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Unit 3 Free Will and Determinism

I. Introduction A. What is the problem? Science!

Why? 1. The universe is governed by physical laws 2. People are part of the universe Therefore: People are governed by physical laws 3. Events governed by physical laws are necessary (they must logically happen) 4. Necessity negates choice Therefore: People have no freedom of choice

Three approaches to the problem (a preview) 1. Hard determinism - All events are caused (necessary); caused (necessary) events are never free 2. Soft determinism/compatibilism - All events are caused (necessary); caused events are not necessarily inconsistent with freedom. 3. Libertarianism - Not all events are caused, so even though caused events are not free, the fact that not all events are caused means some events are free.

B. Why does it matter? From a practical perspective - we want to believe we have choice regarding our actions If we do have choice, how does this choice occur? Are people morally responsible for their actions? Is it fair to punish people for actions which they did not choose? If we have no free will, do words like good and evil still have meaning? Without free will, does existence have meaning?

II. Non- philosophical approaches to the question A. Fatalism

II. Non- philosophical approaches to the question A. Fatalism B. Karma

II. Non- philosophical approaches to the question A. Fatalism B. Karma C. Predestination/Divine foreknowledge

Predestination God determines, before the beginning of time, everything that will happen Free will is impossible

Divine Foreknowledge God knows everything that will happen This may or may not threaten free will

Nelson Pike - Foreknowledge means no free will God is everlasting God knew before I was born that I would give this lecture I have no power to do other than what God knows will happen

Boethius, 480-524 God is Eternal (outside of time) God possesses his existence completely and simultaneously Thus God knows what will happen as it happens Thus Divine knowledge does not threaten free will, because it is not foreknowledge

III. Hard Determinism Ancient roots Democritus (460-370 BCE) - Everything is composed of atoms in motion Leucippus (460-?BCE) - Naught happens for nothing but everything from a ground of necessity

III. Hard Determinism Development during the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment Isaac Newton (1642-1727) - Described and defined what at the time were considered to be universal laws of motion

III. Hard Determinism Paul-Henri Thiri - Baron d Holbach (1723-1789)

III. Hard Determinism d Holbach s Argument 1.The universe is made up of only matter and motion (materialism) 2.The behavior of all matter and motion are determined by the laws of nature 3.Man is a part of nature

In what ever Manner man is considered, he is connected to universal nature, and submitted to the necessary and immutable laws that she imposes on all the beings she contains...

III. Hard Determinism d Holbach s Argument 1.The universe is made up of only matter and motion (materialism) 2.The behavior of all matter and motion are determined by the laws of nature (Pink 1) 3.Man is a part of nature (Pink 1) Therefore: Man and his actions are determined by the laws of nature

Man s life is a line that nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the Earth, without him ever being able to swerve from it, even for an instant... (1)

All human actions are beyond their choice His ideas come to him involuntarily (1) He is good, or bad, happy or miserable, wise or foolish, reasonable or irrational without his will being for anything in these various states. (1)

What we consider to be our will is determined by outside factors D Holbach uses the example of the thirsty man and the poisoned fountain (3) Nevertheless, in either case, whether he partakes of the water, or whether he does not, the two actions will be equally necessary; they will be the effect of that motive which finds itself most puissant (powerful, influential); which consequently acts in the most coercive manner on his will. (3 end)

D Holbach s Rejection of his Critics centers on one fundamental observation It is, then... for want of being able to analyze, for not being competent to decompose the complicated motion of his machine, that man believes himself a free agent; it is only upon his own ignorance the he founds the profound yet deceitful notion he has of his free agency... (17)

D Holbach and modern hard determinists In paragraph 8, d Holbach argues that the statement he (man) appears to be the master of choosing (in this case whether or not to move his arm); from which it is concluded that evidence has been offered of free agency. (8) With a partner, explain d Holbach s objection to this statement and then connect this objection to ideas (a quote) from the first part of Kane. be prepared to discuss

D Holbach s response... he is not the master of the thought presented to his mind, which determines his will; this thought is excited by some cause independent of himself. (10)

Kane s two types of freedom 1. Surface freedom - the freedom to choose what we want - Kane, like d Holbach, denies that this is true freedom:...suppose we had the maximal freedom to make such choices to satisfy our desires and yet the choices we actually made were manipulated by others, by the powers-that-be. In such a world we would have a great deal of everyday freedom to do whatever we wanted, yet our free will would be severely limited. We would be free to act and choose as we will, but would not have the ultimate say about what it is that we will. (Kane page 2, column 1, bottom)

Kane s two types of freedom 2. True freedom would be to have control over what it is we will, not simply the ability to choose to satisfy what we want

B.F Skinner on Free Will Re- read the section in which Kane describes Walden Two (Bottom page two through 1.5 columns of page 3), then be prepared to answer the following: 1. According to Skinner, what level of freedom is possible and why? 2. Is Walden Two a good society? Why or why not? 3. How does Walden Two related to our own modern society? Is Modern America a good society based on the standards you used to answer 2 above? Be prepared to explain and provide examples

B.F. Skinner All human action is the result of behavioral conditioning Surface freedom - the ability to satisfy one s desires - is the only freedom we can hope for because to have anything more: we would have to be the original creators of our own wills - causes of ourselves. (Kane p. 3 bottom column 1) Ultimate freedom (for Skinner) is the freedom to only want what one can have, thus behavioral conditioning can facilitate more freedom rather than less, since one can be conditioned to have only those desires that can be satisfied.

Sigmund Freud s argument against free will 1. Free decisions are those that are consciously made 2. None of a person s decisions are consciously made but rather the product of subconscious conflicts of which we are only dimly (if at all) aware. Therefore: None of our decisions are free

John Hospers on the implications of Freud s argument We may... say that a man is free only to the extent that his behavior is not unconsciously motivated at all. If this be our criterion, most of our behavior could not be called free: everything, including both impulses and volitions, having to do with our basic attitudes toward life, the general tenor of our tastes, whether we become philosophers, artists or business men... has its inevitable basis in the subconscious. (Hospers in Palmer)

Strengths of the hard determinist position Hard determinism accords with the materialistic/ scientific tendencies of modern philosophy - behavior and its causes can be investigated empirically Much of science is based on the idea that all phenomena are determined. Things don t just happen. Why should we be any different?

Weaknesses of the hard determinist position It rejects common sense (not much of a weakness) It rejects the possibility of the existence of the non-physical in the universe (no God, no soul, no mind etc. - again, this might not be much of a philosophical weakness It rejects the idea of moral responsibility In the twentieth century through advances in physics we now understand that not all events are determined - the behavior of very small particles has been shown not to be deterministic - this is quantum theory It rejects our experience of life in favor of a methodological analysis of life

IV. Compatibilism/Soft determinism Theory that maintains: 1. Determinism is true 2. Free will is still possible (hence the name)

A. Classical/Traditional compatibilism Developed and refined by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume Hume s argument - actions are free if: 1. They are caused by the will of the agent 2. They are not forced Hume claims that freedom is possessed by everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains.

Walter T. Stace 1886-1967 A native of Britain, he worked as a British civil servant and later as professor of philosophy at Princeton Stace s compatibilism:

The problem of free will can be reduced to a problem with the definition of freedom The problem is not a real one... The dispute is merely verbal, and is due to nothing but a confusion about the meaning of words (3 bottom) This error stems from the erroneous belief that determinism (the idea that all events are caused) is inconsistent with free will and that free will is defined as indeterminism (5) The mistake here is similar to defining man as a five legged animal. With such a definition, man would not exist.

Freedom must be defined such that the definition has meaning in the real world Common usage is the criterion for deciding whether a definition is correct or not (6) Stace s examples in 7-8 help to illustrate the importance of definitions based on common usage and the absurdity of metaphysical definitions of freedom What distinguishes the free acts from those that are not free is that the free acts were chosen, therefore being uncaused or being undetermined by causes must be an incorrect definition of free will (12 bottom)

This brings Stace back to Hume s definition Acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent. Acts not freely done are those whose immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent (13 bottom). Thus an act is free when it is chosen (resulting from an internal state) and not forced (by external factors).

Stace rejects the idea that determinism destroys the concept of responsibility (this was one of the weaknesses of Hard determinism) Punishment is a part of the the chain of cause and effect relationships The punishment of a man for doing a wrong act is justified, either on the ground that it will correct his own character, or that it will deter other people from doing similar acts (22). Thus punishment is the cause of a desired effect In this sense, moral responsibility is not only consistent with determinism, but requires it. The assumption on which punishment is based is that human behavior is causally determined (24).

Strengths and problems of classical compatibilism It accords with common sense, or as Stace would have it, common usage (weak?) Its principles are consistent with the logic underlying our legal system Stregnths It doesn t require magic Problems Traditional compatibilism only deals with surface freedom Soft determinism fails to answer the following question affirmatively: Given any situation is it possible that I could have chosen to act differently than I did? It does not address the question of compulsion.

B. Deep Self Compatibilism Harry Frankfurt. 1929 Taught at Yale and Princeton Wrote the book On Bullshit in 2005

Frankfurt s Compatibilism People not only have desires, but desires about their desires Frankfurt calls these second order desires This idea of second order desires allows us to evaluate what our true or authentic desires actually are Inauthentic desires are desires that we do not actually identify with or endorse (with our second order desires).

T1 T1.1

T2 - The higher order thought - I want my desire to prepare the philosophy lecture to win

Frankfurt argues that, for an act to be free (and for a person to be responsible for it) a person must identify with and endorse the motives behind an action. Free actions are those that accord with our second order desires. Thus actions which result from psychological compulsion are not free, because they do not reflect our true (second order) desires.

Strengths and problems of deep self compatibilism Strengths Problems Frankfurt is closer to deeper freedom - free will. Deep self compatibilism takes into account internal constraints on behavior not just external ones. Frankfurt demonstrates that actions can be forced and free at the same time Are people who fail to follow their second order desires of the hook in terms of responsibility? A hard determinist would likely say that our second order desires (just like our first order desires) are shaped by forces over which we have not control. In this case aren t we back at hard determinism?

IV. Libertarianism People who use indeterminism to justify free will adopt a perspective known as libertarianism. This is the view that traditional determinism is false and that freedom exists.

Indeterminism is the position that not all events are caused. This leads to several possibilities: 1. All events are random 2. Some events are random and some are caused 3. Some events are uncaused and some are caused 4. Some caused events are not necessary events (adapted from Palmer s section on indeterminism)

Two varieties of libertarian thought A. Roderick Chisholm Chisholm claims the metaphysical problem of free will, which is the conflict that arises from the idea that Human Beings are responsible agents and that human actions are determined, can solved only by looking at human beings as very special cases: if we are responsible... then we have a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain things to happen, and nothing - and no one - causes us to cause those events to happen (Chisholm 1).

No set of statements about a man s desires beliefs, and stimulus situation at any time implies any statement telling us what the man will try, set out or undertake to do at that time... This means... there can be no science of man (Chisholm 12).

This concept is called agent causation. The problem is, how can agents cause effects without their actions themselves being caused and thus determined.

B. Robert Kane b. 1938 Professor of philosophy at the university of Texas at Austin Specializes in questions of free will and moral responsibility

Kane argues defenders of agent causation typically make one of two errors: When trying to explain free will, these... libertarian defenders tend to fall either into confusion or emptiness - the confusion of identifying free will with indeterminism or the emptiness of mysterious accounts of agency such as that suggested by Chisholm (Kane - paragraph just above the beginning of pt. 2) Why is identifying free will with indeterminism a problem? Kane s effort then, is to provide an explanation for agent causation that is neither mysterious or confused.

Kane s Argument for Free will Basic assumption (and one that is soundly supported in the sciences) Quantum uncertainty exists at the atomic level. We know that the behavior of certain sub atomic particles is not deterministic but probabilistic. In short this means that some sub atomic events occur without a cause or indeterministicly.

Pool Table Physics In Newtonian mechanics the universe is deterministic. If we know the variables of the event (force, friction, direction of impact), we can predict with certainty the location and trajectory of the ball at all possible times (T1, T2 etc) T1 T2 T3 T4 T5

Pool Table Physics But Quantum Physics has demonstrated that at a micro level (think atomic level and below) that such certainty is not possible, even if all the variables are known. If our pool ball was an electron, even if all the variables were known, we could not predict with 100% accuracy whether the ball would be at point A or point B at T6. A T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 B T6 As Palmer points out, this uncertainty is not due problems with our ability to know, but rather with the nature of the subatomic world. This means that there are some events that occur that are either uncaused or that did not happen of necessity.

Kane s Argument for Free Will 1. Many of our actions (in ordinary circumstances) are determined by our character (we have no choice). (Kane pt. 2 B top) 2.But our character is formed by previous decisions we have made - some of these decisions were undetermined. These decisions are called self forming actions, or SFAs. Not all choices or acts done of our own free wills have to be undetermined, but only those choices or acts in our lifetimes by which we made ourselves into the kinds of persons we are. Let us call these self forming actions or SFAs (Kane pt.2b paragraph 1). 3.A self forming action occurs when we are torn between competing visions of what we should do or become (Kane pt.2b paragraph 2). Kane use the example of the business woman in pt. 2B paragraph 3

Kane s Argument for Free Will 4.At these moments, regions of our brains are moved out of their thermodynamic equilibrium... a kind of stirring up of chaos in the brain (Kane pt. 2B paragraph 2) 5.This chaos creates a window in which the deterministic factors are muted allowing for indeterminate factors to be causal Recall the basic assumption: Quantum uncertainty exists at the atomic level. We know that the behavior of certain sub atomic particles is not deterministic but probabilistic. In short this means that some sub atomic events occur without a cause or indeterministicly. 6.Ordinarily, these indeterministic forces are so small as to be of no consequence, but in moments of great stress, the balance of a decision can be tipped by the smallest of factors.

Think of this analogy. In a typical election the behavior of one voter does not determine the outcome of the election - their voice (or signal) is simply to small and is overwhelmed. But in an election where the electorate is sharply divided - one vote could make a difference. In ordinary times, the indeterminism in our brains is like the one voter in a normal election - overwhelmed. In times of great stress where the individual is torn between two possible courses of action- indeterministic forces (like the single voter) can actually control the outcome.

But isn t a window of indeterminism simply a window of randomness? Kane says no. 7. Each competing desire represents a neural network inside the brain. Each network has an activation threshold, that, if reached, would result in either that act of helping or the act of going to the meeting (pt 2 C, column 2 top). 8. These two networks are connected so that the indeterminacies causing the chaos at stage 4 above are caused by the competing network. (pt 2 C, column 2 top paragraph 2) 9. Thus the indeterminacy is caused by a tension creating conflict in the will. (pt 2 C, column 2 middle) 10. Thus whichever network wins (reaches the activation threshold) will win because it has overcome the indeterministic noise generated by the other network. (pt 2 C, column 2 middle) 11. Overcoming in this case represents an act of will, a choice, the result is not random. (pt 2 C, column 2 bottom) 12. So, according to Kane, there are two aspects of our free will: the choices we will at times of stress (SFAs) and the way these choices shape later decisions that are the product of our character - choices that are determined by prior events in our lives (SFAs) in which we were free to will a decision.

Strengths and problems of Kane s theory Strengths Problems His explanation is grounded in modern scientific understandings of both physics and the brain It makes an effort to explain where free will arises and doesn t rely (so much) on magic It deals with deeper free will rather than surface freedom It offers a clearer (more satisfying) definition of freedom than compatiblism. Freedom requires both real alternative possibilities and that we be ultimately responsible for causing those outcomes Kane s assertion that during SFAs deterministic forces are muted is speculative rather than empirical At its heart, critics argue that Kane s theory still equates freedom with indeterminism and thus freedom with randomness, which Kane himself sees as a problem

A video of Robert Kane explaining his own theory can be found here: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/ philosophers/kane/ I will put a link to this on the website. The page it is associated with, the Information Philosopher is a very interesting site as well.