DANU Strategic Forecasting Group May 27th 2016 How the Shift in VEOs Activities Affect the Military Situation in Mali By Elias Langvad Tools: Analyst Notebook, Excel with ACLED database, and R Studio The military situation in Mali has in recent years become more and more complex. Since the fall of the previous government in 2012, the number of violent extremist groups (VEOs) have increased, with both regional and national VEOs conducting attacks in Mali. However, after the military intervention by the UN and also French forces, the attacks by VEOs seem to have seceded and the location of the attacks appear to have shifted from central to Northern Mali, with incidents in the Southern part as well. Since there are numerous groups operating in Mali, this analysis tries to identify the most influential and active ones. After conducting research in the area, the groups Al Qaeda in Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine, al-mourabitoun, and Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) seem to be the most active and influential. However, many of the VEOs in Mali are offshoots from other groups. Al-Mourabitoun is for example, a group formed by a merger of Masked Men Brigade (AMB) and a faction of MUJAO. Although the VEOs have different goals, they have a tendency to work together on many occasions, with several being allies. This first picture tries to visualise the relations between the VEOs in Mali but also other groups, such as pro-government forces and secessionist groups. 1
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Having identified the most active groups, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Dataset was then used to observe the number of attacks by these groups, and where they took place. The ACLED Dataset codes all the reported political violence and protest events in over 60 countries, including Mali. However, one piece of information to keep in mind is that many of the attacks are listed as being done by an Unidentified Armed Group. These attacks may have been claimed by some VEOs, but it is not certain that they actually were conducted by them. This analysis only uses the attacks which are confirmed to be by AQIM, Ansar Dine, al-mourabitoun, or MU- JAO. The number of attacks by these groups may then be higher than listed, which should be kept in mind. This analysis tries to identify the changes regarding the attacks by VEOs in order to assess how successful the military interventions have been. The success is being determined by whether the attacks have become less frequent and less civilian targeted. Using the ACLED Dataset, one notices that in 2012 there were around 120 reported incidents by these VEOs. The most active ones were Ansar Dine (35 attacks) and MUJAO (65 attacks) with AQIM conducting 16 attacks. Al-Mourabitoun had not been formed in 2012 and is therefore not listed. Of these 120 attacks, most occurred in the area near Timbuktu and Gao, with a few isolated attacks in Northern and Eastern Mali. The attacks near Timbuktu and Gao preceded the capture of the two towns, eventually becoming two of the VEOs strongholds. Nearly all attacks were against Malian civilians, with some being against Malian military forces and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). In 2013 the international community decided to intervene in Mali in order to try and stabilise the country. The United Nations MINUSMA operation launched April 2013 and the French led antiinsurgent Operation Serval in January 2013, which was later succeeded by Operation Barkhane in August 2014. These came upon request by the Malian government in order to try and stabilise Mali, especially the Northern part. In order to analyse the success of the operations, this paper looks at the attacks conducted by the previously mentioned VEOs in 2015, to see how they have changed since 2012. What one notices is that the amount of attacks are significantly fewer in 2015 than 2012. Only 21 attacks were reported, with AQIM and Ansar Dine carrying out the majority of them, and al-mourabitoun and MU- JAO only a few (4 attacks each). However, there are around 150 incidents by an Unidentified Armed Group. These four groups are almost certainly included in the unidentified groups, which could mean that their activities have not decreased as much as pictured. What is also notable is that the attacks have shifted from civilians, to Malian and international military forces, and Coordinations of Movements of the Azawad (CMA). A number of the attacks are still taking place in the area of Timbuktu and Gao, but more of the attacks in 2015 are spread out across the entire country. 3
This map done in the software tool of R Studio gives an indication of the location of the attacks. The South has seen an increased level of violence, with the attack against a hotel in the capital Bamako being the most fatal one (19 civilians dead). From the dataset and the map created, it is understood that the international military intervention has helped thwart the number of attacks from VEOs, but has also forced the attacks to be more widespread. The VEOs have lost their regions of influence (Timbuktu and Gao) and have retreated further North and towards the Algerian border. The presence of MUJAO seems to have diminished whilst AQIM and al-mourabitoun seem to have an increased presence, although al-mourabitoun not as big as previously thought. Ansar Dine have conducted fewer operations but are still one of the most active of the terrorist groups in 2015. As highlighted on the first picture, these groups are closely connected, with al-mourabitoun swearing allegiance to AQIM, and AQIM being allies with both MUJAO and Ansar Dine. They also conduct operations and attacks together in many cases. AQIM seems to be the major group that needs to be disrupted in Mali, with Ansar Dine close behind. Succeeding in this will potentially enable the Malian government to regain some of the stability it had before 2012. The continuing presence of international forces will most likely help stabilise the country and reduce the VEO attacks even further. Since the VEOs bases of operations are being pushed further North towards the borders, regional cooperation is necessary in order to prevent a spill-over effect. 4
Resources: Acleddata. ACLED version 6 (1997-2015). [Online] Available at: http://www.acleddata.com/data/version-6-data-1997-2015/ [Accessed 2016-05-06) Acleddata. Realtime Data (2016). [Online] Available at: http://www.acleddata.com/data/realtime-data-2016/ [Accessed 2016-05-06] BBC News. 2013. Mali crisis: Key Players. BBC Online [Online] [Accessed on 9 April 2016]. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17582909 U.S Department of State. Terrorist Designations of Ansar Dine. [Online] [Accessed on 9 April 2016] Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/206493.htm Weiss, C. 2016. Ansar Dine Highlights Attack on Tuareg Separatists in Mali. Long War Journal Online [Online] [Accessed on 9 April 2016] Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/01/ansar-dine-highlights-attack-on-tuareg-separatists-i n-mali.php 5