What Might We Learn From al-fārābī About Plato and Aristotle With Respect to Lawgiving?

What Might We Learn From al-fārābī About Plato and Aristotle With Respect to Lawgiving? Charles E. Butterworth To be even remotely interested in what we can learn from al-fārābī about Plato and Aristotle with respect to lawgiving or any other important topic, we must first know something about who al-fārābī is and why what he has to say might be worth our attention. Generally known as the second teacher, that is, second after Aristotle, Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭarkhān ibn Awzalagh al-fārābī is generally heralded as having founded political philosophy within the Islamic cultural tradition. Born in about 870 in the village of Farab in Turkestan, he resided in Bukhara, Marv, Harran, Baghdad, and perhaps in Constantinople, as well as in Aleppo, Cairo, and Damascus, where he died in 950. John Scotus Eriugena, who was actually born in Ireland and whose efforts to defend the doctrines of the Church led him to France, died in about 877 or just about the time al-fārābī was born, while Anselm of Canterbury, often referred to as the second Augustine, was born just over 80 years after al-fārābī died, that is, in 1033. Isaac Israeli, whose philosophical accomplishments were harshly assessed by Maimonides in a letter to Samuel Ibn Tibbon, was a near contemporary of al-fārābī and lived from about 855-955 in Egypt. Saadia Gaon or, more properly, Saadia ibn Joseph al-fayyūmī, was, as his name indicates, also from Egypt and lived from 892-942. Somewhat better known than Isaac, he was, primarily interested in theology and religious ethics. In sum, the term dark ages may say more about our ignorance of this time than about reality. Al-Fārābī s era is one of the richest in Arabic and Islamic culture, especially philosophy. A Bird s-eye View of Arabic-Islamic Philosophy At least five outstanding figures characterize Arabic-Islamic philosophy during the classical period of medieval Islamic culture, that is, from about 850 to 1350 or from the time of Abū Yūsuf Ya qūb ibn Isḥāq al-kindī to that of Abd al-raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn. The first, known as the philosopher of the Arabs and famous for his treatise on metaphysics, was born in Basra and educated in Baghdad, where he died in 866. The latter variously dubbed the father of sociology or the founder of historiography, neither title coming even remotely close to capturing what he

472 Charles E. Butterworth accomplished was born in Tunis in 1332 and died in Cairo in 1406. He wrote a comprehensive three volume Introduction to his much longer seven volume philosophy of the history of the world. Thanks to Franz Rosenthal s translation of the shorter work as well as to Muhsin Mahdi s study of Ibn Khaldūn s thought in general, we know much more about him and his ideas than about many of the other philosophers who flourished during this period. Sometime political advisor to widows and frequent boon companion of princes, Abū Alī al-ḥusayn Ibn Sīnā, or Avicenna, was born in Afshanah in 980 and died in Hamadhan almost 60 years later. He is justly famous for his forty volume exposition of Aristotle s teaching, al-shifā or Healing, numerous other books, and a comprehensive tome on medicine. Still, he must be blamed for the injudicious remarks that drew upon philosophy and philosophers the ire of the jurists and theologians, notably that of Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-ghazālī (1058-1111) in his Tahāfut al-falāsifa (Destruction of the Philosophers). The attack was severe and carried the day, especially because it came forth at a time when theologians and jurists enjoyed great esteem and had bested the other contenders for cultural glory, the grammarians. What is more, for a number of political reasons, cultural life was waning in the east. Anticipating, as it were, Horace Greely s advice, philosophy moved west, abandoning Baghdad, Damascus, and Cairo to take root in Andalusia, in Cordoba as well as in Marrakush. There, Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Ṭufayl, who lived in Cordoba from 1110-1185, composed the intriguing philosophical novel, Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān (Living the Son of Awakened), and was chiefly responsible for setting Abū al-walīd Muḥammad Ibn Rushd, or Averroes, on his path as commentator on Aristotle. Of Averroes, who died in 1198, just at the advent of the 13 th century, suffice to say that he redeemed philosophy by his answers to al-ghazālī and then gently instructed fellow philosophers in the delicate art of speaking so as to be understood by one another but not so as to trouble the opinions of those less learned. Note that Averroes contemporary and fellow Cordovan was none other than Mūsā ibn Maymūn or Maimonides (1135-1204), who developed the art of esoteric writing far beyond the stipulations of either al-fārābī or Averroes but then put an explicit limit on the kind of questions to be reasonably explored in philosophy. At this point, Latin-Christian philosophy enters the picture. Prior to Ibn Khaldūn, we find Roger Bacon, Giles of Rome, Thomas Aquinas, Dante, and Marsilius of Padua struggling with the teachings of the Arab philosophers, notably Averroes, but al-fārābī and Avicenna as well. Far more could be said about the rich and complex learning in science, mathematics, poetry, history, grammar, theology, jurisprudence, medicine, as well as the practical arts of that earlier cultural world. All of these Mélanges de l Université Saint-Joseph 61 (2008)

What Might We Learn From al-fārābī About Plato and Aristotle? 473 individuals, and numerous others in addition, were bursting with a desire to learn more about ancient Greek culture even as they were struggling to ensure that the revelation they had been vouchsafed would not perish. About al-fārābī The son of an army officer, al-fārābī first studied Islamic jurisprudence and music in Bukhara then moved to Marv where he began to study logic with a Nestorian Christian monk, Yūḥannā Ibn Ḥaylān. While in his early twenties, al-fārābī went to Baghdad and continued to study logic and philosophy with Ibn Ḥaylān. At the same time, he improved his grasp of Arabic by studying with the prominent philologist Ibn al-sarrāj and is said to have followed the courses of the famous Nestorian Christian translator and student of Aristotle, Mattā ibn Yūnus. Around 905-910, al-fārābī left Baghdad for Byzantium (maybe reaching Constantinople), where he remained for about eight years studying Greek sciences and philosophy. On his return to Baghdad, he busied himself with teaching and writing until political upheavals in 942 forced him to seek refuge in Damascus. Two or three years later, political turmoil there drove him to Egypt where he stayed until returning to Damascus a little over a year before his death. 1 His writings, extraordinary in their breadth as well as their deep learning, extend through all of the sciences and embrace every part of philosophy. Al-Fārābī s interest in mathematics is evidenced in commentaries on the Elements of Euclid and the Almagest of Ptolemy, as well as in several writings on the history and theory of music. Indeed, his Kitāb al-mūsīqā al-kabīr (Large Book on Music) may well be the most significant work in Arabic on that subject. He also wrote numerous commentaries on Aristotle s logic, was knowledgeable about the Stagirite s physical writings, composed a commentary of sorts on the Metaphysics, and is credited with an extensive commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics that is no longer extant. In addition to writing explicit accounts of Plato s and Aristotle s philosophy as well as an essay in which he struggles to harmonize their teaching, he composed a commentary on Plato s Laws, and several works in which he draws freely upon both of these looming figures. As the first philosopher within the tradition of Islam to explore the challenge to traditional philosophy presented by revealed religion, especially in its claims that the Creator provides for human well-being by means of an inspired prophet legislator, 1 See Mahdi Muhsin S. (1971), Al-Fārābī, in Gillispie Charles C. (ed.), Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Charles Scribner s son, New York, vol. IV, p. 523-526; and id. (1990), Al-Fārābī s Imperfect State, in Journal of the American Oriental Society 110/4, p. 712-713.

474 Charles E. Butterworth al-fārābī has come to be known as the founder of Islamic political philosophy. 2 Leo Strauss is surely the first to have brought the political significance of al-fārābī s teaching to light, an accomplishment all the more noteworthy given how little was known about al-fārābī and his writings when Strauss was making these pathbreaking discoveries. 3 Even more striking, in an age in which we are accustomed to highly reliable critical editions of al-fārābī s works based on the careful compilation of several manuscripts, is the truncated and sometimes incomprehensible character of the writings to which Strauss had access. That he somehow cut through such confusing texts and managed to make sense of al-fārābī s teaching is therefore all the more remarkable. Now al-fārābī is not a founder who turns his back on the past. Indeed, in the first part of the Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle the Attainment of Happiness he seeks to pinpoint the common concerns that link religion and revealed law with pagan philosophy in its highest form, namely, the writings of Plato and Aristotle. That effort finds an echo in another writing, the Selected Aphorisms (also known, probably erroneously, as Aphorisms of the Statesman) in two ways. First, the opening words of the treatise indicate that al-fārābī draws upon what the ancients that is, Plato and Aristotle have to say about governing, but governing with a view to a particular purpose. As he, or perhaps a scribe, puts it, the aphorisms selected and presented in this work: comprise the roots of many of the sayings of the Ancients concerning that by which cities ought to be governed and made prosperous, the ways of life of their inhabitants improved, and they be led toward happiness. 4 For al-fārābī, the goal is to govern cities so that they become prosperous and that the lives of their citizens are improved, improved in the sense that they be led toward happiness. Second, the overlap between this work and the Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, especially the Attainment of Happiness, indicated by these words 5 is made 2 See Mahdi Muhsin S. (2001), Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy: Essays in Interpretation, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 47-62. 3 See Strauss Leo (1995), Philosophy and Law: Contributions to the Understanding of Maimonides and His Predecessors, tr. Adler Eve, SUNY Press, Albany (NY), especially chap. 2-3. 4 See Butterworth Charles E. (tr.) (2001), Alfarabi, The Political Writings: Selected Aphorisms and Other Texts, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY), p. 11, 2-5; for the Arabic text, see al-fārābī Abū Naṣr (1971), Fuṣūl Muntaza a, éd. Najjar Fawzi, Dar al-mashreq, Beirut, p. 23, 3-5. The terminology may well remind the reader of Islam and its revealed law, but that is not what al-fārābī says. 5 Consider the opening words of the Attainment of Happiness: The human things through which nations and citizens of cities attain earthly happiness in this life and supreme happiness in the life beyond are of four kinds: theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues, and practical arts, in Mahdi Muhsin (tr.) (2001), Alfarabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, rev. edition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY), Mélanges de l Université Saint-Joseph 61 (2008)

What Might We Learn From al-fārābī About Plato and Aristotle? 475 even more explicit toward the end of the Selected Aphorisms where a long and very important passage in Aphorism 94 paraphrases sections 11-20 of the Attainment of Happiness. Yet al-fārābī seems always alert to the difficulties religion and revealed law pose for the older approach to politics. For example, in the fifth chapter of the Enumeration of the Sciences, an ostensibly popular writing, he sets forth two accounts of the old political science. Both presuppose the validity of the traditional separation between the practical and the theoretical sciences, but neither is adequate for the radically new situation created by the appearance of revealed religion. The two accounts explain in detail the actions and ways of life required for sound political rule to flourish, but are utterly silent about opinions especially the kind of theoretical opinions now set forth in religion and thus unable to point to the kind of rulership needed now that religion holds away. 6 Nor can either speak about the opinions or actions addressed by the jurisprudence and theology of revealed religion. These tasks require a political science that combines theoretical and practical science along with prudence and shows how they are to be ordered in the soul of the ruler. Such a view of political science is presented in The Book of Religion. It is a political science that is a part of philosophy. Yet, even as al-fārābī offers this redemptive vision of political science, he suggests that religion and revelation must also be put into perspective or considered anew and then goes about explaining religion in such a manner that its theoretical and practical subordination to philosophy becomes manifest. Al-Fārābī s account of this subordination makes it seem perfectly reasonable, so reasonable that the limitations thereby placed on dialectical theology and jurisprudence appear to follow necessarily from it. 7 To this explanation of the way al-fārābī elaborates the relationship between the philosophy of the ancients and the new revelation, one might object that it relies too much on a presumption of harmony and agreement between Plato and Aristotle on these matters. We know, however, that the two differed about many minor and not so minor questions. This issue is addressed in the highly enigmatic Harmonization p. 13, 1; for the Arabic text, see al-fārābī Abū Naṣr (1345H), Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-sa āda, Maṭba at Majlis Dā irat al-ma ārif al- Uthmāniyya, Hyderabad, p. 2, 2-5. 6 See The Enumeration of the Sciences, chap. 5, 1-3 in Butterworth, Alfarabi, The Political Writings, p. 76-80; for the Arabic text, see al-fārābī Abū Naṣr (1949), Iḥṣā al- Ulūm, ed. Amīn Uthmān, Dār al-fikr al- Arabī, Cairo, p. 102, 4 107, 4. At the very outset of the Enumeration, al-fārābī signals the popular character of this work by noting that he intends to enumerate each of the well-known sciences ; ibid., p. 43, 3-4. 7 See Book of Religion, 5, 7-10, and 15-27, esp. 27, in Butterworth, Alfarabi, The Political Writings, p. 97-98; 106-113; for the Arabic text, see al-fārābī Abū Naṣr (1968), Kitāb al-milla wa-nuṣūs Ukhrā, ed. Mahdi Muhsin, Dar al-mashreq, Beirut, 5, 7-10, and 15-27, esp. 27.

476 Charles E. Butterworth that is, The Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages, Plato the Divine and Aristotle. Here, al-fārābī, desirous of putting an end to the disputes and discord among his contemporaries about the disagreement they claim to discern between the two eminent and distinguished sages, Plato and Aristotle, sets out to show that their opinions are in agreement, to remove doubt and suspicion from the hearts of those who look into their books, and to explain the places of uncertainty and the sources of doubt in their treatises. These goals, set forth in the opening words of the treatise, are surely most appealing. But do they not too readily discount or ignore simple facts manifest to any student of Plato and Aristotle? Almost as though it were an objection he had anticipated, al-fārābī s final observation at the beginning of the treatise affirms that such agreement or harmonization is among the most important [things] to be intent upon explaining and among the most beneficial to wish to expound upon and elucidate. 8 Al-Fārābī s task as founder of political philosophy within Islam is to develop a broader view of political science, one that takes religion into account without discounting what he has learned from the ancients about human aspirations. He does so by making judicious use of the authors whose names are most closely associated with that older, now supposedly obsolete, political science Plato and Aristotle. He does so, that is, by showing how their counsel even more, their wisdom remains ever needful, how the most important aspect of revelation the lawgiving that allows human beings to achieve ultimate happiness is, above all, a philosophical inquiry. This he accomplishes by approaching them and the differences between them in two quite distinct manners. Al-Fārābī s Two Approaches to Differences of Opinion Between Plato and Aristotle 1. A Declaration of Differences That Is Then Muted In the Attainment of Happiness, al-fārābī executes a series of inquiries that takes the reader from what is upon reflection quite obvious to an identification of subjects, arts, sciences, and actions that are anything but obvious. Beginning with the way we use words and what we mean by them, then moving to the way we form sentences 8 See The Harmonization of the Two opinions of the Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle, 1, in Butterworth, Alfarabi, The Political Writings, p. 125; for the Arabic text, see Najjar Fawzi M. and Mallet Dominique (ed. and tr.) (1999), Abū Naṣr al-fārābī, L Harmonie entre les opinions de Platon et d Aristote, Institut Français de Damas, Damascus, 1. Mélanges de l Université Saint-Joseph 61 (2008)

What Might We Learn From al-fārābī About Plato and Aristotle? 477 and learn to engage in reasoning and next to the way such reasoning allows us to unfold or explain the world around us and even the principles that make it such as it is, al-fārābī reaches a point where he can identify the inquiry that permits such explanations and show how it is related to other inquiries. Whether denoted as true wisdom or highest wisdom and its acquisition as science, knowledge, or even philosophy, it is clear that this is what everyone would like to possess. And it has flourished in different places at different times, just as it has been neglected or forgotten. This knowledge or science, this practice of philosophy, differs from another important human pursuit religion in that it actually comes to know things by means of the intellect and insists upon firm demonstrative proofs, whereas religion remains at the level of imagining their similitude and is content merely to represent them in a persuasive manner. Science or philosophy and religion come together at the moment that the former leaves aside theoretical inquiry to concentrate on explaining the way things are to those not capable of seizing demonstrative arguments and, even more, on bringing those persons to act in ways beneficial for them. Differently stated, science or philosophy makes common cause with religion when theoretical investigation is replaced by practical considerations. Practical science or philosophy is also expressed in terms of similitudes and by means of persuasive speech. The laws or nomoi set down by lawgivers have their roots in theoretical philosophy, but are expressed in popular images. In this sense, the same thing is intended or meant when we speak of imam, philosopher, and lawgiver (the term is wāḍi al-nawāmīs) and even when we speak of philosopher, first ruler, king, lawgiver, and imam. 9 This at any rate is what we learn from true science and true philosophy: These things are philosophy when they are in the soul of the lawgiver. And when they are in the souls of the multitude, they are religion. For when the lawgiver knows these things, they are evident to him through certain insight, whereas what is established in the souls of the multitude is through an image and persuasion. 10 It is true science, true philosophy, and also true religion because the lawgiver who discovers and uses images and persuasion does so for the sake of the multitude. He knows with certainty the way things really are. Such is not the case with respect to the counterfeit philosopher, the vain philosopher, or the false philosopher. The threat each poses for true philosophy is constant, as is the danger that philosophy may fall into neglect and oblivion. For al-fārābī, true philosophy: 9 See Attainment, 57-58 (also 51-56), in Mahdi, Alfarabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 46-47 (also, p. 42-46) ; Arabic text, al-fārābī, K. Taḥṣīl al-sa āda, p. 42, 11 44, 2 (also p. 37, 14 42, 11). 10 Attainment, 59, in ibid., p. 47; Arabic text, ibid., p. 44, 2-13. I have modified the translation.

478 Charles E. Butterworth was handed down to us by the Greeks from Plato and Aristotle only. Both have given us an account of philosophy, but not without giving us also an account of the ways to it and of the ways to re-establish it when it becomes confused or extinct. 11 It is apparently for this reason that he can close the Attainment with the admonition: so let it be clear to you that their purpose is the same in what they presented and that they intended to present one and the same philosophy. 12 Unfortunately, the presentation of the philosophical teaching of each that follows does not corroborate this judgment. Plato s philosophical quest, at least according to al-fārābī, begins by inquiring into human perfection and thus into human happiness. It is a quest that leads him to investigate what kinds of knowledge make human beings happy and perfect and how such knowledge might be obtained. At first, the quest takes him through the practical arts and the knowledge that is generally accepted among humans. Finding these inadequate, he also investigates the qualities of soul praised by human beings and eventually hits upon the importance of love and friendship. These somehow lead him to philosophy and statesmanship, to the quest for what is truly good, and then to the discovery of the importance of conversation for instruction. 13 Even at such a point, however, he returns from this summit to the city and to the recognition that true philosophy and statesmanship are not valued there. Al-Fārābī s Plato constantly moves between investigations that take him away from the city and the concerns of the city back to the city and its needs. He finds repeatedly that what is true, just, and good is not appreciated in the city. But only after the investigation that leads him to recognize what a truly just city might be, namely, a city that will not lack anything that leads its citizens to happiness 14 and this inquiry is to be found in his book the Republic says al-fārābī 15 does Plato investigate the divine and natural beings as they are perceived by the intellect and known by means of that science. 16 In other words, al-fārābī s Plato moves from the city to the world of nature and to the principles on which it rests, not from reflection 11 Attainment, 63, in Mahdi, Alfarabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 49-50; Arabic text, al-fārābī, K. Taḥṣīl al-sa āda, p. 47, 3-8. I have modified the translation. 12 Attainment, 64, ibid., p. 50; Arabic text, ibid., p. 47, 9-10. 13 See The Philosophy of Plato, its Parts, the Ranks of Order of its Parts, from the Beginning to the End, Parts i-vi, in Mahdi, Alfarabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 53-62; for the Arabic text, see Gabrieli Franciscus (ed.) (1952), Alfarabius, Compendium Legum Platonis, Warburg Institute, London, p. 3, 4 16, 15. 14 Philosophy of Plato, 31, ibid., p. 65; Arabic text, ibid., p. 20, 6-7. 15 Philosophy of Plato, 32, in ibid., p. 65; Arabic text, ibid., p. 20, 14. 16 Philosophy of Plato, 33, in Mahdi, Alfarabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 65-66; Arabic text, Gabrieli, Alfarabius, Compendium Legum Platonis, p. 20, 16. Mélanges de l Université Saint-Joseph 61 (2008)

What Might We Learn From al-fārābī About Plato and Aristotle? 479 on nature to one on political and human things. Yet his concentration on the political is important, for it alerts him or so al-fārābī asserts to the shortcomings of Socrates and the merits of Thrasymachus: He explained Thrasymachus method and made it known that Thrasymachus was more able than Socrates to form the character of the youth and instruct the multitude; Socrates possessed only the ability to conduct a scientific investigation of justice and the virtues, and a power of love, but did not possess the ability to form the character of the youth and the multitude; and the philosopher, the king, and the lawgiver ought to be able to use both methods; the Socratic method with the elect, and Thrasyumachus method with the youth and the multitude. 17 Al-Fārābī s Aristotle does not proceed in the same manner. It is not clear, moreover, that his philosophy is the same as that of al-fārābī s Plato. Whereas the philosophy of his Plato starts from, and constantly returns to, the human things, that of his Aristotle starts from the principles on which human things are based and moves from them to the principles governing the universe. Though he returns from time to time to speak about human affairs, al-fārābī s Aristotle is much more rooted in natural investigations and in what natural things stand on in what might be called the metaphysical. The difference between the two is stated clearly at the outset of the Philosophy of Aristotle: Aristotle sees the perfection of man as Plato sees it and more. However, because man s perfection is not self-evident or easy to explain by a demonstration leading to certainty, he saw fit to start from a position anterior to that from which Plato had started. 18 In other words, though there is a difference between the two, it is a mere procedural difference, one rooted in Aristotle s concern to posit certain premises or to lay bare certain suppositions that Plato had neglected. At the end of the exposition, however, al-fārābī lets slip if it is accurate to say that al-fārābī ever lets anything slip; after all, this is the author of whom no less an authority than Maimonides said that his thoughts are finer than fine flour and are to be treated accordingly the following: It has become evident that the knowledge that he [Aristotle] investigated at the outset just because he loved to do so, and inspected for the sake of explaining 17 Philosophy of Plato, 36, in ibid., p. 66-67; Arabic text, ibid., p. 22, 2-8. I have modified the translation. 18 See The Philosophy of Aristotle, The Parts of his Philosophy, the Ranks of Order of its Parts, the Position from which he Started and the One he Reached, 1, in Mahdi, Alfarabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 71-72; for the Arabic text, see al-fārābī Abū Naṣr (1961), Falsafat Arisṭūṭālīs wa-ajzā Falsafatihi wa-marātib Ajzā ihā wa-al-mawḍa alladhī minhu Ibtada a wa-ilayhi Intāhā, ed. Mahdi Muhsin, Dār Majallat Shi r, Beirut, p. 59, 5-7.

480 Charles E. Butterworth the truth about the above-mentioned pursuits, has turned out to be necessary for attaining to the political activity for the sake of which man is made. 19 Not gentle buttressing of Plato, then, nor even an attempt to provide the necessary antecedents for Plato s investigation which is supposed to be one and the same as his but a different tack entirely, one pursued out of simple love of learning, prompts Aristotle s difference. Nonetheless, that inquiry, like Plato s, culminates in an understanding of political life that fosters human perfection. Sound political practice, then, must be based on a correct apprehension of the way things work in the world of nature and on awareness of how human conduct can be brought into line with that order. This account of the way the philosophical pursuits of Plato and Aristotle mesh, despite major differences, is central to the claim that they are one and the same. Another way to see their common purpose is to consider what al-fārābī has to say about them, though mentioning them by name only in passing, in the Selected Aphorisms. 2. Passing Over Potential Differences in Silence In many of his writings, al-fārābī s procedure seems to imitate that of his Plato. He starts on one course of investigation, pursues it for a certain moment, then pauses to reflect on where it has led, and declares that it is necessary to begin the investigation from another perspective. Nowhere is this more evident than in Aphorism 94, the longest in the Selected Aphorisms and the only one to be accorded a title, namely, on the uses of the theoretical part in philosophy and that it is necessary for the practical part in [different] ways. After setting out that a grasp of the theoretical virtues, as well as the virtues of calculation, allows one to have knowledge of the happiness that is truly happiness, al-fārābī notes that this does not come to be as a whole except through pursuing theory and transferring from degree to degree and level to level, then goes on to explain what he means. 20 An example may not be amiss: The one who wishes to learn theoretical philosophy begins with numbers, then ascends to magnitudes, then to the rest of the things to which numbers and quantities pertain essentially like optics and moving magnitudes then to the celestial bodies and music, to weights, and to mechanics. [ ] And he ascends little 19 Philosophy of Aristotle, 99, in Mahdi, Alfarabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 128-130; Arabic text, al-fārābī, Falsafat Arisṭūṭālīs, ed. Mahdi, p. 132, 11-13. Reading with Mahdi s correction of the text (see Mahdi, Alfarabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 147 n. 9 to 99). 20 For this aphorism, see the appendix. Mélanges de l Université Saint-Joseph 61 (2008)

What Might We Learn From al-fārābī About Plato and Aristotle? 481 by little in the things that need matter to be understood and conceived of until he comes to the celestial bodies. Then, afterwards, it is necessary for him to introduce principles other than the principles of what, by what, and how to aid him in using the things that it is difficult or impossible to come to intellect unless they come into matter. [ ] Then he transfers to knowledge of the reasons for the existence of natural bodies and the search for their essences, substances, and reasons. When he ends up at the celestial bodies, the rational soul, and the active intellect, he transfers again to another rank. So it is necessary for him to inquire theoretically into the principles of their existence until he becomes aware of principles that are not natural. [ ] He also comes to a mid-point between two sciences the science of natural things and the science of what is after the natural things in the ranking of investigation and instruction. [ ] The human being has already come close to obtaining the level and degree of theoretical knowledge by which he gains happiness. And he obtains theory from both directions until he ends up at a being that cannot possibly have any of these principles at all. On one level, the point is quite simple: it is most difficult to acquire theoretical knowledge. Yet the problem posed at the end of the Selected Aphorisms, as at the end of the Attainment of Happiness, is that there are many who claim to have theoretical knowledge or philosophy and thus to be able to rule wisely, even to make good laws and yet are actually bereft of it. Precisely because the multitude does not know how to distinguish between the true philosopher or the true recipient of revelation and the false one, precisely because the who fortuitously divines or hits upon the right solution, resembles the one who truly knows, it is necessary to have a grasp of theoretical principles. Or, as al-fārābī puts it even more poignantly, it is necessary to have knowledge about the nature of the possible. This belongs to the one schooled in natural science alone. The Selected Aphorisms leads to this understanding by gently mixing the teaching of Plato and Aristotle, by presenting the teaching of both as though it were the same. Indeed, as already noted, the opening words of the treatise, which acts as a kind of sub-title or even a scribe s summary, explains its purpose succinctly: Selected aphorisms that comprise the roots of many of the sayings of the Ancients concerning that by which cities ought to be governed and made prosperous, the lives of their people improved, and they be led toward happiness. The treatise consists of either 96 or 100 aphorisms, these last four contested aphorisms being found only in the most recent and least reliable of the six manuscripts. In the work as a whole, al-fārābī begins with, then develops, a comparison between the health of the soul and that of the body. Somewhat abruptly, he starts his exposition by defining the health of each and then explains how the health of the more important of the two that of the soul may be obtained and its sickness repulsed. The first

482 Charles E. Butterworth word of the Selected Aphorisms is simply soul, while the last is virtue. In the 96 aphorisms occurring between these two words, al-fārābī first enters upon a detailed examination of the soul then provides an account and justification of the well-ordered political regime which the soul needs in order to attain its perfection. At no point in the treatise does he speak of prophecy or of the prophet or legislator. The terms are not even evoked. He is equally silent with respect to the philosopher and mentions philosophy only two times, both in the famous antepenultimate aphorism (aph. 94) the same one in which he mentions, for the only time, the word revelation. On the other hand, al-fārābī speaks constantly throughout these aphorisms of the statesman (madanī) hence the now contested title, Aphorisms of the Statesman and of the king. The ancients referred to above are, of course, none other than Plato and Aristotle. Al-Fārābī calls upon them to identify the political order that will achieve human happiness. The individual who succeeds in understanding how a political community can be well-ordered whether this person is a statesman or a king will do for the citizens what the physician does for individual sick persons and will accomplish for the citizens who follow his rules what the prophet accomplishes for those who follow his. Nonetheless, to attain such an understanding, one must first be fully acquainted with the soul as well as with political life. More precisely, the virtuous political regime is the one in which the souls of all the inhabitants are as healthy as possible: the one who cures souls is the statesman, and he is also called the king (aph. 4). This may explain why such a patently political treatise contains two long discussions of the soul. One, very similar to the Nicomachean Ethics, explains all the faculties of the soul except for the theoretical part of the rational faculty (aphs. 6-21). The other analyzes this theoretical part as well as its companion, the practical part, by discussing the intellectual virtues (aphs. 33-56). Again, the discussion proceeds from a perspective highly reminiscent of the Nicomachean Ethics. This may explain as well why such a political treatise also contains an investigation of the sound and erroneous opinions with respect to the principles of being and to happiness (aphs. 68-87). This investigation is couched in terms such as to call Plato s Socrates to mind, but that is not the point. The point, rather, is that al-fārābī sets forth here the premises on which a sound political teaching may be founded. To draw attention to the unscrupulous who pretend to be lawgivers without having the wherewithal to present sound laws is a necessary task to be sure. But it is not sufficient. Al-Fārābī must also provide criteria by which to judge the soundness of laws, especially of that law governing his own community. But he must do so in a manner that prepares the investigator yet does not alarm the current exegetes of the law or laws, the jurists, or those who see their function as defending the revelation on which the laws are based the theologians. Clarity about Mélanges de l Université Saint-Joseph 61 (2008)

What Might We Learn From al-fārābī About Plato and Aristotle? 483 the human soul, how things are, as well as how they come into being, and the end of human existence is fundamental to such a task. These three groups of aphorisms constitute a little less than two-thirds of the treatise. Void of formal structure or divisions, the treatise unfolds in such a manner that each moral discussion is preceded and followed by other groups of aphorisms that go more deeply into its political teaching. Thus, the discussion of the soul in general is preceded by a series of analogies between the soul and the body as well as between the soul and the body politic (aphs. 1-5). It is followed first by a discussion devoted to domestic political economy (aphs. 22-29) and then by an inquiry into the king in truth (aphs. 30-32). The second discussion of the soul, preceded by these three aphorisms, is followed by an inquiry into the virtuous city (aphs. 57-67); that inquiry vividly calls to mind discussions raised in Plato s Republic. The discussion of the virtuous city precedes the investigation of sound and erroneous opinions about natural phenomena and ultimate happiness, and it is followed by the account of the virtuous regime (aphs. 88-96). Subsequent to each moral digression, the tone of the discussion seems to become more elevated, almost as though the moral teaching were the driving force for the political teaching of the treatise or were at least giving it direction. In this sense, Aristotle s inquiries into the physical and psychological principles of human conduct offer the grounding for Plato s loftier queries. To be sure, al-fārābī treats both Plato and Aristotle quite loosely in this work. But the pattern of moving from one to the other cannot be ignored, especially given the image he provides in Aphorism 94. Such an explanation of the general structure of al-fārābī s Selected Aphorisms and identification of its major themes reveals something more about al-fārābī s general teaching and the way this fits with his use of Plato and Aristotle. First, by allowing the aphorisms about household economy and the king in truth to interrupt his explanation of the human soul and its faculties (aphs. 6-21 and 33-56), al-fārābī underlines the difference between life in a small unit like the family where moral virtue is sufficient and life in a larger surrounding a city or kingdom where theoretical understanding and practical wisdom are necessary. It is not practical to attempt to provide a full account of the soul s faculties especially of its intellectual faculty before pointing to the needs that arise in different kinds of human association and thus suggesting the inadequacy of simple patriarchal rule. Second, once the human soul has been fully explained, thus permitting al-fārābī to turn to the problem of providing for it in a proper political order, the fact that he pauses in the middle of that discussion and turns to aphorisms that discuss the principles of being and opinions about human happiness suggests the limits of the city per se and why lawgiving is more suited for an association of cities for a nation.

484 Charles E. Butterworth But this is not a lesson to be learned from the ancients. It is one unique to his own setting, one he addresses by implying that the ancients are as good guides for the larger form of virtuous political community, the regime, as for the smaller, the city. Equally important, however, is the repeated admission in the Selected Aphorisms, as in the Philosophy of Plato and the Philosophy of Aristotle indeed, in the Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle as a whole that the knowledge constantly sought after and requisite for ultimate clarity about all of these issues is not available and that recourse to philosophy is as necessary now as it always has been. The admission challenges the claims of revelation in no way. Rather, it shows why those claims, set forth as they are in religion, can make sense only when expounded by a philosophical understanding similar to the one al-fārābī has shown to be that of Plato and Aristotle one that accounts for human existence in its entirety. Conclusion This brushes up against the limits of what we can claim to learn from al-fārābī about Plato and Aristotle with respect to lawgiving. Were we to go further, we might be forced to find some means of justifying the image of Aristotle that he presents in the Harmonization, that is, of an Aristotle who could seriously be presented as the author of a work like the Theology of Aristotle. 21 Fortunately, it is not necessary to go so far. Al-Fārābī brings Plato and Aristotle together in the Attainment of Happiness and the Selected Aphorisms, but also in the rest of his teaching, by showing how their concerns are at the core of sound politics. Behind his claim that the idea of the philosopher, first ruler, king, law-giver, and imam is but a single idea is the notion that truth is one. While the goal of the philosopher is to discern truth, that of the others is to set it before the citizens in a manner they can fathom and then pursue. After all, this is what allows a discerning governor to bring about prosperous cities and to institute an educational system that improves the way of life of the inhabitants. Only in this way, one that includes proper attention to law but also to character formation or to the shaping of virtuous souls, will it be possible to lead the citizens toward happiness in this realm. This is what al-fārābī tries to indicate in his different writings. It is also the goal common to Plato and Aristotle. To discern the merit of such a teaching, one must understand the way things are that is, one must have achieved theoretical virtue or excellence. To succeed in bringing it about, one must have a clear idea about how to persuade human beings how to motivate them to do what is good for the com- 21 See Harmonization, 56, 66, and 75, in Butterworth, Alfarabi, The Political Writings. Mélanges de l Université Saint-Joseph 61 (2008)

What Might We Learn From al-fārābī About Plato and Aristotle? 485 munity. This skill comes about from deliberative virtue or excellence, and it depends on a clear grasp of the human good and the strength to strive for it on moral virtue. The ability to persuade, to capture in images clearly discernible to most citizens, what this good is and why it must be pursued certainly depends on the practical art of rhetoric. And the lawgiver or leader imam who carries out such a task may also have need of another practical art, that of coining linguistic images that move people to long for good and noble actions even as they shun or abhor their opposites. In sum, al-fārābī s ability to bring together the philosophic pursuits of a Plato with the analyses of an Aristotle allows him to point to what is common to the philosopher, first ruler or founder of a regime, king, lawgiver, and imam. His investigations of the ancient philosophers allow him to preserve philosophy in his own time and, perhaps more important, show why it must necessarily guide all present and future inquiry into religion and lawgiving.

486 Charles E. Butterworth Appendix Abū Naṣr al-fārābī Selected Aphorisms (aph. 94) 22 (94) Aphorism. On the uses of the theoretical part in philosophy and that it is necessary for the practical part in [different] ways. One of them is that practice is virtuous and correct only when a human being has [a] become truly cognizant of the virtues that are truly virtues, [b] become truly cognizant of the virtues that are presumed to be virtues yet are not like that, [c] habituated himself to the actions of the virtues that are truly virtues so that they become one of his traits, [d] become cognizant of the ranks of the beings and what they deserve, [e] set each of them down in its level, [f] given it the full share of its right namely, the extent of what it was given and of its rank among the ranks of being, [g] preferred what ought to be preferred, [h] avoided what ought to be avoided, and [i] not preferred what is presumed to be preferable nor avoided what is presumed ought to be avoided. This is a state that is not attained or perfected except after becoming sophisticated; perfecting cognizance by means of demonstration; and becoming perfect in the natural sciences, what follows upon them, and what is after them according to rank and order, so that he finally comes to knowledge of the happiness that is truly happiness namely, that which is sought for its own sake and at no period of time is sought for anything else and is cognizant of how the theoretical virtues and the virtues of calculation are a reason and principle for bringing about the practical virtues and the arts. This does not come to be as a whole except through pursuing theory and transferring from degree to degree and level to level. It is not possible in any other way. That is, the one who wishes to learn theoretical philosophy begins with numbers, then ascends to magnitudes, then to the rest of the things to which numbers and quantities pertain essentially like optics and moving magnitudes then to the celestial bodies and music, to weights, and to mechanics. These are things that are understood and conceived of without matter. And he ascends little by little in the things that need matter to be understood and conceived of until he comes to the celestial bodies. Then, afterward, it is necessary for him to introduce principles other than the principles of what, by what, and how to aid him in using the things that it is difficult or impossible to come to intellect unless they come into matter. They are 22 For the Arabic text, see al-fārābī, Fuṣūl Muntaza a, éd. Najjar. Mélanges de l Université Saint-Joseph 61 (2008)

What Might We Learn From al-fārābī About Plato and Aristotle? 487 adjacent to, and midway between, the genus that has no principles of existence other than what it is and the genus for whose species the four principles exist. 23 The natural principles emerge for him, and he pursues them and makes a theoretical inquiry into the natural beings and their principles of instruction until he comes to the principles of existence. What he procures of the principles of existence comes to be a ladder and principles of instruction for him. So the principles of existence he has procured come to be principles of instruction only in relation to two things. 24 Then he transfers to knowledge of the reasons for the existence of natural bodies and the search for their essences, substances, and reasons. When he ends up at the celestial bodies, the rational soul, and the active intellect, he transfers again to another rank. So it is necessary for him to inquire theoretically into the principles of their existence until he becomes aware of principles that are not natural. Thus, what he has procured of the principles of existence of that third rank also comes to be principles of instruction for these beings that are of more perfect existence than the natural ones. He also comes to a midpoint between two sciences the science of natural things and the science of what is after the natural things in the ranking of investigation and instruction. He also becomes aware of the principles for the sake of which they were brought into being, as well as of the goal and perfection for the sake of which the human being was brought into being. He knows [a] that the natural principles that are in the human being and in the world are insufficient for the human being to come by them to the perfection he was brought into being to obtain and [b] that the human being needs intellectual principles by which he strives toward that perfection. The human being has already come close to obtaining the level and degree of theoretical knowledge by which he gains happiness. And he obtains theory from both directions until he ends up at a being that cannot possibly have any of these principles at all. Rather, it is the first being and the first principle for all the beings mentioned previously; in ways no defect intrudes upon, but rather in the most perfect of the ways by which something is a principle for the beings, it is the one by which, from which, and for which they exist. He thus attains cognizance of the ultimate reasons for the beings. This is divine theoretical inquiry into the beings. In addition, he is always investigating the purpose for the sake of which the human being was brought into being namely, the perfection incumbent upon the human being to obtain and all the things by which the human being obtains that perfection. Then he is able to 23 That is, in addition to the three principles identified in the first sentence of this paragraph, the principle of end for what. 24 The two things in question seem to be the two genera: namely, the genus having no principles of existence other than those for its own existence, and the genus that has the four principles of existence.

488 Charles E. Butterworth transfer to the practical part, and it is possible for him to begin to practice what he ought to practice. Another way is for someone to be given the practical part by a revelation that directs him toward a determination of each thing that he ought to prefer or avoid. They are both called knowers, for the name knowledge is homonymous for both of them just as it is homonymous for the practitioner of natural science and the diviner who relates what comes to be with respect to possible things. That is, the diviner does not have the ability to know all the individual possible things, because they are unending; and it is absurd that knowledge would encompass what is unending. Yet he has the ability to set down knowledge of some possible thing that happens to occur to his mind or to the mind of one asking him about it. Because knowledge of some possible thing is knowledge contrary to the nature of the possible, the diviner does not have knowledge about the nature of the possible. Rather, knowledge about the nature of the possible belongs to the practitioner of natural science. Therefore the knowledge of both of them does not come from one substance but the two are, rather, mutually contrary. The case is similar for someone who has become perfect in theoretical science and someone who has had revealed to him how to determine the actions of the inhabitants of cities or of a city without having cognizance of anything pertaining to theoretical science. Nor is there a link or true congruence between one who has received revelation and who is perfect in theoretical knowledge, and one who has received revelation without having become perfect in theoretical knowledge. Rather, the congruence is in name alone. Mélanges de l Université Saint-Joseph 61 (2008)