109 CHAPTER - SIX Exists As A Predicate : Some Contemporary Views 6.1 : Introduction. Our discussions so far go to show that existence-talk owes a lot to the modem development of quantificational theory. Though the philosophers who are chiefly responsible for invention and development of quantificational logic are not unanimous in their interpretations or presentations of talk about existence in terms of quantificational apparatus, yet they all strongly believe that exists is not a logical (or a first-level) predicate. But some contemporary thinkers, being obsessed with ordinary language, lend their support to the opposite view that exists can sometimes be treated as a logical predicate. It is, therefore, of primary importance to understand the views of these thinkers. And in this regard the obvious choice is P. F. Strawson. 6.2: P. F. Strawson : Exists As A Logical Predicate P. F. Strawson, a leading British philosopher, maintains that any attempt to deal with existence-talk by the tool of quantificational logic carries one away from the use of exists in ordinary discourse. He believes that ordinary language is quite adequate for philosophical purposes. So we need
110 not depart from the ordinary use of the words like exists in favour of artificial language or language of any specially regimented pattern. So he attempts to show that exists can function as a logically unexceptionable predicate without at the same time assimilating it to the quantificational apparatus itself. But before entering into Strawson s view regarding existence and predication it is worth noting that his analysis is closely related to his theory of presupposition. Hence it is better to start with the clarification of this key concept. According to Strawson, subject - predicate statements1 in which identifying reference is made by the subject, there would not generally be an explicit assertion about the existence of the subject. Its existence is only presumed to be known or taken for granted. And this presumption of the item of knowledge about the existence of the subject is called presupposition after Strawson. In elucidating his concept of presupposition Strawson distinguishes it from the notion, of entailment. In his words :...if a statement S presupposes a statement S' in the sense that the truth of S' is a precondition of the truth or falsity of S, then of course there will be a kind of logical absurdity in conjoining S with the denial of S'.... But we must distinguish this kind of logical absurdity from
Ill straightforward self-contradiction. It is self-contradictory to conjoin S with the denial of S^if Syis a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of S. The relation between S and S* in the first case is that S entails S'. We need a different name for the relation between S and S' in the second case ; let us say, as above, that S presupposes S^. 2 The falsity of S in such a case would imply that S is a statement without any truth value. Strawson s view can be made clear with the help of examples. Let us consider the statements : That bowl is silver plated, The man in the garden is singing merrily. The subjects of these statements are ( a demonstrative pronoun with a descriptive expression and definite description respectively) all referring devices or, as Strawson calls them, identifying references and do not make an explicit assertion about the existence of the subjects. Their existences are only presumed, otherwise the respective predicates can not be successfully assigned to these subjects. If there is reference-failure, the statements would be neither true nor false. Having explained the notion of presupposition let us focus our attention to Strawson s proposal that exists can sometimes be treated as a logical predicate. What is a logical predicate? Strawson suggests a criterion for determining whether anything could be a logical predicate.3 The criterion is as follows : Given a grammatical subject and predicate, then it is a necessary
112 condition of their counting as a logical subject and predicate respectively that if the grammatical subject admits of starting off with any of the quantifying adjectives, then it should admit of starting off with them all (with, where necessary, i.e., where at least one is involved, a change from singular to plural or vice versa). 4 So according to Strawson the condition of being a logical predicate is that if the grammatical subject of a sentence admits of commencing with all of the quantifying adjectives all, most, many, some, a few, none, at least one, and so on, then it is a logical subject, and the predicate of a logical subject is a logical predicate. Strawson argues that if exists could be shown to be the grammatical predicate of the subject which admits of commencing with any of the quantifying adjectives mentioned above, then it would turn out to be a logical (or genuine) predicate. Strawson now goes on to show that there are some cases in which exists can be used as a logical predicate. In this context he gives the example of a child who is given a Classical Dictionary to look at and is told by the person handing him the volume, A good proportion of the characters listed are mythical, of course, but most of them existed 5 Since the sentence Most arid. of them existed makes perfectly good sense in this situation, since, according
113 to the criterion stated earlier, whenever a quantifying adjective like most or any of the others can be meaningfully used, we are ready to admit that the y*s ft IojUaI SufejeeK subject;. ; rf a sentence in which it occurs^ Therefore the grammatical predicate exists according to Strawson s criterion must be admitted as a logical predicate in the sentence in question. But a difficulty arises here. In this situation what is that whose existence is presupposed in this sentence in using the subject characters in the Classical Dictionary? Strawson tries to overcome the difficulty by introducing the notion of a presupposed class. A presupposed class is a class the existence of members of which is presupposed. He argues that in the example Some tigers are tame - tame is used as a logical predecate. What is presupposed in this statement is that there is a class viz., the class of tigers and some of the members of it belong to one of its subclasses (viz., the class of tame tigers) but not to others (i.e, the class of ferocious or non-tame tigers), Analogously in the case of the existential statement Most of the characters listed in Classical Dictionary existed, there is a presupposed class of characters because the statement presupposes that there is a class viz., the class of characters (those listed in Classical Dictionary). The existence of this class of characters is presupposed, because it consists of the class of characters being talked about, discussed, described. This class is, however,
114 ontologically heterogeneous, since it contains a sub-class of genuine historical characters and a sub-class of mythical characters. Why should not we say then, Strawson argues, that exists really does work as a predicate here; and that so also would, in such a context, fictional, legendary, mythical, imaginary, made-up, on the one hand ~ and real or historical on the other? 6 Strawson then goes to show how exists can function as a logical predicate in singular statements like, King Alfred did exist and King Arther did not exist. In Strawson s view, We have only to see the names as serving to identify, within the heterogeneous class of kingly characters talk about - a class which comprises both actual and legendary kings - a particular member of that class in each case; and then see the predicate as serving to assign that particular member to the appropriate sub Class. Thus exists, appears as a predicate, and not as a predicate of a concept; but as a predicate of some, and not of other, members of the heterogeneous class. 7 Thus Strawson concludes that exists is used as a genuine or logical predicate both in connection with certain classes and also in connection with certain individuals.
115 6.3 : D. F. Pears : Exists As A Peculiar Predicate Like Strawson, Pears also upholds the view that exists5 can be treated as a predicate. His view emerges especially as a reaction to the claim that exists is not a predicate because (i) it adds nothing to the subject concept. And (ii) it says nothing about the subject concept. Pears first tries to show the verb exists does add something to the subject concept. Let us consider the sentence : Tigers exisf. For Pears, if we assert Tigers exist - what it implies is that the concept tiger has instances in reality-that is, that there are tigers in the world. But Pears admits that there is an oddity in asserting that Tigeitf exist" in normal circumstances, for its addition does not surely enrich or augment the concept of subject as the idpa of an additional empirically verifiable quality (like yellow, striped etc.) does. But it would be too much to say that it adds nothing to the subject concept. As Pears puts it :...to say that a concept has instances in reality is certainly to add something to it, even if what is added is peculiar. 3 Moreover, Pears points out, it is false to say that when one asserts that Tigers exist, one is saying nothing about tigers. For if anyone asks the
116 question : what are you talking about? his reply would be tigers. Similarly if someone says Tigers do not exisf or Mermaids do not exist, one is talking about tigers and mermaids respectively. So it would be incorrect to say that a positive existential or a negative existential statement is not about the subject. Nothing is being said about in such statements. Pears, thus, refutes the claims mentioned above and holds that exists is a predicate. But he admits that surely exists does not behave in the same way as other predicates do. He points out that exists enjoys a peculiar status. And its peculiarity lies in the fact that unlike other predicates the assertion or denial of existence in a sentence results in referential tautology or referential contradiction. Pears substantiates his view with the help of an example. According to Pears, in the sentence This room exists - exists, no doubt, functions predicatively, but it functions in a peculiar way. For the expression this room implies that there is a room viz. this one and it implies this in virtue of having been used to refer to this room. And the addition of exists is nothing but to iterate the same thing once again; it is as if one were just saying this room (which exists) exists and this is a mere tautology. If someone says, This room does not exist, one gets involved into contradiction. For to say this is
117 to say this room (which exists) does not exist. And this is a self-contradiction. This analysis goes to show that as the use of exists, results in either referential tautology or referential contradiction, its use must be different from the uses of other predicates and so, according to Pears, it is a peculiar predicate. With these notions of referential tautology and referential contradication Pears suggests a more exact formulation of the Kantian thesis that existence is not a predicate; The more exact formulations would be as follows. Existence is not a predicate because a) it adds nothing new to the subject concept and b) it says nothing that has not been said implicitly already. Pears calls this the minimal formulation. This minimal formulation, however, Pears thinks, needs qualification in three ways. Firstly the subject term of a singular existential statement might refer to something or somebody in the legendary or fictional world, and so imply existence in that world but not in the real world. For example, if one says about David Copperfield that he existed in real life the subject phrase of the statement would imply existence only in the world of fiction created by Charles Dickens. So if one goes to assert that David Copperfield existed
118 in real world, he would indeed be adding something new. And so there would be no referential tautology in this case. This is because the statement implies existence in the world of fiction and asserts it in the real world. Analogously if one says David Copperfield does not exist one would not be guilty of referential contradiction for the same reasons. Secondly, someone might say, The Euston Arch no longer exists. Pears says, Since the subject of the statement referentially implies existence in the real world and since the verb exists denies existence in the real world, this might look as if the statement is a referential contradiction. But in fact it is notw.9 For Euston Arch s existence has been implied for one time and denied for a later time. And thus referential contradiction is avoided. The same consideration also holds good for affirmative cases. Finally, if the subject term of a singular existential statement implies existence at a particular level while the verb denies existence at another level, then the statement does not involve a referential contradiction. For example, suppose someone like Macbeth is having a hallucinatory experience of a dagger before him and says to himself, That dagger does not exist. Pears thinks that referential contradiction could be avoided here if we make a distinction between two senses in which the dagger might be considered to exist: first, it
119 could be said to exist as a visually experienced dagger and so the subject phrase that dagger implies that it exists at least at that level. Secondly, it might be taken to exist as a dagger in space, i.e. a real dagger independent of any visual experience of it. So in saying That dagger does not exist one is not guilty of referential contradiction for what is being implied at one level is being denied at another level. So Pears'* thesis is as follows : If the subject phrase of a singular statement referentially implies existence, then if the verb asserts existence, the statement will be a referential tautology, and if the verb denies existence, the statement will be a referential contradiction, except under one of the following three condtions. First, the implication and the assertion are about different worlds, secondly they are about different times, thirdly they are about different levels. 10 H-e y<.*iev\ ViveJ tr*.u* «With these three qualifications. :.;' any singular affirmative ' A A A existential statement negative existential statement and.any singular A : can be escaped.
120 6.4 : P. T. Geach : The Two Sense Theory of Exists Peter Geach is another eminent philosopher who strongly supports the view that exists can be a predicate and indeed be a logical predicate. He argues that apart from the use of exists as a second-level predicate, it also plays the role of a first-level predicate. Thus he advocates the two-sense use of exists!1' In the opinion of Geach there are of course certain cases in which the use of exists can be understood only in the way as suggested by Frege, i.e. in the sense of instantiation. For example Martyrs exist can be understood as the property of being martyr is instantiated at least once. But according to him this is not the only way of treating exists. There are also cases where the use of exists is to be understood in a different way. And this is the case in sentences such as Aristotle exists. Geach maintains that it would sound problematic (and also non-sensical) if it is understood in the Fregean sense as Aristotle is instantiated at least once. Here the problem lies in the fact that individuals are not just the kind of thing that ever could be instantiated. Rather than being them selves instantiable, they are the kind of thing in which instantiations occur. For example, the property of being a philosopher can be instantiated in Aristotle, but Aristotle himself can not be instantiated in
121 anything. Miller thus12 : Geach s view is represented in the form of an argument by Barry P j What can be predicated of a kind differs absolutely from what can be predicated of an individual. P2* Exists is predicated both of individuals and of kinds. Therefore, exists has two senses, one as predicated of individuals, the other as predicated of kinds. To explain : In regard to the first premise, although there are two ways in which a predicate might be conceived of as being applicable to both kinds and individuals, it could be shown that neither is tenable. One way would be for a second-level predicate to be applicable to both individuals and kinds; the other for a first-level predicate to be said of them. As to the first alternative, we must be clear as to precisely what kind of expression can be said of what the first-level predicate refers to (e.g. a kind, or Fregean concept). If we consider the proposition (3x) (x is G), the first-level predicable is...is G. And
122 the second level predicate, attached to it is, however, not simply (3x) but (3x) (x...). Now if we ask the question whether the second level predicate could equally be attached not only to a first-level predicable but to a proper name, it becomes clear that it could not. This is because the bound variable, which filled the gap in...is G, has no role to play when... is G is filled up by a proper name. The expression that results from such a combination is, therefore, not even a closed sentence. The second alternative mentioned above fares no better. If... is G and...is F are two first-level predicables, then the result of combining them would be (... is G) is F or (... is F) is G. Once again, neither combination would be even a closed sentence, as the gap would be filled neither by a bound variable not by a proper name. From this is follows that no predicate whether of first level or of second-level, could be said both of individuals and of kinds. And this would establish the first premise (p,). To prove the second premise (: i.e. P2) of the above argument Geach shows the different uses of exists. According to him, in its popular use exists obviously enjoys the status of a second-level predicate as in the example Men exist. This statement may be rendered as (3x) (x is a man), for it asserts that the property of humanity is instantiated at least once. Thus in this example exists functions a second-level predicate. But apart from the
123 second-level predicative use of exists it also has use as a first-level predicate. As for example Socrates no longer exists. This should be understood as It is no longer the case that (Socrates exists). Thus understood the proposition has Socrates exists embedded in it and consequently could not make sense unless the embedded proposition also made sense. And the embedded proposition ( Socrates exists ) could not make sense unless exists were predicable of Socrates. So we have to admit that in this case exists can be predicated of an individual. From the above Geach concludes that exists can be predicated both of individuals and of kinds i.e., it can both be a first and second level predicate. So exists is bound to have two senses. These two senses of exists are called by Geach actuality sense (when used as a first level predicate) and there is sense (when used as a second level predicate). From the above discussion it follows that in Geach s view since first level predicative use of exists possible, it can be a logical predicate. 6.5: G. Nakhnikian And W. C. Salmon : Exists As A Universal Predicate Following the line of Strawson, Pears and Geach, Nakhnikian and Salmon also uphold the view that exists can be treated as a predicate. For them,
124... Exists can be consistently treated as a predicate. As a predicate exists has special characteristics. 13 The primary objective of Nakhnikian and Salmon is not to prove whether exists is a predicate or not (because they definitely consider it to be a special kind of predicate), but to review the thesis that the treatment of exists as a predicate leads us to absurd consequences. In other words, their view is mainly a reaction to the philosophical claim that - the treatment of exists as a predicate would result in either tautology or self contradiction. In this connection they refer to the views of J. Wisdom, A. J. Ayer and C. D. Broad who make this claim. Nakhnikian and Salmon make an attempt to show that the above claim is the result of certain misunderstanding; and so; te' must be removed. They think that it would be more convenient to begin with quoting die relevant passages of those thinkers(wisdom, Ayer, Broad)who made the above claim and therefore consider exists as not being a predicate at all. John Wisdom, in his book Interpretation and Analysis' writes, Suppose the proposition expressed by the instantial sentence, Homes exist, is related to this sentence in the same way that the proposition
125 expressed by the sentence, ^Horses are herbivorous is related to that sentence. Then (1) affirmative instantials are tautologous, and (2) negative instantials are self-contradicjpy. For Horses are herbivorous equals if there exists anything which is a horse, it is herbivorous. And Horses exist treated on these lines becomes, If there exists anything which is a horse, it exists. And Horses are not herbivorous equals If there exists anything which is a horse it is not herbivorous. And Horses do not exist treated on these lines becomes If there exists anything which is a horse, it does not exist. Now instantial propositions are not silly in this way. 14 A. J. Ayer, is in complete agreement with Wisdom s above argument. In his book Language, Truth and Logic, he says : Existence is not an attribute. For when we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists; so that if existence were itself an fufattribute, it would follow^ all positive existential propositions were tautologies, and all negative existential propositions self-contradictory; and this is not the case. So that those who raise questions about Being which are based on the assumption that existence is an attribute are guilty of following grammar beyond the boundaries of sense. 15 C. D. Broad, in his book Religion, Philosophy and Psychical
126 Research, shares the view of Wisdom and Ayer. He says : Let us begin with the two negative propositions cats do not bark and Dragons do not exist. The first might be expressed, on the conditional interpretation, by the sentence If there were any cats, none of them would bark. On the instantial interpretation it might be expressed by the sentence There are cats and none of them bark. Suppose you try to express the negative existential proposition in the same way. On the first alternative it would be expressed by the sentence If there were any dragons, none of them would exist. On the second alternative it would be expressed by the sentence There are dragons, and none of them exist. Both these sentences are self-contradictory and meaningless. So if you try to analyze negative existential propositions in the same way as negative characterizing propositions, you will find that they are all selfcontradictory... 516 Broad considers two affirmative propositions Cats scratch and Cats exist. He continues, on the conditional interpretation the former would be expressed by the sentence If there were any Cats, none of them would fail to scratch. On the instantial interpretation it would be expressed by the sentence, There are cats, and none of them fail to scratch. Suppose you try to express the affirmative existential proposition in the same way. On the first
127 alternative it would be expressed by the sentence If there were any cats none of them would fail to exist. On the second alternative it would be expressed by the sentence There are cats, and none of them fail to exist. Now both these sentences are mere platitudes. So if you try to analyze affirmative existential popositions in the same way as affirmative characterizing propositions, you will find that they are all platitudes. But it is plain that Cats exist is not a mere platitude.17 It is a substantial proposition which might very well be doubted by a person who had never seen a cat. So it is certain that existential propositions need a different kind of analysis.18 From the above considerations it is clear that Wisdom, Ayer and Broad commonly share the view that if exists is treated as a predicate then the following absurdities would arise : a) All affirmative existential proposition would be tautologies. b) All negative existential propositions would be self-contradictory. But Nakhnikian and Salmon point out that the first absurdity is due to improper translation of affirmative existential proposition and the second absurdity is the result of wrongly identifying a correct translation as a selfcontradiction. If existential affirmative and negative propositions are properly
128 translated and correctly understood, they would neither result in tautologies nor into contradictions. According to Nakhnikian and Salmon, in categorical propositions very often the quantifier expressions are not explicitly stated. And it lies on the part of the reader or hearer to determine (according to their practical knowledge) whether the quantifier all or some is intended. For example, in the English sentences Snakes are reptiles, Snakes are poisonous - quantifiers are omitted. But we understand that in the first sentence all is intended and in the second some would probably be correct. Similarly in Wisdom s example, the intended meanings of Horses are herbivorous and Horses exist, are: All horses are herbivorous and Some horses exist. This clearly shows that the comparison drawn by Wisdom between these two sentences is not a correct one because the sentences are not of the same logical form. But J. Wisdom incorrectly compares these two sentences and analyses them in the same way. This compels him to think that affirmative existential sentence (like Horses exist translated into If there exists anything, which is a horse, it exists ) is a tautology and negative existential sentence (such as Horses do not exist translated as If there exists anything which is a horse, it does not exist ) results in contradiction.
129 Ayer argues that when we ascribe an attribute to a thing we covertly assert that it exists. So affirmative existential proposition would be tautologous and negative existential propositions would be self-contradictory. Broad also argues on the lines of Wisdom and Ayer. Against the above contentions of Wisdom, Ayer and Broad, Nakhnikian and Salmon maintain that affirmative existential propositions, if properly translated, would not be tautologies and negative existential propositions, if rightly understood, would not be self-contradictory. They would thus claim to have refuted the philosophical claim that exists cannot be treated as a predicate without giving rise to absurdities. According to them, on the Boolean interpretation of proposition if exists were regarded as a predicate, affirmative and negative existential propositions would become T and O propositions respectively - which are both categorical propositions. On the Boolean interpretation the existence of the subject term of a proposition is asserted and not presupposed and as such if exists were treated as a universal predicate neither affirmative existential propositions would be tautologous nor negative existential propositions would be self-contradictory. To substantiate their view Nakhnikian and Salman introduce the formula \x)ex as a meaning postulate for exists in their logical system. This
130 formula is taken to mean that everything exists or that there are no nonexistent entities. In other words, the extension of exists is universal and for extensional logic this constitues a complete specification of the meaning of exists. This postulate does not say either that every intension has non-null extension or that every idea corresponds to an existent entity, or that every conception in literature has a counterpart in reality. 19 Ex', (or x exists) according to them^can be explicitly defined thus : Ex = df. (x = x ) and (x) Ex = df. (x) (x = x) [This being a logical truth can be used in any deduction harmlessly] In other word^to say a thing exists is to assert that it is identical with itself and to say everything exists is to say that everything is identical with itself. Now Nakhnikian and Salmon argue that if, after wisdom, Ayer and Broad, we translate Horses exist into All horses exist, symbolically 1) (x) {(Hx- Ex) z> Ex} (Where Ex means x exists ) then it would obviously be a tautology. But a proper translation of Horses exist is Some horses exist
131 (because by saying Horses exist' we generally mean that there are certain existent horses). This could be schematically represented thus : 2) - (x) (Hx zd - Ex) This, however, is not a tautology. It is logically equivalent to : 3) ( 3 x ) (Hx Ex) which implies: 4) ( 3 x ) Hx Similarly, the negative existential proposition Horses do not exist on Wisdom s translation could be symbolized as : 5) (x) {(Hx Ex) 3 - Ex} This is logically equivalent to 6) (x) { Hx zd (Ex 3 - Ex)} However, 7) (Ex id-ex)} = -Ex So (6) (x) {Hx zd (Ex zd - Ex)} is logically equivalent to 8) (x) (Hx zd- Ex) which involves no contradiction. Nakhnikian and Salmon argue that (8) by itself is not self-contradictory. Logically it is not the contradictory of (1) (x) {(Hx. Ex) zd Ex} but
132 of (2) i.e., - (x) (Hx 3 - Ex). And this is quite consistent because Horses exist is the contradictory of Horses do not exist. And thus they show that affirmative existential propositions can be schematized by the formula (2) which is not a tautology. Whereas, the negative existential proposition could be schematized by the formula (8) and this involves no contradiction. Having established that the treatment of exists as a predicate does not give rise to any kind of absurdity, Nakhnikian and Salmon further maintain that if the formula (x)ex which means everything exists is introduced as the meaning postulate for exists, then the formula which schematizes sentences using exists as a predicate are logically equivalent to the quantificational schematization of the same sentence. Thus the proposition Horses exist taken to mean as some horses exist could be schematized as (3x) (Hx. Ex) which is equivalant to its quantificational schematization into (3x) Hx. Again the negative existential proposition^ Horses do not exist when schematized by the use of logical notation Ex would be (x) (Hx 3 - Ex) and this is logically equivalent to (x) - Hx the schematization of the sentence in quantificational logic. Since the treatment of exists does not result in any absurdity Nakhnikian and Salmon conclude,
133... Exists can be... treated as a predicate... it is a logical constant rather than a descriptive predicate. Furthermore, it is a redundant predicate... But being a special kind of predicate is very different from not being a predicate at all. 20 6.6 : Murray Kiteiey : Exists Has A Predicative Use. Murray Kiteley also criticizes the views of Ayer, Broad and Wisdom that the treatment of exists as a predicate gives rise to some sorts of absurdity. He maintains that the view held by Ayer, Broad and Wisdom is founded upon the basic assumption that Predication entails existence. That is, whenever we predicate something, the subject of predication must exist. And this assumption, according to him, is not universally correct because we sometimes ascribe predicate with respect to things that do not exist. That is to say, the assumption that Predication entails existence, holds good only if certain restrictions are made, i.e. only in the cases of successful, true or correct predication (eg. the table is brown, Tigers are quadruped etc.). Because a predication might fail due to^. failure (e.g., Santa claus is kind-hearted, Fairies are beautiful etc. etc.)., Ao the doctrine that predication entails existence is erroneous. In his positive thesis, Murray Kiteley shows that exists has a predicative use which does not give rise to absurdity (i.e. either redundancy
134 or self-contradiction). To show this, he makes a distinction between exiguous use and non-exiguous use of exists. According to him, exists, if used exiguously, is non-predicative but when used non-exiguously it can be treated as a predicate without resulting in any absurdity. In order to understand the distinction between exiguous and non-exiguous uses of exists let us consider the sentence Tame tigers exist. Kiteley maintains, Exists, when employed exiguously, tells you something about tame tigers but nothing about each and every tame tiger; it tells you something about the membership, but nothing about the members. Existence, here, is something like full strength of a regiment: the regiment can be at full strength, but none of the members can be. 21 Kiteley holds tht exiguous use of exists speaks us something about the property or concept but not about any individual. And this usage is expressed in classical symbolic logic in terms of existential quantifier. The proposition Tigers exist symbolically (3x) Tx means the same as there exists at least one x, such that x is a tiger. It clearly shows the non-predicative use (or the second-level use) of exists. In contrast with the exiguous use when exists is used non-exigu- ously, it says nothing but only focusses on those things that are to be excluded.
135. 8y saying All tame tigers exist we are simply denying that they (tame tigers) are dead, or destroyed, mythical, escaped etc. etc. Thus by introducing the distinction between exiguous and non-exiguous uses of exists Kiteley comes to the conclusion that... so long as exists is used in a non-exiguous way neither redundancy nor self-contradiction will be incurred. 22 Kiteley would thus hold that there are non-existent horses, eg. Pegasus.is quite consistent because non-existent is used in the way of an excluder. Thus Kiteley shows that exists can sometimes have a predicative use without involving either redundancy or contradiction. Kiteley s view is supported by a number of modem thinkers like Roland Hall,23 Frank. B. Ebersole,24 J. L. Shaw,25 and others. They all make it a point that exists, when used in a specific sense,26 has a predicative character. R. Hall maintains, Excluders serve to mle out something without adding anything and ambiguously rale out different things according to the context. 27 To put it simply: It may be said that such a use of exists does not add anything to the subject concept but only rales out some possibilities and what it rales out depends upon the context in which the proposition is stated. Thus after
136 making a thorough survey, if a zoological survey team in order to file a report on the tame tigers exclaim, Extraordinary, they all exist! - the force of their exclamation is quite intelligible in the sense that it excludes their death in captivity, extinction and so on.28 The force of the exclamation of the Zoological survey team, is not the absurd proposition that None of them (tame tigers) have died nor escaped. Thus we see that a special contextual reference can give intelligibility to such an apparently non-sensical string of words. Ebersole also admits the predicative use of exists. He holds that the predicative use of exists is negative in character. He says, In general where W is a property word, not-w is also a property word... then one would presumably have to classify exists with not-w s... 29 From the above discussion we see that according to Kiteley, Hall and Ebersole predicative use of exists is possible when exists is used as an excluder or in non-exiguous sense. NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. RF. Strawson makes an important distinction between Sentence and Statement. By Sentence he means a combination of words which makes sense, and by Statement he means the use of a sentence. 2. Strawson, R F., Introduction to Logical Theory. Methuen, London, 1952. Ch - 6, p. 175 3. In suggesting the criterion for logical predicate, Strawson is influenced by G.E.Moore from whom he derives some part of his basic idea.
137 4. Strawson, P.F., Is Existence Never A Predicate^ in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, Methuen, London, 1974. p. 195. 5. Ibid., p. 195. 6. Ibid., p. 196. 7. Ibid., pp. 196-197. 8. Pears, D. F., Is Existence A Predicate?, in Philosophical Logic, edited, by P. F. Strawson, Oxford University Press, New york, U.S.A., p. 97. 9. Ibid., p. 99. 10. Ibid., p. 100. 11. Geach, P.T., Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary vol.- 42, 1968, pp. 7-16. 12. Miller, B., In Defence of the Predicate Exists', in Mind, Vol.- 84,1975.pp 3 <*1-3-23 13. Nakhnikian, G and Salmon, W. C., Exists As ftpredicate, in Philosophical Review, V0I.-66, 1957, pp 533^5^0 14. Wisdom, John, Interpretation and Analysis, London, 1931, p. 62. 15. Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and logic, Second edition, London, 1947, p. 43. 16. Broad, C. D., Religion, Philosophy,and Psychical Research, London, 1953, pp. 182-183. 17. By platitude in this context Broad means the same as what Wisdom and Ayer mean by tautology. 18. Ibid., pp. 182-183. 19. Nakhnikian and Salmon, in The Philosophical Review, vol.-66, 1957. AMS Reprint Company, New York. p. 539. 20. Ibid., pp 539^- 21. Kiteley, Murray, Is Existence A Predicate? in Mind, Vol.- 73,1964, p. 369. 22. Ibid., p. 370. 23. Hall, Roland, Excluders in Analysis, vol.- 20, 1959, p. 1. 24. Ebersole, F. B., Whether Existence Is A Predicate, in Journal of Philosophy, Vol.- 60, no. 18, p. 518. 25. Shaw, J.L., 'Exists' And 'Predicate', in Sambodhi, vol.- 8(14), 1980, p. 108. 26. What Ki^ey calls the non-exiguous use of 'exists has been termed by R. Hall as excluder uses of exists and by F. B. Ebersole as reactionary uses of ^exists.
138 27. Hall, Roland, Excluders, in Analysis, Vol.- 20, 1959. p. 1. 28. This example is given by Murray Kiteley, in Mind, Vol.- 73,1964, p.369. 29. Ebersole, F. B., Whether Existence Is A Predicate, in Journal of Philosophy, Vol.- 60, no. 18, p. 518.