\ WAS IT PRACTICABLE Chris Godart
Names like Pickett, Chamberlain, Reynolds, Buford or Armistead and places like Little Round Top~ The Peach Orchard, The Wheatfield, Cemetery Hill, and Seminary Ridge will forever be etched and inked in history after the first three days of July 1863. Mention any of these names or places and the Battle of Gettysburg immediately comes to mind. This battle is called the "high mark of the Confederacy." Many feel that if the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia had won this battle, the Union cause would have been dealt a severe blow and President Lincoln may have been forced to sue for peace. The battle was not won by the Southern army,and with the loss came questions and accusations about the planning, interpretation and execution of orders prior to and during the three day engagement. It is easy to point to a single decision and profess to know what should have been done and by whom. Change a decision and other decisions will have to be made based on that one change without guarantee that the outcome will be different. Although a lot of focus is placed on the decisions and actions of the Southern generals, actions of commanders and soldiers of the Union's Army of the Potomac also had a lot to do with the Southern army's defeat. Late on the first day of the battle, the commanding General of the Army of Northern Virginia, Robert E. Lee, sent an order to Lt. Gen. Richard Ewell, commander of the Second Corps. The order left Ewell with a lot of leeway in its execution and the general receives a lot of criticism for his decision after receiving this order. His actions
as he considered whether or not to attack Cemetery Hill and the sequence of events that led Culp's Hill to be in possession of the federals have been written about as one of the moments in time that could have turned the battle in the south's favor.. When attempting to judge the soundness of his decision it is important to consider only the facts available to General Ewell at 4:30 p.m. on July 1st. The Army of Northern Virginia had not intended to engage the Army of the Potomac on July 1st at Gettysburg and the men who fought that day had no idea that they would be engaged in a three day battle. Hindsight gives us the ability to look at decisions made on the first day and know how they would affect the actions of the following days but those men did not have that luxury. Some decisions are made after long, careful deliberations; others are made spontaneously but all decisions are influenced by either the character of the person,.~. _~l. making the decision and/ or the result and experiences of previous decisions made by that person. Richard Stoddert Ewell graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point with the class of 1840. He finished 13th in a class of 42. Classmates and friends included fellow Virginian George H. Thomas, Thomas' roommate and fishing buddy of Ewell, William Tecumseh Sherman, George Getty and Bushrod Johnson. After selecting the United States Dragoons for service (mounted infantry), Ewell is sent to the western frontier with the 1 st US Dragoons. As a Lieutenant in Company A, he served in the far western territories providing escort to traders and wagons and taking
part in the Santa Fe and Oregon Trail expeditions. In 1847, now a member of Company F, he fought in the Mexican War where his Company served as escort to General Winfield Scott. When Company F's commander was wounded, Lt Richard Ewell assumed command of the Company and led his men to victories at Contreras, Churubusco and Chapultepec. He was brevetted Captain for" gallant and meritorious conduct in the battles of Contreras and Churubusco." After the war he returned to the west in the New Mexico Territory fighting Navajo and Apache Indians and proved himself a very effective Indian fighter. He developed a friendship with another Indian fighter named Kit Carson that would last for many years. His most memorable episode came when he rescued two young girls from a Chiricahua tribe led by Cochise. His rescue of the young girls was so well received that delegates of the Constitutional Convention of Arizona named one of the new territory counties after him (it was renamed Pima County after Ewell left the US Army for the Confederate Army). In late 1860, his health deteriorating from the many years of desert life and exposure to malaria & dyspepsia, he requested an extended leave of absence which was approved and set to take effect at the end of court martial duty in Albuquerque. When Richard Ewell started his journey back to the states on January 31,1861 six states had already seceded from the Union and even though he is opposed to secession he also knows that Virginia's fate must be his own. Ewell has invested 21 years in the military and although he has had opportunities to leave the military he loves what he is
doing and hopes a compromise can be found to avoid a war between the states. "It is hard to account for my course, except from a painful sense of duty. I say painful because I believe few were more devoted to the old country than myself" he would later explain. On 12 April 1861, Confederate batteries fired on Fort Sumter. President Lincoln, proclaiming the states to be in revolt called for 75,000 troops to "suppress the rebellion." With dissolution of the Union now certain, Ewell's duty was now clear to. \ him and on 24 April 1861 Richard Ewell surrendered his commission in the US Army. One day later Ewell is named Lieutenant Colonel of cavalry in the Confederate Army and is put in charge of cavalry instruction in Ashland, VA In late May he is ordered to Culpeper, VA and shortly thereafter to Manassas under General Bonham. The general sends him to Fairfax Court House where on June 1st, he commands his first action in a skirmish with a detachment of US Cavalry. He was in command of the..cavalry troops stationed there and during a night raid by a detachment of Company B, Second US Cavalry he organized the troops and successfully repelled the Federals. He was slightly wounded in the neck by the leader of the federal cavalry. The skirmish at Fairfax Court House, though insignificant by later standards, was a major news event at that time and gave Ewell a measure of fame. On June 17, 1861 he is named Brigadier General and is in put in charge of three regiments. His command is one of six Brigades under General PGT Beauregard. When General Beauregard established his line along the Bull Run in Manassas, Ewell's Brigade was assigned the extreme right flank of the Confederate Army at Union Mills.
The General expected the Federals to attack the left end of his line and he would then throw the right wing of his Army (with Ewell leading) across the stream and strike General McDowell's flank. The battle did not develop the way Beauregard had anticipated and Ewell's Brigade was not called to take any action during the battle. After the Battle of First Manassas, the Armies of Generals Beauregard and Johnston merged." Johnston was given overall command and he reorganized the structure of the Army in Virginia. On January 24, 1862 Richard Ewell was promoted to Major General. His division was composed of three brigades and by mid-april 1862 Johnston ordered Ewell's Division to cooperate with General Thomas Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson, who was commanding the Valley District, was also a Major General but as senior in rank he was the overall Commander of the Army in the Valley. For the next two months General Jackson's Army of the Valley with Richard Ewell's 10,000 men Division and his own 7,000 men Division experienced many successes defending the valley from attacks by Union Generals Nathaniel Banks, John Fremont and James Shields. In early summer of 1862, the Army of the Valley rejoined the rest of the army near Richmond. General Robert E. Lee, appointed to army command after the wounding of General Johnston at the Battle of Seven Pines, organized the Army of Northern Virginia into two Corps. The First Corps is assigned to James Longstreet and the Second Corps to Thomas Jackson. Richard Ewell's Division is kept under Jackson's Command in the Second Corps. In August 1862, the Second Corps executes Lee's
movement around General Pope's army which culminates in the Battle of Second Manassas. On August 28th, during the battle of Groveton, General Ewell's horse proved impossible to handle during the fight and he dismounted, turning the skittish animal over to an aide. The fight was a terrible battle with both sides firing at each other from less than a hundred yards. The Sixth Wisconsin was firing from a wooded ravine and Ewell led a regiment to flush the enemy from their cover. He kneeled below a low pine's branches to get a better look and when some Confederate soldiers recognized the general they cried out "look boys, here is General Ewell." Some of the federals also heard the cry and promptly fired a volley at the General. He was hit by a bullet in his left knee and the kneeling position he was in caused the bullet to go through the patella and shatter the head of the tibia. The next morning his left leg had to be amputated above the knee. Ewell was moved from house to house, evading capture, and eventually settled in Richmond. While recuperating at the house of Dr. Hancock in Richmond he was joined by the only woman he had ever loved: Lizinka Campbell Brown. Lizinka was his first cousin and he had been in love with her since his teenage years. Richard left for West Point while Lizinka moved to Tennessee with her family. She married Mr. James Brown at nineteen years old but within a few years she would lose her husband, her father and her brother so that by the age of 33, after inheriting large tracks of land, she is now one of the richest women in Tennessee. She kept in touch with Richard while he was out west and even asked him to give up military life and come to Tennessee to help
her manage her large land holdings. Ewell went to visit her and stayed for a month to lend a hand but decided to remain in the US Army. They always kept in touch and, after Ewell's return to Northern Virginia, during a visit with each other in December 1861, he asked her to marry him. She accepted his proposal but together decided to put off the wedding for fear that her land holdings would be confiscated by the US Government as a result of her marriage to a high ranking Confederate Officer. After being together during the eight months of recovery from the amputation they decided to go ahead with the wedding and shortly before returning to duty Richard and Lizinka were married in April 1863. Eight months after his amputation, Ewell wrote to General Thomas Jackson in April 1863. He reported he was fit to return to duty and asked to be reassigned to Jackson's Second Corps. Although he made no specific request he hoped to be given command of DH Hill's old division which had been without a commander since January. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson was accidently wounded by his own men at the battle of Chancellorsville and died on May 10, 1863. General Lee decided to reorganize his army from two to three Corps. The First Corps remained with General James Longstreet; Lee promoted Richard Ewell to Lieutenant General and assigned him Jackson's old Second Corps. General AP Hill was also promoted and assigned to the newly formed Third Corps. On May 23, 1863 Adjutant General Samuel Cooper confirmed the promotions and with General Ewell's name above that of AP Hill on the
order made him the third ranking officer in the Army of Northern Virginia behind Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet. General Ewell's new Second Corps was composed of three divisions led by Generals Robert Rodes, Jubal Early and Edward" Allegheny" Johnson. Lt. Gen. Ewell now reported directly to General Lee. The conveyance and style of General Lee's orders were distinctively opposite of the orders Richard Ewell received from General Jackson while serving under him. Jackson's orders were never to be questioned and had to be followed to the letter on penalty of court-martial. The orders coming from General Lee were more directive in nature and gave the recipient latitude in execution. On June 1, 1863, the soldiers of the Second Corps welcomed their new commander and were very happy to have someone they were familiar with, many of them served with Ewell in the Army of the Valley. The following day, General Lee called 'hls corps commanders for a meeting and shared with themhis plans for an invasion of Pennsylvania. On June 2, the Second Corps received orders for the march. They were to lead the Army of Northern Virginia down the Shenandoah Valley crossing the Potomac River into Maryland and Pennsylvania and along the way gather as many supplies as possible. The cavalry was tasked with screening the movement of the Army but just as the campaign began, General JEB Stuart's cavalry was attacked by Union cavalry at Brandy Station. Although the battle was essentially a draw, it did reveal the confederate infantry was on the move. On June 10, the Second Corps was joined by General
Jenkins' Brigade of cavalry which remained with the Corps through the march (+ /- 1000 men). On the north end of the Shenandoah Valley, Winchester, VA was currently occupied by US General Milroy and, not wanting to leave union troops in the rear of the Confederate army, General Ewell attacked and captured Winchester, routing the US troops and capturing 4,000 prisoners and 300 loaded wagons. General Rodes' division crossed the Potomac into Maryland on June 1St followed by General Johnson on the 19th. General Early crossed on the 22nd. On that same day, General Ewell received a dispatch from General Lee advising him to move towards the Susquehanna River in three widely separated columns to better gather supplies. The. dispatch read in part "The general direction should be northeast to the river. If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it". All three divisions arrived at Greencastle, P A by June 24th where they split. Generals Rodes and Johnson went north through the Cumberland Valley from Greencastle to Chambersburg, Shippensburg and Carlisle. General Early moved east of the mountains towards York via Waynesboro and Greenwood to break the Northern Central Railroad, then was to march towards the Susquehanna River. After reaching Wrightsville, Early was to secure the river bridges to prevent Union forces from advancing from that direction. If the bridges could be secured, they were to be burned or destroyed. General Early was then to rejoin the rest of the corps and participate in the assault on Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania.
On his way to York, Brigadier General John Gordon of Early's division marched toward the town of Gettysburg on June 26th and encountered the 26th Pennsylvania Emergency Militia, a unit formed just eight days earlier. After a brief battle in which several of the Pennsylvania militia were killed and 175 men captured, the militia retreated and left the town. When General Early arrived in the town square that, evening he issued a list of demands from the town council, including barrels of flour, bacon and 1,000 pairs of shoes. Instead of providing the supplies, the Borough Council invited Early to search the local shops for the supplies but little was found. While in Carlisle, on the 29 June, preparing for an assault on Harrisburg, an order from General Lee reached General Ewell directing him to reunite with AP Hill and Longstreet at Chambersburg. Lee, having received information on the movement of the Union Army had decided to regroup his army. A second order later the same night changed the destination to Heidlersburg which lays thirty miles south of Carlisle and 15 miles north of Gettysburg. Although General Ewell understood the reasons behind General Lee's orders to regroup the army, he was very disappointed in the timing of these orders. Harrisburg was ready to be taken; General Jenkins' cavalry were at that moment scouting the defensive positions and the prize of the Pennsylvania capital was easily within their reach. Orders are orders and General Ewell directed. General Rodes to move his division south across South Mountain to Heidlersburg. General Johnson was ordered to stay with the wagon train which by now was over
twenty miles long and cross the mountains at Cashtown Pass. General Early's Division was tasked to turn about and make way directly to Heidlersburg. Just in case a return to Harrisburg might be necessary, General Ewell ordered General Jenkins and his cavalry to continue shelling the Harrisburg defenses one more day then fall back to Carlisle and follow the infantry. On arrival at Heidlersburg, General Ewell, who was riding with General Rodes' division, received orders from General Lee to now move to either Cashtown or Gettysburg" as circumstances require." Ewell pondered this order but was confused at its meaning. He showed the order to Generals Rodes, Early and Isaac Trimble. Trimble had also recently recovered from an amputation and was traveling with the Army without a command. The generals also shared in the confusion of Lee's order. General Ewell looked at it again and exclaimed "Why can't a Commanding General have someone on his staff who can write an intelligible order." It was decided to head for Cashtown and if General Lee did indeed want them at Gettysburg it was easier to make way into that town because of the many roads leading to it. General Rodes took the road via Middletown (21st century Biglerville) and General Early via Hunterstown. July I, 1863 had started with General Lee sorting through his army's order of march as the three corps were re-grouping per his orders. Richard Anderson's division of AP Hill's corps was sent out first to catch up with the rest of his corps and Longstreet was to follow Anderson down the Chambersburg Pike. Lee also sent Brigadier General John D. Imboden's brigade of cavalry to relieve Major General Ceorge E. Pickett's
division at Chambersburg so that Pickett might rejoin the First Corps by July 2nd. General Lee had camped close by General Longstreet's headquarters the night before and asked Old Pete to ride with him for the short march to Cashtown, only 8 miles, away. Shortly after the march was underway, Allegheny Johnson's division, which was escorting the Second Corps' wagon train, came down the Chambersburg Pike. Major General Lafayette McLaws of Longstreet's Corps was told to halt and let Allegheny Johnson's division and the wagon train pass before resuming his division's march. This would delay McLaws and the rest of the First Corps by almost eight hours. This was crucial because it plainly showed that no engagement was anticipated on that day. An army expecting a battle would place the infantry ahead of wagon trains. Around 10:00AM, just outside Middletown, a dispatch from General AP Hill arrived informing Ewell that the Third Corps had engaged Union Cavalry at Gettysburg. "General Ewell promptly answered that he would support Hill and directed Rodes to turn south.on the Middletown Rd., he also sent an order to Early to make his way to Gettysburg by way of the Harrisburg Rd (aka Heidlersburg Rd). Riding with General Rodes' division, Ewell reached the battlefield between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m. He was not sure what to expect but by happenstance found that his Corps' approach from the north put him in an excellent flanking position. He sent his aide (and stepson) Major Campbell Brown to find General Lee and inform him of this advantage and that he intended to join in the battle. Major Brown found Lee and relayed Ewell's information. Lee listened and asked Brown if General Ewell had heard
from General Stuart. When Brown replied he had not, Lee impressed upon Brown very strongly that a general engagement was to be avoided until the arrival of the rest of the army. Lee sent Brown back to report to General Ewell. General Rodes deployed his five brigades: Ramseur's, O'Neal's, Doles', Iverson and Daniel's Brigades entered the battle at 1:30 p.m. He was faced with elements of the US First Corps which had been engaged with Hill and now turned northward with the apparent intention to attack. As Rodes' division was deployed, the lead elements of the US Eleventh Corps led by General Oliver Otis Howard deployed north of town and threatened to turn Rodes' left flank. General Ewell watched this action from Oak Hill. Major Brown returned and reported General Lee's comments and added he found General Lee /I showing a querulous impatience I never saw before". Soon after Brown had relayed Lee's message to General Ewell, Major Venable of General JEB Stuart's staff along with one courier arrived. General Ewell sent Major Venable to report to General Lee and told the courier to go back to JEB Stuart and hurry up the cavalry. Ewell sized up the battle so far: AP Hill was engaged, the Artillery from both sides were exchanging volleys and Rodes was deployed with an obvious advantage in position on the Union flank. Ewell therefore considered the order from General Lee to avoid an engagement obsolete. "It was too late to avoid an engagement and I determined to push the attack vigorously." This was the first major decision of the day for General Ewell and some have compared it Jackson-like in its decisiveness.
Rode's initial attack was repulsed. As Ewell was watching Rodes' efforts, he sent Major Brown back out again to find General Early with the order to hurry forward. Ewell rode back to Oak Hill to bring forward Ramseur's Brigade that had been held in reserve. By the time General Ewell arriyed back to his headquarters on Oak Hill, he learned the battle had shifted dramatically in his favor. General Lee saw this development and ordered Hill to send in Pender's Division to push the retreating Union soldiers. General Early arrived on the battlefield with 8,000 men around 3:30 p.m. and deployed his division. His division was composed of four brigades led by Generals Gordon, "Extra Billy" Smith, Avery and Hays. Gordon's attack was initially stopped but when Hays and Avery arrived on the Union flank and rear, the Union line broke. Gordon pressed the wavering 11th Corps; f~ ont and the federals rushed in disarray towards the town of Gettysburg and Cemetery Hill on the other side of town. Rodes overtook hundreds of the fugitives and Early captured many more. As many as 4,000 union soldiers were captured along with three cannons. General Ewell rode into town and encountered Gordon. Major Henry K yd Douglas of Johnson's division appeared and informed them that his division is still a few miles out of town. General Gordon asked General Ewell to allow him to join forces. with Johnson when he arrived and continue the attack on Cemetery Hill. Ewell replied that although he had felt it necessary to disregard General Lee's earlier instructions,
there was no justification for doing it now. "General Lee is on the field now and I do not feel like I can go further or make another attack without orders from him." He sent for Generals Early and Rodes to confer on where to place Johnson when he arrives. While General Ewell was waiting for General Rodes and Early to arrive, Major Taylor of Robert E. Lee's staff arrived at General Ewell's headquarters with an order from General Lee. The commanding General had watched the union retreat from Seminary Ridge and thought it necessary to press those people and "secure the heights if he could do so to advantage." This order will be recounted by General Lee in January 1864 when the general wrote his report on the campaign and will change the wording to "if practicable". From the moment General Lee arrived on the battlefield he was with AP Hill and supervised the movement of the Third Corps through Hill. They were together on ~.. Seminary Ridge at 4:30 P.M... Hill noted that his two divisions (Heth and Pender) were exhausted from six hours or more of fighting and under the impression the enemy was routed declared "prudence leads me to be content with what has been gained and not push forward troops that are disordered and exhausted probably to encounter fresh union troops." Of note is that the largest division of Hill's Corps, Anderson's, was available and had not been used. Lee himself ordered Anderson to stop his advance two miles west of Gettysburg earlier that day. Anderson wrote Lee asking for confirmation of that order. Lee's reply was that the army was not all up and as he was ignorant to the force of the opposing Army present wanted to hold him in reserve in
case of disaster. Anderson was called forward late in the afternoon but not sent into battle and instead was told to prepare his division for the night. Earlier that afternoon, about 2:00 p.m., US General 0.0. Howard determined that Cemetery Hill was to be the reserve position for his XI Corps and decided he would establish his headquarters at that location. Cemetery Hill was ideally suited for a defensive battle; stone fences formed natural breastworks for the infantry and the gentle slopes made it outstanding as an artillery platform. The convex shape of the hill also allowed for moving reinforcements quickly to any point on the line. By 4:30 p.m., Colonel Orland Smith's 2,000 man Brigade of VonSteinwehr's Second Division was firmly in place on Cemetery Hill and was still fresh from not having participated in the earlier battle. John Buford's 1500 cavalry troopers retreated to the west side of this position and were supported by artillery from both the I and XI Corps. As retreating 'Federal soldiers were streaming through the streets of Gettysburg, they were rallied on Cemetery Hill by Generals Howard and Winfield S. Hancock who were sent ahead to the battlefield by US Commanding General George Meade. The first flood of retreating soldiers from the XI Corps was closely followed by men of the I Corps, commanded most of the day by General Abner Doubleday. Hancock and Howard rallied these troops and set up a strong defensive position on the hill. The 7th Indiana's 500 fresh troops were directly behind the Cemetery Hill. These were the numbers that General Ewell and his staff could ascertain; unbeknownst to him was that US General J,W. Geary's Division from the Twelfth Corps was within thirty minutes of
arrival (5,000 men) and General A.S. Williams' Division of the same Corps (approx.. 4,000 men) was within one hour arrival. These times are when they actually arrived (Geary at 5:00 p.m. and Williams at 5:30 p.m.), they could have gotten there much quicker if a battle had forced their march. It is not known how many of the retreating soldiers from the I and XI Corps were now on Cemetery Hill but a safe assumption is that approximately 7 to 8,000 men were on Cemetery Hill by 4:30 with another 9,000 within easy reach of any battle that would develop. Generals Rodes and Early met General Ewell and reported that some of their troops were at the foot of Cemetery Hill. Ewell shared with them General Lee's order and they each reported the condition of their divisions. Rodes had sent all five brigades into the battle. Rodes' total casualties stood at 2,900 from the 6,200 that started the fight two hours earlier and only two Brigades (Doles' and Ramseur's) were at the front in a position to continue the fight. O'Neal had lost 27% of his force and most of the survivors remained on Oak Hill, Daniel lost almost 35% of his troops and Iverson 60%. Of Early's four Brigades, only one was available for another attack (Avery's 2,000 men). Brigadier General Extra Billy Smith, posted to guard the York Road, reported a mixed union force advancing towards him. General Early dispatched Gordon's brigade who had suffered 350 casualties of the 1,200 he had to join Smith's Brigade on the York Road. Extra Billy Smith and Gordon's Brigades were now east of town and not available to continue. General Hays' Brigade was in the town guarding all the prisoners
captured earlier in the day. Along with Avery's 2,000 men, Rodes' Brigades of Doles and Ramseur account for about 2,000 men. The total confederate troops available to continue the fight was about 4,000 men exhausted from the day's fighting. Even under these conditions, both Early and Rodes agreed that Cemetery Hill should be attacked but asked for support from troops from AP Hill's First Corps which had stopped. Ewell concurred and sent Captain Smith to report back to General Lee the request of Early and Rodes for support from the West flank. While waiting for Captain Smith's return, Generals Ewell and Early rode south to a high point on Baltimore Street to get a better view of Cemetery Hill. They saw the Union troops gathering behind the stone walls and John Buford's cavalry Division guarding the western approach. Most of all, their attention was drawn to 43 pieces of artillery. The position of this formidable artillery front made an attack from the town impossible. In order to attack, they would have E~dto maneuver around Gettysburg and make their attack from the east with the troops requested from AP Hill's Corps supporting the attack from the west. Captain Smith now returned with General Lee's answer that" General Longstreet's people are not up yet and I have no troops to advance at this point." He urged General Ewell to take the hill with the Second Corps alone, if possible and reiterated his order for Ewell to avoid a general engagement until the entire Army was present.
Lee's reply frustrated and baffled Ewell. As he looked back over the hill, he realized it would have been impossible to take the position without bringing about a large battle with the enemy entrenched on the hill and therefore force a general engagement. A frontal assault was not possible and he now knew that the support requested from the west side was not coming. The report from General Smith that there was Union troops coming in to his rear on the York Pike if he started an attack from the east side of the town and the inactivity of the troops under General Lee's own eyes were also on General Ewell's mind. He then made the decision not to attack Cemetery Hill. General Isaac Trimble, who was also just returning to duty after a serious wound, was placed in command of the Valley District on June 1 st. When he arrived in the Valley he quickly realized all the troops had gone north with the army. He caught up with General Lee in Maryland and asked for permission to ride with him on the -inv-,asion of-pennsylvania. General Lee agreed but after three days of pestering General Lee and making a nuisance of himself, General Lee sent him to join General Ewell when the Second Corps was in Harrisburg. General Trimble had asked General Lee to let him have a Brigade to go to and free Baltimore. He also wanted to roam the Maryland towns to raise a Division of men. The only Brigades even close to where he was belonged to AP Hill's Corps and General Hill refused to take away command of a brigadefrom one of his Generals to give to General Trimble. Lee also did not want to have any troops in Baltimore. General Trimble was now with General Ewell as an observer; he had been alongside Ewell most of the afternoon and had made a
reconnaissance of the area around Cemetery Hill. He reported of a wooded hill known locally as Culp's Hill that commanded Cemetery Hill from the east. Ewell realized that by seizing this hill, it might compel the Union army to abandon Cemetery Hill and it would not bring about the general engagement General Lee wished to avoid. Ewell did not disagree with him but preferred to wait until he received a report on the location of General Johnson's division. This third division of the Second Corps was about a mile out of town by the college and should have been pulling into town soon. Trimble did not accept this and kept arguing with Ewell. The Corps Commander's patience finally gave out and Ewell snapped at Trimble "when I need the advice of a junior officer, I generally ask for it." Trimble was furious at this remark and walked away, never to return to Ewell again. General Ewell sent two aides, Lt Thomas Turner and Robert Early, a civilian volunteer and General Early' s nephew, to reconnoiter Culp's Hill and report their findings. General Allegheny Johnson arrived, ahead of his division, to receive instructions on where to place his division when it arrived in town. He found General Ewell meeting with Generals Early and Rodes. He informed them that his division was still outside the town and was slowed down because of wagon traffic on the roads: Ewell turned to Early and proposed to him to have Avery's Brigade climb up Culp's Hill and occupy it; Johnson's division would then position itself in the gap between Early and Rodes. Early is clearly annoyed and growled that his division has been doing all the
hard marching and fighting and was in no condition to make the move. The remark led to-an exchange of words between Early and Johnson which has been reported as "more forceful than elegant." Ewell gave in to Early and ordered his hot tempered lieutenant to go into camp and directed Johnsonto bring his division to the edge of town and he would have further orders for him. When Lt Turner and Mr. Early returned from their reconnaissance they reported that they had ridden to the top of the hill and found it unoccupied and free of federals. Ewell asked Rodes what he thought of sending Johnson's division to occupy the hill. Rodes replied that his own men were too tired and that he did II not think it would result in anything one way or the other." When asked the same question, Early took the opposite view and replied "if you do not go up there tonight, it will cost you 10,000 men tomorrow." Ewell agreed with Early and ordered Johnson to occupy the hill; he sent Lt Turner and Mr. Early as guides for Johnson's division which was by then.,.-. arriving to the area. Soon after, General Lee arrived at General Ewell's headquarters for a report on the condition of the Second Corps. He had already talked with Generals Longstreet and Hill about his options and wished to discuss with Ewell his plan to renew the attack as early as possible the next day. He had not yet developed a specific plan but asked Ewell, Rodes and Early who were all present about the possibility of the Second Corps moving to the right of the confederates' line and concentrate an attack on the Union's left with Longstreet and Hills' corps. This suggestion elicited a vociferous denial from
General Early who argued against withdrawing from a position won by fighting and leaving captured guns and wounded men behind. Generals Ewell and Rodes concurred with Early and Lee, sensing the reluctance from his generals, remarked that Longstreet would have to make the attack and the Second Corps would provide a diversion. General Ewell pointed out to the Commanding General that General Johnson's division was at that moment taking possession of a hill that dominated the Cemetery Hill occupied by the Union army and that at daybreak they might be able to move the Federals from this hill while Longstreet attacked their flank. The meeting lasted well into the night and when Ewell returned to his headquarters he learned from Lt Turner that Johnson was not on top of the hill. He reported that /I a reconnoitering party met a superior force of the enemy-who captured some of its members and sent the rest packing." The Federals were in possession of Culp's Hill. The earlier.reconnaissance of Lt Turner and Mr. Early somehow. failed to notice that elements of the Iron Brigade had taken position on the west side of Culp's Hill. Although they reported having climbed to the top of the hill it is more likely that they only climbed up the east slope and stopped at a point somewhere south of its peak. This would have put them in the rear of the Iron brigade's position which, in the growing darkness, might have been invisible to the two young aides. General Ewell, on hearing this news, must have felt a huge disappointment and remarked 1/ day is breaking and it is now too late for any change of place." This remark probably reflects that had he known Culp's was occupied by the Union army he might
have agreed with General Lee's suggestion to move the Second Corps to the right side of the line. History will prove unjust and unfair as to General Ewell's decision on July 1st, 1863. In the years following the south's surrender, the loss of the Battle of Gettysburg took on greater significance and southerners began to look for placing of blame. When some, including James Longstreet, suggested Robert E Lee had to shoulder some of the blame, the defenders of the great general began to point fingers at others' decisions made prior to and during the battle. Other generals wrote their own memoirs, in particular John Gordon, Isaac Trimble and Jubal Early who all served with Richard Ewell. These memoirs, like most, tend to inflate one's participation and contributions all the while pointing the finger of blame for failures to others. Richard Ewell never wrote his memoirs, preferring instead to move on with his life and, like Lee, let the official reports stand as his record of decisions. A.P. Hill escapes the same criticism Ewell receives for not pushing on the attack late in the afternoon and neither Hill nor General Lee ever explained why Hill's largest division, Richard Anderson's, was never put into battle on July 1st. An attack by Anderson's fresh troops from the west and what remained of Ewell's second corps on the east might have broken the union line along the ridge. Lee should also shoulder some of the responsibility for the confusion at the end of the day on July I, 1863. If he truly desired to press the attack and continue the fight to Cemetery Hill even after twice asking his subordinate generals not to bring on a general engagement, a more direct order to Ewell was called for instead of a
discretionary one. The order of not bringing on a general engagement was given to Richard Ewell before: In May 1862 when part of the Valley Army, General Jackson had given Ewell the order to delay General Freemont at Strasburg, V A but not bring on a general engagement. As mentioned earlier such an order by Jackson was to be followed to the letter and was not ever discretionary. Historians and writers have written that several factors may have affected General Ewell's decisions. They name his marriage to Lizinka, that he was impaired by the loss of his left leg or simply not capable of reaching a decision. Others present the, "If Jackson had been there he would have attacked" scenario. General Jackson was an aggressive commander but it does a disservice to the General to think he would have attacked a formidable position without knowing what he was up against. Jackson was a brilliant tactician but even he could not have conjured up more troops when they were needed. The one concession that might have' made a difference is that Jackson probably would not have given in to Early when Early balked at going up Culp's Hill. Would General Lee still have split his Army into three Corps if Jackson had not died? If not, this scenario alone would have changed the entire perspective of the Pennsylvania Campaign so it truly is impossible to know the answer. Richard Ewell's relationship with Lizinka had little, if any, effect on him after the marriage. They had agreed to be married long before the Gettysburg campaign and knew each other for many years. Their marriage in April 1863 only made formal what
was already a strong relationship of a few years. Nor can anyone provide any proof that the loss of his left leg impaired him. He needed help getting on and off his horse but many in his command were always amazed at how well he rode with only the use of one good leg. He was known to be an excellent horseman. As far as being hesitant at attacking the hill, Ewell reached a decision and was not hesitant about it. Maybe not the decision that people writing about this moment wish he had made, but reasonable given the situation the general found himself in that evening.. To quote Major Campbell Brown, General Ewell's Assistant Adjutant General on his staff: " The notion that General Ewell's decision lost the battle is one of those frequently recurring but tardy strokes of military genius, of which one hears long after the minute circumstances that rendered them at the time impracticable, are forgotten"