Michael Barak Sufism in Wahhabi and Salafi Polemic Discourse in Egypt and the Mashriq (Arab East) 1967-2001 Abstract This study examines the discourse or the polemics of Wahhabi activists in Saudi Arabia, and prominent Salafi activists in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent (Lebanon, Syria and Kuwait), against Sufis and Sufism (a central mystical school in Islam) during the period 1967-2001. Wahhabism is a conservative Sunni Islamic movement that adopts Islam literally; it has been the official and hegemonic ideology of Saudi Arabia since the early 20 th Century. The Modern Salafi movement, which began in the late 1960s, is characterized by conservatism and excessive puritanism. Its teachings reflect a desire to renew the spirit of primordial Islam that is, of the first three generations of Islam including an adherence to a literal interpretation of Islam's holy sources, and a limited invocation of the Ijtihad principle. Although there is some similarity in the thought of Wahhabism and Salafism, there is also considerable difference between them, as reflected, in part, in their differing hierarchical and educational structure. Moreover, each is a product of different historical circumstances. This study employs concepts and theories formulated by the French philosopher Michel Foucault regarding discourse, power and exclusion, using them to explore how Wahhabi and Salafi activists have built an image of the other Muslim, as opposed to the image of the true Muslim and the correct form of Islam. Following the "Islamic awakening" that began after the 1967 war between Israel and multiple Arab states, Islam rose as a political force, gaining strength in many sectors of the Arab
population. In the framework of this awakening, Sufi orders experienced a renewed strengthening of their power. They enjoyed growing public support, as well as the support of some Arab regimes such as those in Egypt and Syria, which was founded on their desire to curb the power of political Islam. This trend fueled anti-sufi polemic, and contributed to an increase in the production of anti-sufi literature, which is negative and delegitimizng. Since 1967, Saudi Arabia has been a major player in the Middle East, due in part to the decline in power of the Egyptian regime and in part to the vast oil revenues that have poured into Saudi Arabia since the mid-1970s. The Wahhabi religious establishment, which enjoyed the revenues of the state, leveraged these to spread Wahhabi ideology beyond the borders of Saudi Arabia, to places where Sufis were still entrenched, such as Africa. This expressed an interest in weakening the power of the Sufi orders, and exacerbated the anti-sufi polemic. As part of its distribution network, the Saudi Arabian Wahhabist regime established extensive support networks and funding for Salafi groups which, as noted, shared with it certain beliefs. The events of September 2001 are the end point of this study. Since 2001, the jihadist Salafi movement has become a significant presence in the consciousness of the Middle East, while the Wahhabi ideology has been forced to take a defensive position against waves of criticism promulgated by Arab regimes in the wake of Saudi activists participation in the September 2001 attacks. This study uses anti-sufi polemical literature to shed light on internal Islamic tensions and the self-image of Wahhabi and Salafi activists. The first part of the study examines prominent Salafi activists, who took part in the production of anti-sufi polemics, among them the Association of the Supporters of the Sunna of Muhammad (Jamaat Ansar al-sunna al-muhammadiyya), which was founded in Egypt in 1926 by Sheikh Muhammad al-faqi (1892-1959); the Association of Preaching the Truth (Jamaat Da wat al-haqq), which was founded in Cairo in 1975 by Abd al-qadir
Razik al-tawil (1932-1998); Sheikh Abd al-rahman Abd al-khaleq (b. 1939), who is considered the spiritual father of the Salafi movement in Kuwait and who headed The Society of Islamic Heritage (Jam iyyat Ihya al-turath al-islami); Sheikh Abd al-rahman al-dimashqiyya (b. 195?), of Beirut, Lebanon; Sheikh Muhammad Nassir al-din al- Albany (1914-1999), who influenced many Salafi and Wahhabi activists; and Sheikh Safar bin Abd al-rahman al-hawali (b. 1950), a radical Saudi sheikh who criticized the Wahhabi religious establishment. This section of the thesis also explores the extent of the Wahhabi religious establishment s impact on these activists. For example, it provided the above-cited Egyptian Salafi groups with obvious moral, ideological and material support. In addition, all of these activists fertilized each other, and held a joint front against Sufism. The second section of this study explores the social and political context in which Salafi and Wahhabi activists operated. In the Saudi case, the study emphasizes the Wahhabi religious establishment's response to the activity of the Sufi Saudi Sheikh Muhammad Alawi al-maliki, who was very popular in the Sufi world. The approach of the Wahhabi religious establishment was mainly very hostile, as reflected in the production of polemics against al- Maliki and Sufism. Sheikh Safr al-hawali, the most radical polemicist, demanded prosecuting al-maliki in accordance with the strictures of Islamic law (Shari a). In the Egyptian case, Salafi activists harshly criticized Sufism in their publications, denouncing Sufi orders such as the Burhaniyya order. Similarly, they criticized anyone who supported, advocated or inclined towards Sufism, such as the Al-Azhar institution. This study also examines the polemic of al-dimashqiyya regarding the Ahbash Association in Lebanon, the Rifai yya Sufi order, and the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order. In so doing, the study focuses on
the main themes discussed in the framework of the anti-sufi polemic, such as issues of faith, law, and history. The attitude of Wahhabi and Salafi activists regarding Sufism is very similar despite their different geographic locations and the varied political and social contexts in which they functioned. In the eyes of both Wahhabists and Salafists, Sufism and its adherents are alien to Islam, and must be denounced and ostracized from the Muslim nation. The third section of this study examines the strategy and methods of dissemination established by anti-sufi polemicists. The Wahhabi education system, for example, served as a distribution and inculcation channel for the religious Wahhabi establishment, which encouraged students at Islamic universities to write dissertations about the negative aspects of Sufism, thereby perpetuating a negative image of Sufism. Some Salafi activists used the sectoral media as a major tool for spreading their doctrine. The polemic strategies of Wahhabi and Salafi Da wa [proselytizing] against Sufism are multiple and varied. This Da wa uses many motifs, as well as metaphors, ridicule and sarcasm, word play, rhetorical questions, analogies to historical figures that have a bad reputation in the Islamic tradition, religious rulings, the quoting of scholars and orientalists, the distortion of historical facts, use of blunt language, accusing Sufis of being responsible for the ills of the Muslim nation, publishing readers' letters, guides for managing a controversy with Sufis, tips for identifying Sufis, a description of the Sufi bookshelf as imaginary and sexual literature, and the publication of the personal stories of Sufi sheikhs who have awakened and found the right path to the correct Salafi faith. In fact, the Wahhabi religious establishment adopted several of these former Sufis, incorporating them into the Saudi education system and encouraging them to publish their personal stories.
The fourth section of this study deals with the polemics of major Sufi activists against the critical discourse of Wahhabi and Salafi activisits. The Supreme Council of Sufi orders in Egypt preferred to establish an essentially apologetic discourse to prove the Islamic roots of Sufism and justify its beliefs and attendant rituals. Other Sufi activists also preferred to produce apologetic discourse, but wove it into a combative discourse. This group included Sheikh Yusuf al-rifa (b. 1932) from Kuwait, and the Al- Azmiyya order and al- Ashira al- Muhammadiyya orders of Egypt. This discourse accused Wahhabis and Salafis of being responsible for a rift in the Muslim nation, and for weakening the Islamic religion by fomenting religious fanaticism and intolerance towards the other. The fifth section of this study deals with the Wasatiyya movement ( centrism ), whose prominent ideologists are the wellknown Egyptian Sheikh Yusuf al-qaradawi (b. 1926), who resides in Qatar, and the Egyptian Sheikh Muhammad al-ghazali (1917-1996). It serves as a control group for how Sufism was perceived during the period under study. The Wasatiyya movement expressed a less rigid attitude towards Sufism thanks to al-qaradawi s agenda, which he began to mold in the 1970s and which gained prominence during the 1990s; this agenda promotes a moderate belief model, which left room for pluralistic interpretation of Islam's holy sources. Al-Qaradawi and al-ghazali called for maintaining the orthodox character of Sufism, and praised its spiritual and emotional aspects. In this context, the Wasatiyya movement called for a hybridized merger of Sufism and Salafism, to create a balanced model of faith for believers. The religious polemic between the Wahhabi and Salafi schools of thought on one hand, and the Sufi school of thought on the other, reflects a struggle for the souls and minds of believers, a struggle for power and hegemony in the public and religious spheres, and
competition for material resources. As a whole, modern Wahhabism and Salafism are imbued with intolerance of the "other"; both attempted to delegitimize and, in extreme cases, dehumanize Sufis. This was a new phenomenon in Islam, which expressed the frustration of Wahhabi and Salafi activists at the growing power of Sufis and Sufism, and the inability of Islam to deal with various threats.