CHAPTER-III NYĀYA VIEW ON TRUTH AND ERROR 3. Origin of Nyāya : Nyāya is one of the six Hindu systems of thought and is very old. The word nyāya is derived from the Sanskrit root i which means to reach, to arrive at, which the prefix ni which indicates certainty or rule. Originally it was founded by Gautama who is also known as Akṣapāda. Ānviksikī Vidya (science of criticism), Nyāya Darśana, Nyāya Sāstra, Tarka Śāstra, Pramāṇa Śāstra, Hetu vidyā, Vāda vidyā, Gautamīya Śāstra, Akṣapāda Darśana, etc. are some of its names in the long history. But in the present time there are two very important branches of Nyāya, one is called prācina (the ancient one) and the other is called navina (the modern or navya nyāya). Nyāya literally means going into a subject, i.e., that analytical reasoning by which the mind is led to a conclusion. The word nyāya popularly connotes right or Justice and hence the Nyāya system is known as the science of right judgement or true reasoning. 1 Technically the word nyāya means a syllogism 2 (or a speech of five parts). It is a science of right knowledge, pramāṇa sāstra. 3.1 Sixteen Philosophical topics of the Nyāya-sūtra : The aim of the Nyāya to win the field of truth and then to secure it with the fence 3 of dialectics against the encroachment of error and sophistry. The Nyāya philosophy deals with the heightened interest of the external world. It is called a realistic school as it accepts sixteen categories or padārthas. Through these categories their philosophy has developed. Vaiśeṣika recognizes seven categories, and classifies all reals under them, the Nyāya recognizes sixteen categories and includes all the seven categories of the vaiśeṣika Nyāya mostly (53)
accepts the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. In the Nyāya system, the knowledge of the sixteen categories was explained as a prerequisite for apavarga (liberation). The term category (padārtha) means here philosophical topic. Gautama, in his Nyāya-sūtra, mentions a scheme of sixteen philosophical topics, these are 1. The first category is pramāṇa. It is the way in which we come to know anything truly and objectively. 2. Prameya is anything that can be known truly and objectively (or simply, the knowable). 3. Saṁśaya is doubt or lack of certainty in which the mind oscillates between the two alternatives. 4. Motive (prayojana) is the end of voluntary actions, which is the attainment of good or the rejection of evil. 5. Dṛṣṭānta is any fact or state of affairs concerning which there is no dispute, and which therefore serves as an instance of a general truth, principle or rule. 6. Siddhānta is a theory or doctrine which is upheld by a person or school. 7. Avayava is a part, member, or organ of the Nyāya syllogism; an avayava may be either a premise or conclusion of a syllogism. 8. Hypothetical reasoning (tarka) favours one of the two alternative hypotheses by showing the absurd consequences of the other. 9. Nirṇaya is true and certain knowledge arrived at by the application of only the legitimate and permissible means and method of knowledge. 10. Discussion (vāda) is a logical debate between a disputant and an opponent with the help of five-membered inferences for the ascertainment of truth without a desire for victory. 11. Wrangle (jalpa) is a seeming dispute or argument in which one or other of the parties engages with the aim not of arriving at truth but merely of winning the argument. 12. Cavil (vitaṇḍā) is a wrangle in which a person merely refutes disputant s thesis but does not establish his antithesis. (54)
13. Hetvābhāsa is something that is offered as a valid reason but is in fact not so. 14. Quibble (chala) is refutation of an argument by taking a word in a sense different from what is intended by the speaker. 15. Futility (jāti) is the employment of false and inappropriate analogies to defend one s own position or refute that of others. 16. Ground of defeat (nigrahasthāna) is the basis on which an argument is lost, so in the course of an argument, one party demands that the other concede defeat by showing that the latter has either grossly misunderstood its own position (or that of the former) or is unaware of the implications of its own thesis (or that of the former). The Naiyāyika s view is that by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (niḥśreyasa) is attained or supreme happiness is obtained by knowledge of the above sixteen categories. The Nyāya holds that truth is extrinsic to knowledge. They hold that the truth of our ideal depends on their relations to facts and points out that this relation is one of agreement or correspondence. The Vedānta and the Mimāṁsā theory is known as the theory that truth is svataḥ whereas falsity is parataḥ. In contrast to this theory, we have the Nyāya theory that both truth and falsity are parataḥ. Svataḥ and parataḥ literally means from within and from without respectively. Mimāṁsā-Vedānta theory holds that truth is intrinsic to knowledge. It may mean on the one hand that the originating conditions of the truth of knowledge are exactly the same as the originating conditions of the knowledge itself. It also holds that the knowledge and its truth are apprehended together. Hence intrinsic means both intrinsic with regard to origin and intrinsic with regard to apprehension, both utpattitaḥ and jñāptitaḥ. Knowledge arises as a result of contact between the self and the non-self. 4 According to Nyāya, knowledge is not an essential but only an adventitious property of the self. 5 Nyāya s fundamental definition of knowledge is cognition, apprehension, consciousness or manifestation of objects. It compares knowledge to the light (55)
of the lamp which reveals the lamp as well as the objects around it. That, light is different from the lamp and the objects. Like, Nyāya also divides knowledge into two broad sorts: preventative and representative. 3.2 Forms of svataḥprāmāṇya theory : There are different forms of the svataḥprāmāṇya theory. It has mainly two parts-one is concerned with the origin of truth and the other its apprehension. Though they all agree that truth of a knowledge originates precisely from those causal conditions which also give rise to the knowledge, the different advocates of the svataḥprāmāṇya theory notwithstanding differ amongst themselves as to the nature of the apprehension of the truth. So there are differences among four different forms of the theory-the Prābhākara, the Bhāṭṭa, the Miśra, and the Vedānta. i) In Prābhākara theory, there is no positive error. Truly speaking, the problem of truth and error is simply meaningless on his theory. On the cognitive side all knowledge is true. But Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā distinguishes three levels of truth and error : In the broadest sense, the meaning of the term truth, is all awareness, so all knowledge is true. In a narrower sense of the term, all awareness other than memory is true. In a still narrower sense of the term, only those knowledge s are true that lead to successful practice whereas those that lead to unsuccessful practice are false. According to Rāmanujācārya there are three different kinds of truth: yathārtha, prāmāṇya and samyakta. Yathārtha belongs to all awareness 6 (including memory and what ordinarily passes for erroneous apprehension), prāmaṇya to all awareness 7 excepting memory (but including even the so called erroneous apprehension) and samyaktva only to such knowledge other than memory which leads to successful practice. 8 ii) Though Bhāṭṭa school agrees in the fundamental point of svataḥprāmāṇya but there are difference also from the Prābhākaras. The (56)
Bhāṭṭa regards knowledge as an imperceptible activity and not as iii) iv) something self-luminous. On the Bhāṭṭa theory, we come to know about our knowledge through an inferential process. According to the Bhāṭṭas, truth is apprehended svataḥ in the sense that the same inference from the jñātata which makes us aware of a knowledge also makes us aware of the truth of that knowledge. In the same factors of course, truth has its origin which also give us rise to the knowledge but like the knowledge its truth also remains unknown at the beginning. There may arised a question here. What does the Bhāṭṭa mean by prāmāṇya? But Kumārila has not given anywhere a precise definition of it. We could only fall back on the line : tasmād bodhātmakatvena svatahḥ prāptā pramāṇatā 9 which suggests the conjecture 10 that also for Kumārila, as for the Prabhākara, prāmāṇya is the same as awareness-of-the-object (bodhātmakatva). In this sense, it is clear that every knowledge is intrinsically true. The third form is the Miśra theory. It is ascribed to the school of Mīmāṁsā associated with the name of Murāri Miśra none of whose writings is handed down to us but who is mentioned in Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā treatises. 11 This school is represented as combining the Nyāya doctrine of anuvyavasāya with the Mīmāṁsā theory of intrinsic truth. There is no difference as to the origin of truth; in which all the three Mīmāṁsā schools agree. Another form of the svataḥprāmāṇya theory is the vedantic theory. The vedāntin s conception of knowledge varies from the Mīmāṁsāka s. In the Advaita system, knowledge means four things (a) a modification of the inner sense (antaḥkaraṇavṛtti) or (b) consciousness as limited by a modification of the inner sense (antaḥkaranavṛttyavacchinnacaitanya) (c) the witness self (sākṣī) and at last (d) the pure undifferentiated consciousness free from all limiting adjuncts and determinations. (57)
In the vedāntic theory, svataḥprāmāṇya means that the truth of a knowledge is apprehended through the same sākṣī awareness through which the knowledge itself is apprehended. However there is really a pertinent question-what does the vedāntin mean by prāmāṇya? The usual definition of prāmāṇya are in terms of the uncontradicted character (abādhitatvam) and the originality (anadhigatatvam) of a knowledge. 12 The Advaitin s opinion is that tadvati tatprakārakatva is common to both right knowledge and error and so does not constitute the sense of truth in which all knowledge is intrinsically true (but not intrinsically false). Madhusūdana is however emphatically clear on this point. 13 The exact sense of prāmānya in which the Advaitin could speak both of svataḥprāmāṇya and parataḥprāmāṇya to be specified in some other manner. There are two suggestions-the one give us psychological account and saves the theory; the other suggests a definition and renders the theory valid but analytically trivial. Gaṅgeśa considers tadvatitatprakarakatva as the feature which distinguishes right knowledge from error. On the otherhand, Madhusūdana and many Advaita writers regard that it belongs to all apprehensions not excluding error. There is reason, therefore, to suspect that the Naiyāyika and the Vedāntin do not mean quite the same by tadvatitatprakarakatva. One reason for this may be that the Advaitin admits a false object which is the object of false apprehension, so that e.g., the false silver does possess the generic character of silverhood. 3.3 Theory of Parataḥprāmānya : The theory of parataḥprāmāṇya, specially is upheld by the Nyāya school. The notions of jñāna and prāmāṇya are the parts of the Nyāya theory of parataḥ-prāmāṇya. The Nyāya system gives us an elaborate discussion regarding the nature of truth (pramā) and the means of such knowledge is pramāṇa. According to the Naiyāyikas prama is a definite and assured knowledge of an object which is (58)
true and presentational in character. Various schools of Indian philosophy have expressed divergent opinions with regard to the nature of pramā. Prof. D. M. Datta seems to be perfectly right in his observation that pramā is generally defined as a cognition having two-fold characteristics of truth and novelty (abādhitatva or yathārthatava and anadhigatatva), and that as regards the first characteristic-truth-all schools of India philosophy are unanimous. 14 In second characteristics, there is a difference of opinion. However, it is to be seen that even those who hold truth as an essential criterion of knowledge differ amongst themselves regarding the meaning of truth. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is of the view that pramā is that knowledge of objects which is free from doubt and illusion. 15 Gaṅgeśa maintains that pramā is that which informs us of the existence of something in a place where it really exists. 16 For Śivāditya, it is the experience of the real nature of things. 17 Udayana in his Tātparypariśuddhi says cognition of the real nature of things is pramā, and the means of such knowledge is pramāṇa (yathārthanubhavaḥ pramā tatsādhanam ca pramāṇaṁ). If we compare the Nyāya view of pramā with western thinking it is similar to the correspondence theory of western Realists. In the West, this view is termed as the pragmatic theory of knowledge. The Nyāya theory affirms the correspondence theory of truth. Correspondence theory is that according to which our knowledge of a given object is valid. According to it, the truth of knowledge consists in its correspondence with objective facts (the real nature of the object). In the Nyāya truth of all knowledge is a correspondence of relations (tadvati tatprakāra). To know a thing is to judge it as having suchand-such a character. By contrast, invalid knowledge lacks in such agreement and correspondence. According to Nyāya, action and behaviour based on valid knowledge lead to success and fulfillment. In addition while those based on invalid knowledge lead to failure and disappointment. On the otherhand, according to the Naiyāyika both truth and error can be proved only by fulfilled and unfulfilled activity respectively. It might lead one into thinking that the Nyāya theory of truth is also pragmatic. For example - I have the knowledge of (59)
milk as white in colour and ice as cold now my knowledge of milk as white and ice as cold will be true if milk is really white and ice is really cold in the objective world. The view that the existence and characteristics of external objects are independent of the experiencing subject, the correspondence between knowledge and the object of knowledge is in no way dependent upon the knower. The Naiyāyikas accept the view that every true awareness produces successful action or that every false awareness produces unsuccessful action. They hold that successful action can be produced only by a true awareness. Hence, being the producer of a successful action is a reliable mark from which the truth of the awareness may be inferred. To sum up, it is clear that Nyāya is realistic with respect to the nature of truth and pragmatic with respect to the test or criterion of truth. The value of the Nyāya system lies specially in its methodology or theory of knowledge on which it builds its philosophy. One of the charges against Indian philosophy is that it is based on religious authority and is therefore, dogmatic. The theory of knowledge, formulated by Nyāya, is made the basis not only of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika but also of other Indian systems with slight modifications. The Nyāya school of philosophical speculation is based on texts known as the Nyāya-sūtra, which were written by Akṣapāda from around the second century. The most important contribution made by the Nyāya school to modern Hindu thought is its methodology to prove existence of God, based on the Vedas. This methodology is based on a system of logic that, subsequently has been adopted by majority of the other Indian schools whether orthodox or heterodox. 3.4 Jñāna in Nyāya system : In the Nyāya philosophy, knowledge is understood in a very wide sense. Gautama does not find any difference between buddhi, upalabdhi and jñāna. 18 (60)
In this regard, Gautama suggests that knowledge stands for any conscious determinate state and not necessarily referring to correct awareness alone. In forms of determinate judgment, all knowledge must be expressible. It is possible by the invariable association of jñāna and vyāvahara. It is the conceptualised judgement which is of interest for the Naiyāyikas, Nonconceptualised knowledge is not accepted as an independent form of knowledge anywhere in Nyāya Philosophy. Gautama, Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara do not refer to this kind of knowledge. But, only Vācaspati in his Tātparyaṭīkā traces the distinction between savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka jñāna by interpreting the two words avyapadeśyam and vyavasāyātmakam contained in the sūtra (1.1.4) to mean respectively nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perceptions. The non-conceptualised stage is not a matter of perception or of direct awareness. 19 Therefore, to later Naiyāyikas, nirvikalpaka jñāna is neither pratyakṣa nor anumiti nor any other kind of anubhava, and can hardly come under buddhi itself, as it gives rise to no vyavahāra. It can be neither pramā nor apramā, for as it has no prakāratā neither the definition tadvati tat prakārakatvam nor atadvati tatprakārakatvam applies to it. 20 The Nyāya epistemology considers knowledge (jñāna) or cognition (buddhi) as apprehension (upalabdhi) or consciousness (anubhava). Knowledge may be valid or invalid. According to the Nyāya, knowledge is just the manifestation (prakāśa) of objects. A knowledge is true when it corresponds to the real nature and relations of its object, if not, it becomes false. In the Nyāya system, the validity of knowledge is due to the efficiency of the conditions of knowledge (karaṇaguṇa), while its invalidity is due to some deficiency in those conditions (karaṇadoṣa). The efficiency or deficiency of the conditions is constituted by certain positive factors. We cannot say that the efficiency of the conditions of knowledge is simply the absence of defects in them (doṣābhāva), or that their deficiency means only the absence of efficient conditions (guṇābhāva). Hence efficiency and deficiency both stand for certain (61)
special positive conditions which modify the general conditions of knowledge and make it true and false respectively. 3.5 Types of Correct Knowledge in the Nyāya School : The Naiyāyikas accept four valid means (pramā) for obtaining valid knowledge. All knowledge implies the subject (pramātā), the resulting cognition (pramiti), and the means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Nyāya deals with the highest state of knowledge. The Nyāya teaches that the highest good is attainable only through the highest knowledge. Therefore, it is that the problem of knowledge that finds an important place in the Nyāya philosophy. In the Nyāya system, the four pramāṇas by which correct knowledge can be gained are perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. 3.5.1 Perception (pratyakṣa) : Perception is the knowledge resulting from sense-object. It a very important part of Gautama s definition of perception. The object here signifies substance (dravya), such as a table, a pot, a chair etc. It also signifies quality (guṇa) such as colour (rūpa), hard or soft (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha) and sound (sabda). The object also includes pleasure and pain (sukha and dukha) are directly cognized or perceived by us without the help of any sense organ. The cognition of substance like a table and of quality like colour is an External perception, but the cognition of pleasure or pain is an Internal or mental perception. 21 Pratyakṣa (perception) occupies the foremost position in the Nyāya epistemology. Perception is defined by Akṣapāda Gautama in his Nyāya sūtra (1, i.4) as a non erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of sense organs with the objects. Of course, the presence of the self, its contact with the mind (manas), and the contact of the mind with the sense organs are necessary factors, but the contact of the sense-organs with the appropriate objects of the sense is the most essential factor in perception. Again perception (62)
is of two kinds, i.e., (i) laukika, ordinary or worldly and (ii) alaukika, extraordinary or supernormal. The laukika perception is of six kinds, revealing the objects having the five sensory qualities sound, touch, form, taste and smell and the feelings of pleasure and pain (apprehended by mind). The alaukika perception is of three kinds viz, sāmānyalakṣaṇa jñānalakṣaṇa and yogaja. In sāmānyalakṣaṇa perception we become aware not only of the specific nature of the object perceived but also of the nature of its genus which is not confined to it. For example, when we are aware of the fire in a hearth, we also become aware of the general nature of fire wherever else it may be present. In Jñānalakṣaṇa perception we are not only aware of the particular sensory quality in contact with our particular sense but also of some other quality of another sense closely associated with which we are in contact. Viz, while seeing a white piece of ice with our eyes we also actually feel the coolness of it. The yogaja perception is another kind of alaukika perception. It is the extraordinary and supernormal perception of a yogi who can directly, without actual sensory contact perceive distant and hidden objects. The founder of the Nyāya philosophy, Gautama or Akṣapada defines perception as the knowledge which is produced by the intercourse of an object with a sense organ, undefinable, determinate and in harmony with its object. Pratyakṣa or perception (direct knowledge) is defined in Nyāyasūtra; 1.1.4: indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyaavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam. This definition includes the following factors: 1. Perception is a cognition (jñāna). According to Gautama, perception is a cognition i.e., the cognition of an object. 2. It arises from the sense-object contact (indriyārthasannikarṣā). 3. It is not due to words that is, it is inexpressible in words (avyapadeśya). 4. It is invariably related to the object that is, it is not erroneous (avyabhicāri). 5. It is well defined or definite (vyavasāyātmaka). (63)
The specific feature of the definition of perception is the sense-objectcontact, which is accepted by many philosophical systems. We see that in the Vaiśeṣika system, perception is described as knowledge which is conditioned by the senses. The same view is expressed in Sāṁkhya system as perception is the direct cognition of an object by a sense-organ when the two come in contact with each other. In the Yoga system it is held that perception is especially a cognition of the particularity of an object. For it, perception is a mental modification produced by sense impressions and mainly related to the specific characters entering into the nature of the individual object of perception. In Mīmāṁsā system, perception is defined as the cognition which is produced by the efficient contact of the senses with their objects. From all these definitions of perception given by different philosophical systems, we see that the senseobject-contact is the essential nature of perception. 3.5.2 Inference (anumāna) : Inference (anumāna) is the second source of valid knowledge in the Nyāya system. Inference is the means of knowing something through the medium of the knowledge of some mark (liṅga) by virtue of a relation of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the two. 22 It is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is knowledge which arises after (anu) other knowledge. Indian logicians attach much importance to inference mainly because it is accepted as a means of valid knowledge by all the systems except Cārvāka. Inference (anumāna) is said to be the source of anumiti (inferential knowledge). Its another name is parāmarśa (consideration). Parāmarśa is defined as knowledge of pakṣadharmatā with vyāpti. Pakṣadharmatā means the quality of being a pakṣa. Pakṣa is that place or thing where some such thing (sign) is present and indicates the presence of something else, which is not actually perceived. The Nyāya system makes the valuable contribution to inference. Gautama does not give any definition of inference. But Vātsyāyana (64)
gives an etymological definition of inference. According to Vatsyāyana, It is the knowledge of an object due to a previous knowledge of some sign. 23 This view is also accepted by Jayanta 24 and Gaṅgeśa. 25 Inference is called anumāna because it is a kind of knowledge (māna) which we get after (anu) some other knowledge i.e perception. 26 It is mediate knowledge of an object (e.g., a fire) derived through the medium of the knowledge of a mark (e.g., a smoke) by virtue of the relation of invariable concomitance between them. Inference is accepted by most of the Indian philosophical systems. According to Buddhists, inference consists in the perception of that which is known to be inseparably connected with another thing. The Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Mimāṃsā and Vedānta systems also explain inference as the knowledge of one term of a relation, which is not perceived, through the knowledge of the other term which is perceived and is clearly understood as invariably related to the first term. But according to Cārvāka, inference cannot give us the validity of knowledge. It gives us probable knowledge, so there remains a doubt. According to them all inferences are doubtful. There are three kinds of inference according to Gautama, i) pūrvavat, ii) śeṣavat and iii) sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. But he has not define them anywhere in the Nyāya-sūtra. Vātsyāyana offers two alternative interpretations of these terms. i) A pūrvavat inference is the inference of an unperceived effect from a perceived cause, e.g., the inference of future rain from the appearance of dark heavy clouds in the sky. ii) A śeṣavat inference is the inference of an unperceived cause from a perceived effect; i.e., the inference of the fall of rain in the upper regions of a river from seeing the river in spate. In this manner, these two kinds of inference are based on the casual relation. But sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is based on non-causal relation. iii) A sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is the inference of an imperceptible object from a perceived mark, which is known to be uniformly related to it. (65)
The movement of the sun is inferred from its different positions in the sky, which are perceived, even as the movement of a person is inferred from his different positions on earth. Uddyotakara and Viśvanātha remark that sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is not based on the uniformity of causation but on the non-causal uniformity. Gaṅgeśa also accepts three kinds of inference (a) ānvayavyatireki, (b) kevalanvayi and (c) kevalavyātireki. (a) In anvayavyatireki inference, there is a universal affirmative relation of the reason with the predicate as well as a universal negative relation between them. For example-yatra dhūmaḥ, tatra vahniḥ as in the mahānasa (kitchen); and if this is proved through negative example, as yatra vahnir-nāsti, tatra dhūmo pi nāsti, as in a lake, then this is called anvayavyātireki anumāna. Here the vyāpti is established both positively and negatively. (b) In kevalānvayi where anvaya-vyāpti alone is possible and no vyatireka, that is called kevalānvayi. In kevalānvayi inference, the reason (hetu) has affirmative uniform relation with the presence of the predicate (sādhya). It has an affirmative reason (anvayi hetu) which exists in all similar instances (sapakṣa), and has no dissimilar instances (vipakṣa). The jar is nameable, because it is knowable. The reason knowability exists in all nameable objects. (c) Another inference, where only negative is possible and no positive, is called kevalavyatireki. It depends upon a negative invariable concomitance (vyatirekavyāpti) or uniform relation between the absence of the reason with the absence of the predicate, which is established by the method of agreement in absence. For example-what is not different from the other elements has no smell. The earth has smell. Therefore, the earth is different from the other elements. In this inference, the reason smell is the uncommon attribute of the subject (66)
earth, it is co-extensive with the subject, there is no similar instance in which it may exist. That is why it is called kevalavyātireki. According to Annaṁbhaṭṭa, inference is of two kinds, viz, (a) inference for oneself (svārtha) and (b) inference for others (parārtha). (a) Svārtha, for oneself. It is meant to convince one s own self about the existence of an object. It is a mental process; i.e., a person happens to see with his own eyes in kitchens and other common places smoke always accompanied by fire, for which he comes to a conclusion that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Thus this is the psychological process of inference for one s own sake. (b) Parārthānumāna is the inference for another. It is a logical process in which we try to convince others of its truth by stating all the members of a syllogism in a formal manner. There are five members of the Nyāya syllogism, these are-pratijñā (proposition) the logical statement which is to be proved e.g., the hill is on fire. 27 Hetu is the second member of the syllogism. It states the reason for the establishment of the proposition, i.e., because the hill has smoke. Udāharaṇa is the third member of the syllogism which is a universal proposition showing the invariable concomitance between hetu and sādhya; e.g., wherever there is smoke there is fire as in the kitchen. The fourth member upanaya is the application of the universal concomitance to the present case, e.g., same kind of smoke which is accompanied by fire. In the last, nigamana is the conclusion drawn from the preceding propositions, the hill is on fire. These five parts make up a perfect demonstrative inference and leave no doubt in the mind of the person. The above mentioned parts are accepted in Sāṁkhya 28 and Vaiśeṣika 29 systems also. 3.5.3 Comparison (upamāna) : (67)
Comparison (upamāna) is an independent source of valid knowledge. In the Nyāya system, it is the third source of valid knowledge accepted by some Indian systems like Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Advaita vedānta. When a new object not seen or known before is recognised by perceiving a similarity in it with something else known before and pointed out by somebody else in the past, then this process is called upamāna accepted by Nyāya. It is the relation between the names and the objects denoted by them. According to Annambhaṭṭa: upamāna is the source of our knowledge about the relation between a word and its denotation. Comparison is the means of knowing an unknown object through its resemblance with another well-known object. 30 For example-one has seen dogs but not a wolf, and he has been told that a wolf is similar in appearance to a dog. So when he sees an animal in the forest which looks like a dog but it isn t one, and he surmises that it must be a wolf. Perception of similarity plays an important part in upamāna. There are two factors involved in an argument by comparison (1) the knowledge of the object to be known, (2) the perception of similarity. According to Naiyāyikas, the first factor is the principal cause of the knowledge, While the Navya Naiyāyikas regard perception of similarity more important. But Uddyotakāra and Vācaspati s view is that, in upamāna the new knowledge takes place through the recognition not only of similarity but also of dissimilarity. Gaṅgeśa also accepts these two kinds of comparison when he defines comparison as the knowledge that a word denotes the generic character of an unfamiliar object which co-exists with its similarity or dissimilarity with a known object. Gautama says that upamāna as a distinct and independent means of knowledge. But some systems of Indian philosophy do not accept it as an independent source of knowledge. According to Cārvāka, upamāna is not a pramāṇa at all, it cannot give us true knowledge about the denotation of words as maintained by the Naiyāyikas. On the nature of upamāna, the Mīmāṁsā and the Nyāya views are fundamentally different. There is a minor difference between the Prābhākara (68)
and the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā. According to Prabhākara, similarity or sādṛśya which is the object of upamāna, is an independent category, not reducible to substance, quality, action and universal etc. on the otherhand, according to Kumārila, it is nothing but an assemblage of common features. Of course, the Advaita Vedānta view is identical with the Bhāṭṭas. The Naiyāyikas define comparison (upamāna) as the knowledge of similarity of an unknown object like a wild cow with a known object like a cow. The knowledge is that the perceived wild cow is like the remembered cow. The Mīmāṁsakas reject this statement of comparison. They point out that the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word is derived by verbal authority and not by upamāna. Śabara defines upamāna as resemblance which brings about the cognition of an object not in contact with the senses. 31 Kumārila explains it as the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object (e.g., a cow) with an object (i.e., a wild cow) perceived. It is the meaning only-the cow which was perceived by me in the past in a town is similar to this wild cow perceived in a forest at present. 32 The Prabhākaras remark that upamāna as the knowledge of similarity as subsisting in an object not in contact with the senseorgans brought about by the perception of similarity in some other object which is perceived by the senses. The knowledge of similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow is upamāna. Prabhākara s view of upamāna is identical with the view of Kumārila. The Nyāya says that upamāna does not depend upon the quantity of similarity, but it depends upon perceived similarity of an unknown object with a well known object. The Naiyāyikas do not deny that upamāna sometimes leads to false judgement. Hence we conclude with the Naiyāyikas view that upamāna is an independent source of our knowledge of the denotaion of words. But Bauddhas, Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāmkhyaits do not accept upamāna as an independent source of valid knowledge. (69)
3.5.4 Testimony (śabda) : Testimony is an important source of knowledge. It has been defined by Gautama as āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ which means the assertion of a reliable person is what is meant by śabda. 33 Śabda is defined by Nyāya as a statement uttered by a trustworthy person (āpta). A trustworthy person is one who always speaks truth. A trustworthy person may be a man or God who is always trustworthy. The Vedas are considered as authoritative because they are regarded by the Naiyāyikas to be the words of God. In the same way the statements of any wordly person will be authoritative when it is certain that the person is a trustworthy one. Therefore, the validity of śabda pramāṇa depends on its being based on the statement of a trustworthy person, human or divine. Annaṁbhaṭṭa points out that śabda as a source of valid knowledge, it consists in understanding the meaning of the statement of a trustworthy person. 34 Gautama has rightly said that testimony (śabda) is of two kinds, these are-dṛṣṭārtha or that relating to perceptible objects and adṛṣṭārtha or that relating to imperceptible objects. Dṛṣṭārtha-these objects are found in this world; and adṛṣṭārtha-these objects are found in the next world, such as heaven, hell, transmigration etc. According to navya Naiyāyikas, testimony is of two kinds-secular (laukika) testimony and scriptural (vaidika) testimony. Secular testimony is the testimony of human beings, therefore may be true or false. In vaidika testimony, we have the words of God. The Vedas are not impersonal but personal, and these are created by God. So, valid on all points. Hence all Naiyāyikas agree that śabda must be based on the words of trustworthy persons, human or divine. All other systems of Indian philosophy accept testimony as an independent source of valid knowledge, except the Cārvāka, the Buddha and the Vaiśeṣika schools. Among the four means of valid knowledge that Nayāya acknowledges for the right cognition of the above mentioned prameya s i.e., pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison) and śadba (verbal (70)
testimony). Perception is considered to be the most important because it alone is self sufficient to allay doubt. 35 In the above four pramāṇas of Nyāya system, we find that testimony is the knowledge of words while perception is due to sense-object-contact, inference or anumāna to be the knowledge of invariable concomitance and upamāna to the perception of similarity or dissimilarity. Now it is quite clear that Nyāya system accepts the above four means of knowledge as distinct and independent. 3.6 Stage of indefinite knowledge in the Nyāya Philosophy : Besides these, Nyāya explains the nature of doubt, fallacy, truth and error. Saṁśaya or doubt is a state of uncertainty. It is a form of invalid knowledge. It is an indefinite knowledge which characterizes an object in mutually conflicting ways. It arises from confusion of common qualities or recognition of properties not common, conflicting testimony, irregularity of perception as between a pool and a mirage, irregularity of non-perception, or a lapse of memory. According to Gautama, saṁśaya or doubt is a conflicting judgment on the precise character of an object. 36 For example-some tall thing is perceived, but one cannot decide whether it is a man or a post. The opinion of the Naiyāyikas is that doubt is neither a true cognition nor a false one. Vātsyāyana asserts that it is a wavering judgement where characters common to many objects are discerned, but none of them is specific. Vātsyāyana classifies doubt into five kinds. The first kind of doubt is the contradictory knowledge (vimarśa) about the same object due to the apprehension of common characteristics (samāna-dharma), i.e., when we perceive a tall object at a distance and we are not sure if it is a man or a post or a tree-trunk; because tallness is common to all of them. Secondly, it may arise from the cognition of a peculiar and unique property; as when the cognition of sound makes us doubt whether it is eternal or non-eternal because it is not found in eternal objects like the soul nor in non-eternal objects like water. The third, form of doubt may be (71)
due to conflicting testimony, e.g., when the different philosophical theories of the soul leave us in doubt as to the real nature of the soul. In fourth, it may be caused due to the irregularity of perception. As for example; we perceive water in the tank where it really exists but it appears also to exist in the mirage where it really does not exist. Hence it leads to a doubt whether water is perceived only when it actually exists or it does not. The fifth kind of doubt or lastly, it may arise from the irregularity of non-perception, i.e., when we are not sure if the thing we cannot see now really exists or not, since the existent also is not perceived under certain conditions. 37 With regard to the types of doubt, there is a difference of opinion. Uddyotakāra and Vācaspati differ with Gautama and Vātsyāyana on this point. The former two favour only three types of doubt. According to Gaṅgeśa, there are only two sources of doubt; whereas Keśavamisra speaks of three sources of doubt. In all cases of doubt, there is either the perception of common properties or the cognition of something quite new and uncommon. The Naiyāyika s view is that doubt is neither a true cognition nor a false one. As a mental state, doubt is shown to be different from both belief and disbelief. It only raises a problem for thought. However, in doubt, we think of two or more alternatives in regard to the same thing. The Naiyāyika maintains that truth and falsehood both are extrinsic to knowledge in respect of genesis as well as of ascertainment. The Nyāya theory agrees partly with the Buddhist (in respect of the extrinsic nature of truth) and partly with the Bhāṭṭa (in respect of the extrinsic nature of falsehood). Truth and falsehood are specific qualities of cognition. A cognition is the manifestation of some object, which depends on certain causal conditions. The ascertainment of truth depends on some extraneous considerations just as its production depends on some extraneous factors. There is no knowledge of its truth or falsehood at the time of the origination of a cognition. When the cognition of a blue object arises, the object is known to be blue; but the truth of the cognition is not known at that time, and subsequently when it is known it is (72)
not known independently because such knowledge depends on fruitful activity (pravṛttisāmarthya). Fruitful activity is the test of truth and fruitless activity (pravṛttivisaṃvāda) is the test of falsehood. All knowledge is a means to some practical end and from this place it needs to be tested in order to attain practical success. When practical success has been achieved one feels no doubt about it, because doubt is the motive behind the ascertainment of truth. In the case of the first knowledge of water, when water is seen, we expect that it will quench our thirst and if the expected thing actually happens, e.g., if the cognition leads to a successful action it is proved to be true and there is no cause for doubting the truth of the visual cognition of water. In a general way, a visual perception of water reveals the form of water and if the visual perception of water is verified by touching, washing, bathing etc. then the perceived water is real. Even after a vigorous and careful search we do not find any defect in the conditions, we can believe that our volitional experience of successful activity is true. 3.7 Nyāya view of erroneous cognition : The Nyāya account of error has been expounded by a galaxy of thinkers beginning from Gautama (about 3 rd century BC). The Nyāya theory of error or illusion is known as the anyathākhyātivāda. The word anyathā means elsewise and elsewhere and both these meanings are brought out in error. The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented object exists elsewhere. They further maintain that knowledge is not intrinsically valid but becomes so on account of extraneous conditions (parataḥ prāmāṇya) during both validity and invalidity. According to this theory, an illusion manifests a real object in the form of different object which is also real. An error or illusion is the apprehension (khyāti) of an object as otherwise (anyathā) or as a different object; it is misperception of an object (i.e., a nacre) as another object (i.e., silver). Another name of this theory is viparītakhyāti or the theory of erroneous cognition. (73)
According to Nyāya, an illusion is a misplaced fact. All the factors of an illusory perception are real and perceived facts, but they are brought into a wrong relation. For example, in the illusory perception of silver, we have an actual perception of a certain locus and some silver, both as real facts. Here error arises because the silver perceived at a different time and place, and occupied by the perceived locus, namely, the shell. According to Alexander, error consists in wrongly combining the elements of reality. According to Naiyāyika, the concept of error is logically not committed to explain the perceptual error but is to show how error as such is nothing but mere false characterisation. Nyāya points out that error is mere false characterisation. The Navya Naiyāyika like Vācaspati, while discussing error, refer to the instances of erroneous perception like shell and silver yet their account of error as mistaking one for another (sadantaraṁ sadantarāt manā gṛhyate) 38 clearly indicates the logical implication of the theory. In the Nyāya school, in illusion, something is perceived as other than what it is, e.g., the nacre is apprehended as silver. It happens in this way; due to defective eyesight, or insufficient light, or some other causes of person fails to cognise a nacre as nacre and apprehends it as something bright as silver. It is the manifestation of a real object in the form of a different object. The error lies not in the indeterminate perception of the given but in the determinate perception of it as worked up and modified by some representative elements. 39 When we perceive the qualities of silver in a nacre, we have an illusion; which is a single cognition of a perceptual character. A nacre in intercourse with the visual organ vitiated by a defect and aided by the recollection of silver is actually perceived as silver. There is first contact of sense with something present before it. Due to some defects, the sense apprehends such general features of the thing as its brightness, etc. but fails to discern its peculiar and distinctive features. On the other hand, the general features being associated with some other thing (e.g., silver) recall the memory images of the peculiar properties of that other thing. The recollection of silver is owing to the revival (74)
of its impression by the perception of similarity (i.e., brightness). The Navya or modern Nyāya explains it by jñānalakṣanasannikarṣa. So, in the case of illusion, Naiyāyika accepts the jñānalakṣaṇapratyakṣa. There is an extra ordinary intercourse through the medium of the idea of silver revived in memory. The error comes in and the illusion arises when the silver that is perceived elsewhere is referred as a predicate to the this as its subject. It is the determinate knowledge as qualified by silverness (viśiṣṭajñāna). In recognition (pratyabhijñā) in which we say This must be the same man who helped me in the tramcar yesterday. We see how certain presentative and representative elements join together to make up one single perception. It is also one kind of perception qualified by past perception. We see an object and recognize it as having been perceived on a previous occasion, giving us a knowledge of present objects qualified by the past. 40 In it, we know immediately that the thing we cognise is the same as that which was cognised before. It is produced by memory and perception. Any ordinary valid perception explains how a given sensum combines with associated ideas to make up one percept. In illusion, the relation between the perceived this and silver is not objectively real. It is contradicted and sublated. So, it is clear that the error lies not in the presentations concerned in the perception but in the determination of one presentation by another given through association and memory (jātyasaṁskārāt). Jayanta Bhāṭṭa, a Naiyāyika, advocates viparītakhyāti theory of error. According to him, mistake or error consists in misinterpreting a thing. It is to be identical with the anyathākhyāti considered by other Naiyāyikas. While refuting the Prābhākaras theory of akhyāti, he presents this theory. He observes that an illusion is a single cognition of the nature of a positive false knowledge. It is the false perception of one thing as a different thing. This theory involved in an error is the manifestation of a real object in the form of a different object. 41 It is not a negation of discrimination between two cognitions. It is a positive misperception. For example, a mother-of-pearl shell which has (75)
been mistaken for a piece of silver, and this knowledge is expressed as This is silver. Now the question is, how such an illusion arises? According to the older Naiyāyikas what we first perceive in the shell silver illusion is those qualities of nacre which are common to both nacre and silver. Owing to the perversion of the visual organ, we fail to perceive the peculiar qualities of the nacre, then the perception of these common qualities reminds us of the peculiar qualities of silver by association. 42 Due to some perversion of the mind, the recollection of silver produces the perception of silver; in contact with the visual organ. Some later Naiyāyikas (modern or Navya Naiyāyikas) introduced a complicated form of perception for explaining illusion. They hold that the visual perception of silver in a nacre depends upon the extraordinary intercourse through the idea of silver revived in memory by association. Through this intercourse, the idea of silver reproduce in memory by association produce the visual perception of silver. 43 In explaining perceptual illusion Gaṅgeśa finds a constant in memory providing the predication content, the qualificational material. Gaṅgeśa analyses non-veridical sensory awareness as a cognition whose predication content does not qualify the object connected to the sense organ. According to Navya Naiyāyikas, in illusion the conch-shell is mistaken for silver which exists some-where else and is perceived where actually shell is present. Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the Neo-Naiyāyika School, also advocates the doctrine of anyathākhyāti. He explains how a real object existing elsewhere appears in consciousness in an illusion. According to him there is an extra-ordinary intercourse with the visual organ and produces the illusory perception of silver in a nacre. It is also complicated perception through association. Gaṅgeśa s opinion is that this extraordinary intercourse through association (jñānalakṣaṇa-saṇnikarṣa). This is the only point how an illusion is misperception of an object as a different object. The Nyāya explains it by jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti which means a kind of sense-object contact brought about by the revival of the idea of past experience of an object. (76)
The school of the later Nyāya shows great ingenuity to explain the perceptual character of illusory experience. That there is the attribution (āropa) of false character to a perceived fact is true in illusion no doubt. But the questions that arise are: how do we come to ascribe the false character? How does this false character appears as something actually perceived in illusion? The Nyāya maintains that an illusory experience is a single perception. It is not a complex of perception and recollection with their distinction blurred by obscuration of memory as Prabhākara thinks. Dr. S. C. chatterjee rightly points out that when we have the illusion of silver in a shell, we no doubt attribute silverness to that shell which is not its proper locus, but at the same time it is equally doubtless that the silver is somehow perceived and not merely remembered in illusion. 44 This is also pointed out by A.C. Ewing. He maintains that, the difficulty in the case of perception is not the mere fact of error, but the demand that we should hold both that what we immediately perceived numerically identical with a physical object or a part of such an object and yet that it is quite different. 45 Therefore, we have to explain the perceptual character of illusion to explain illusion. We should not try to explain it away. It is a presentative cognition or perception and not a representative cognition or recollection, the representative character of which has lapsed owing to lapse of memory as Prabhākara holds. 46 Kaṇāda defines false knowledge (avidyā) as due to the defects of the sense organs and the defects of impressions. 47 Saṁkara Miśra illustrates the aphorism thus: false knowledge or illusion is due to the sense organs tainted bodily by humours, and impressions of past experience corrupted by the nonperception of the distinctive characters of an object. Such the Vaiśeṣika also advocates the doctrine of anyathākhyāti or viparītakhyāti. Patañjali defines an illusion as false knowledge, which does not remain uncontradicted. 48 Nescience (avidyā) is a metaphysical error and consists in knowing the non-eternal as eternal, the painful as the pleasant, the impure as (77)