Belief Logic = = = = You believe that A. You accept A. Believe that A. Accept A. u:a. u:a

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Belief Logic u:a u:a You believe that A. You accept A. Believe that A. Accept A. 1. The result of writing a small letter and then : and then a wff is a descriptive wff. 2. The result of writing an underlined small letter and then : and then a wff is an imperative wff. LogiCola N (BM & BT) Pages 290 91

You believe that A is true You don t believe that A is true You believe that A is false You don t believe A and you don t believe not-a u:a Àu:A u:àa (Àu:A Â Àu:ÀA) You believe that you ought to do A Everyone believes that they ought to do A u:oau (x)x:oax You believe that if A then not-b If you believe A, then you don t believe B u:(a Ä ÀB) (u:a Ä Àu:B) LogiCola N (BM & BT) Pages 290 91

Believe that A is true Don t believe that A is true Believe that A is false Don t believe A and don t believe not-a u:a Àu:A u:àa (Àu:A Â Àu:ÀA) Believe that you ought to do A Let everyone believe that they ought to do A u:oau (x)x:oax If you in fact believe A, then don t believe B Don t combine believing A with believing B (u:a Ä Àu:B) À(u:A Â u:b) LogiCola N (BM & BT) Pages 290 91

Three Approaches to Belief Logic 1. Belief logic studies what belief formulas validly follow from what other belief formulas. 2. Belief logic studies how people would believe if they were completely consistent. 3. Belief logic generates consistency imperatives, like: Don t combine believing A with believing not-a À(u:A Â u:àa) Don t combine believing A-and-B with not believing A À(u:(A Â B) Â Àu: A) LogiCola OB Pages 291 97

A belief policy is a set of imperatives about what you are or are not to believe, e.g., u:p, Àu:W, Àu:ÀW ( Believe that Michigan will play; be neutral about whether Michigan will win ). A corresponding belief world ( u, uu, uuu, ) is a possible world containing all the statements you re told to believe (and perhaps other statements). Belief logic forbids belief policies that tell you to believe inconsistently (where the set of things you re told to believe is inconsistent or else logically entails something you re told not to believe); such belief policies are ones where these rules lead to some belief world being inconsistent (apply B- before B+): B- If you re told to refrain from believing A, then put not-a in a new belief world of yours. B+ If you re told to believe A, then put A in all of your belief worlds. LogiCola OB Pages 291 97

Belief Inference Rules B- B+ Àu:A u Á ÀA, use a new string of u s * u:a u Á A, use any string of u s First drop negative imperative belief operators; use a new belief world each time. Then drop positive imperative belief operators; use old belief worlds if you have them (otherwise use a new world u ). LogiCola OB Pages 291 97

Don t combine believing A with believing not-a. [ Á À(u:A  u:àa) Valid * 1 1 asm: (u:a  u:àa) 2 2 Á u:a {from 1} 3 2 Á u:àa {from 1} 4 2 u Á A {from 2} B+ 5 3 u Á ÀA {from 3} B+ 6 Á À(u:A  u:àa) {from 1; 4 contradicts 5} Apply B- before B+ B- If you re told to refrain from believing A, then put not-a in a new belief world of yours. B+ If you re told to believe A, then put A in all of your belief worlds. LogiCola OB Pages 291 97

Don t combine believing A-and-B with not believing A. [ Á À(u:(A  B)  Àu:A) Valid * 1 1 asm: (u:(a  B)  Àu:A) 2 2 Á u:(a  B) {from 1} * 3 2 Á Àu:A {from 1} 4 2 u Á ÀA {from 3} B- 5 2 u Á (A  B) {from 2} B+ 6 3 u Á A {from 5} 7 Á À(u:(A  B)  Àu:A) {from 1; 4 contradicts 6} Apply B- before B+ B- If you re told to refrain from believing A, then put not-a in a new belief world of yours. B+ If you re told to believe A, then put A in all of your belief worlds. LogiCola OB Pages 291 97

1 È(A Ä B) Valid [ Á À(u:A  Àu:B) * 2 1 asm: (u:a  Àu:B) 3 2 Á u:a {from 2} * 4 2 Á Àu:B {from 2} 5 2 u Á ÀB {from 4} B- 6 2 u Á A {from 3} B+ * 7 2 u Á (A Ä B) {from 1} 8 3 u Á B {from 6 and 7} 9 Á À(u:A  Àu:B) {from 2; 5 contradicts 8} 1. Reverse squiggles (quantificational/modal/deontic). 2. Drop weak operators, using new things: Àu: R (Æx) Ç 3. Lastly, drop strong operators, using old things (if you have them): u: O (x) È LogiCola OB Pages 291 97

u:a You accept (endorse, assent to, say in your heart) A is true. You believe that A. u:a You accept (endorse, assent to, say in your heart) Let act A be done. You will that act A be done. If A is present: u:au You accept the imperative for you to do A now. You act (in order) to do A. If A is future: u:au You accept the imperative for you to do A in the future. You re resolved to do A. If u x: u:ax You accept the imperative for X to do A. You desire (or want) that X do A. LogiCola N (WM & WT) Pages 298 300

u:au You act (in order) to do A. You say in your heart, Do A (addressed to yourself). Au You do A. u:(æx)(kx  Rx) u:(æx)(kx  Rx) u:(æx)(kx  Rx) You desire that some who kill repent. You say in your heart Would that some who kill repent. You desire that some kill who repent. You say in your heart Would that some kill who repent. You desire that some both kill and repent. You say in your heart Would that some kill and repent. LogiCola N (WM & WT) Pages 298 300

u:a Accept (endorse, assent to, say in your heart) Let act A be done. Will that act A be done. If A is present: u:au Accept the imperative for you to do A now. Act (in order) to do A. If A is future: u:au Accept the imperative for you to do A in the future. Be resolved to do A. If u x: u:ax Accept the imperative for X to do A. Desire (or want) that X do A. LogiCola N (WM & WT) Pages 298 300

Use underlining before : to tell someone what to believe or will. Use underlining after : if the sentence is about willing. Indicatives u:a You believe A. u:a You will A. Imperatives u:a Believe A. u:a Will A. LogiCola N (WM & WT) Pages 298 300

Don t combine believing that it s wrong for you to do A with acting to do A. [ Á À(u:OÀAu  u:au) Valid * 1 1 asm: (u:oàau  u:au) 2 2 Á u:oàau {from 1} 3 2 Á u:au {from 1} 4 2 u Á OÀAu {from 2} B+ 5 2 u Á Au {from 3} B+ 6 3 u Á ÀAu {from 4} 7 Á À(u:OÀAu  u:au) {from 1; 5 contradicts 6} LogiCola OW Pages 301

Ou:A A is evident to you. It s obligatory (rationally required) that you believe A. Insofar as intellectual considerations are concerned (including your experiences), you ought to believe A. Ru:A A is reasonable for you to believe. It s all right (rationally permissible) that you believe A. Insofar as intellectual considerations are concerned (including your experiences), it would be all right for you to believe A. LogiCola N (RM & RT) Pages 303 304

It would be unreasonable for you to believe A It s obligatory that you not believe A It would be reasonable for you to take no position on A It s evident to you that if A then B If it s evident to you that A, then it s evident to you that B You ought not to combine believing A with believing not-a ÀRu:A OÀu:A R(Àu:A Â Àu:ÀA) Ou:(A Ä B) (Ou:A Ä Ou:B) OÀ(u:A Â u:àa) knowledge You know that A uka evident true belief [roughly] A is evident to you, A is true, & you believe A. (Ou:A Â (A Â u:a)) LogiCola N (RM & RT) Pages 303 304

Hub Hub OHub RHub u:hub u:hub u:hub u:hub You hit the ball. Hit the ball. You ought to hit the ball. It s all right for you to hit the ball. You believe that you ll hit the ball. Believe that you ll hit the ball. You act (with the intention) to hit the ball. Act (with the intention) to hit the ball. Ou:Hub Ru:Hub You ought to believe (insofar as your evidence goes) that you ll hit the ball It s evident to you that you ll hit the ball. It s all right (reasonable) for you to believe that you ll hit the ball (insofar as your evidence goes). LogiCola N (RM & RT) Pages 303 304

1 Ou:G Valid [ Á ÀRu:ÀG * 2 1 asm: Ru:ÀG 3 2 D Á u:àg {from 2} 4 2 D Á u:g {from 1} 5 2 Du Á ÀG {from 3} B+ 6 3 Du Á G {from 4} B+ 7 Á ÀRu:ÀG {from 2; 5 contradicts 6} Theism is evident for you. Á Atheism is unreasonable for you. 1. Reverse squiggles (quantificational/modal/deontic). 2. Drop weak operators, using new things: Àu: R (Æx) Ç 3. Lastly, drop strong operators, using old things (if you have them): u: O (x) È LogiCola O (R & M) Pages 305 306

[ Á OÀ(u:OÀAu  u:au) Valid * 1 1 asm: ÀOÀ(u:OÀAu  u:au) * 2 2 Á R(u:OÀAu  u:au) {from 1} * 3 2 D Á (u:oàau  u:au) {from 2} 4 2 D Á u:oàau {from 3} 5 2 D Á u:au {from 3} 6 2 Du Á OÀAu {from 4} B+ 7 2 Du Á Au {from 5} B+ 8 3 Du Á ÀAu {from 6} 9 Á OÀ(u:OÀAu  u:au) {from 1; 7 contra 8} You ought not to combine believing that it s wrong for you to do A with acting to do A. 1. Reverse squiggles (quantificational/modal/deontic). 2. Drop weak operators, using new things: Àu: R (Æx) Ç 3. Lastly, drop strong operators, using old things (if you have them): u: O (x) È LogiCola O (R & M) Pages 305 306

Our belief logic is oversimplified in three ways. A more sophisticated belief logic would: add qualifications to the implicit One ought to be consistent axiom and the derived consistency norms, perhaps qualify the conjunctivity principle (because of the lottery paradox), and add a second deontic operator O* (for what one ought to believe insofar as intellectual considerations go) distinct from O (for what we ought to do all-thingsconsidered). Pages 309 11