The Philosophy of Logical Atomism:

The Philosophy of Logical Atomism:

107 Chapter 4 The Philosophy of Logical Atomism 4.1 The Method of Analysis'. The method of analysis used in the theory of definite descriptions shows that a proposition of ordinary language turns out to be one of a completely different logical form. This view of analysis and the notion of logical form came to dominate in Russell s philosophy as a whole after he wrote On Denoting. The notion is radical so far as its connection with logical atomism is concerned. This notion of analysis of propositions involved in Russell s theory of definite descriptions works as a preface to Wittgenstein s analysis of propositions in Tractatus. Complimenting on Russellian distinction between the grammatical and the logical form of propositions, Wittgenstein remarked: T. 4.0031...it was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one. Similarly, Wittgenstein s impact upon Russell was also enormous. Russell says: Wittgenstein s impact upon me came in two waves: the first of these was before the First World War; the second was immediately after the War when he sent me the manuscript of his Tractatus. His later doctrines, as they appear in his Philosophical Investigations, have not influenced me at all. (Russell, 1997, p. 83) One of the important consequences of the formulation of the concept of incomplete symbols is that it is unnecessary to posit the existence of items which could be logically constructed (Griffin, 1998, p. 399). We shall be dealing with this concept of logical construction a little later in this chapter. Russell considers this

108 heuristic maxim to be the supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing. The maxim is: Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities (Russell, 2004a, p. 326). Russell applies this principle to what he calls the principle of abstraction or the principle which dispenses with abstraction. 4.2 Logical Atomism: Bertrand Russell Russell s philosophy of logical atomism represents his philosophical standpoint from 1905 to 1919 (Griffin, 1998, p. 399). The phrase logical atomism was used by him to describe a position which states that the world is made of logical atoms together with the facts composed of these atoms. He coined the name logical atomism just before the First World War when he met Wittgenstein. The philosophy of logical atomism is an attempt to explain the nature of the world. Just as Pythagoreans tried to explain the world in terms of geometry, Locke in terms of atomistic mechanics, similarly Russell tried to give an account of the world by means of mathematical logic. Russell prefers to call his doctrine logical atomism rather than realism because he held that: My own logic is atomic, and it is this aspect upon which I should wish to lay stress. (Russell, 2004a, p. 323) And his atoms are logical: The reason that I call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms that I wish to arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical atoms...the point is that the atom I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis, not the atom of physical analysis. (Russell, 2004a, p. 179) By logical atoms Russell means particulars, such as little patches of colour or sounds, momentary things and predicates or relations etc. Russell s philosophy of logical atomism is thus a doctrine of logistic analysis of language.

109 The concept of form is important so far as Russell s formal analysis is concerned. Morris Weitz points out that there are two basic kinds of forms (Weitz, 1989, p. 83): (1) proper names and logical particulars, and (2) propositions and facts. These are the forms by means of which the ultimate ontological entities are recognized. 4.2.1. Proper names and logical particulars: The metaphysical thesis of logical atomism holds that the world consists of simple partilculars that exhibit qualities and stand in simple relations to one another. Russell defines particulars as terms of relations in atomic facts (Russell, 2004a, p.199). Proper name is the only kind of word that is theoretically capable of standing for a particular (Russell, 2004a, p. 200). But words like Socrates, Hitler etc. are not regarded as proper names. Russell points out that these words are abbreviations for definite descriptions (Russell, 2004a, p. 200). According to logical atomism, all the ordinary objects of daily life are apparently complex entities (Russell, 2004a, p.190). Ordinary names such as Socrates is used as descriptions, because the word Socrates can be replaced by such phrases as the Master of Plato or the philosopher who drank the hemlock. It is seen therefore that in the proper strict logical sense of the word (Russell, 2004a, p. 201) it is hard to get any instance of a name. Russell holds that words like this or that can be used to denote particulars. He compares particulars with the old conception of substance: the former has the quality of self-subsistence that used to belong to substance, but not the quality of persistence through time which was supposed to be a necessary quality of substance. Particulars have only a short period of life. But from the logical position of self-subsistence Russell equates them with substance: ' One must not suppose that atoms need persist in time, or that they need occupy space: these atoms are purely logical. (Mumford, 2003, p. 94) At this point it may be helpful to have a look at his distinction between universals

110 and particulars. 4.2.1.1 Universals and Particulars: In his Problems of Philosophy, Russell advocates Platonic realism. According to him, proper names stand for particulars (the point that proper names are particulars has been discussed above), while other substantives, adjectives, prepositions and verb stand for universals. For example, the word chair stands for chaimess; red stands for redness. The verb like denotes something which may be shared by many i particulars since different persons may like different things or persons. Universals are neither mental nor physical: Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist or have being, where being is opposed to existence as being timeless. (Russell, 1999, P- 57) While for Plato, universals are ontologically real, particulars are copies of the universals. Russell differs from Plato in that according to the former, universals and particulars both are real. In his Presidential address to the Aristotelian Society, in 1911-12, Russell presented an essay entitled On the Relations of Universals and Particulars. In this essay he took up the logical distinction between universals and particulars as equivalent to the question: whether there is an ultimate simple asymmetrical relation which may be called predication, or whether all apparent subject-predicate propositions are to be analysed into propositions of other forms, which do not require a radical difference of nature between the apparent subject and the apparent predicate. (Russell, 2004a, p.109) His contention of the dualism of particulars and universals rests upon the belief that the relation of predication is ultimate which means that there are particulars and

Ill these have qualities or relations which are instances of universals. universals: According to Russell, all entities are classifiable into two: particulars and (1) particulars, which enter into complexes only as the subjects of predicates or the terms of relations, and, if they belong to the world of which we have experience, exist in time, and cannot occupy more than one place at one time in the space to which they belong; (2) universals, which can occur as predicates or relations in complexes, do not exist in time, and have no relation to one place which they may not simultaneously have to another. (Russell, 2004a, p.124) In his An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Russell propagates a different theory of the problem of the status of universals. Proper names like this or that are regarded by many philosophers as symbols of particulars. If someone utters the statement this is red, one may mean that a particular called this has the predicate or quality of redness, i.e., one may be tempted to regard this statement as a subject-predicate statement. Russell argues that if one holds such a proposition:...one finds that this becomes a substance, an unknowable something in which properties inhere, but which nevertheless, is not identical with the sum of its properties. Such a view is open to all the familiar objections to the notion of substance. (Russell, 1995, p. 97) To avoid this difficulty, Russell replaces statements like this is red by redness is here and that red is a name, not a predicate (Russell, 1995, p.97). He suggests that if a thing has the quality C, then the thing is to be replaced by the collection of qualities existing in the place in question. Thus, C becomes a name, not a predicate. Morris Weitz observes here that Russell s way of replacing a subject-predicate statement in this way is nothing but a bundle of co-existing qualities: All of this follows, unless we wish to get stuck with the substratum of Locke. Now, that this theory is tantamount to universalism is shown by the fact that it denies implicitly the relation of predication, which is basic to dualism and rejected by universalism. (Weitz, 1989, p. 80)

112 Russell in his Reply to Criticisms (Russell, 1989, p. 685) states that Weitz misunderstands his tentative theory set forth in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, according to which a given shade of colour is a particular, not a universal. He overcomes this difficulty in the following way: Suppose we see simultaneously two patches of a given shade of colour C; let the angular coordinates of the one visual space be 9, <j>, and those of the other 9', ft. Then we are to say that C is at (9, #) and also at (9', ft). The angular coordinates of an object in the visual field may be regarded as qualities. Thus(C, 9, ^) is one bundle of qualities, and (C, 9', ft ) is another. If we define a thing as the bundle of qualities(c, 9, (j>), then we may say that this thing is at the place (9, ft), and it is analytic that it is not at the place (9', ft). (Russell, 1995, p. 99) He illustrates this point by citing an example of two red patches. If someone perceives two red patches simultaneously, one red patch on his right and the other on his left, then these two patches are to be seen as two complexes in the way mentioned above. Russell emphasizes the point that the coordinates (right and left, up and down) are to be taken into account as qualities as much as redness. The two other forms, i.e. propositions and facts are associated with Russell s concept of formal analysis. 4.2.2 Propositions and Facts: The ultimate point of reference, for Russell, is the atomic facts. A fact is that which makes a proposition true or false. For example, if someone says It is raining, it will be true in a certain condition of weather and false in other conditions of weather. A fact is not a particular existing thing such as Plato, the river or the mountain : When I speak of a fact, I do not mean one of the simple things in the world; I mean that a certain thing has a certain quality, or that certain things have a certain relation. Thus, for example, I should not call Napoleon a fact, but I should call it a fact that he was ambitious, or that he married Josephine. (Russell, 1972, p. 60)

113 A fact cannot be said to be either true or false, there are just facts. They are independent of our thinking; they belong to the objective world. Facts are not created by thoughts or beliefs except in special cases. Russell says: Given any fact, there is an assertion which expresses the fact. (Russell, 1972, p. 61) The assertion involves a thought and it may be either true or false. A proposition states something. A proposition, for Russell, is an indicative sentence. It either asserts or denies something. It is that which we believe truly or falsely: typical vehicle on the duality of truth and falsehood (Russell, 2004a, p. 185). A proposition is also defined as a complex symbol. It is a complex symbol in the sense that it has parts that are symbols. Russell emphasizes the point that propositions are not names forfacts (Russell, 2004a, p. 187). A proposition differs from a name: there are two relations that a proposition may have to a fact: being true and being false. But a name can have only one relation to that which it names: it can name a particular and if it does not name, it is a mere noise (Russell, 2004a, p.187). Propositions are not names for facts since corresponding to a single fact there are two propositions, one true and another false. Facts cannot be named at all; they can be asserted or denied, or desired or willed or wished or questioned. There are certain species which Russell considers to be valid: Atomic propositions and facts, Molecular propositions and facts, Existence propositions and facts, General propositions and facts, Completely general (logical) propositions and facts; and Intensional propositions and facts.

114 4.2.2.1 Atomic propositions and facts: An atomic proposition is defined as that which asserts that a certain thing has a certain quality, or that certain things have a certain relation (Russell, 1972, p. 62). For example, this is white, this is before that etc. are atomic propositions. The simplest atomic fact is the possession by a particular of a certain quality, for example this is white. There may be dyadic relation between two particulars, triadic between three particulars and so on. For n particulars we get n-adic relation. These facts are the simplest kinds of facts which consist in the possession of a quality or relation by some particular or particulars. In every atomic fact there is one component which is expressed by a verb. This component, if it is a quality, is expressed by a predicate or an adjective. The atomic facts correspond to the atomic propositions. An isomorphic relationship is thus seen between atomic proposition and atomic facts. Corresponding to the subjects (proper names) in an atomic fact there are terms (particulars) in an atomic proposition, similarly adjectives correspond to qualities, and verbs correspond to relations. 4.2.2.2 Molecular propositions and facts: Russell holds: The study of grammar, in my opinion, is capable of throwing far more light on philosophical questions than is commonly supposed by philosophers. (Russell, 1937, p. 42) He thought that the atomistic structure of the world would have the structure of language and logic. This logic has a definite grammar and it is at this point necessary to highlight the chief points of this logic. Formal logic regards a proposition or a statement to be either true or false. The linguistic account of propositions holds the view that propositions are truthfunctionally accountable. Defining truth-function, Russell wrote:

115 I call these things truth-functions of propositions, when the truth or falsehood of the molecular proposition depends only on the truth or falsehood of the propositions that enter into it. (Russell, 2004a, p.210) Again, defining a molecular proposition, Russell wrote: I call them molecular propositions because they contain other propositions which you may call their atoms, and by molecular propositions I mean propositions having such words as or, if5, and, and so forth. (Russell, 2004a, p. 207) Let us take an example: 'p and q' is a molecular proposition and it is to be regarded as truth-function as its truth-value depends on the propositions p and q separately. The proposition The weather is cloudy today and Smita brings an umbrella is true provided the proposition The weather is cloudy today is true, and the proposition Smita brings an umbrella is true separately. A proposition is true if it represents a fact and false if it does not represent a fact. At this point Russell denies the existence of molecular facts: I do not suppose there is in the world a single disjunctive fact corresponding to ip or q\ It does not look plausible that in the actual objective world there are facts going about which you could describe as p or q\ (Russell, 2004a, p. 209) This means that the truth or falsity of the proposition p or q' depends upon two facts, one of which corresponds to p and the other to q. Russell also speaks about disjunctive facts in Human Knowledge. A disjunctive proposition is a combination of two (or more) propositions disjoining each from the other(s) with an or implying that one of the members of the complex proposition is true though the speaker /writer of the proposition is not sure which one is the case. Or expresses conscious partial ignorance (Russell, 1992, p.143) in ordinary non-logical sense. A proposition containing or, such as p or q is true if there is a fact corresponding to p, or there is a fact corresponding to q. It is false if there is no fact corresponding to p, and there is no fact corresponding to q, but there

116 is another fact corresponding to a third proposition, say r. The disjunctive proposition does not require a disjunctive facf containing some constituent corresponding to or to make it true. Russell analyzes an indicative sentence into three components: i) the cognitive attitude of the assertor (belief, disbelief and hesitation), ii) contends) of the sentence, and iii) the verifier or falsifier (i.e. fact or facts) that make the sentence true or false. A not... sentence is accompanied by the cognitive attitude of disbelief, and an or sentence is accompanied by that of hesitation. A sentence without any such logical words is accompanied by the cognitive attitude of belief. 4.2.23 Existence propositions and facts: Existence propositions do not say anything about the actual individual, but only about the class or function (Russell, 2004a, p. 234). It is however important to note that existence is essentially a property of a propositional function. A propositional function is an expression which contains a variable, say, x, whose value is not determined. So, one can know the truth of an existence proposition without knowing any instance of it. Such a proposition asserts the truth of at least one value of a propositional function. An existence proposition is a quantified form of a propositional function. Mx is a propositional function which states x is man; but in absence of any value of x we cannot say what it stands for and whether it is true, when it is preceded by an existential quantifier (3x) then it becomes a proposition. It asserts that there is at least one entity which is man. An existence proposition is made true by an existence fact. Existence facts are different from atomic facts. Examples of existence facts are: there are men, there are sheep etc. 4.2.2.4 General propositions and facts: A general proposition is defined as that which asserts or denies the truth of all values of a propositional function.

117 A general fact corresponds to a general proposition. But, Russell argues that a general proposition is not equivalent to a conjunction of singular propositions. The general proposition All men are mortal cannot be established by a complete enumeration of each and every individual man s death. Besides the empirical impossibility to enumerate the deaths of all men, one has further to know that these are the all men there are. To know that these are the all men there are is to know a general proposition. But this knowledge does not come from induction from experience or any inference. Hence he says that the knowledge of general proposition is a primitive knowledge which is not derived from inference:...when you have enumerated all the atomic facts in the world, it is a further fact about the world that those are all the atomic facts there are about the world, and that is just as much an objective fact about the world as any one of them are. (Russell, 2004a, p. 236) Corresponding to the general propositions Russell feels obliged to admit the existence of general facts. A general fact is irreducible to any other fact. But a general proposition of the form All men are mortal is understood as if x is a man, x is mortal or x is man implies x is mortal. This hypothetical proposition does not assert that x really is a man and that x is mortal. It even does not assert that there is any entity called man. Citing Bradley s example trespassers will be prosecuted, he says that this sentence implies that if there is a trespasser, (it does not assert that there is any), then he will be prosecuted. And as he included if...then propositions in the group of molecular propositions, so he felt it necessary to admit the existence of molecular facts in order to make molecular propositions true or false, though he was hesitant to accept the existence of molecular fact while discussing disjunctive facts. It is seen that Russell was not categorically sure about the existence of molecular facts. Russell in Human Knowledge suggests a theoretical possibility in this connection: if we had a list of all true sentences that were free from logical words, together with

118 the knowledge that they were the all such sentences, we could derive all other true sentences not in the list by logical inference. A sentence not in the list, say q, becomes true by insertion of not before it (not-#). So from p which is in the list we derive p or # and p implies p or #. (It is to be noted here that his earlier assertion of implicative facts in Logic and Knowledge [ x is a man implies x is mortal is always true is a fact] gets rejected on this new theory.) We also get new true sentences by conjoining two or more sentences from the list. (Russell, 1992, p.145) 4.2.2.5 Completely general (logical) propositions and facts: A completely general proposition is defined as that which contains only variables and nothing else. '(However Russell admits that there are some propositions which are expressed logically but they are not proved logically. E.g. there is at least one thing in the world. This proposition is to be known empirically.) (Russell, 2004a, p. 240). These propositions have:...a certain peculiar quality which marks them out from other propositions and enables us to know them a priori. But what exactly that characteristic is, I am not able to tell you. (Russell, 2004a, p. 240) In his earlier essay Logic as the Essence of Philosophy Russell gave an example of, what he called there, an absolutely general proposition : If anything has a certain property, and whatever has this property has a certain other property, then the thing in question has the other property. (Russell, 1972, P. 66) Logical propositions such as (p ) (j>p => <f>v are completely general and a priori in character. 4.2.2.6 Negative facts: Are there such facts as you might call the fact that Socrates is not alive? asked Russell in the lecture HI of The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (Russell, 2004a p. 211). He says that the idea of negative facts created a riot at Harvard. It is

119 mentioned earlier that Russell accepts correspondence theory of truth. If Socrates is alive is false, it is because it is out of correspondence with facts. It is false because of the fact Socrates is not alive. Russell takes one alternative view put forward by Mr. Demos, who wrote an article in Mind in April, 1917 (Russell, 2004a, p. 211) regarding negative facts which assert that not-p means the same as there is some proposition q which is true and is incompatible with p.' For example, the proposition This pen is not red means There is some true proposition which is incompatible with This pen is red. This theory claims that part of the meaning of This is not red is the assertion that there is some true proposition incompatible with This is red without saying which (Urmson, 1956, p.70). Russell objects to this theory on the ground that this theory makes incompatibility fundamental and an objective fact Russell gives some points in favour of this ground: first, incompatibility is a basic sort of fact not less disturbing than the negative facts, secondly, it makes a complex fact basic, i.e. p being incompatible with q' and thirdly, he points out that incompatibility can hold between two propositions and cannot hold between two facts. If this is the case, then something involving propositions, as opposed to facts, are to be considered as basic elements. But Russell does not consider propositions to be capable of being basic elements as he considers propositions to be logical constructions. Hence, he admits negative facts: A thing cannot be false except because of a fact, so that you find it extremely difficult to say what exactly happens when you make a positive assertion that is false, unless you are going to admit negative facts. (Russell, 2004a, p. 214) Apart from the facts mentioned above, there are other facts called intensional facts that is, those facts corresponding to propositions such as John believes that the earth is flat. The truth or falsity of this proposition does not depend upon whether the earth is flat or not but on whether John believes or not that the earth is flat. Thus it is seen that although Russell s proclamation was about adherence to

120 the principle of Occam s razor, he ultimately ended up in admitting the existence of a large number of facts. Ayer also finds it very strange that Russell admits of negative facts in order to make a proposition false when diminishing ontological commitment is his policy. To the suggestion that the falsity of a propositionp consists in its incompatibility with the fact that makes another proposition q true, Russell s reply was that i) incompatibility is a relation that holds between propositions, and not between facts, and ii) if it is a fact that p is incompatible with q it is itself a negative fact. But Ayer points out: If incompatibility is a relation between propositions... and if facts must have real constituents, and if propositions are not real, then what follows is not that the incompatibility of two propositions is a negative fact, or that it is a fact implying the reality of propositions, but that it is not a fact at all. (Ayer, 1971, p. 86) If a fact is real, then what is not real is not a fact. So if p is false then there is no fact corresponding to p. Russell s admission of negative facts is criticized by many as unnecessarily crowding the ontological world. It is also seen as a departure from his robust realism. What prompted Russell to admit negative facts is probably his earlier statement that corresponding to every fact in the objective level, there are two propositions on the linguistic side: one true, the other false. But from this it is definitely erroneous to think that there should correspond a negative fact to a false proposition as there is a positive fact corresponding to a true proposition. Moreover, this concept of negative fact goes contrary to what he says about facts that they cannot be said to be true or false, they are just there. A negative fact, then, is to be understood as one which is not there. If it is asserted to be there (like an evil spirit in order to make propositions false), then by virtue of correspondence to that negative fact, a false proposition should be true. But since it is false by definition, it cannot be true which would violate the law of contradiction. Negative facts then should be assigned a kind of Meinongian subsistence - a position which Russell himself repudiated earlier.

121 However, in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits Russell of course denies the existence of negative facts. He discusses the issue at considerable length and comes to the negative conclusion about negative facts after a detailed analysis of possible situations:...what makes a judgment of perception true (or false) is in general something that would still be a fact if there were no judgment in the world. The yellowness of the buttercup may be taken to be such a fact.,..but would there be the buttercup s non-blueness if there were no judgments? And must we, in a complete description of the buttercup, mention all the colours that it is not? (Russell, 1992, pp. 137-138) Russell s approach here seems to be similar with the one he adopted in dealing with definite descriptions. A proposition of the form not-/? is analyzed in a way so that the logical word nof no more remains in the final analysis. That is, the negation not is given almost an equal status with an incomplete symbol - a misleading one. There cannot be a fact corresponding to the sentence the buttercup is not blue to be termed as negative fact. He thus goes to examine the logic of the word not and shows that it can be dispensed with. Negative judgments are derived from perception. In his example, when I take sugar thinking it to be salt and exclaim it is not salt, there is a clash between the idea of the taste of salt and the sensation of the taste of sugar. This clash is the basis of the negative judgment. Distinguishing between what a judgment expresses and what it states, Russell maintains that when I utter, this is not blue, there is on the subjective side, consideration of this is blue followed by rejection. On the objective side there is some clour differing from blue. Towards an indicative sentence, this is red there may be two attitudes: belief and disbelief - both positive in the sense that both can be described without the word not. Each is capable of being true, but the truth of a disbelief is not quite the same as that of a belief. Belief in the proposition is true if it is caused by something red. When we disbelieve then we see some other colour, so the disbelief

122 in the proposition that this is red is true when it is caused by something having to red, the relation of positive dissimilarity... (Russell, 1992, p.141). He finally presents an analysis of the words not and falsehood with a reinterpretation of the law of contradiction which is ordinarily understood as /? and not-/? cannot both be true. In his restatement of the law the words not and falsehood are replaced by disbelief and the truth of a disbelief ; so the law is expressed as: A disbelief in the sentence the belief that this is red and the disbelief that this is red are both true is always true (Russell, 1992, p.141). The words this is not blue are defined as expressing disbelief in what is expressed by the words this is blue. This is how Russell tries to avoid the need of not as an indefinable constituent of facts : The purpose of this theory is to explain how negative sentences can be true, and can be known, without its being necessary to assume that there are facts which can only be asserted in sentences containing the word not. (Russell, 1992, p.142) 4.3 Logical Atomism: Ludwig Wittgenstein In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein develops a metaphysical system which is based on logical analysis of language. Like Russell, Wittgenstein also sought to investigate the foundation of logic and mathematics. The metaphysics of the world followed as a logical corollary of his theory of proposition and truth (Pradhan, 2001, p.58). Wittgenstein holds that a proposition is the most important concept in logic, because a completed proposition can represent the world either correctly or incorrectly. Propositions are therefore said to picture reality. i Like Russell, Wittgenstein also talks about fact rather than object: T. 1. The world is all that is the case. T. 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things. T. 1.2 The world divides into facts.

123 The distinction drawn between fact and object here is important Like Russell, Wittgenstein also admits feet as complex which necessarily depicts certain configuration, arrangement and combination. Things which are objects for Wittgenstein are such that they cannot exist apart from facts, but facts can exist independently of everything else. There are atomic facts which are not analyzable into further facts. From the existence or non-existence of one fact nothing can be inferred regarding the existence or non-existence of another (T. 2.062). This shows the atomistic character of the universe. According to Wittgenstein, language consists in propositions, and these are compounds made up of elementary propositions. Like Russell s atomic proposition, Wittgenstein talks of elementary proposition. An elementary proposition is the limit of analysis, that is, it is incapable of any further analysis. However, it can be analyzed into constituent parts, but these components are not themselves propositions. Wittgenstein s claim that there is a distinction between elementary and complex propositions becomes transparent from the notion of truth-functional language. The truth-value of a truth functionally complex sentence is derived from the individual truthvalue of its parts. This means that if the truth values of the parts are understood, then it is possible to understand that of the whole. An elementary proposition, Wittgenstein says, is one consisting of names: T. 4.22 An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names. Wittgenstein agrees with Russell here so far as the use of the term name is concerned. Just as Russell considers proper name in a logical sense, Wittgenstein also considers name in a technical sense: T. 3.26 A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign. Wittgenstein does not consider terms like cow or square to be names, because these are ordinary proper names. A term can be a name in Russellian-Wittgensteinian

124 sense provided the term does not allow any possibility of being defined except by ostensive definition. A name can be ostensively defined only in case the name denotes something which is observable, i.e. by pointing to whatever it denotes for example the word this. In other words, a name should not have any possibility of either defining it or analyzing it. A name is simple as it is not analyzable into any part: T. 3.203 A name means an object. T. 2. 02 Objects are simple. An elementary proposition is thus one that consists of terms which denote simples. Unlike Russell, Wittgenstein does not cite any example either of a simple \ or of an elementary proposition. He thinks that to find out an actual example is a mere empirical task and being a logician he is not interested in this type of empirical investigation. He holds that it is certain that they exist a priori. As Roger Scruton observes: He wished to give the clear statement of the logical structure of the world: its actual contents did not concern him. (Scruton, 1981, p. 275) Wittgenstein thus comes to the conclusion that there must be simple things, i.e. objects denoted by the names that constitute elementary propositions: T 4.21 The simplest kind of proposition, an elementaiy proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs. Corresponding to an elementary proposition in language, there is a state of affairs in the world. Just as elementary propositions are not analyzed further, similarly a state of affairs also does not consist of more basic state of affairs. Again, just as an elementary proposition consists only of names in combination, similarly a state of affairs consists entirely of simple objects: T 2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things). T 2.04 The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.

125 Elementary propositions are logically independent of one another. It is therefore necessary for us to say which of them are true and which is false. Correspondingly it can be said that reality consists of all possible states of affairs, whether existing or non-existing. A.C. Grayling (Grayling, 1988, p. 29) in his Wittgenstein, gives a representation of a crude preliminary form of the language - world parallel. Language < > World Propositions <»! 1 Elementary propositions < > 1I Names < > 1 Facts 1 States of affairs 1 Objects Here, Wittgenstein arrives at the simples in the form of objects. The objects are simple in the sense that they are without components, they cannot come into being nor can they be destroyed. 4.4 Russell on Simplicity: The aim of logical atomism, in case of both - Russell and Wittgenstein, was to arrive at simples that are not further analyzable. Whether there are such simples actually existent or not, there is the attempt on the part of both the philosophers to proceed on their act of logical analysis in search of those simples: One purpose that has run through all that I have said, has been the, justification of analysis, i.e. the justification of logical atomism, of the view that you can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples, out of which the world is built, and that those simples have a kind of reality not belonging to anything else. (Russell, 2004a, p.270).

126 Describing simples Russell says: Simples, as I tried to explain, are of an infinite number of sorts. There are particulars and qualities and relations of various orders, a whole hierarchy of different sorts of simples, but all of them, if we were right, have in their various ways some kind of reality that does not belong to anything else. (Russell, 2004a, p.270) Russell is aware of the criticism by Urmson on his quest for simplicity. Urmson criticizes Russell by pointing out that however far one may carry one s analysis, one can never reach to the simples. In Some Replies to Criticisms, Russell replies to Urmson that even if there are no ultimate simples, that is to say analysis is incapable of reaching to the most fundamental layer of reality, this does not invalidate analysis as a philosophical method, because: Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and I on occasion spoke of atomic facts as the final residue in analysis, but it was never an essential part of the analytic philosophy which Mr. Urmson is criticizing to suppose that such facts were attainable. (Russell, 1997, p. 164) Citing an example Russell holds that points may be defined as classes of events, but it does not falsify anything in traditional geometry which treated points as simples (Russell, 1997, p.165). Russell therefore holds that even if atomic facts are not asserted, we do not necessarily cease to admit atomic yehfe«ce,s' (Russell, 1997, p.165). Russell concluded, the whole question whether there are simples to be reached by analysis is unnecessary (Russell, 1997, p.123). Bernard Linsky remarks that Russell s logical atomism can be understood as a commitment to analysis as a method used for the rejection of idealistic monism rather than as some more substantive view about the end results or products of analysis (Linsky, 2003, p. 386). In 1924, Russell wrote:

127...I confess it seems obvious to me (as it did to Leibniz) that what is complex must be composed of simples, though the number of constituents may be infinite. (Russell, 2004, p. 337) Russell became aware that his search for simples was not going to achieve a satisfactory result because it is possible that the parts of a complex might not be simple, they might also be complex. For example, atoms were first considered to be simples until further parts were discovered to some of them. But some further parts of these parts could also be discovered some day. Similarly, the parts of a complex thing could also be complex and this process may go on ad infinitum. Indeed, Russell himself admits this point later on when he says:...so long as we abstain from asserting that the thing we are considering is simple, nothing that we say about it need be falsified by the subsequent discovery of complexity. (Russell, 1997, p. 123) And I have come to think, however that, although many things can be known to be complex, nothing can be known to be simple... (Russell, 1997, p.123). Though in his earlier lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Russell propagated the thesis that there are simple entities, he modified this thesis later on by saying that what is important for his philosophical outlook is not absolute simplicity, but only relative simplicity. Stephen Mumford observes: Russell s claim that complexes presuppose simples is wrong, if such simples are to be understood literally as simples, but it will be right if they are understood only as relative simples. (Mumford, 2003, p. 92) In this context the question of dichotomy between simple and complex arises. Logical atoms into which complexes were analyzed were supposed to be simples. A fact, even an atomic fact, being analyzable into its components, was not simple.

128 Hence facts were complexes. At this point Russell considers the following objection raised by Bradley against his position (Russell, 2004a, p.336): Mr. Russell s main position has remained to myself incomprehensible. On the one side I am led to think that he defends a strict pluralism, for which nothing is admissible beyond simple terms and external relations. On the other side Mr. Russell seems to assert emphatically, and to use throughout, ideas which such a pluralism surely must repudiate. He throughout stands upon unities which are complex and which cannot be analysed into terms and relations. These two positions to my mind are irreconcilable, since the second, as I understand it, contradicts the first flatly. Russell replies to this criticism by regarding simples and complexes as always [being] of different types. He says that one must not say facts are not simples, because a fact cannot occur where a simple can occur. This means that meaning is a different relation to different types: The way to mean a fact is to assert it; the way to mean a simple is to name it (Russell, 2004a, p.336). It is a mistake to hold that fact and simple belong to the same type. As Russell points out in his theory of types:... when two words have meanings of different types, the relations of the words to what they mean are of different types; that is to say, there is not one relation of meaning between words and what they stand for, but as many relations of meaning, each of a different logical type, as there are logical types among the objects for which there are words. This fact is a very potent source of error and confusion in philosophy. (Russell, 2004a, pp. 332-333) He makes this point clear by holding that Brutus killed Caesar is significant, but Killed killed Caesar is nonsense, so that one cannot replace Brutus by killed although both words have meaning. He holds this point to be commonsensical. So far Bradley s criticism is concerned, Russell defends his point by saying that the statements There are simples and There are complexes use the words there are in two senses which are different from each other.

129 4.5 Language-Reality Isomorphism: The philosophy of logical atomism aims at discovering simples in both the planes - linguistic as well as ontological. The philosophy presumes that there is one-one relation between the two planes so that the structure of one is identical in nature with that of the other. Russell advocates correspondence between propositions and facts. A proposition is true in so far as there is a fact corresponding to it. Similarly, Wittgenstein maintains that a proposition pictures the reality. This picturing is logical in that there / is a similarity in logical form of propositions with that of the reality. It is mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that Wittgenstein was also influenced by Russellian distinction between grammatical form and the logical form of propositions. This relation can be called the pictorial correlation between fact and proposition. Wittgenstein, like Russell, holds that natural language cannot express the logical form of language. Hence, he feels the necessity of an artificial language to unearth the essence of a proposition lying under the surface structure of language. He claims: T. 4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality. T. 4.03 A proposition communicates a situation (state of affairs) to us and so it must be essentially connected with the situation. And the connection (between the proposition and the state of affairs) is precisely that it is its logical picture. T. 4.06 A proposition can be true or false in virtue of being a picture of reality. A proposition expresses a thought, and thought is a logical picture of facts; in this sense a proposition is a logical picture of reality. By inviting an analogy of music and its notation Wittgenstein says that as in this case a music can be composed by following the notation and after listening to the music it can be brought back to notation, so also a proposition can picture reality in virtue of the same internal relation of a common logical form (between proposition and reality).

130 For Russell philosophical problems were only logical problems. In the same tune Wittgenstein also holds that philosophical problems are pseudo problems, these problems can be dissolved by paying sufficient attention to the logic of language: T. 4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but non-sensical... Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language. It is known to all that Wittgenstein in his later work Philosophical Investigations abandons the picture theory of his early stage. Discussions along that line will be dealt with in the next chapter of this present work. It can be observed at this point that the quest for simples, a logically perfect language and the supposed wordworld one-one correspondence proves to be an idealized vision of the analytic philosophers like Russell and Wittgenstein. The logically perfect language thus seems to postulate a different kind of metaphysics which admits only what is given in experience. Russell demands that such metaphysics admits as logical atoms the simple objects called sense-data (Pradhan, 2001, p. 63). Wittgenstein s philosophy of logical atomism has faced many criticisms. 1) Anders Wedberg says that there are properties of, and relations among things in the world which cannot be named in language. But the picture theory speaks of these properties and relations among things. Thus the picture theory of meaning itself is an attempt to say the unsayable and therefore an instance of higher non-sense (Wedberg, 1984, p. 184). 2) Picture theory of meaning violates the conventions of language we use. The sentences used in our language are of linear structure. They are not maps of the facts they describe. It means that picture theory is inconsistent with the characteristic feature of language. There may be ideally a one-to-one correspondence between a map and

131 the situation it describes. But while a map is two-dimensional, a proposition is onedimensional. Wittgenstein s picture theory regards propositions as pictures of reality, but a proposition may represent a situation or it may be a picture of a situation without being two dimensional. Thus picture theory seems to be inconsistent with the general nature of language. (Dwivedi, 1977, p.97) We may now venture to examine these critical points from a Russellian perspective, since Russell in his essay The Impact of Wittgenstein (Russell, 1997, p. 82) puts a few remarks where his convictions regarding the philosophy of logical atomism differs from Wittgenstein. First, Russell talks about Wittgenstein s concept of structural similarity between propositions and facts. A proposition is a picture of the facts that it asserts. So far Wittgenstein s concept of the importance of structure goes, Russell agrees with him; but he disagrees with Wittgenstein when he holds that a true proposition reproduces the structure of the facts concerned: For, Wittgenstein, however it was fundamental. He made it the basis of a curious kind of logical mysticism. He maintained that the form [logical form] which a true proposition shares with the corresponding fact can only be shown, not said. (Russell, 1997, pp.84-85) Russell is not convinced with Wittgenstein at this point. In the introduction to Wittgenstein s Tractatus Russell suggests that though there are things in any given language which cannot be expressed by that language it is possible to construct a language of a higher order in which the things can be said. Russell s suggestion of such new language, he says, becomes an accepted common place of logic (Russell, 1997, p. 85). Secondly, Russell holds that one of the usual criticisms against Wittgenstein s two general principles, namely, the principle of extensionality and the principle of atomicity is that there is no reason to believe in simples or in atomic facts. But as

132 we have observed in the Third Chapter of this work that by simplicity Russell means relative simplicity, thereby the demand for the simples cannot be regarded to be an unnecessary one. J. O. Urmson observes:...logical atomism is one of the most thorough-going metaphysical systems yet elaborated. This is true in spite of the anti-metaphysical strain which is to be found in Wittgenstein s Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, alongside of the metaphysics. For breadth of sweep, clarity, detailed working-out, and consistency it can have few rivals. Most similar to it of all the great metaphysical systems of the past is that of Leibniz, for whom Russell had a significant admiration.(urmson, 1956, pp 4-5) Rudolf Carnap, a German empiricist philosopher and a prominent member of Vienna circle, a logician, was a pupil of Frege and was influenced by Russell and Wittgenstein. Carnap s most important work is Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928) translated under the title The Logical Structure of the World. In this work, he tries to give an explanation of how a logical system of concepts may be based on, or may be reducible to, what is immediately given by direct experience. By the term structure (Aufbau), Carnap, like Russell, refers to all the formal properties of an object or relation. He believes that there are two ways of approaching language: one is formal mode and the other is eonnotative mode of speech. This distinction is very important in the development of formal language philosophy, hi the investigation of language, one can employ either the eonnotative mode or the formal mode. Material mode is the mode in which objects are talked about, and in the fomal mode the syntax of the words and sentences are focused. Carnap regards eonnotative mode of speech to be more customaiy and obvious:...but one must use it with great care; it frequently begets muddles and pseudo-problems. (Carnap, 1992, p. 59) Carnap gives some examples of both the speeches and compares them: