World Hunger and Poverty Some Facts & Figures Many people live in dire poverty; some people live in (comparatively) great affluence. About 767 million people (10.7% of the world population) live in extreme poverty, < US$1.90 /day About 2.1 billion people (~30%) live on < US $3.10 /day (World Bank, 2016) The richest 0.6% of world population hold 39.3% of the world s wealth; the bottom 95% hold 28.4% (OECD, 2012) 1
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There are also, of course, inequalities of wealth (and inequalities of welfare) within political communities. Yet many/most modern states accept that governments have least some responsibility, often grounded in distributive justice, to minimize, or at least manage, intrastate inequalities. Basic Questions At the global level, a basic moral question: Are economically advantaged people morally obligated to participate in some redistributive scheme so that some of their wealth goes to less economically advantaged people? If so, what best explains this obligation? One way to think of this would be in terms of a duty of beneficence (i.e., to help those in need) a duty that features in several different moral theories 3
Beneficence Assuming we have a duty of beneficence, we can ask: Scope I.e. to whom is the duty owed? People existing the present only or future generations as well? Content I.e., how strong is the duty? In effect, how much do we owe to others (expressed, say, as a percentage of wealth or comparison to our own needs and wants) Strength Is a (global) duty of beneficence an overriding duty, a less-stringent duty, or is it possibly just superogatory? Hardin: Lifeboat Ethics Garrett Hardin offers a broadly C argument: The scope, content, and strength of any putative duty of aid must be assessed in terms it long-range consequences. Hardin: The likely long run consequences of a policy of aid will be worse for everyone (currently wealthy and currently poor alike). So, we have no duty of aid. In fact, we have a C duty not to provide aid. 4
The Lifeboat Metaphor Think of rich states as lifeboats full of rich people and poor states are (much more crowded) lifeboats full of poor people. The central problem of lifeboat ethics : What should the passengers on a rich lifeboat do? There are three basic possibilities 1. Unlimited Sharing (i.e., let on to the lifeboat everyone who wants to, perhaps motivated by Christian or Marxian ideals) Hardin: This will lead to immediate catastrophe (there won t be enough to go around, the lifeboat will founder) 2. Selective Sharing (i.e., admit some people on to the lifeboat, e.g., on the basis of first come, first served or according to need or according to talent). Analogue: Aid programs such as a World Food Bank Hardin: This will make things worse in the long through the Tragedy of the Commons and the Ratchet Effect 3. No Sharing: Hardin s recommendation 5
The Tragedy of the Commons (TOC) When people make use of a commons (i.e., unowned) resource, it is instrumentally rational for them to maximally exploit it right up to the point were is it ruined. E.g., the classical case of shepherds on a commons pasture vs. private holdings If everyone restrained themselves from overexploitation, the commons might be preserved. But is not rational to restrain oneself if there is no payoff for doing so (or no price for not doing so). The Ratchet Effect Uncontrolled (e.g., unregulated) human reproduction creates a TOC. If aid is supplied (e.g., through a World Food Bank), impoverished people will generally accept it (it would be irrational not to). Aid will stave off present emergencies But, unless reproduction is controlled, it will also lead to higher populations of poor people such that future emergencies will be worse this iterates indefinitely into the future until global catastrophe. 6
Singer: The Life You Can Save Peter Singer argues, also on C grounds, for a conclusion that is directly opposed to Hardin s. On C grounds, we have a general obligation to reduce suffering. Many of us who are comparatively well-off could sacrifice at least some of our wealth without making ourselves appreciably worse off. Yet if we all made even relatively small sacrifices, this could greatly improve the conditions of others Saving a Life Singer's famous thought experiment: On your way to work you pass a small pond and see a young child who seems likely to drown if you don't wade in and pull him out. If you pull him out, though, you will ruin your new shoes, dirty your suit, and be late for work. What should you do? Common Intuition: You should try to save the child. If you don t, you will have done something morally wrong 7
Implication: The situation with global poverty is analogous. We morally ought to donate relatively small amounts of money to save those who are dying from starvation, easily treatable diseases, etc. If intuition is doing the work in the case of the drowning child, this could instead be generalized and formalized 1. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. 2. If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is morally wrong not to do so. 3. By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care, without sacrificing anything nearly as important. 4. If you do not donate to aid agencies, you are doing something morally wrong. 8
Some Possible Objections We're all entitled to our beliefs. Yes, but this doesn t entail moral relativism. If we see someone torturing an animal, we don t simply say oh well, you are entitled to follow your beliefs. We have a right to our hard-earned money. Yes, but just because you have a right doesn t mean that you can t also have moral duty constraining your exercise of that right. Libertarianism (Narveson): We have a duty to compensate those we have wronged, but we have doing nothing wrong to world s poor. Haven t we? Cf. supporting corrupt regimes, exploitative TNCs, climate change.etc. Aid breeds dependency Yes, it can, so we should give aid directly to the poor only in emergencies. In general, we should give aid to agencies/institutions that will promote long-term economic development 9
Charity begins at home. I.e., we have special relationships with our families and communities and we should be morally permitted to favour them. This is natural. And, of course, if your family or friends need aid to anything like the degree that the world s poor do, it would be permissible to give to them first. For most of us in the developed, however, that is simply not realistic. Arthur: Hunger and Obligation John Arthur (Binghampton) argues (on what turn out to be basically SCT grounds) that Singer s argument is, in effect, incomplete. Singer s argument is founded on commitment to equal moral consideration of all. (Cf. impartiality) But, in addition to equality, morality involves commitments to entitlement, including rights and considerations of desert. 10
Greatest Moral Evil Rule (GMER) Arthur: Singer s argument depends on this principle If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it (663) It follows immediately from the GMER that we are morally entitled to keep what we have only if there is no way for us prevent greater evil by giving it away. I.e., taken literally, the GMER is very demanding if we spend money on toys for ourselves while others starve, we are, by the lights of GMER, treating others as if their happiness/suffering matter less than ours. I.e., we give special consideration to ourselves, denying the moral equality of others. But, again, a commitment to equality is only a part of morality ( our moral code ). It can be countered by considerations of right and desert 11
E.g., we could conceivably make someone much better off by letting him use our body (donating a kidney or an eyeball): One eyeball/kidney isn t that much worse than two, but much better than none, so the GMER, on its own, would mandate donation. But: Rights. You have a ( natural, negative) right to your body, so others have no entitlement to use it. Donating an eyeball is not morally obligatory, it is superogatory. You may have a ( not natural ) positive right to receive aid from me if I promised or we entered into a contract. But apart from some such agreement, no such right exists. Also: Desert. X is a highly industrious farmer who has worked hard to produce a crop surplus; Y is a lazy farmer who spends his time fishing. Does X morally owe some or all of his surplus to Y, simply because Y will suffer he doesn t give it to him? Arthur: This doesn t mean that rights and entitlements simply trump equality considerations. We may even consider revising our moral code to give priority to equality. But we need some account or other of how to balance off these considerations. 12
Arthur: Yet if we are considering reform, we should bear in mind the purposes of morality (per SCT): To promote our welfare and that of others. We will agree to support a moral code only if it is practical i.e., if actually delivers its promised benefits, if the demands that it makes on ourselves and others aren t excessive in relation to those benefits only if it is rational for (nearly) everyone to support. Giving priority to equality would undermine these conditions for support. Upshot: Our code expects us to help people in need as well as to respect negative and positive rights. But we are also entitled to invoke our own rights as a justification for not giving to distant strangers when the cost to us is substantial... (670) 13