Practical Wisdom & The Unity of Virtue in Nicomachean Ethics VI.12-13

Practical Wisdom & The Unity of Virtue in Nicomachean Ethics VI.12-13 C.G. Healow December 15, 2015 Abstract In the N icomachean Ethics VI, Aristotle commits himself to the rather strong claim that an agent having practical wisdom is both a sufficient and necessary condition for that agent s having each of the moral virtues. He then uses this claim to argue for the further position that an agent has one of the moral virtues if and only if he has them all. Despite the fact that some scholars have suggested that Aristotle s arguments don t (or even can t) succeed, I intend to argue that once properly understood, the idea that practical wisdom implies, and is implied by, the unity of virtue is a defensible hypothesis which provides a useful goal to all who seek to attain a virtuous character. In section 1 I provide an outline of the theses Aristotle supports and provide a brief sketch of some prima facie reasons why his theses might be doubtfully true. Then, in section 2, I recount the arguments Aristotle gives in support of his controversial theses. Lastly, in section 3 I examine two objections scholars have made against his arguments, while detailing some of the other features of Aristotle s ethical theory which may provide the resources to respond to these objections. 1 Introduction In the chapters 12 and 13 of book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle seeks to provide responses to some of the likely objections that might be raised against the account of virtue he proposes. These objections range from the question of whether practical wisdom is an essential characteristic of the virtuous agent and whether practical wisdom could itself be useful given that our dispositions are responsible for our actions, to the question of what the relation is between intellectual and practical wisdom. These various concerns are dispatched with varying degrees of detail and effectiveness. But what makes these chapters especially noteworthy is the fact that it is here that Aristotle reveals his commitment to, and arguments in favor of, two remarkable positions. One of these positions is what I ll call the Practical Wisdom 1

Thesis (PW). It supposes that practical wisdom (φρον ησις) is intimately related to virtue (ρετ η), such that having practical wisdom is both a sufficient and necessary condition for having any of the moral virtues Aristotle describes in earlier books of the Nicomachean Ethics. Practical Wisdom Thesis (PW): For any agent, a, a has practical wisdom if and only if a possesses moral virtue. Additionally, Aristotle believes that (PW) provides adequate reason to accept what I ll call the Unity of Virtue Thesis (UV), which supposes that anyone who has one moral virtue must have all the others as well. Unity of Virtue Thesis (UV): For any agent, a, arbitraryvirtue,v x and full set of virtues, (where v x ), a has v x if and only if a has. Initially, neither (PW) nor (UV) seem to be very plausible theses. For instance, take (PW); it seems highly suspicious to claim that practical wisdom requires that one be virtuous. After all, aren t there frighteningly many examples of intelligent people who are quite skilled at attaining ends that are of questionable moral value? Similarly, isn t it conceivable that we might find ignorant people who more often than not behave properly, but do so unintentionally? Each of these would seem to be counterexamples to (PW). There also appear to be straightforward counterexamples to (UV). Of course, one aspect of (UV) seems trivially true (e.g. if there are only three virtues say, v 1, v 2, v 3 and a person has all the virtues, obviously she will have each virtue independently). But it seems totally outrageous to claim that one cannot be, say, generous, without also being courageous, proud, temperate, etc. With this in mind, (UV) appears rather dubious at the outset. Still, regardless of their initial implausibility, Aristotle does give arguments in favor of both theses and each of these arguments clearly draws on the account of virtue Aristotle devotes the majority of the N icomachean Ethics to elucidating. It is my belief that analysis of some of Aristotle s other claims in this work go a long way towards vindicating his arguments in support of (PW) and (UV). Clarifying Aristotle s arguments and analyzing their success is the topic of this paper. In section 2, I ll examine Aristotle s arguments in isolation from the rest of the Nicomachean Ethics. Then, in section 3, I ll examine some of the more threatening 2

objections that have been leveled against (PW) and (UV) while outlining broader themes in Aristotle s ethical theory that bear on the evaluation of such objections. 2 Aristotle s Arguments for (PW) and (UV) 2.1 Having Practical Wisdom Implies Being Virtuous In order to establish the truth of the biconditional represented by (PW), Aristotle recognized the need to establish both that (i) the presence of practical wisdom implies the presence of virtue, and that (ii) the presence of virtue implies the presence of practical wisdom. He opts to prove (i) first. Practical Wisdom Thesis 1 (PW 1 ): For any agent, a, ifa has practical wisdom, then a possesses virtue. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Aristotle indicates that wisdom itself has a normative connotation, which makes it similar to a virtue. Wisdom is a species of a more general skill called cleverness, (δεινότης) which can be either positive or negative depending on the use to which it is put. His idea appears to be that it is, of course, possible for someone to be effective at securing her ends even if the ends she chooses to pursue are improper in the sense that they are not the ends that a person mindful of goodness would choose. It seems peculiar to say this person is unwise in the sense that she is not able to bring about her ends, but it does seem appropriate to say this person is unwise in the sense that she is choosing ends that run contrary to what is naturally good for her qua human being. Thus, Aristotle offers the distinction between cleverness and wisdom; cleverness is required in order for one to be practically wise, but the only way one can truly be practically wise is for her to have a proper starting point, avaluefromwhichagoalcanbederivedsuchthathereffortscanbeeffectivelyused to secure an appropriate end. But it is still possible to be clever that is, skilled at achieving your ends even if you don t know how to select ends properly. This eye of the soul [cleverness] does not come to be in its proper condition without excellence (ρετ η),... for chains of practical reasoning have astartingpoint... andthisisnotevidentexcepttothepersonwho possesses excellence, since badness distorts a person and causes him to be deceived about the starting points of action. So it is evident that it is 3

impossible to be wise (φρον ησις) without possessing excellence (ρετ η). 1 N icomachean Ethics VI.12 1144a30-b1 So, it looks like Aristotle s argument for (PW 1 )takesthefollowingform: (1) Cleverness is the ability to secure one s ends. (2) This ability is praiseworthy when one s ends are noble, but is blameworthy when they are not. (3) Those who have a praiseworthy cleverness are practically wise, while those who have a blameworthy cleverness are unscrupulous. (4) Virtue (or the lack of it) is what explains a person s being drawn to noble (or base) ends. (5) So if one is not virtuous, one doesn t have practical wisdom, or (6) If one has practical wisdom, then one is virtuous. By arriving at (6), Aristotle has proven (PW 1 ) and derived the first conditional needed in order to establish (PW). 2.2 Being Virtuous Implies Having Practical Wisdom Aristotle has a similar argument to prove the other conditional, (PW 2 ), which is needed to establish (PW): Practical Wisdom Thesis 2 (PW 2 ): For any agent, a, if a possesses virtue, then a has practical wisdom. Indeed the argument for (PW 2 )isforeshadowedinapassagethatappearsbeforethe argument for (PW 1 ). Just as we say that in some cases people do what is just without being just themselves... so, it seems, it is possible to do the various sorts of things from a certain disposition, so as actually to be a good person: I mean e.g. doing them because of decision, and for the sake of the things 1 All Aristotle passages in this paper are from the S. Broadie and C. Rowe translation of Nicomachean Ethics (2002). 4

being done themselves. The decision, then, is made correct by excellence (ρετ η), but the doing of whatever by the nature of things has to be done to realize that decision is not the business of excellence but of another ability [i.e. practical wisdom]. N icomachean Ethics VI.12 1144a14-22 Here Aristotle recognizes the reciprocal relationship between practical wisdom and virtue. At the same time, he also notes that virtue itself will not be identifiable merely by noticing the dispositions people seem to be utilizing when they act. His point seems to be that, you might have two different people with seemingly the same disposition, each of which are inclined to do the right thing. But if one of them is so inclined because the action is right and the other because the action is required by law, Aristotle wishes to claim that only the former is truly virtuous. This constitutes the starting point for his argument supporting (PW 2 ). Just as one needs to distinguish between cleverness and practical wisdom, so too does one need to distinguish in the case of virtues between natural virtues and primary virtues. The latter category will be those which we properly understand to correspond to virtue in the traditional sense and Aristotle wishes to claim primary virtue will only come about with the aid of practical wisdom, as this quote reveals: [S]o with the character-bearing part [of the soul] there are also two, one being natural excellence and the other excellence in the primary sense and of these, the latter does not come about unless accompanied by wisdom. N icomachean Ethics VI.13 1144b15-8 Natural virtues are those innate dispositions which would determine our actions if we were left without any moral education or social conditioning. The suggestion appears to be that these dispositions may result in our performing actions, and these actions might even occasionally be those which would be performed by the wise and virtuous person. However, no one truly thinks (in Aristotle s estimation) that such a person left to their own devices could be truly virtuous. Or, to put it another way, when we note that a person is virtuous presumably we are not seeking to praise her innate and untempered dispositions. Rather, we seek to reinforce those which she has cultivated over time with the aid of reflection on those actions which are good. Apparently, then, everyone seems somehow to divine the truth that this sort of disposition [the sort in accordance with the correct prescription] is excellence (ρετ η), i.e. the one in accordance with wisdom (φρον ησις). But one must go a little further on than this: it is not just the disposition 5

according to the correct prescription, but the disposition accompanied by the correct prescription, that constitutes excellence; and it is wisdom that correctly prescribes in contexts of this sort. N icomachean Ethics 1144b24-9 Consequently, Aristotle is convinced that everyone will endorse the notion that primary virtue requires practical wisdom, as this is tantamount to saying that we should follow whatever the correct prescription (ρθός λόγος) is and following the correct prescription is what we are doing when we are exercising our practical wisdom. That is, primary virtue consists in utilizing our rational capacity to gauge a particular situation and determine what course of action is called for, rather than blindly doing whatever our fallible natural dispositions would compel us to do. Picking up where the argument for (PW 1 ) left off, Aristotle s argument for (PW 2 ) proceeds as follows: (7) There are natural and primary virtues. (8) Natural virtues are the sort with which animals are naturally vested, but which are unwieldy and can often lead to harm. (9) Primary virtues are the sort which arise from practice and don t lead to harm. (10) Being virtuous in the primary sense means following the correct prescription in each case. (11) Following the correct prescription is a matter of exercising practical wisdom. (12) It is not possible to be virtuous (in the primary sense) without having practical wisdom, or (13) If one is virtuous, then one has practically wisdom. Having reached (13), Aristotle has derived (PW 2 ). Thus, he takes himself to have established (PW) conclusively: It is clear, then, from what has been said that it is not possible to possess excellence in the primary sense without wisdom, nor to be wise without excellence of character. N icomachean Ethics 1144b31-3 6

2.3 The Unity of Virtue Immediately after completing his argument for (PW), Aristotle moves on to the consideration of (UV). The argument is not as clear as one might hope, but it seems to be something like the following. If we suppose that an individual has a single virtue, but lacks the others, this is an untenable position because, if one accepts (PW 2 ), this implies that the individual has practical wisdom and has the single virtue. But then, contrary to the assumption, having practical wisdom and accepting (PW 1 )impliesthattheindividualhasallthe other virtues. So, given (PW), the agent having a single virtue implies that the agent has the single virtue and all the virtues. Considering the contradiction that results from assuming that an agent can have a single virtue, we re therefore forced to conclude that (UV) follows from (PW). 2 In other words: Take an agent, a, asinglevirtue,v x,thefullsetofvirtues,,(wherev x ), and practical wisdom, P, (14) Suppose that a has v x,and (15) a does not have. (16) From (13) and (14), it follows that a has P. (17) One can t be partially practically wise, for practical wisdom is one. 3 (18) But if a has P,itfollowsfrom(6)and(16)thata has. (19) But then, by assumption, a does and does not have, which is absurd. 2 Up to this point in the argument, its possible to misconceive of the nature of practical wisdom quite easily, such that this move seems unmotivated and far too strong. Indeed, Aristotle never goes into great detail in his discussion of practical wisdom s scope or particular characteristics. However, by making the argument for (UV), Aristotle reveals that his notion of practical wisdom which he has been discussing is a rather robust all or nothing quality that all virtuous people have and which enable them to deliberate and execute their plans effectively. So, for example, when it was noted in (PW 1 ) and (PW 2 ) that practical wisdom and virtue mutually imply one another, he didn t mean to suggest that an agent has whatever particular bit of practical wisdom pertains to decisions one must in order to have one specific virtue. Rather, when Aristotle assumed (or rather, tried to establish by argument) that an agent had practical wisdom, he meant to claim that the agent possessed all the expertise required to make proper decisions with respect to every virtue she might potentially have. With this understanding of practical wisdom in mind, the move from (PW) to (UV) becomes much more explicable (notwithstanding the fact that such an inference might still appear illegitimate for various reasons). 3 Aristotle s commitment to this premise is demonstrated by the following obscure (and perhaps highly questionable) quote: [I]f wisdom, which is one, is present, they [the virtues] will all be present along with it. N icomachean EthicsVI.13 1145a2-3 7

(20) Therefore, if a has v x,thenahas. (21) It s trivially true that if v x andahas that a has v x. (22) Therefore, a has v x if and only if a has. Given the inherent implausibility of this conclusion, many have decided that the arguments which lead to (PW) and (UV) must involve some illicit steps. In the next section I ll consider a few of the stronger objections that I know of which have been raised against Aristotle s arguments for (PW) and (UV). Along the way, I ll try to lend greater clarity to some of the specific details of Aristotle s theory of virtue in an attempt to meet the challenges posed by these objections. 3 Objections & Replies 3.1 Objection 1 Elizabeth Telfer has argued that the (UV) is doomed to failure because of the fact that (PW) cannot be sensibly upheld. 4 Her main line of critique proceeds by noting that one needs to utilize different notions of practical wisdom in the arguments for (PW 1 )and(pw 2 )inorderforboththesestobeplausible. Forinstance,byher reckoning (PW 2 ) appears totally implausible if one supposes that practical wisdom means that one must have complete understanding and expertise as to how a person can accomplish any aims she might have. Indeed, it seems much more reasonable to suppose that the meaning of practical wisdom utilized in (PW 2 )isa capacityto know what actions are required by the virtues in question. 5 On the other hand, if one is examining (PW 1 ), and suggesting that one s having practical wisdom is sufficient for her to have any or all of the virtues, then surely the notion of practical wisdom being considered will have to be robust enough to cover the vast array of considerations a person will need to be sensitive to in order to manifest all of the virtues Aristotle discusses. So, Telfar concludes, given that neither of the conceptions of practical wisdom used to establish (PW 1 ) and (PW 2 )canbe used to establish the other, the result is that neither (PW) nor (UV) are properly supported theses and so both ought to be rejected. 4 Telfer (1989-90) The Unity of the Moral Virtues in Aristotle s Nicomachean Ethics. 5 Telfer (1989-90), p. 36. 8

3.2 Reply 1 Aside from the fact that Telfer doesn t do much to address the specific arguments Aristotle provides in support of (PW) and (UV), it seems to me that her argument crucially depends on an impoverished notion of virtue. Telfer herself draws attention to Sorabji s reading of Aristotle in which he notes that virtue is a complex disposition. Telfer s arguments suggest that, in actuality, doing the virtuous thing and being a virtuous person could involve an agent having only a single virtue and having the skill set and moral knowledge necessary to only perform virtuous actions which that one virtue requires. However, as Sorabji (and Aristotle himself) make quite clear. Having the knowledge to do the virtuous thing, such that one can be virtuous, is not limited to being sensitive to a small and specific set of concerns, but necessarily involves one s having an understanding of, and attraction to performing actions which promote, goodness. Accordingly, doing actions in ignorance, or even without full knowledge of what all the goods are which must be weighed as one deliberates what action to perform, is anathema to being a virtuous person. John M. Cooper s explanation of the intimate role that practical wisdom plays in virtue is instructive in this regard. So, for them [Plato and Aristotle], though virtue is in no sense one condition no single state of mind and character the complex of conditions that makes it up is a single and unified cluster, formed around and dominated by the single virtue of wisdom (Plato) or practical wisdom (Aristotle)....That there is a knowledge component and, ultimately, this single one in every ethical virtue is established for Aristotle by the reflection that, properly understood, each of these virtues is a refined, intelligent, flexible mode of response, sensitive to every sort of nuance in a situation calling for action, in a way that no simple, non-knowledge-based way of feeling ever could be. 6 [Author s emphasis] In fact, since the virtuous action requires full knowledge of the situation and of what one s actions are, it could be argued that, by definition, the virtuous person will not perform an action blindly which might come at the expense of another good. 7 6 John M. Cooper (1999), pp. 108-9. 7 That one s having the appropriate knowledge is one of the conditions for an agent being a virtuous agent agent is revealed by the following passage: Again, neither do the case of the skills and that of the excellences resemble each other: the things that come about through the agency of skills contain in themselves the mark of their being done well, so that it is enough if they turn out in a certain way, whereas the things that come about in accordance with the excellences count as done justly or 9

Since one only has a virtue insofar as she knows the situations in which acting in accordance with that a specific disposition would be called for, it can be argued that if one supposedly has only one virtue and the knowledge only to weigh whether an action is in accordance with that one virtue, then either this person will lack the knowledge necessary to appraise whether or not a situation calls for an action according to that virtue (in which case the agent s vantage point is too parochial and, as a result, the so-called virtue this agent possesses is no virtue at all), or that the knowledge this agent has is extensive enough to determine whether such a virtuous action of that kind is called for, in which case the agent must have practical wisdom. 3.3 Objection 2 Another incisive and potentially devastating objection to Aristotle s arguments for (PW) and (UV) is raised by Richard Kraut. 8 In the same paper in which he argues that there need not be inconsistency among the moral virtues Aristotle discusses in the Nicomachean Ethics, Kraut expresses skepticism about (UV). His worry is expressed in the following way: This [(UV)] strikes me as a thesis that is badly in need of support.... Even if we grant him the premiss that understanding one good requires understanding them all, we would still need to be persuaded that if one has successfully integrated certain emotions with one s reasoned conception of the good, then one has been equally successful with all of one s emotions. We can see how Aristotle arrives at the conclusion that one cannot be virtuous in one area and yet have a vice in a different area.... Perhaps this thesis (no one has both virtues and vices) is the core that lies behind [(UV)], and [(UV)] itself is a hasty generalization based on this core. 9 Kraut s objection is at once straightforward and powerful. His idea appears to be something like this. Suppose we take it for granted that there is a cognitive component to each of the virtues (which there certainly is). Suppose also that Aristotle is correct that one cannot have virtues and vices simultaneously, as this would seem to imply an moderately not merely because they themselves are of a certain kind, but also because of facts about the agent doing them first, if he does them knowingly, secondly if he decides to do them, and decides to do them for themselves, and thirdly if he does them from a firm and unchanging disposition. N icomachean Ethics II.4 1105a27-b1 8 Richard Kraut (1988) Comments on Disunity in the Aristotelian Virtues, by T.H. Irwin. 9 Richard Kraut (1988), p. 83. 10

irrationality which is inconsistent with practical wisdom. Even in this case it seems justified to doubt whether the presence of full practical wisdom and a few virtues implies that all the other virtues must be present as well. If we ve stipulated that the agent has some virtues and doesn t perform any actions contrary to virtue, there s no reason to object that this agent isn t behaving in a virtue way, especially if she s reasoning properly with her practical wisdom, she s performing all the actions she should with respect to the virtues she has, and her virtuous actions don t run contrary to the virtues she lacks. If we recognize this possibility, however, it seems we have reason to suppose that an agent might have practical wisdom and individual virtues without having all of the moral virtues fully integrated into her conative attitudes that constitute her motivational set. But this is tantamount to the repudiation of (UV). So, on Kraut s appraisal, although Aristotle was correct to incorporate practical wisdom into his account of virtue and to give it a prominent explanatory role, the fact that one can have practical wisdom without all the virtues undermines (PW 1 ) and (UV) because virtues require people to have conative attitudes which practical wisdom is not sufficient to guarantee. 3.4 Reply 2 To a significant extent, I m inclined to agree with Kraut that there is cause for concern regarding this portion of Aristotle s theory. Even if we suppose that one s practical wisdom is functioning properly and is fully developed, and that one has the dispositional attachment to the property of certain actions being good, it does seem as though there is room to question whether the presence of practical wisdom is enough to guarantee that the particular individual in question has incorporated all the relevant dispositions into her motivational set to such an extent that she will have all the moral virtues. This is a salient observation, and it certainly does deserve further attention and consideration. By way of response, however, one might note that a large portion of this concern relates to the manner in which we conceive of the virtuous agents moral education. That is, Kraut s challenges question how is it that a person develops her favorable dispositions towards good actions such that she will be inclined to pursue other good actions. As a further step, it seems we need to ask whether practical wisdom conceived as the faculty which enables an agent to attain her ends rather than the one that determines them can have a role to play in filling out the dispositions and forming the individual virtues an agent has yet to establish? These are, of course, difficult and 11

highly relevant questions. For the time being, I will simply begin to sketch an answer to them in the hope that they might go some distance towards lessening the force of the objection that Kraut raises. To begin with, it s vital to note that Aristotle thinks virtuous actions are those that are done for themselves, as they are inherently good. This is revealed both by passages which note that these actions are chosen for their own sakes (N icomachean Ethics II.4 1105a27-b1, IV.1 1120a23-4) and by passages which reveal that there is a certain kind of noble pleasure that arises from performing virtuous actions (N icomachean Ethics I.9 1099a12-25. But, as Myles Burnyeat argues in his highly insightful piece which examines Aristotle s views on moral education, there appears to be good reason to suppose that doing the virtuous thing and developing the dispositions that will ultimately constitute our moral characters is a gradual process. He thinks that this process of habituation is not only effective because it results in people behaving properly externally, but that it also results in people having access to the noble pleasures mentioned above and the property of goodness that brings it about. For, as Aristotle himself notes on numerous occasions, the virtuous person will take pleasure from doing the right thing, but this pleasure will not be what explains why she chooses to do what she does. On this view, therefore, there is a aspect of practical wisdom that is itself only gained by way of habituation people can only do the proper actions as they come to understand the property of goodness that their actions promote. Correlatively, as one continues to bolster her understanding of this property, the more effectively the agent will be able to observe greater varieties of diverse situations in which virtuous actions could be done. [I]f learning to do and to take (proper) enjoyment in doing just actions is learning to do and to enjoy them for their own sake, for what they are, namely, just, and this is not to be distinguished from learning that they are enjoyable for themselves and their intrinsic value, namely, their justice and nobility, then perhaps we can give intelligible sense to the thesis that practice leads to knowledge, as follows. I may be told, and may believe, that such and such actions are just and noble, but I have not really learned for myself (taken to heart, made second nature to me) that they have this intrinsic value until I have learned to value (love) them for it, with the consequence that I take pleasure in doing them. 10 Perhaps these insights can have the effect of making Kraut s objection seems much 10 Myles Burnyeat (1980) Aristotle on Learning to Be Good. 12

weaker than it initially appeared. Since his objection presupposed the existence of a significant gap between an action s being correct according to practical wisdom and its being appropriately tied to the conative attitudes that inspire action, and if we ve shown that no such significant gap exists in Aristotle s conception, then it would seem Kraut s argument is somewhat mollified. The conative attitudes most salient to the virtuous person with practical wisdom are those that are associated with virtuous action, and so there is little reason to suspect that a person with practical wisdom will fail to incorporate the insights this attribute reveals into her motivational set. However, even if this response is correct and Kraut s argument is somewhat undermined, there is still a real problem here, as it s not entirely clear at what point in a person s moral development we should say that she has become virtuous. That is, one of the ways in which one might understand this response to Kraut is by taking it to be saying that, in fact, the person he describes is at a stage of moral development where she is not entirely virtuous nor is she (contrary to Kraut s assumption) practically wise. But, it might be said, this is simply to suggest that the standards one must reach in order to be a truly virtuous person are so lofty as to be almost entirely unattainable. Again, I think there is something to this insight, as, without further direction from Aristotle, it seems we must say either that being a virtuous person is goal unattainable for the vast majority of people (maybe everyone), or that Aristotle was mistaken to believe in (PW) and (UV) since, if virtue and practical wisdom are commonplace, there is no reason to suppose that one need imply the other. In my mind, the former option is clearly the more desirable of the two, since it preserves (PW) and (UV), but it does seem to come at a high cost. 11 11 J.L. Ackrill (1981) seems to appreciate this dilemma when he writes the following passage: This idea of the unity of virtue is at first sight very strange. In real life people have some virtues and not others. However, this is because in real life we are not dealing with perfect examples of any virtue.... If, for theoretical purposes, we are to explain what would be involved in the perfect possession of any one virtue, we find that we cannot allow defects anywhere in the character: all desires and feelings and tendencies must have been brought (by training) into a proper balance. For otherwise a defect in one area would always be liable to interfere with the proper operation of a virtue elsewhere.... Thus at the level of theoretical analysis, if one is talking about ideal moral virtues, the thesis that they necessarily go together can be defended. And at the practical level it does have something important to teach us. It is a reminder of the tragic fact that a person with many excellent qualities can do terrible things and cause immense suffering because of a fatal flaw somewhere else in his character. So one should aim at achieving a certain balance and harmony among one s various desires and feelings, and not let any of them become much too strong or much too weak, lest this should have disastrous consequences for one s whole life. [Author s emphasis] (pp.137-8) 13

References Ackrill, J.L. (1981) Aristotle the Philosopher (New York: Oxford University Press). Aristotle (2002) Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Broadie, S. & Rowe, C. (New York: Oxford University Press). Badhwar, N.K. (1996) The Limited Unity of Virtue, Noûs, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 306-29. Burnyeat, M. (1980) Aristotle on Learning to Be Good, in Rorty, A.O. (ed.) Essays on Aristotle s Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 69-92. Cooper, J.M. (1999) The Unity of Virtue, in Reason and Emotion (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 76-117. Irwin, T. (1988) Disunity in the Aristotelian Virtues, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, SupplementaryVol.,pp.61-78. (1988) Disunity in the Aristotelian Virtues: A Reply to Richard Kraut, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, SupplementaryVol.,pp.87-90. (1980) The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle s Ethics, in Rorty, A.O. (ed.) Essays on Aristotle s Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 35-53. Kraut, R. (1988) Comments on Disunity in the Aristotelean Virtues, by T.H. Irwin, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, SupplementaryVol.,pp.79-86. Sorabji, Richard (1980) Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue, in Rorty, A.O. (ed.) Essays on Aristotle s Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 201-19. Telfer, Elizabeth (1989-1990) The Unity of the Moral Virtues in Aristotle s N icomachean Ethics, Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Vol.90,pp.35-48. 14