Naturalism and Subjectivity

Naturalism and Subjectivity Michela Summa and Pietro Giuffrida Over the last decades, naturalism has progressively become one of the leading positions in the philosophical debate. In analogy with the linguistic turn, the contemporary trend in philosophy has even been characterized as a turn from anti-naturalism to naturalism. 1 This is particularly true for Anglo-American philosophy, where naturalistic theories have been proposed in such different domains as the theory of knowledge, the theory of mind, and the ethical discourse. Yet, it is particularly with respect to the theory of mind and consciousness studies that the debate on naturalism has met phenomenology. Since the seminal studies published in Naturalizing Phenomenology, 2 different attempts have been made to naturalize the phenomenological analyses of consciousness and subjectivity, and different ideas regarding what such a naturalization would amount to have been proposed. Both the critical and the more sympathetic reactions to the project of naturalizing phenomenology reveal that a thorough confrontation with the problems raised by naturalism in its different forms represents relevant challenges for phenomenology. Such challenges concern, for instance, the proper understanding of the mind-body relationship, the status of idealities, and the meaning of the transcendental. On the other hand, however, subscribing to the idea of the irreducibility of the first-person perspective, phenomenology itself represents a challenge to the naturalizing projects. This is particularly true if one endorses the Husserlian understanding of phenomenology as transcendental philosophy. As it is well known, Husserl expresses himself quite vehemently against the naturalistic approaches of his times. 3 Particularly, his criticism is related to the reduction of the ideal laws of pure logic to natural laws, and to the attempt to reduce the theory of consciousness to an objectivistic, third-personal theory. Rather than being an object in nature, subjectivity constitutes nature in its meaningfulness. Thus, for Husserl, subjectivity cannot be addressed on the background of naturalistic objectivism if the latter intends to reduce subjectivity, as a constituting instance, to nature, which is instead constituted. The question as to whether subjectivity can be fully naturalized, according to the reductionist understanding of naturalism, does not only concern the Husserlian transcendental project, but also touches on the more general problem of the apparent irreducibility of the first-personal account of subjective experience. In other words, only if first-personal statements on subjective experience could be fully replaced by third-personal statements could the idea of naturalization of subjectivity be considered legitimate. However, critics of the project of naturalization argue that 1 Cf. Zahavi 2010. 2 Petitot et al. 1999. 3 On Husserl anti-naturalism, see, notably, Moran 2008, who contextualizes the Husserlian critique with respect to the forms of naturalism (mostly psychologism and objectivism) of his time. Recently, the meaning of Husserl s phenomenological project for a critical understanding of current naturalistic ontologies has been highlighted by Zhok 2012. In this study, several naturalistic claims are critically thematized in relation to the phenomenological descriptions of sensible experience and constitution. ISSN 2281-9177

8 Michela Summa and Pietro Giuffrida such a replacement is necessarily doomed to failure. Observing that there cannot be a full correspondence between first-personal and third-personal accounts of subjective experience, these critics argue that there is something irreducible and indispensable in first-personal experience, and in what it is like for the subject to have such an experience. The criticism we have considered thus far is mostly directed toward the reductionist versions of naturalism, based on the claim that the method of the natural sciences (notably physics) is the only truly legitimate scientific method. Accordingly, only the ontology and the epistemology that are based on such a method can be considered fully legitimate. Endorsing this view seems to imply the abandonment of both the transcendental project and the irreducibility of the first-personal stance. Thus, the main problem of naturalism would be the understanding consciousness as a natural object, which implies the neglect of the transcendental status of subjectivity. However, as soon as we understand the subject as bodily subject, the problem of embedding first-personal, subjective experience within nature re-emerges. Which raises the question: how does this relate to the transcendental? Can we not think of a naturalizing project that does not dismiss the dimension of the transcendental? As Zahavi points out, the challenges of such an endeavor can only be taken up if one gives up reductionism, representationalism and objectivism, 4 for these views clearly conflict with the phenomenological view on experience. However, the question of whether reductionism, representationalism, and objectivism shall monopolize the concept of naturalism remains open. The remarkable amount of research on the dividing line between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, which have been developed over the last years, has brought to the fore the actuality of such theoretical problems. Besides showing that there is still much space for a fruitful collaboration between philosophy and the positive sciences on several aspects of experience, this production also seems to require some fundamental reflections concerning the meaning of nature and subjectivity, the role of philosophy in investigating their relationship, and the appropriate method that is required for such investigations. In fact, it is remarkable that the large spreading of naturalism within the philosophical debate goes hand in hand with the proliferations of meanings of naturalism, and of different positions regarding the relation between philosophy and the natural sciences. For instance, the problem of how epistemological, ontological, and methodological naturalism relate to transcendental philosophy (mostly Kant s transcendental philosophy) has become an important topic of discussion in analytic philosophy. 5 Moreover, a distinction between reductionist and non-reductionist versions of naturalism have been made by authors from different philosophical traditions. 6 Non-reductionist, or liberalized, forms of naturalism seem more suitable than others to enhance the dialogue between philosophy and the empirical sciences, without thereby giving up the specific status of the philosophical questions. The contributions to this thematic issue of Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy take up the challenges of a philosophical understanding of the relationship between the subject and nature. Besides showing that the way we philosophically approach naturalism very much depends on the concept of nature we endorse, they bring to the fore the relevance of the specific understanding of the relation between subjectivity and nature in such different philosophical domains as ontology, theory of knowledge, epistemology, and ethics. 4 Zahavi 2004. 5 Smith and Sullivan 2001. 6 See, for instance, De Caro and Macarthur 2004; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008.

Naturalism and Subjectivity 9 In his paper, Antonio M. Nunziante focuses on the American debate on naturalism in the Mid-Twentieth century. Discussing the variants of naturalism involved in such a debate, Nunziante emphasizes the anti-metaphysical claims shared by different positions, which become particularly manifest in the attempt to exorcise the myth of the subjective. Which position did phenomenology take in that debate? Focusing on Farber s attempt to reconcile Husserl s phenomenology with naturalism, Nunziante highlights the difficulties of such an endeavor and shows how these difficulties are particularly related to the concept of evidence. The essential features of contemporary naturalism are discussed in Mario De Caro s paper. De Caro distinguishes two main variants of naturalism: scientific naturalism and liberalized naturalism. Out of the three main theses of scientific naturalism that are discussed in the article (the constitutive thesis, the anti-foundational thesis, and the continuity thesis), liberalized naturalism particularly challenges the continuity thesis, namely by claiming that there is a continuity between the natural sciences and philosophy, which eventually means that the latter shall be considered part of the former. Accordingly, liberalized naturalism recognizes the autonomy of the philosophical discourse, which seems to be challenged by scientific naturalism. The idea of the naturalization of subjectivity is questioned by Lynne Rudder Baker. Assuming the term naturalism ontologically and broadly related to reality, Baker argues that naturalism can be considered to be true if and only if all aspects of reality are centerless or non-perspectival. This implies that all those aspects of reality that appear to be perspectival shall be considered eliminable, i.e., as reducible to non-perspectival aspects. Arguing for the impossibility of such a reduction of the first-person perspective, considered a dispositional property having rudimentary and robust stages, Baker consistently claims that, once we recognize that the firstperson perspective cannot be fully accounted for in third-personal terms, we shall also subscribe to the impossibility of naturalizing subjectivity. The question of what it means to be a real naturalist is taken up by Galen Strawson. Defending, as Strawson does, real naturalism, which is based on the claim that concrete reality is entirely physical in nature, does not mean discarding the basic fact of experience. On the contrary, experience, considered in its pre-philosophical meaning, is an undeniable, and to be true the most certainly known, natural fact. Denying the existence of experience and its specificity, accordingly, would amount to defending a spurious kind of naturalism. Admitting that there is no evidence for the existence of non-experiential reality, as there is evidence for the existence of experiential reality, the real naturalism Strawson is defending does not rule out panpsychism or panexperientialism, as the simplest theory of the nature of reality. Jan Slaby and Jan-Christoph Heilinger focus their argument specifically upon the understanding of naturalism defended by Thomas Metzinger, which they consider to be equivalent to a form of neurocentric subjectivism. Beginning with some remarks on the project of critical neuroscience, which lies at the background of the critical argument developed throughout their paper, the authors challenge the basic assumptions of Metzinger s representationalism and their theoretical consequences. Finally, Slaby and Heilinger extend their critical assessment to Metzinger s neuroethics and to the quest for a completely new approach to ethics, which the alleged new ethical concerns deriving from the progress in neuroscientific research would imply. More explicitly related to ethical issues is the contribution by Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl. Her paper focuses on the meaning of the Husserlian concept of foundation for the proper understanding of the status of values and for ethical discourse. After assessing the problems at hand when it comes to defining the status of values and considering

10 Michela Summa and Pietro Giuffrida the need to provide an adequate understanding of the concept of foundation, Rinofner- Kreidl argues that the referential dilemma inherent in evaluative acts can be solved by a proper understanding of the two-stage constitution of value objects. This paper offers a thorough analysis of the principles that ground phenomenological ethics and the theory of values. In a second and related paper by Rinofner-Kreidl, the integrative model of foundation presented here will be assumed as the basis to phenomenologically address central issues in the current debate on ethical naturalism, and notably the idea of supervenience. This second paper will be published in a special issue of Metodo, On Supervenience, which is envisaged for spring 2014. Developing a transcendental-pragmatic critique of naturalism, inspired, among others, by the work of Apel and Habermas, Matthias Richter s article also has important ethical implications. Critically addressing the theoretical background of reductionist naturalism, the author particularly focuses on the dangers of such a background when it comes to interpersonal praxis, and notably psychotherapeutic praxis. In his view, endorsing naturalism would amount to conceiving of interpersonal praxis as based on the principle of purposive rationality. Challenging this view on the basis of an existential understanding of personhood, Richter considers psychotherapy as grounded on the interplay between purposive rationality and interpersonal praxis. In this context, Heidegger s conception of artistic activity is adopted as a model to clarify the specific form of activity that is implied in psychotherapy. Michael Städtler s contribution proposes a critical theory of subjectivity based on the relationship between historical praxis and natural knowledge. Such a theory shall be understood as a dialectic mediation between the idealistic understanding of the pure subject and the idea of a destruction (or deconstruction) of subjectivity. In Städtler s view, subjectivity is an epistemological concept that can only be determined on the basis of the subject-object relationship in its historical forms. Finally, the paper focuses on the historical determinations that are entailed in the philosophical concept of natural knowledge. This allows the author to argue that subjectivity cannot be fully dissolved in the objectivity of natural determinations, nor can it be idealistically constructed apart from such determinations. On the contrary, it can only be thought of within the interplay of nature and spirit. The meaning of the concept of nature and of naturalism in Husserl s phenomenology is thematized by Danilo Manca. Assuming the Husserlian critique of naturalism, Manca nevertheless suggests that there is a form of genuine phenomenological naturalism to be detected in Husserl s writings. Proposing an argument based on the comparison between Husserl and McDowell, the author pursues two aims. First, he argues that the concept of nature is not fully exhausted by the modern mechanistic understanding of nature as the realm of measurable reality, since such an understanding rules out the phenomenon of life. Secondly, he claims that a genetic phenomenology of the organic realm shall be seen as the basis for the Husserlian ontology of the life-world. The phenomenological critique of naturalism is at the core of Jeanne Marie-Roux s paper. Considering particularly Merleau-Ponty s critical assessment of both objectivistic naturalism and Husserlian idealism, Roux suggests that Merleau-Ponty s own project, although based on the constitutive incompleteness and opaqueness of our experience of the world, does not properly overcome idealism. According to the author, a consistent critique of naturalism that does not fall into the traps of idealism should also give up transcendentalism. That Merleau-Ponty s critique of objective naturalism does not prevent us from recognizing a peculiar kind of phenomenological naturalism in his own philosophy is testified by Diego D Angelo s and Alessio Rotundo s articles. Both papers show that

Naturalism and Subjectivity 11 the collaboration between philosophy, and notably phenomenology, and the natural sciences, which is exemplified by Merleau-Ponty s seminal works, goes hand in hand with a new understanding of the concept of nature. Diego D Angelo aims to understand the meaning of Merleau-Ponty s suggestion that there is a truth of naturalism and to retrace the consistency of such a meaning throughout Merleau-Ponty s works. To this aim, he first focuses on the understanding of nature as primordial being in order to subsequently consider the truth of naturalism in relation to such an understanding. The naturalism Merleau-Ponty is defending is thus considered to be related to nature as something that comes before the distinction of subject and object, and as something in which the subject thus necessarily participates. Against this background, the author eventually suggests a way to possibly reconcile the previously described naturalism of primordial being with scientific naturalism. Alessio Rotundo concentrates on Merleau-Ponty s understanding of the relationship between nature and subjectivity in the Nature lectures. Beginning with the study of the particular expression of nature in the living being, which is inspired by the understanding of behavior developed by biologists like Coghill and Gesell, the author subsequently thematizes Merleau-Ponty s concept of nature. Being before the very distinction of subject and object, nature is understood as the leaf of being. In this sense, the analyses developed in the Nature lectures can be considered as an anticipation of the ontology Merleau-Ponty will outline in his last and unaccomplished work, The Visible and the Invisible. In the section devoted to The Paths of Method, finally, we publish a paper by Klaus Held, focusing on the genesis of the phenomenological epoché. Considering how this relates to the fundamental philosophical quest for a truth that goes beyond the possible fallacies of appearances, Held argues that the roots of the Husserlian epoché shall be found in Ancient Greek philosophy, and notably in Pyrrho s skepticism. The aim of phenomenology, however, is also to overcome skepticism through the radical commitment to the epoché. Accordingly, phenomenology inaugurates a third way to philosophy, which goes beyond both the Parmenidean thought of the cobelonging of being and truth and Descartes s subjectivism. This, as Held points out in his conclusions, affects the understanding of the relationship between the different life-worlds and the one shared world. References De Caro, M. and D. Macarthur (eds.) 2004, Naturalism in Question, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA). Gallagher, S. and D. Zahavi 2008, The phenomenological mind: An introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, Routledge, New York. Moran, D. 2008, Husserl s Transcendental Philosophy and the Critique of Naturalism, in Continental Philosophy Review, 41, 4, pp. 401 425. Petitot, J., F. Varela, B. Pachoud, and J.-M. Roy 1999, Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, Stanford University Press, Stanford.

12 Michela Summa and Pietro Giuffrida Smith, J. and P. Sullivan (eds.) 2001, Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Zahavi, D. 2004, Phenomenology and the project of naturalization, in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3, pp. 331 347. 2010, Naturalized Phenomenology, in Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, ed. by S. Gallagher and D. Schmicking, Springer, Dordrecht. Zhok, A. 2012, La realtà e i suoi sensi. La costituzione fenomenologica della percezione e l orizzonte del naturalismo, ETS, Pisa.