition. (The Concordance to the Peshitta Version of the Aramaic New Testament p. 156a word no. 1262; published by TWI gives the words teaching and doctrine as alternate translations of the same Aramaic word in the Scriptures Moreover, translation is a form of interpretation. The two words are synonyms, a translator is an interpreter because translation is interpretation. Therefore translation of the Aramaic New Testament is by its very nature Scripture interpretation on the most fundamental level, and thus is doctrine. Scripture interpretation is doctrine. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963, at footnote 1, the Supreme Court identifies the Seventh-Day Adventist s interpretation of the Holy Bible as doctrine and implicating the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Thus by the face of TWI s pleading, the Court s determination of this suit hinges upon resolving a dispute between two religious groups over how doctrine may be worded because determination in this suit hinges upon the interpretation of Scripture and particularly the wording of the Bible. Translation of the Bible is by its very nature the interpretation of a sacred religious text. At issue in this suit is the translation of the Ancient Aramaic New Testament version. Scripture interpretation and therefore Bible translation by the Bible believer is not just 5
interpreting a Scripture simply by examining the text itself, but by reading the text with openness to the mind of God and the Holy Spirit. See, 1 Cor. 2:12-16; James 1:5; and 1 John 2:27. Interpretation of Scripture is by its very nature an exercise of religion. Bible translation involves examining words and phrases in a biblical language (in this case Aramaic and interpreting these with English words and phrases that have as close to the same meaning as possible to the source words and phrases. When the Believer engages in this process, it involves not only an examination of the text itself, but interpreting this text with openness to the mind of God and the Holy Spirit. The result is Scripture interpretation and therefore doctrine on the most fundamental level. Plaintiff contends that the Defendants translation agrees too closely with their own translation and thus that the Defendants translation infringes on their copyright. Plaintiff admits that the AEINT and the HRV are not identical when Plaintiff says the HRV contains what Plaintiff calls word substitutions throughout. (Defendants maintain there are many other differences beyond word substitutions; however, Plaintiff s statement admits that the two versions are not actually identical. Plaintiff in effect contends that the copyright law would forbid Defendants from interpreting the New Testament in a manner that is similar but not identical to Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends therefore that the copyright law may be used to prohibit Defendants from holding to doctrine that is similar but not identical to Plaintiff s doctrine. Thus, although AEINT is property, it is also Scripture interpretation and doctrine and the Court is barred from determining ecclesiastical questions (Scripture interpretation and doctrine in resolving property disputes pursuant to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court case law. Thus, the Court is barred from determining if Mr. Trimm and SANJ may interpret/translate Scripture in a given way in resolving this property dispute. Plaintiff therefore is asking the Court to settle a dispute between two religions concerning just how a 6
sacred religious text may be interpreted. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear TWI s claims because to do so would require the court to evaluate and scrutinize, consider and weigh interpretations of a religious text by two religions and resolve if Defendants may or may not interpret the Bible in a given way. The Court would be asked to weigh and consider line by line whether Defendant s doctrine necessitates translating a given word or phrase in a given way and even whether Defendants doctrine would permit translating a given word or phrase in another way, or even whether the guidance of the Holy Spirit would allow Defendant to translate or interpret a word or phrase in another manner. Only Defendants may determine their own doctrine. The Aramaic text of the New Testament is doctrine, the interpretation of the Aramaic Scripture into English is doctrine, and the guiding criteria used to choose which words and phrases with which to interpret the Aramaic Scripture into English is doctrine. Ultimately the decision to interpret the Aramaic Scripture in a given way is a doctrinal decision guided by the Holy Spirit. The Court would thus be asked to weigh and consider doctrine in resolving this property dispute. The Court would also be asked to forbid one religion from interpreting the Bible in a given way, while allowing another religion that same interpretation, in violation of the First Amendment. The First Amendment requires that courts decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,448. The Supreme Court has recognized three methods of accomplishing this goal, only one of which is relevant in this case. Maryland & Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367. 7
The first method is Deference to Hierarchical Decision-Making Body. Civil courts may follow Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13Wall. 679 (1871, and its progeny, in deferring to the decision making authorities of hierarchical churches. Maryland & Virginia Eldership of Churches of God at 368. Through this approach the court avoids entanglement in religious issues by accepting the decision of the established decision making body of the religious organization. This method cannot be applied to the present case, because Plaintiff and Defendant have never shared a mutually recognized Hierarchical Decision-Making Body. The second method is to apply neutral principles of law. Id. at 370. However, the Neutral Principle cannot be applied in this case because the property in question is itself doctrine, i.e., the Bible. Normally a copyright case would be resolved largely by comparing and scrutinizing the works in question. In this case, however, this would involve scrutinizing Defendants Spirit led interpretation of Scripture (and therefore Defendants doctrine which would by its very nature fall outside the bounds of neutral principles of law. The U. S. Supreme Court states in relation to this method that it may be used only so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith. Id. at 368. And general principles of property law may not be relied upon if their application requires civil courts to resolve doctrinal issues. Id. at 370. The Court cannot determine by Neutral Principles the legitimacy of Defendants interpretation of Scripture or his guidance by the Holy Spirit. Moreover, the Court cannot determine through Neutral Principle if Defendants are permitted to interpret Scripture in a given manner. Defendant s translation choice, in each and every instance, is by definition, Defendant s interpretation of Scripture, and is therefore by definition defendant s doctrine as he was guided by the Holy Spirit. Any analysis of Defendants interpretation of Scripture is by its very nature an analysis of Defendants doctrine and guidance by the Holy Spirit, and this violates the very bounds envisioned by the First Amendment as it has 8
been upheld by the U. S, Supreme Court. Such an analysis would cross the line described by the U.S. Supreme Court as the forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church doctrine. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451. If the Neutral Principle could allow the Court to consider, analyze, weigh and scrutinize doctrine and forbid one religious group from interpreting Scripture in a given way, while permitting another to do so, then the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment itself would become in effect nullified by Neutral Principle. In this situation Neutral Principles cannot be applied, because they cannot be applied where the would require the court to engage in consideration of doctrinal matters ; resolve doctrinal disputes or interpreting or weighing church doctrine. Thus the Court is prohibited from: 1 Consideration of doctrinal matters; 2 Interpreting church doctrine; 3 Weighing church doctrine; and 4Resolving doctrinal disputes. This very case is a dispute between two churches over how one church may interpret its Scriptures and would require the court to engage in consideration of doctrinal matters. Hearing this case would itself be consideration of doctrinal matters because the translation of Scripture is the interpretation of Scripture and the interpretation of Scripture is clearly a doctrinal matter. Hearing this case would also involve the court interpreting church doctrine in that the court would be hearing testimony and considering evidence as to other possible translation options as well as instances where witnesses would testify that a given translation is erroneous or awkward. This would place the Court in the situation of itself interpreting these Scriptures. The Court is clearly barred from determining whether or not a Church s Spirit led interpretation of Scripture is erroneous or awkward, rather than Spirit led. The court would also be asked to engage in weighing of church doctrine. Weighing implies a judgment rooted in comparing two or more things. In this case the court would be weighing church doctrine in that it would be comparing 9
two translations and therefore weighing interpretations of Scripture. Also, the court ultimately in this case would be asked effectively to resolve doctrinal disputes because here we have a dispute between two ministries over how the Defendant Church may interpret Scripture and render its doctrine through the interpretation Scripture. The copyright law cannot be used to forbid one religious group from interpreting Scripture in a specific way, while allowing another to do so without violating the First Amendment itself. Therefore Neutral Principles cannot be used in this case, because hearing this case would require the court to engage in the very activities which the US Supreme Court has specifically excluded from Neutral Principles. Should the Court find that it has jurisdiction, all of TWI s alleged causes of action fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted, because they are each barred by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Interpretation of Scripture is by its very nature an exercise of religion and specifically in rightly proclaiming the word of truth. 2 Tim. 2:15 HRV. Defendants Hebraic Roots Version is a translation, and therefore an interpretation of Hebrew and Aramaic religious texts and is therefore the product of Defendants free exercise of religion. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear TWI s claims because to do would require the Court to determine if it should prohibit Defendants free exercise of religion in violation of the First Amendment. Accordingly, all of TWI s alleged causes of action fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted, because they are each barred by the First Amendment. TWI has requested that the Court grant them relief in the form of a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining and enjoining Defendants manufacturing, printing, producing, distributing, importing, exporting, transporting, circulating, selling, offering for sale, or otherwise disposing of the HRV and That the court order the destruction of all copies of the HRV of all plates, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which copies may be 10
reproduced, including but not limited to electronically stored copies. Original Complaint, p. 21. In effect, Plaintiff asks the Court to ban the version of the Bible used by SANJ and many other Nazarene Jewish groups as their standard Scriptures and forbid the use of the HRV as doctrine. Therefore, the relief sought by TWI is impermissible under the First Amendment and TWI s claim should be dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim, or alternately, the relief TWI seeks is barred by the First Amendment and should be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. II. STATEMENT OF THE LAW REGARDING ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTRINE AND PROPERTY DISPUTES The First Amendment s mandate, Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, has been consistently recognized and upheld by the courts of this country to require the government to refrain from interfering with religious organizations with respect to matters of their doctrine. U.S. Const. Amend. I. In 1872, the U.S. Supreme Court made the following observations: In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679. While TWI claims that the AEINT is property it is clear on the face of their complaint that the AEINT is also doctrine in that it is religious education material of TWI s ministry as well as the translation (and therefore interpretation of Scripture. 11
As the Supreme Court has observed, religious freedom encompasses the power of religious bodies to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94. In 1862 the U.S. Supreme Court held in a dispute between Presbyterians and Unitarians over title to a church meetinghouse in Boston, that there was no subject matter jurisdiction to permit an appeal from state court. Attorney General v. Federal Street Meeting-house, 66 U.S. 262. In 1969 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Georgia court ruling holding that Civil courts cannot, consistently with First Amendment principles, determine ecclesiastical questions in resolving property disputes; and since the departure-from-doctrine element of Georgia's implied trust theory requires civil courts to weigh the significance and meaning of religious doctrines, it can play no role in judicial proceedings. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440. The U.S. Supreme Court observed in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church: It is of course true that the State has a legitimate interest in resolving property disputes, and that a civil court is a proper forum for that resolution. Special problems arise, however, when these disputes implicate controversies over church doctrine and practice. The approach of this Court in such cases was originally developed in Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (1872, a pre-erie R. Co. v. Tompkins diversity decision decided before the application of the First Amendment to the States but nonetheless informed by First Amendment considerations. (fn4 There, as here, civil courts were asked to resolve a property dispute between a national Presbyterian organization and local churches of that organization. There, as here, the disputes arose out of a controversy over church doctrine. There, as here, the Court was asked to decree the termination of an implied trust because of departures from doctrine by the national organization. The Watson Court refused, pointing out that it was wholly inconsistent with the American concept of the relationship between church and state to permit civil courts to determine ecclesiastical questions. Id. at 446. In language which has a clear constitutional ring, the Court went on to further state: In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate 12
the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.... All who unite themselves to such a body [the general church] do so with an implied consent to [its] government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them [sic] reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for. 13 Wall., at 728-729. The logic of this language leaves the courts no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes. Any decisions which have been made by the general church about the local churches withdrawal have at most a tangential relationship to the state-fashioned departure-from-doctrine standard. A determination whether such decisions are fraudulent, collusive, or arbitrary would therefore not answer the questions posed by the state standard. To reach those questions would require the civil courts to engage in the forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church doctrine. Even if the general church had attempted to apply the state standard, the civil courts could not review and enforce the church decision without violating the Constitution. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446-451 (1969 [Emphasis added]. Justice Brennan further noted in the same case that:.first Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.... [T]he [First] Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Id. at 449 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that there are limited ways to resolve property disputes between religious bodies. The first is the approach of as articulated in the Watson case: Thus the States may adopt the approach of Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (1872, and enforce the property decisions made within a church of congregational polity by a majority of its members or by such other local organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical government, id., at 724, and within a church of hierarchical polity by the highest authority that has ruled on the dispute at issue, (fn1 unless express terms in the instrument by which the property is held condition the property's use or control in a specified manner. (fn2 Under 13
Watson civil courts do not inquire whether the relevant church governing body has power under religious law to control the property in question. Such a determination, unlike the identification of the governing body, frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous religious law and usage. To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a church so as to decide where religious law places control over the use of church property would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine. (fn3 Similarly, where the identity of the governing body or bodies that exercise general authority within a church is a matter of substantial controversy, civil courts are not to make the inquiry into religious law and usage that would be essential to the resolution of the controversy. In other words, the use of the Watson approach is consonant with the prohibitions of the First Amendment only if the appropriate church governing body can be determined without the resolution of doctrinal questions and without extensive inquiry into religious polity. (MD. & VA. Churches v. Sharpsburg CH., 396 U.S. 367, 368-370 (1970 The Second approach is that of neutral principles of law, as the Supreme Court continued: [N]eutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, Presbyterian Church, at 449, provide another means for resolving litigation over religious property. Under the formal title doctrine, courts can determine ownership by studying deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporation laws. Id. at 370. The Supreme Court went on to state that the Neutral Principles of law cannot be applied where the State would be resolving doctrinal issues : Again, however, general principles of property law may not be relied upon if their application requires civil courts to resolve doctrinal issues. For example, provisions in deeds or in a denomination's constitution for the reversion of local church property to the general church, if conditioned upon a finding of departure from doctrine, could not be civilly enforced. Id. at 370. Furthermore in the Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994, the majority, concluded that government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion. 14
III. EACH OF PLAINTIFF S ALLEGED CAUSES OF ACTION CHALLENGES ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTRINE IN SCRIPTURE INTERPRETATION; ADDITIONALLY, ALL OF PLAINTIFF S ALLEGED CAUSES OF ACTION FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM FOR WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED Although TWI s complaint phrases their claim under a number of legal theories, each alleged cause of action is fundamentally a challenge to the First Amendment rights of the Defendants. As TWI recognizes in their complaint this challenge revolves around the interpretation of Scripture and doctrine. Original Complaint, 8, 9, 10, 13. The cases cited above demonstrate that this Court is prohibited by the First Amendment from considering whether Defendants may interpret Scripture in a given way in resolving a property dispute between two religious groups, or determining that one religious group may interpret Scripture and word doctrine in a given way, while another may not. Also, each of TWI s alleged causes of action fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted, because they are barred on the same constitutional grounds which deprive the Court of jurisdiction. IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF Plaintiff s suit cannot proceed without requiring this Court to review evidence and engage in inquiries which are forbidden under the First Amendment, additionally, all of Plaintiff s alleged causes of action fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Therefore the defendant respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion and order this suit dismissed with prejudice. The defendant also requests such other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which it may be justly entitled. 15
Larry Meadows Texas Bar No. 24010835 P.O. Box 1084 Brownwood, Texas 76804 (325 200-4420 (512 287-3130 Email: lm@meadowsllp.com ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS JAMES TRIMM AND SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF NAZARENE JUDAISM 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing document upon counsel by first class mail and e-mail on March 8, 2010. Robert R. Bodoin Patricia LaRue Bodoin, Agnew, Greene & Maxwell, P.C. Burnett Plaza, Suite 3450 801 Cherry Street, Unit 31 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Telephone: (817377-1654 Facsimile: (817377-1213 Email: bob@bodoinlaw.com plarue@bodoinlaw.com Larry Meadows 17