Hume: Of the Original Contract David Hume (1711-1776) Scottish philosopher; possibly the most important philosopher to write in English. p p p g Like Locke, an empiricist, but of a much more radical (or consistent) sort. Cf. Humean skepticism (e.g., about the existence of God; the self; causation) Portrait by Allan Ramsay (1766) Instrumentalism: An action is just if it serves an agents goals or desires. Reason can show us how to realize those goals and desires, but it cannot tell us which goals and desires are choiceworthy 1
Hume: Philosophical Background Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. (Treatise of Human Nature, II, iii, 1740) Reason has no fundamental role in morally judging behaviour; so, pace Locke, immoral actions are not immoral in virtue of being against reason. In fact, says Hume, morality is ultimately founded on sentiment our desires and preferences for ourselves and others with whom we happen to sympathize. Of the Original Contract (1748) Parties (i.e., factions) and perhaps, by extension, social institutions and social movements generally need a justificatory story, a philosophical or speculative system of principles (40) Parliamentary factions in Hume s day: Tories: The authority of government derives ultimately from the Deity; so it would be sacrilege to disobey even a tyrannical government Whigs: The authority of government derives ultimately from the consent of the people; the people retain the power to remove a government that aggrieves them 2
Hume: Both of these principles are just (though not for the reasons their proponents offer) Moreover, both principles can lead to prudent (i.e., desirable for practical purposes) consequences, but not if taken to the speculative extremes that their proponents urge Against the Divine Right View That the Deity is the ultimate author of all government, will never be denied by any, who admit of a general providence (40) Everywhere, in practically all cultures, we find governments. But in no case does the Deity create authority by any particular or miraculous interposition. Moreover: The same Divine Superintendent who for wise purposes The same Divine Superintendent who, for wise purposes, invested a Titus or a Trajan with authority, did also, for purposes no doubt equally wise, though unknown, bestow power on a Borgia or an Angria. (40) 3
So no particular sovereign can claim to be acting as the Deity s viceregent, except in the very general sense that God holds all things together" (Col. 1.17) Which is to say, appeals to divine right don t actually explain or justify the power of the state any power, whether or good or evil, can appeal to the same principle Against the Contractarian View Since all human beings are more or less equal in strength, intelligence, etc. (?), nothing but their consent could, at first, bring them together, and subject them to any authority (40) In that respect, authority must indeed have arisen originally out of agreement A Just-So Story: Once upon a time, the local chieftain may have ruled more by persuasion than command, appealing to people s utility in each case. Gradually, this exercise of authority became habitual. But civil government, properly so called, arises only once authority has become fully habitual and rulers can use force to bring people into line. 4
The Empiricist s Revenge But while civil government may have originated from consent, this does not show that political authority continues to be founded on consent in the present. If we look abroad into the world, we find nothing that corresponds to the idea of consent. Instead, we mainly find claims to authority based on: Conquest Succession Accepted, inculcated habits of obedience Force and violence Were you to preach, in most parts of the world, that Were you to preach, in most parts of the world, that political connexions are founded altogether on voluntary consent or mutual promise, the magistrate would soon imprison you as seditious for loosening the ties of obedience; if your friends did not first shut you up as delirious for advancing such absurdities. (42) 5
Even in democracies, we cannot speak of real consent to government. In ancient Athens, e.g., establishment was not first made, nor any law ever voted, by a tenth part of those who were bound to pay obedience to it. In fact, says Hume, virtually all governments are ultimately founded d and maintained i by force. So, in short, the contract model does seem to fare very well as an explanation of political authority and obedience. (We ve seen this before.) Does it fare any better as a normative justification? Hume: We can t argue that we continue to be bound by an original contract. Why assume the consent of the fathers to bind the children? So, perhaps, as the Laws of Athens (and Locke) suggest, perhaps we are bound by our tacit consent? 6
Tacit Consent I Implied consent only makes sense where a man imagines that the matter depends upon his choice. (44, emphasis added). Are poor people, ignorant people, oppressed people, free to choose between emigration and not voting with their feet? We may as well assert that a man, by remaining on a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish the moment he leaves her. (44) Tacit Consent II While a foreigner may offer a kind of tacit (or possibly explicit) consent when he leaves his country to settle in another, this doesn t necessarily extinguish the claim of his native prince. His native prince would still be justified in seizing him in time of war (i.e., the subject s obedience isn t extinguished just because he moved away) In general, people give their tacit consent to whoever successfully asserts authority over them, but they never imagine i that t their consent made him sovereign. (45) There are also more philosophical reasons to doubt the contractarian argument 7
But First, To Review 1. Divine Right: Appeals to divine right neither explain nor justify very much: Given that the Deity does not pick out political authorities by any particular or miraculous interposition, the most that DR can say is that the Deity holds all things together good, liberty-promoting authorities and bad, tyrannical authorities alike. 2. Consent (I): Sometimes, e.g., at the very beginning of civil society when chieftains ruled more by persuasion than command a kind of consent brings people together. But persuasion is not command: Real political authority involves obedience; real political communities are compulsory, not voluntary, organizations 3. Consent (II): And, as a matter of fact (i.e., of history), most political communities are founded not on consent but on habit and/or coercion. 4. Consent (III): Moreover, it s not clear that consent could, in practice, actually justify very much. Genuine consent depends on (real) choice, but, in fact, for most people, most of the time, are not in a position to make real choices about what sort of government they will have. And, in any case 8
A More Philosophical Refutation There are, Hume says, two kinds of moral duties: 1) Those that arise from natural instinct or immediate propensity e.g., caring for children 2) Those that arise from a sense of obligation, in which our instincts are checked and restrained by subsequent judgment and observation Political allegiance and promise keeping are both duties of the second kind, so the idea of promise keeping adds nothing to an account of allegiance instead, we recognize, on the basis of experience, that society cannot function without authority, and we recognize that authority requires at least some degree of general obedience. The contract story, by contrast, holds that we offer allegiance because we promised to do so. But why keep our promises? Hume: Because experience and judgment teach us that society cannot function without promise-keeping 9
Similarly, we may ask to whom is allegiance due? Who is our lawful sovereign? We could come up with all sorts of answers (this leader because of his ancestry; that leader because he successfully connived his way to the top) Any of these could potentially be a good reason, says Hume, since our allegiance is ultimately based on the value of the sovereign successfully maintaining order and looking after our interests (i.e., not on our consent) The general obligation which binds The general obligation which binds us to government, is the interest and necessities of society; and this obligation is very strong. (48) 10
Humean Conservatism A well-functioning system of government is a contingent historical achievement. If we happen to have good, liberty-promoting government, then that s the outcome of rulers and ruled having gradually learned through experience that that sort of government works. Consent/contract theories let us to pretend that we could will good government into existence. But we cannot and should not really believe that. 11