CONTINUAL CREATION AND FINITE SUBSTANCE IN LEIBNIZ S METAPHYSICS

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH VOLUME 36, 2011 CONTINUAL CREATION AND FINITE SUBSTANCE IN LEIBNIZ S METAPHYSICS JOHN WHIPPLE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO ABSTRACT: This paper examines Leibniz s views on the theistic doctrine of continual creation and considers their implications for his theory of finite substance. Three main theses are defended: (1) that Leibniz takes the traditional account of continual creation to involve the literal re-creation of all things in a successive series of instantaneous states, (2) that a straightforward commitment to the traditional account would give rise to serious problems within Leibniz s theory of finite substance and his metaphysics more generally, and (3) that Leibniz does not straightforwardly affirm the continual creation doctrine, despite certain texts that initially seem to suggest otherwise. I also present a more speculative interpretive hypothesis about what Leibniz s considered view of creation might have been, namely that in a single act, God creates and conserves substances that are non-spatial and atemporal at the deepest level of reality. I. INTRODUCTION D iscussions of the doctrine of continual creation can be found in the writings of a number of early modern philosophers. 1 Descartes famously affirms the doctrine in a few short lines in the Meditations and the Principles of Philosophy lines that have given rise to a long-running debate over whether he is a temporal atomist. 2 The doctrine is also utilized by Malebranche (and a number of other figures) as an argument for occasionalism. 3 These are the two most famous appearances of the continual creation doctrine in the modern period, but they are not the only places it can be found. One can also find it in the writings of Leibniz. He affirms the doctrine on a number of occasions; but his remarks have not received the

2 JOHN WHIPPLE attention they deserve in the secondary literature. 4 This is unfortunate, for a careful analysis of Leibniz s view on continual creation takes one to the very heart of his mature metaphysics. 5 Leibniz s affirmations of the continual creation doctrine raise two immediate questions. First, how does he think the doctrine has been traditionally affirmed; and second, is Leibniz straightforwardly committed to the traditional doctrine? I shall argue that the answer to the first question, roughly stated, is that he takes the traditional doctrine to maintain that God literally re-creates the world in a successive series of instantaneous states. With respect to the second question, there are several texts in which Leibniz seems to straightforwardly commit himself to the traditional doctrine. This has led several prominent commentators to claim that Leibniz is in fact committed to an instantaneous account of creation. They concede that this account initially seems to be at odds with certain aspects of Leibniz s metaphysics, but they argue that the tensions are only apparent. 6 I shall argue that this interpretive verdict is incorrect. Once all of the problems associated with the traditional doctrine have been carefully elaborated, it will become clear that the traditional doctrine simply cannot be reconciled with Leibniz s views on the endurance and activity of finite substances, inter alia. This does not imply that Leibniz s mature metaphysics suffers from severe internal inconsistencies, however. I shall also argue that Leibniz does not straightforwardly affirm the continual creation doctrine, that is, he does not take it to provide a metaphysically rigorous description of God s creative activity. Although he is willing to affirm the doctrine in some sense, he does not think that God literally re-creates the world in a successive series of instantaneous states. These important interpretive results give rise to an additional question: in exactly what non-literal sense is Leibniz willing to affirm the continual creation doctrine? Unfortunately, Leibniz does not provide a fully explicit answer to this question. I do think, however, that it is possible to formulate a plausible interpretive hypothesis about his considered view on the matter. In the final section of the paper I suggest that Leibniz is willing to affirm the continual creation doctrine because it provides an acceptable way of conceptualizing the dependence of creatures on God at the level of appearances. His deep metaphysical view of creation is quite different: in a single act, God creates and conserves substances that are strictly non-spatial and atemporal. Although Leibniz does not explicitly affirm this account of creation I shall argue that central features of his metaphysics point in its direction. The interpretive hypothesis also serves to elucidate a number of Leibniz s terse comments on the continual creation doctrine and the duration of finite substances, among other things. One thing that counts in favor of the interpretive hypothesis I present concerning Leibniz s considered view on creation is that it nicely compliments the interpretive results of the earlier sections of this paper. I want to emphasize, however, that the earlier interpretive results and the interpretive hypothesis of the final section are logically independent. The earlier results are significant in their own right and do

CONTINUAL CREATION AND FINITE SUBSTANCE IN LEIBNIZ 3 not depend on the more speculative interpretive hypothesis that I present in the final section of the paper. II. THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUAL CREATION: THREE PROBLEMS In keeping with standard Christian doctrine, Leibniz holds that all finite substances depend on God for their existence. This dependence does not merely consist in the fact that God creates them, but also in the fact that God conserves them in their continued existence. Leibniz does not think that the conservation of a substance differs intrinsically from its creation, and so affirms an account of conservation that equates it with continual creation. Here are some characteristic remarks from two of Leibniz s most famous essays: [1] It is quite true that, speaking with metaphysical rigor, there is no real influence of one created substance on another, and that all things, with all their reality, are continually produced [continuellement produites] by the power of God. (New System of Nature; G 4, 483; AG, 143) [2] God alone is the primitive unity or the first simple substance; all created or derivative monads are products, and are generated, so to speak [pour ainsi dire], by continual fulgurations [fulgurations continuelles] of the divinity from moment to moment. (Mon 47, G 6, 614; AG, 219) These texts show that Leibniz is willing to affirm continual creation, but they do not reveal how the doctrine is to be understood in its specifics. 7 One important question to consider is whether the doctrine implies that the world literally comes into existence in a series of distinct states. Leibniz s talk in text [2] of continual fulgurations of the divinity from moment to moment suggests an affirmative answer to this question, though he does qualify his remarks with a pour ainsi dire. A more explicit affirmation of this position occurs in an oft-cited letter to Electress Sophie. 8 Before quoting from the letter, however, a few words should be said about its context. In late 1705 Leibniz s correspondence with the Electress took an excursion into matters metaphysical. The occasion for this excursion was the publication of a book on geometry by the Duke of Bourgogne, an extract of which Leibniz had read in the Journal des Savants. In the extract the Duke touched upon one of Leibniz s favorite subjects the notion of unity to which he raised the following objection: Here is our argument... reduced to strange extremes. Geometry shows us the divisibility of matter to infinity, and we find at the same time that it is composed of indivisibles (31 October 1705, HK, 148). After reminiscing about previous discussions with Queen Sophie Charlotte (the daughter of the Electress) on the subject, Leibniz proceeds to resolve the Duke s puzzle by noting that the actual division of matter does not at all prevent matter from being composed [composée] of simple and indivisible substances, since the multitude of these substances or of these unities is infinite (HK, 149 150). 9 In the remainder of the letter Leibniz makes additional remarks on matter, composition, continuity, and several related

4 JOHN WHIPPLE topics. These remarks have been taken by some commentators to provide us with crucial insights into the structure of Leibniz s metaphysics. 10 Towards the end of the letter Leibniz affirms the continual creation doctrine in the following way: [3] The duration of things, or the multitude of momentaneous states, is the accumulation [l amas] of an infinity of bursts [eclats] of the divinity, of which each one at each instant is a creation or reproduction of all things, there not at all being a continuous passage [passage continuel], to speak properly, from one state to the next. (HK, 154) Three things should be noted about this text. First, it says that the conservation of the world consists in its literally being re-created in a successive series of distinct instantaneous states. Second, it says that the transition between successive states is not at all continuous, which suggests that there are metaphysical gaps of some sort between successive states. Third, Leibniz takes this account of divine creation and conservation to be a traditional one. In the sentence immediately following text [3] he says that this identification of conservation with continual creation is a celebrated truth of theologians and Christian philosophers (HK, 154). A number of additional texts that I shall present in subsequent sections of this paper will confirm that Leibniz takes this to be an accurate characterization of the continual creation doctrine as it has been traditionally affirmed (particularly by the Cartesians). 11 I shall refer to it as the Traditional Account of Continual Creation. 12 On first reading, text [3] suggests that Leibniz himself is willing to straightforwardly affirm the Traditional Account of Continual Creation. One of the central theses I will be defending in this paper is that this in not in fact the case. Before making that argument, however, it will be useful to note several serious problems that a straightforward affirmation of the Traditional Account would raise in the context of Leibniz s philosophical system. In order to properly formulate the first two problems, some background on Leibniz s theory of finite substance must be provided. 13 Leibniz consistently and frequently affirms that finite substances are active beings, and that they are active in virtue of possessing an internal force or power. In the De Volder correspondence, for example, he writes: What I take to be the indivisible or complete monad is the substance endowed with primitive power, active and passive, like the I or something similar (20 June 1703, G 2, 251; AG, 176). A substance is active because it has an internal force, but what exactly does its activity consist in? The answer to this question can be discerned in Leibniz s thesis that created substances exhibit spontaneity. A substance is said to be spontaneous or active if everything must arise for it from its own depths (New System of Nature, G 4, 484; AG, 143). By everything Leibniz means all of a substance s modifications or states. These modifications, often called appearances or expressions, are a substance s successive perceptual states. To say that these perceptual states arise from a substance s own depths is to say that they are produced or caused by the substance s internal force. The doctrine of spontaneity is of a piece with Leibniz s denial of inter-substantial causation. No

CONTINUAL CREATION AND FINITE SUBSTANCE IN LEIBNIZ 5 finite substance needs to cause a change in the modifications of any other finite substance, for all of the modifications of each substance are caused or produced by the substance itself. 14 We can now formulate the first (and most obvious) problem associated with the Traditional Account of Continual Creation. Leibniz characterizes finite substances as essentially active, but it is not clear how the Traditional Account could leave any room, as it were, for this purported activity. Leibniz frequently claims that God creates every finite substance with an internal force, which produces everything that will ever happen to it in an orderly way. But on its face text [3] seems to be saying that the only thing that happens to a substance is that it is created and re-created ex-nihilo in a series of successive states. The production of each state would appear to result directly from God s creative activity, not from the substance s primitive force of action. I shall refer to this as the Problem of Activity. The Problem of Activity has received a fair amount of attention in the secondary literature. 15 It is crucial to recognize, however, that it is not the only problem that the doctrine of continual creation raises within Leibniz s metaphysics. Another problem, which is at least as serious as the Problem of Activity, I shall term the Problem of Endurance. This problem arises because of the way that Leibniz characterizes the transition between created states in text [3]. He writes that to speak properly there is not at all a continuous passage from one state to the next. This seems to imply that that there is a metaphysical gap, of some sort, separating each state from its succeeding state. But if this is correct, then nothing that is created at one instant could endure, strictly speaking, to the next instant a conclusion that seems to undermine the very possibility of an ontology of enduring substances. 16 Leibniz is fond of saying that monads can only begin by creation and end by annihilation (Monadology 6, G 6, 607; AG, 213). The account of creation presented in text [3] appears to take this idea to the extreme, implying that substances are created and annihilated at every instant. 17 The third problem associated with the Cartesian Account of Creation is related to Leibniz s view on time. The Traditional Account implies that the history of the world consists in a series of instantaneous states. But such a conception of the created world seems to resolve time into instants. In the Theodicy Leibniz notes this apparent implication: [4] This dogma [continual creation] appears to resolve time into moments, whereas others regard moments and points as mere modalities of the continuum, that is, as extremities of the parts that can be assigned to it, and not as constituent parts. (T, 384, emphasis Leibniz) This apparent implication poses a significant problem for Leibniz because he is one of the others who denies that instants are constituent parts of time. According to Leibniz, time is a continuous quantity that lacks actual parts; it is not composed of instants. 18 This is the Problem of Time, the solution of which would involve showing how Leibniz could simultaneously embrace the doctrine of continual creation and deny that time is composed of instants.

6 JOHN WHIPPLE In 1708 Leibniz tells his correspondent Bartholomew Des Bosses, My views certainly are connected with each other in such a way that no link can be removed without the chain being broken (October 1708, G 2, 361 362). The results of the present section might lead one to draw a different conclusion, however, for it is difficult to see how the link of continual creation fits together with other links in Leibniz s metaphysical chain, particularly his account of finite substance and his account of time. Can the doctrine of continual creation be rendered consistent with the fundamental tenets of Leibniz s metaphysics, or must we conclude that some of his central metaphysical doctrines are ultimately incompatible? III. TIME, DURATION, AND CONTINUITY The aim of this section is to discuss one possible solution to the Problem of Time a solution that is based on an important distinction Leibniz draws between time and duration. In order to do this, Leibniz s thought on the famed labyrinth of the continuum will have to be engaged. Recent scholarship has shown that continuity is a very important subject in Leibniz s philosophy. 19 The details of his analysis of the various problems and issues pertaining to continuity are a matter of scholarly controversy, however, and full treatment of them far exceeds the scope of this paper. For our purposes we need only focus on largely uncontroversial features of Leibniz s analysis. A brief discussion of these features will show that Leibniz s views on continuity do not bode well for a straightforward commitment to the Traditional Account of Continual Creation. Although there is a way in which the Problem of Time might be solved without rejecting the Traditional Account, this solution would have implications that Leibniz could not accept. The discussion as a whole will underscore just how problematic it would be for Leibniz to straightforwardly affirm the Traditional Account of Continual Creation. Leibniz typically draws the distinction between time and duration in tandem with an analogous distinction between space and extension. One place he draws these distinctions is in the correspondence with De Volder. In his 30 June 1704 letter Leibniz quotes two of De Volder s claims: I conceive innumerable properties of mathematical body that are very evident, and I conceive of the mathematical body as existing and inhering in nothing else (G 2, 268 269; AG, 179). Leibniz concedes the first claim but rejects the second, noting: [5] If by the mathematical body [corpus mathematicum] you mean space, it must be compared with time; if you mean extension, it must be compared with duration. Indeed, space is only the order of existing for possibles that exist simultaneously, just as time is the order of existing for possibles that exist successively. And the state or series of things relates to time just as the physical body relates to space. Body and the series of things [series rerum] add motion to space and to time, that is, they add action and passion and their source [principium]. (G 2, 269; AG, 179, emphasis Leibniz) In this passage Leibniz claims that De Volder fails to take account of the distinction between extension and space. De Volder s corpus mathematicum is nothing other

CONTINUAL CREATION AND FINITE SUBSTANCE IN LEIBNIZ 7 than the Cartesian conception of extended substance, a conception that Leibniz regards as fundamentally confused. It confuses space something abstract and ideal, with what Leibniz variously calls extension, or bodies, and which he describes as determinate and real. Neither space nor bodies are substances, strictly speaking, although the latter are well-founded on monads. In his remarks to De Volder, Leibniz uses extension as a synonym for body. It is not quite as clear what duration is signifying in the passage. He writes that the state or series of things relates to time just as the physical body relates to space. Here duration is being identified with the series of things, but what, exactly, are the things in question? The analogy with extension/space suggests that the series of things are bodies considered insofar as they exist successively. However, in the next sentence Leibniz states that body and the series of things add motion to space and to time, that is, they add action and passion and their source [principium]. Given that monads are the ultimate principium of action and passion, the series of things should also signify monads insofar as they exist successively. If this is correct, then the extension/space duration/time distinctions are not perfectly analogous, for duration, but not extension, applies to both bodies and monads. 20 Our focus is on the distinction between duration and time, particularly as it applies to monads. Duration, Leibniz claims, is an attribute of monads. Text [5] suggests that the duration of a monad just is the monad insofar as it exists successively. Monads have their own duration, but they do not have their own time. There is only one time. It is something ideal, which is abstracted from durational things, and that serves to measure them. Leibniz thus speaks of time as the order of successive existences. He is also explicit in affirming that time is continuous. This is a characteristic of time that merits underscoring. One sure way to entangle oneself in the labyrinth of the continuum is to attempt to specify how something continuous could be composed out of actual parts. 21 One uncontroversial feature of Leibniz s analysis of continuity is his denial that there can be any such composition in continuous quantities. This means that time, as a continuous quantity, is not composed out of instants. Instants are merely limits or extremities, not actual parts of time. One can specify an interval of time, and regard that interval as a part of time. Indeed, Leibniz thinks that this can be done in an indefinite number of ways. But the whole of time is prior to any of these parts, which Leibniz characterizes as possible rather than actual. Time can be arbitrarily divided into such parts, but it is not composed out of them. Enough has been said about the distinction between time and duration to understand one way it might be employed to solve the Problem of Time. According to the Traditional Account of Continual Creation, every finite substance is re-created in a successive series of distinct instantaneous states. Given the distinction between duration and time, this would imply that a substance s duration is composed out of a series of instantaneous states, but it would not necessarily imply that time must be so composed. The latter implication could be avoided because time, unlike duration,

8 JOHN WHIPPLE is not an attribute of things; it is merely something ideal that is abstracted from durational things, and which serves to measure them. If these observations were supplemented with a complimentary account of abstraction, the Problem of Time could be solved within the strictures of the Traditional Account of Continual Creation. 22 Let us now turn our attention to the merits (or, rather, demerits) of the abovesketched solution to the Problem of Time. This solution would absolve Leibniz of a commitment to temporal atomism, but only at the price of a commitment to durational atomism. And it is not at all obvious that the latter commitment would be less problematic than the former within his philosophical system. In the first place, the account of durational atomism presented in text [3] affirms the existence of instantaneous perceptual states. However, such states should, on Leibniz s principles, be mere nothings. He is clear in affirming that the instant is not, properly speaking, a part of time. For... the whole and the part must be homogenous (3 April 1716 letter to Bourguet; G 3, 591). A part of time must involve an interval of some length or other (this is what makes it homogenous or of the same sort as the whole of time). Any part of time that one specifies is divisible into smaller parts, which themselves are divisible into smaller parts, and so on, ad infinitum. No matter how long this process of subdivision is continued, one will never arrive at an instant. Instants are merely termini of specified parts or limits towards which processes of subdivision can approach. 23 But if an instant is only a limit, then an instantaneous perceptual state should only be a limiting notion as well. To speak of such a state should be to speak of something ideal, not of something actual or real. 24 Leibniz explicitly draws this conclusion in an argument for the conclusion that there are no precise shapes in nature: Now I believe that what is only in a moment has no existence, since it begins and ends at the same time (FC, 245). 25 If a single instantaneous state could be nothing real, then neither could a series of such states. One can t get a something out of a series of nothings. This implies that if the duration of a monad were composed out of a series of momentary states, then the duration of a monad and presumably the monad itself would reduce to nothing. In other words, to suppose that the duration of a monad could be composed out of a series of instantaneous states would be to throw Leibniz back into the labyrinth of the continuum headlong. 26 Even if one were to suppose that the difficulty concerning instantaneous existence could be put to one side, one would still have to contend with Leibniz s assertion that a continuum cannot be composed out of actual parts. This means that if the duration of a substance were composed out of a series of instantaneous perceptual states (or a series of perceptual states of some duration or other), then the duration of a substance would be discontinuous. Durational atomism thus leads to the conclusion that substances do not endure, strictly speaking, beyond an instant (or a state of some duration or other). It is highly unlikely that Leibniz would accept this conclusion one that appears to undermine the possibility of an ontology of enduring substances. The solution to the Problem of Time under consideration thus appears to render the Problem of Endurance insoluble. And it is difficult to

CONTINUAL CREATION AND FINITE SUBSTANCE IN LEIBNIZ 9 see how a solution to the Problem of Activity could be provided in the absence of a solution to the Problem of Endurance. We seem driven to the conclusion, then, that this so-called solution to the Problem of Time would not allow Leibniz to successfully incorporate the Traditional Account of Continual Creation into his metaphysical system. If Leibniz straightforwardly affirms the Traditional Account, then the coherence of his metaphysics cannot be salvaged. 27 IV. CONTINUAL CREATION IN THE DE VOLDER CORRESPONDENCE The considerations set forth in 2 and 3 have shown that a straightforward commitment to the Traditional Account of Continual Creation would raise serious problems within Leibniz s metaphysics. Given these results, one must ask: does Leibniz take the text [3] discussion of continual creation to provide a literal account of God s creative activity? I am convinced that the answer to this question is no. In the next two sections I shall consider some of Leibniz s remarks that are explicitly critical of the Traditional Account. In this section I shall examine Leibniz s remarks on continual creation in the De Volder correspondence. In addition to revealing hostility to the Traditional Account, these texts will provide us with the materials for a more nuanced interpretation of text [3]. The doctrine of continual creation comes to the fore in some of the earliest letters in the De Volder correspondence. One of De Volder s initial questions concerned Leibniz s principle that there are no leaps in transitions. De Volder was sympathetic to this principle, but he hoped that Leibniz could provide an a priori demonstration of it. Leibniz responded as follows: [6] This is the axiom that I use no transition is made through a leap. I hold that this follows from the law of order and rests upon the same reason by which everyone knows that motion does not occur in a leap; that is, that a body can move from one place to another only through intervening positions. I admit that once we have assumed that the Author of things has willed continuity of motion, this itself will exclude the possibility of leaps. But how can we prove that he has willed this, except through experience or by reason of order? For since all things happen by the perpetual production of God, or, as they say [ut loquuntur], by continual creation [continua creatione], why could he not have transcreated [transcreare] a body, so to speak, from one place to another distant place, leaving behind a gap either in time or in space. (24 March/3 April 1699, G 2, 168; L, 515 516, emphasis Leibniz) From the point of view of the present study, Leibniz s remarks in text [6] initially seem rather troubling. Although the specifics of the doctrine of continual creation are not enumerated, Leibniz appears to be invoking the Traditional Account, and there are no clear indications that he would be hesitant in affirming it. His use of the locution as they say shows, in a rather vague way, that he regards continual creation as a frequently affirmed doctrine. But who are the they of whom Leibniz speaks? An answer to this question is provided in one of Leibniz s subsequent

10 JOHN WHIPPLE letters. Responding to De Volder s complaint that he (De Volder) did not understand the notion of transcreation (or continual creation), Leibniz writes: [7] I added the hypothesis of transcreation for the sake of illustration, speaking philosophically and particularly like the Cartesians [imprimis cum Cartesianis], who say, with some ground [non male], that God creates all things continually. For them, therefore, moving a body is nothing but reproducing it in successively different places, and it would have to be shown that this reproduction cannot take place in leaps. Rather, this could not be shown without returning to the reason which I have proposed for the universal law of continuity. If you do not accept such a re-creation of things, however, the same thing must be said regardless of what the cause of motion may be. (G 2, 193; L, 521, emphasis added) This text makes it clear that the they spoken of in text [6] is the Cartesians. It is particularly interesting that Leibniz now says that he was speaking like the Cartesians in his earlier letter. He indicates that there is something correct about the continual creation doctrine by noting that the Cartesians affirm it non male. Leibniz proceeds to explain what motion consists in for them, namely transcreation, and subsequently claims that they would have to prove that re-production cannot take place in leaps. Leibniz argues that if De Volder does not accept such an account of transcreation, he still needs to prove that motion is continuous in nature, and this can only be done by means of the law of order. He states that: [8] Anyone who rejects continuity in things will say that motion in its essence is nothing but a succession of leaps through intervening intervals, which flow from the action of God and not from the nature of the thing moved, or which are recreations by God in separate places. His philosophizing will then be almost like that which would compound matter out of mere discrete points and would support this opinion on the ground of the labyrinthine difficulties which surround the nature of continuity, from which there do indeed follow, not the necessity of leaps, but some other things which are not usually well understood. (G 2, 193; L, 521) This text tells strongly against the idea that Leibniz is straightforwardly committed to the Traditional Account of Continual Creation. It suggests that persons who are committed to such a view must affirm (or at least are hard pressed to affirm) the discontinuity of motion, a position that is of a piece with the view that matter is compounded out of distinct points. As is well known, Leibniz unequivocally rejects this latter view as absurd. 28 The letters to De Volder do not reveal all the details of Leibniz s considered views on continual creation, but they are instructive. His remarks in texts [7] and [8] strongly suggest that he does not think that the Traditional Account of Continual Creation provides a literal description of God s creation and conservation of the world. The most important conclusion to note, however, is that in special contexts Leibniz is capable of baldly endorsing the Traditional Account even though his considered views on creation are more nuanced. This provides us with a powerful

CONTINUAL CREATION AND FINITE SUBSTANCE IN LEIBNIZ 11 interpretive tool for analyzing Leibniz s remarks on continual creation in text [3]. Perhaps this is another place where Leibniz is writing as if he is straightforwardly committed to the Traditional Account of Continual Creation. Leibniz does not come out and say that he is proceeding in this manner, and for this reason the interpretation I am suggesting might seem counterintuitive. But neither does Leibniz tell De Volder that he is speaking like the Cartesians in text [6]. If De Volder had not forced him to clarify his remarks on continual creation, text [6], like text [3], would appear to be an affirmation of the Traditional Account. If this interpretation is on the right track, one need not conclude that Leibniz is being disingenuous in the letter to Sophie, for he does endorse the doctrine of continual creation in some (yet to be specified) way. He might simply be omitting the fact that he does not straightforwardly affirm the Traditional Account of the doctrine. V. CONTINUAL CREATION AND THEISTIC PROOF In this section I shall consider whether an analysis of the duration of things can serve as an argument for the existence of God. I shall argue that Leibniz does not think that a theistic proof based on the duration of things is sound. If one were committed to the account of duration presupposed by the Traditional Account of Continual Creation, however, then one could infer the existence of God from the duration of things. The fact that Leibniz rejects this sort of argument provides powerful support for the thesis that he is not straightforwardly committed to the Traditional Account. Let us begin by considering Leibniz s comments on one of the theistic proofs that Descartes sets forth in the Principles of Philosophy. Here is Descartes argument: [9] The nature of time is such that its parts are not mutually dependent, and never coexist. Thus, from the fact that we now exist, it does not follow that we shall exist a moment from now, unless there is some cause the same cause which originally produced us which continually reproduces us, as it were, that is to say, which keeps us in existence. (AT 8A, 13; CSM1, 200) Leibniz does not think that this purported proof succeeds. His criticism (written in 1692) runs as follows: [10] From the fact that we now are, it follows that we will be in the next moment, unless there exists a reason for change. And so, unless it were established in some other way that we cannot even exist without the beneficence of God, nothing is established about the existence of God from our own duration; as if one part of this duration were entirely independent of another, which we cannot admit. (G 4, 360; L, 387) Leibniz rejects Descartes proof because it falsely assumes that the parts of our duration are entirely independent of each other. This, in turn, suggests that Leibniz would not straightforwardly accept the Traditional Account of Continual Creation, for if the duration of a substance consisted in a successive series of instantaneous states,

12 JOHN WHIPPLE as the Traditional Account requires, then each state would be entirely independent of every other state. Text [10] thus appears to be hostile to durational atomism. Leibniz does not fully elaborate his own positive account of duration in text [10], but he is perfectly clear in asserting that nothing is established about the existence of God from our own duration. This remark directly contradicts the account of duration presented in the 1705 letter to Sophie. In that letter, in the paragraph following text [3], he says that the analysis of the actual duration of things in time brings us demonstratively to the existence of God (HK, 155). What are we to make of this textual contradiction? Given that his remarks on the Principles were written more than a decade before the letter to Sophie, is it possible that Leibniz changed his mind on the merit of a theistic argument based on the duration of things? This is unlikely, for Leibniz reiterates his critique of Descartes proof in the Theodicy of 1710. After paraphrasing Descartes argument, he responds: One may answer that in fact it does not follow of necessity that, because I am, I shall be; but this follows naturally, nevertheless, that is, of itself, per se, if nothing prevents it (T, 383, emphasis Leibniz). The only difference between this remark and those made in his examination of the Principles is that now Leibniz distinguishes following of necessity from following naturally. The Cartesians assume that our continued existence does not follow in either of these two senses. Leibniz agrees that it does not follow in the former sense, but he thinks that it does follow in the latter sense. It will be crucial to determine how the notion of following naturally should be understood. Leibniz identifies it with the notion of following from the nature of a thing. A variant of the latter locution occurs in the next paragraph, where Leibniz briefly mentions a theistic proof provided by Erhard Weigel. This proof, which clearly presupposes durational atomism, does not differ in any substantial way from Descartes proof, and it elicits the same negative judgment: There would be need of a more exact proof if that is to be called a demonstration.... In particular it must be shown that the privilege of enduring more than a moment by its nature belongs to the necessary being alone (T, 384). Leibniz does not provide a fully articulated account of his views on duration or continual creation in the Theodicy, but we can infer several things about what his account of duration is not. It is not the view of Descartes, the Cartesians, and other philosophers and theologians, according to which the existence of God can be inferred directly from a consideration of the duration of things. This strongly suggests that Leibniz is not setting forth his considered account of duration in the letter to Sophie, where he presents the very theistic proof that is rejected in the comments on Descartes Principles and the Theodicy, which bracket it in date of composition. The driving consideration that leads Leibniz to reject this sort of theistic proof appears to be a rejection of durational atomism. If this is correct, then Leibniz does not take the Traditional Account of Continual Creation to provide a literal account of the duration of substances, for the Traditional Account presupposes that at least durational atomism is true (if not temporal atomism).

CONTINUAL CREATION AND FINITE SUBSTANCE IN LEIBNIZ 13 VI. AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF CREATION Let us pause to summarize the results of this paper thus far. First, I have argued that Leibniz takes the standard view of continual creation to involve the literal recreation of all things in a successive series of instantaneous states. Second, I have argued that a straightforward commitment to the Traditional Account would give rise to devastating inconsistencies within Leibniz s mature metaphysics. Third, I have provided nearly conclusive support for the thesis that Leibniz does not straightforwardly affirm the Traditional Account of Continual Creation. Although he does think that there is some truth to the doctrine, he does not think that God literally re-creates the world in a series of instantaneous states. These conclusions run counter to the assertions of several influential Leibniz commentators who have variously affirmed (1) that Leibniz did (at least relatively) straightforwardly affirm the continual creation doctrine, 29 (2) that such a commitment can be reconciled with the central tenets of Leibniz s metaphysics, 30 and (3) that Leibniz s 1705 letter to Sophie (which does display an account of continual creation that is in keeping with the Traditional Account) should be regarded as the locus classicus for his views on the labyrinth of the continuum and his metaphysics more generally. 31 These interpretive results naturally lead to additional questions: what is Leibniz s considered view on creation (and conservation), and in exactly what sense is he willing to affirm the continual creation doctrine? Leibniz does not directly address these questions. This could mean a number of different things. Leibniz might have been hesitant to reveal his considered view on these matters because he thought they would be too controversial, or too likely to be misunderstood. 32 Alternatively, he might not have had a fully worked out positive view in the first place. 33 Although neither of these (and other) possibilities can be conclusively established, I suspect that the former explanation is closer to the truth. Accordingly, in this concluding section of the paper I will be making two somewhat controversial assumptions: (a) that Leibniz is quite serious when he claims that his mature metaphysics is deeply systematic, and (b) that Leibniz does have a considered view on divine creation and conservation. I will present an account of what I think Leibniz s considered view is and present indirect evidence for it. The plausibility of this interpretive hypothesis will be determined (given the above-stated assumptions) by how well it coheres with Leibniz s theory of substance, his views on space and time, and his critical comments on the Traditional Account of Continual Creation, among other things. It will not be possible to complete all of these tasks in the present paper, of course. My more modest aim is to say enough about the interpretive hypothesis to show that it is worthy of further consideration. Before proceeding, let me be explicit about two things. First, the interpretive hypothesis that I explore in this section is admittedly more speculative than the interpretive theses that have been defended in the earlier sections of this paper. Second, the earlier results are independent of my interpretive hypothesis about Leibniz s considered view on creation. Some readers may be unwilling to grant assumptions (a) and (b). Others may grant me the assumptions but remain

14 JOHN WHIPPLE unconvinced of the plausibility of the interpretive hypothesis. In neither case would the results of the earlier sections be compromised. I am not the first Leibniz commentator to present an interpretive hypothesis concerning Leibniz s considered view on creation and conservation. 34 An interpretation set forth by French commentator Jaques Jalabert shares several key features with the interpretation that I incline towards. Jalabert approaches Leibniz s accounts of creation and finite substance by focusing on Leibniz s analysis of time. He (along with many other commentators) takes Leibniz to hold that finite substances are non-spatial and atemporal at the deepest level of metaphysical rigor. 35 If Leibniz is indeed an atemporalist, then what account of creation and conservation is he most likely committed to? A view according to which God creates and conserves nonspatial and atemporal substances in a single, miraculous, act. I shall refer to this reductive account of creation as the Strict Metaphysical Account of Creation. 36 Let us begin the exposition of the Strict Metaphysical Account by noting two related objections that might be raised against it. The first objection is that if God creates substances that are atemporal, then the finite substances composing the world could not change. But Leibniz clearly affirms that substances do change: I also take for granted that every created being, and consequently the created monad as well, is subject to change (Monadology 10, G 6, 608; AG, 214). The second objection is that the Strict Metaphysical Account would preclude monadic activity. As we have seen, monadic activity is closely related to monadic change. A substance is active if its successive states (or modifications) are self-produced. But if a substance never changed its state, then a forteriori it could not be the source of its successive states. In short, monadic activity seems to presuppose monadic change; if the latter does not occur, then neither does the former. The two objections to the Strict Metaphysical Account, then, are that it precludes change and activity, which are important features of Leibniz s metaphysics (worries of this sort have led a number of important Leibniz commentators to conclude that his commitment to atemporality conflicts with other features of his metaphysics). 37 The first thing to note about these objections is that they appear to assume that atemporality is incompatible with Leibnizian change and activity. It is not clear that this is a legitimate assumption. Leibniz defines change as an aggregate of contradictory states where one state follows from the other. 38 As Michael Futch has noted, this following from need not be interpreted temporally (though it often has been) (2008, 161). 39 Similarly, the following of a monad s series of states from its primitive force might also admit of a non-temporal interpretation. In support of the suggestion that activity does not necessarily entail temporality one can consider that God is an exemplar of a causally active being in the Leibnizian universe. 40 And God s activity is certainly not temporally conditioned. The initial point that I want to make, then, is that Leibnizian change and activity are not obviously incompatible with atemporality. Attributing an atemporal notion of change to Leibniz is not the only possible strategy for reconciling his remarks on change with the Strict Metaphysical Account

CONTINUAL CREATION AND FINITE SUBSTANCE IN LEIBNIZ 15 of Creation. Another possibility (the one that I will explore in the remainder of this paper) is that Leibniz s considered view on change is that it is a well-founded phenomenon. 41 In order to explain this interpretive strategy a few general comments must be made about Leibniz s ontology. The first point to recognize is that Leibniz s ontology countenances degrees of reality. This point is incontestable; the challenge is to determine exactly how the various degrees of reality are sorted out. Some recent commentators have argued that Leibniz s mature ontology is distinguishable into three levels or tiers : the monadic, the phenomenal, and the ideal. 42 The monadic level, which is constituted by monads, is the most real tier in the ontology. On the other end of the spectrum are ideal things, such as space and time. These entities are purely mental, and thereby possess the least reality in the ontology. The phenomenal level, in contrast, is positioned midway between the monadic and ideal levels. Bodies and motion are paradigmatic examples of things that are phenomenal; they are more real than ideal entities like space and time, but they are not fully real, that is, they do not comprise the metaphysical ground floor of Leibniz s ontology. They are more real than ideal entities because they are grounded or well-founded on monads. 43 One important thing to note here is that Leibniz sometimes simply refers to phenomenal entities as real. 44 This shows that the mere fact that Leibniz refers to change as real does not automatically imply that he takes it to be fully real. Recall that change is defined in terms of successive states. This implies that if successive states are (in a certain sense) phenomenal, change must be phenomenal as well. The question of whether successive states are phenomenal depends in part on how they are individuated. Leibniz does not say a great deal about the individuation of successive monadic states or about the precise structure of intra-substantial causation (as many commentators have noted). 45 He does, however, characterize successive states as limitations, and he says that substances produce modifications by changes in their limits. 46 Here is one way (admittedly an extrapolation from the texts) to understand these suggestive claims. A substance individuates a state by reflectively specifying temporal boundaries for an interval of its duration boundaries that consist in the preceding and succeeding states of the interval in question. By bounding or limiting the initial interval these states make it determinate. However, this would not make the initial state completely determinate, for complete determination could only be attained if the states that limit the initial interval were themselves determinate. This means that the states bounding the intervals that determine the initial interval must also be specified. But then the states bounding the intervals that determine the intervals that determine the initial interval must also be specified, and so on, ad infinitum. This suggests that a state is individuated to the extent that the series of states that bound it are specified, but that no state is ever rigorously individuated as this would require, per impossible, the specification of an infinite series of states. The regress of determination involved in the individuation of monadic states is in keeping with the thesis that successive states are only distinguished at the level

16 JOHN WHIPPLE of phenomena. It implies that the monad as a completely determinate and nonaggregated whole is ontologically and conceptually prior to its reflectively specified successive states. It is conceptually prior because the only way to conceive a state is by conceiving it as a limitation of the prior whole. It is ontologically prior because if the monad did not exist as a determinate whole it would not be possible to reflectively specify a state or a series of states. According to this analysis, any state that is specified follows from the substance (or, equivalently, it follows from the substance s nature or primitive force ), and all of a substance s states can be said to arise from its own depths. One might observe that the analysis provided above does not strictly imply that the successive states of a monad are phenomenal. At most the analysis (if correct) shows that finite substances are only capable of individuating successive states at the level of phenomena. Surely it does not rule out the possibility that successive states are individuated from the perspective of divine omniscience. 47 I concede that this is a possibility. Nevertheless, I do not think that successive states are individuated at the deepest level of metaphysical rigor. To see why this is so a distinction must be drawn between a monad s successive states and its détail. Leibniz frequently claims that monads involve a plurality of modifications or internal détail; he also claims that each substance involves a series of successive states. 48 But what is the relation between a substance s détail and its successive states? One might think that a monad s successive states and its détail are one and the same, but I believe that Leibniz is working with a subtle distinction here. In virtue of its expression or representation of all of the other substances in the world (the expression thesis as it is called in the secondary literature), each monad possesses détail. 49 This détail is something that the monad possesses from the perspective of divine omniscience (i.e., sub specie aeternitatis). The successive states of a monad, on the other hand, have temporal boundaries, which are distinguished only at the level of phenomena. Such boundaries are not perceived from the perspective of divine omniscience. This does not mean that successive states are not real, for the temporal boundaries that are reflectively specified limit or carve up a monad s détail. There is thus a foundation in reality for any state or series of states that is reflectively specified at the level of phenomena. In other words, the reality of a state consists in the détail that it confusedly contains (the détail is the representational content of the state). But again, no state is more than a well-founded phenomenon because the boundaries that limit the détail exist only at the phenomenal level (a monad s détail is not carved up at the deepest level of reality). 50 The interpretation that I have been sketching emphasizes the notion of reflective individuation. This might lead one to ask the following question: do all monads reflectively individuate states, or is this something that is done only by spirits? The answer to this question, I believe, is that only spirits reflectively individuate states. This is because reflective individuation is a form of apperception, and Leibniz holds that only spirits apperceive. 51 One might worry that this is a conclusion that Leibniz could not admit, however, for it seems to entail that animal souls and entelechies