Psychological Egoism. A Popular Mistake

Similar documents
James Rachels. Ethical Egoism

THE MEANING OF OUGHT. Ralph Wedgwood. What does the word ought mean? Strictly speaking, this is an empirical question, about the

Lecture 1 The Concept of Inductive Probability

Consider... Ethical Egoism. Rachels. Consider... Theories about Human Motivations

Philosophy of Ethics Philosophy of Aesthetics. Ross Arnold, Summer 2014 Lakeside institute of Theology

McCLOSKEY ON RATIONAL ENDS: The Dilemma of Intuitionism

Moral Psychology

Verificationism. PHIL September 27, 2011

Challenges to Traditional Morality

LENT 2018 THEORY OF MEANING DR MAARTEN STEENHAGEN

Quine on the analytic/synthetic distinction

Primitive Concepts. David J. Chalmers

Philosophy 1100: Ethics

Analyticity and reference determiners

What is a counterexample?

NOT SO PROMISING AFTER ALL: EVALUATOR-RELATIVE TELEOLOGY AND COMMON-SENSE MORALITY

Chapter 2 Reasoning about Ethics

Varieties of Apriority

Glossary of Terms Jim Pryor Princeton University 2/11/03

CLASS #17: CHALLENGES TO POSITIVISM/BEHAVIORAL APPROACH

Ayer and Quine on the a priori

Max Deutsch: The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, xx pp.

Ayer s linguistic theory of the a priori

Grokking Pain. S. Yablo. draft of June 2, 2000

part one MACROSTRUCTURE Cambridge University Press X - A Theory of Argument Mark Vorobej Excerpt More information

Philosophical Ethics. Distinctions and Categories

Carnap s notion of analyticity and the two wings of analytic philosophy. Christian Damböck Institute Vienna Circle

Introduction to Cognitivism; Motivational Externalism; Naturalist Cognitivism

Ayer on the criterion of verifiability

KANT, MORAL DUTY AND THE DEMANDS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON. The law is reason unaffected by desire.

Oxford Scholarship Online Abstracts and Keywords

Psychological and Ethical Egoism

ON QUINE, ANALYTICITY, AND MEANING Wylie Breckenridge

17. Tying it up: thoughts and intentionality

1. Introduction Formal deductive logic Overview

Constructing the World

Strange bedfellows or Siamese twins? The search for the sacred in practical theology and psychology of religion

Logic. A Primer with Addendum

Philosophical Ethics. The nature of ethical analysis. Discussion based on Johnson, Computer Ethics, Chapter 2.

FORMING ETHICAL STANDARDS

What Is a Normative Ethical Theory? Keith Burgess-Jackson 26 December 2017

Reply to Robert Koons

Bayesian Probability

Overview. Is there a priori knowledge? No: Mill, Quine. Is there synthetic a priori knowledge? Yes: faculty of a priori intuition (Rationalism, Kant)

1 ReplytoMcGinnLong 21 December 2010 Language and Society: Reply to McGinn. In his review of my book, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human

An Introduction to. Formal Logic. Second edition. Peter Smith, February 27, 2019

4 Liberty, Rationality, and Agency in Hobbes s Leviathan

Is anything knowable on the basis of understanding alone?

Chapter 2 Normative Theories of Ethics

Tara Smith s Ayn Rand s Normative Ethics: A Positive Contribution to the Literature on Objectivism?

The Appeal to Reason. Introductory Logic pt. 1

Conceptual Analysis meets Two Dogmas of Empiricism David Chalmers (RSSS, ANU) Handout for Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 4, 2006

A Categorical Imperative. An Introduction to Deontological Ethics

WHY THERE REALLY ARE NO IRREDUCIBLY NORMATIVE PROPERTIES

Naturalist Cognitivism: The Open Question Argument; Subjectivism

Constructing the World, Lecture 4 Revisability and Conceptual Change: Carnap vs. Quine David Chalmers

Royal Institute of Philosophy

Andrei Marmor: Social Conventions

4.1 A problem with semantic demonstrations of validity

REASON AND PRACTICAL-REGRET. Nate Wahrenberger, College of William and Mary

Soc 1 Lecture 2. Tuesday, January 13, 2009 Winter 2009

145 Philosophy of Science

Boghossian & Harman on the analytic theory of the a priori

A Brief Introduction to Key Terms

Ethical Egoism. Ethical Egoism Things You Should Know. Quiz: one sentence each beginning with The claim that

Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge

Moral Twin Earth: The Intuitive Argument. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently published a series of articles where they

5: Preliminaries to the Argument

The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS & THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE

R. M. Hare (1919 ) SINNOTT- ARMSTRONG. Definition of moral judgments. Prescriptivism

Topics in Linguistic Theory: Propositional Attitudes

Bart Streumer, Unbelievable Errors, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ISBN

A Priori Knowledge: Analytic? Synthetic A Priori (again) Is All A Priori Knowledge Analytic?

HARE S PRESCRIPTIVISM

Vol. II, No. 5, Reason, Truth and History, 127. LARS BERGSTRÖM

2 FREE CHOICE The heretical thesis of Hobbes is the orthodox position today. So much is this the case that most of the contemporary literature

FINAL EXAM REVIEW SHEET. objectivity intersubjectivity ways the peer review system is supposed to improve objectivity

The Critical Mind is A Questioning Mind

Sidgwick on Practical Reason

On possibly nonexistent propositions

What is an Argument? Validity vs. Soundess of Arguments

Why there is no such thing as a motivating reason

Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology* Oxford University Press, 2009

Russell s Problems of Philosophy

PHI2391: Logical Empiricism I 8.0

No Love for Singer: The Inability of Preference Utilitarianism to Justify Partial Relationships

The Subject Matter of Ethics G. E. Moore

Making Decisions on Behalf of Others: Who or What Do I Select as a Guide? A Dilemma: - My boss. - The shareholders. - Other stakeholders

Saying too Little and Saying too Much. Critical notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, by Jennifer Saul

HYBRID NON-NATURALISM DOES NOT MEET THE SUPERVENIENCE CHALLENGE. David Faraci

Reply to Hawthorne. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXIV, No. 1, January 2002

Is God Good By Definition?

Saying too Little and Saying too Much Critical notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, by Jennifer Saul

Gale on a Pragmatic Argument for Religious Belief

Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of Propositional Attitudes Capture the Agent s Conceptions? 1

Simplicity made difficult

Statements, Arguments, Validity. Philosophy and Logic Unit 1, Sections 1.1, 1.2

Hume on Ideas, Impressions, and Knowledge

Haberdashers Aske s Boys School

Transcription:

Psychological Egoism A Popular Mistake

Self-interest and Virtue The virtues are lost in self-interest as rivers are lost in the sea. Franklin D. Roosevelt

Two Kinds of Egoism Psychological Egoism (PE): Everyone always, in every instance, acts from a motive of self-interest. Ethical Egoism (EE): Everyone always, in every instance, should act from a motive of self-interest.

PE Refined Plainly people sometimes do things not in their own self-interest: People make mistakes. People are confused. People sometimes simply do foolish things that they later regret and rightly believe not to have been in their own interest. So, slightly amended PE: Everyone always, in every instance, acts from a motive of perceived self-interest. Everyone, that is, always acts in a way they understand to be in their own self-interest.

PE Characterised PE is evidently a descriptive, empirical claim: It purports, that is, to describe how people in fact act. It should, then, in principle, be in some way or other falsifiable. It is, moreover, a synthetic claim. It is thus understood not to be a trivial claim, or a claim which is simply stipulated. It is a substantive claim about human psychology and human motivation in particular.

Analytic vs. Synthetic The Character of this Distinction This is a syntactic-semantic distinction. The Distinction A sentence is analytically true/false iff it is true/false purely by virtue of its logical form or by virtue of the meanings of its words and independently of matters of fact. A sentence is synthetic iff it is not analytic.

PE and EE Contrasted PE is, then, a descriptive claim. EE is, by contrast, a normative claim.

Descriptive Claims Descriptive claims purport to describe the world as it is. One may fairly and uncontroversially ask, when confronted with a descriptive claim: is this claim true or false? What fact, if any, makes this claim true? Some examples: Margaret Thatcher was the first female Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The speed of light in a vacuum is 299,792,459 metres per second. N.b. that we may not actually know the truth value of this or that descriptive claim: Uruguay won the first World Cup, in 1930. It is not possible that anything can travel faster than the speed of light.

Normative Claims Normative claims make appeal, explicitly or implicitly, to some norm; they are generally evaluative or prescriptive. Some examples: Wagner is the greatest opera composer of all time. One should never harm another person willingly. Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. (Benjamin Franklin) You really should do something about that brother of yours.

A Dispute about Normativity Although many people suppose this is so, we do not want to make it definitional of normativity that normative statements are not truth evaluable. Consider: Murder is always and everywhere wrong. If there are moral facts, then this is simply true. The sunset over the Alps was simply gorgeous. You should always pursue your own self-interest exclusively. The crucial point: such statements make implicit or explicit appeal to some norm, either prescriptively or by being evaluative.

Now, to PE PE is, or purports to be, an empirical hypothesis about human motivation. PE holds that all humans, whenever they act, act so as to maximize their own narrowly construed self-interest. PE claims, then, then everyone is always, everywhere, in every action, selfish.

Against PE 1. PE is either analytic or synthetic. 2. If PE is synthetic, then it is plainly false (because counterexamples abound). 3. If PE is analytic, then it is not an empirical claim about human motivation at all (and it is trivial, because stipulative). 4. Ergo, PE is either false or trivial.